{
	"id": "45ffc289-db73-4963-a4a4-07a775b740dd",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T00:07:16.041172Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T03:21:46.310177Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "5ab77e0b6daf89519db569871fe68c2eba45e096",
	"title": "Anubis Networks is back with new C2 server",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
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	"plain_text": "Anubis Networks is back with new C2 server\r\nBy Pierluigi Paganini\r\nPublished: 2022-07-11 · Archived: 2026-04-05 23:03:22 UTC\r\nA large-scale phishing campaign leveraging the Anubis Network is targeting Brazil\r\nand Portugal since March 2022.\r\nA large-scale phishing campaign is targeting Internet-end users in Brazil and Portugal since March 2022. Anubis\r\nNetwork is a C2 portal developed to control fake portals and aims to steal credentials to fully access the real\r\nsystems.\r\nThis C2 server is controlled by a group of operators that come from the previous analysis in 2022, the various\r\nbrands being divided among the operators of the group (in a call center modus operandi).\r\nThis campaign is highlighted by Segurança Informática in 2020, and the high-level diagram of this new\r\ncampaign can be observed below.\r\nFigure 1: High-level diagram of the ANUBIS phishing network and its components (2020).\r\nhttps://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133115/hacking/anubis-networks-new-c2.html\r\nPage 1 of 7\n\nIn detail, this fresh campaign is composed of three crucial operating components:\r\nthe delivery vehicle to propagate the landing page in the wild; usually carried out through smishing\r\n(SMS) and phishing (email)\r\na malicious landing page hosted on a cloud server, composed of a user interface and layout very\r\nsimilar to the real system\r\nan operation back-end that allows criminals to manage the details of users who have fallen into the\r\ntrap.\r\nFigure 2 presents an example of an SMS sent to Internet end-users during the ANUBIS social engineering wave.\r\nThe image is related to an ongoing campaign in Portugal impersonating a specific organization to steal banking\r\ncredentials.\r\nFigure 2: Example of SMS sent during the social engineering wave.\r\nSMSs are sent based on a list created by the C2 owner, namely: 1kk-rusha-01.txt.\r\nFake domains hosted automatically on Cloudflare CDN\r\nThe ANUBIS network phishing campaigns are masked through the Cloudflare CDN. Operators can easily make\r\nthis configuration through an interface that uses the CloudFlare API for configuring new DNS zones.\r\nFigure 3: Feature of adding new domains and configuring them behind the Cloudflare CDN via the ANUBIS back\r\noffice portal.\r\nThe Phishing template\r\nOne of the last campaigns disseminated by criminals is impersonating a popular service in Portugal with the goal\r\nof stealing credentials of home banking portals.\r\nAfter clicking on the link distributed via smishing, the victims are redirected to a specific landing page that\r\ncollects the mobile phone number and the associated code (PIN). As observed, criminals are using the Let’s\r\nEncrypt CA to create valid HTTPs certificates.\r\nFigure 4: Phishing template of ANUBIS Network campaign.\r\nAfter clicking on “CONTINUAR“, a new page is presented. Additional data from the victim are requested by the\r\nserver-side and added to session cookies.\r\nFigure 5: Additional details about the victims are stored on the session cookies.\r\nhttps://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133115/hacking/anubis-networks-new-c2.html\r\nPage 2 of 7\n\nAs observed, 12 target banks operating in Portugal are listed in this specific campaign.\r\nFigure 6: Target banks present on the Anubis Network campaign in Portugal.\r\nIn the next step, credentials to access the target portals are requested.\r\nFigure 7: Credentials to access the real systems are requested.\r\nAdditional details related to credit cards are also requested by criminals. A specific loading page is then presented,\r\nand ANUBIS operators can request other details via the C2 portal in a call center modus operandi.\r\nFigure 8: Additional information requested by criminals.\r\nAnubis Network C2 Panel\r\nBy analyzing the landing page source code, the URL of the C2 server can be obtained.\r\nFigure 9: Endpoint of the Anubis Network C2 server present on the source code.\r\nAs observed, the C2 login page is linked to a legitimate system in order to confuse threat analysts.\r\nFigure 10: Login page of Anubis Network C2 server.\r\nThe features observed inside the C2 server are very similar to the analysis performed in 2020. Operators can\r\ncontrol all the infection flow by requesting additional details and accessing the real system in the background.\r\nFigure 10: Internal pages where Anubis Network operators can control all the malicious flow.\r\nIn detail, global administrators are capable of adding users to specific target organizations as observed below.\r\nFigure 11: Anubis Network operators and permissions page with the target organizations.\r\nAccording to the MySQL database that supports the system, there are 77 operators in the system – which\r\nrepresents the business and operational volume of this malicious scheme.\r\nhttps://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133115/hacking/anubis-networks-new-c2.html\r\nPage 3 of 7\n\nadmin@anubisnetwork.com\r\namigoquatro@anubisnetwork.com\r\namigorusha@anubisnetwork.com.br\r\namigowscincor@anubisnetwork.com\r\namigowsdois@anubisnetwork.com.br\r\namigowsum@anubisnetwork.com.br\r\nanubis@anubisnetwork.com\r\naprendiz@anubisnetwork.net\r\nazzouzmarzuk@anubisnetwork.net\r\nbanzeiro@anubisnetwork.net\r\nbatman@anubisnetwork.com\r\nbicudo@anubisnetwork.com\r\nbigj@anubisnetwork.net\r\nBk_Delas@anubisnetwork.com\r\nbuchuda@anubisnetwork.net\r\nceiffador@networkanubis.online\r\ndimitri@anubisnetwork.com\r\ndk@anubisnetwork.com\r\nel@anubisnetwork.com\r\nelpablito@anubisnetwork.net\r\nestranho@anubisnetwork.one\r\nfezon@anubisnetwork.com\r\nfrost@anubisnetwork.com\r\nfugitivo@network.com.br\r\ngringo@anubisnetwork.net\r\nice@anubisnetwork.com\r\njreis@anubisnetwork.com\r\njunim@anubisnetwork.com\r\nkatatal@anubisnetwork.com\r\nkingg@anubisnetwork.com\r\nklebinho@anubisnetwork.com\r\nknabzdg@anubisnetwork.com\r\nlbooy@anubisnetwork.com\r\nleffzera@anubisnetwork.com.br\r\nlobinho@anubisnetwork.net\r\nlordk@anubisnetwork.com\r\nmagao@anubisnetwork.com\r\nmalware@anubisnetwork.com\r\nmandrake@anubisnetwork.com\r\nmaxter@anubisnetwork.one\r\nmirror@anubisnetwork.com\r\nmk@anubisnetwork.com\r\nhttps://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133115/hacking/anubis-networks-new-c2.html\r\nPage 4 of 7\n\nnetota@anubisnetwork.com\r\nnivel3@anubisnetwork.com\r\noperador@anubisnetwork.com\r\npapoko@networkanubis.online\r\nplasma@anubisnetwork.com\r\npoke@anubisnetwork.com\r\npppp@anubisnetwork.com.br\r\nppppe@anubisnetwork.com\r\nprofessor@anubisnetwork.com.br\r\nr0bust0@anubisnetwork.com\r\nredir@redir.com\r\nreynan@anubisnetwork.com.br\r\nricaria@anubisnetwork.com\r\nrk@anubisnetwork.com\r\nrodrigues@anubisnetwork.net\r\nrushador@anubisnetwork.com\r\nrushadorr@anubisnetwork.com\r\nsavior@anubisnetwork.com.br\r\nshao@anubisnetwork.com.br\r\nskull@anubisnetwork.com\r\nskulll@anubisnetwork.com\r\nstealth@anubisnetwork.com\r\nstealth@anubisnetwork.net\r\nsujo@anubisnetwork.net\r\ntiocris@anubisnetwork.com\r\ntrakino@anubisnetwork.com\r\ntraks@anubisnetwork.com\r\nvelhodick@anubisnetwork.net\r\nwill@anunisnetwork.com\r\nws@anubisnetwork.com.br\r\nwyzgoi@anubisnetwork.net\r\nx0rg@anubisnetwork.com\r\nxinxa@anubisnetwork.com\r\nzeus@anubisnetwork.net\r\nzezinho@anubisnetwork.com\r\nAn interesting feature also implemented in this new version of the C2 portal is the email temp. By using this\r\nfeature, criminals can create new domains and use internal emails to manage all the processes.\r\nFigure 12: Anubis Network email temp feature.\r\nhttps://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133115/hacking/anubis-networks-new-c2.html\r\nPage 5 of 7\n\nThe landing pages presented to the victims and specific data can be configured on the Anubis Network\r\nadministrative portal. The path of the folder and the target brand can be observed on this specific page.\r\nFigure 13: Target organizations of Anubis Network C2 server – Jully 2022.\r\nSince the malicious network is made up of many people, a channel on Telegram was created in order to provide\r\ntechnical support to operators in the performance of their duties.\r\nFigure 14: Telegram channel created as a technical support channel.\r\nThe MySQL database\r\nThe heart of the ANUBIS network is a MySQL database. This database is used for data synchronization between\r\nall components of the malicious ecosystem and maintains everything up-to-date each second.\r\nFigure 15: Database schema of the ANUBIS phishing network.\r\nAdditional details, including final thoughts and Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) are available in the original\r\nanalysis published by the Pedro Tavares\r\nhttps://seguranca-informatica.pt/anubis-networks-is-back-with-new-c2-server/#.Ysv53XZBy5d\r\nAbout the author: Pedro Tavarez\r\nPedro Tavares is a professional in the field of information security working as an Ethical Hacker, Malware Analyst\r\nand also a Security Evangelist. He is also a founding member and Pentester at CSIRT.UBI and founder of the\r\nsecurity computer blog seguranca–informatica.pt.\r\nFollow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook\r\n[adrotate banner=”9″] [adrotate banner=”12″]\r\nPierluigi Paganini\r\n(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Anubis)\r\n[adrotate banner=”5″]\r\n[adrotate banner=”13″]\r\nhttps://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133115/hacking/anubis-networks-new-c2.html\r\nPage 6 of 7\n\nSource: https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133115/hacking/anubis-networks-new-c2.html\r\nhttps://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133115/hacking/anubis-networks-new-c2.html\r\nPage 7 of 7",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"Malpedia"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/133115/hacking/anubis-networks-new-c2.html"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"anubis-networks-new-c2.html"
	],
	"threat_actors": [],
	"ts_created_at": 1775434036,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775791306,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
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