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SUPERNOVA Redux, with a Generous Portion of Masquerading

By Splunk

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The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued an analyst report (AR21-112A) on April 22, 2021 that discussed a recent incident that they supported. As you read the first paragraph, it hits recent hot buttons: Pulse Secure and SolarWinds. Then you start wondering where is this going?

> "The threat actor connected to the entity's network via a Pulse Secure virtual private network (VPN) appliance, moved laterally to its SolarWinds Orion server, installed malware referred to by security researchers as SUPERNOVA (a .NET webshell), and collected credentials." — Analysis Report (AR21-112A)

All of a sudden, we see SUPERNOVA and we breathe a sigh of relief; we've got this, in fact, we blogged about this back in January 2021 in **Detecting Supernova Malware Solarwinds Continued**. But as we read farther, we come to find out that the adversary lovingly decided to take their copy of procdump.exe — a command line tool that is used to create dumps of processes and has been used by various actors to dump credentials — renamed it Splunklogger.exe, and placed it on the compromised SolarWinds server.

to gain access via the VPN.

From there, the adversary used a virtual machine and obfuscated PowerShell scripts to move laterally to the SolarWinds server. At this point, the SUPERNOVA webshell is installed. Due to logs being cleared during the attack, CISA was not able to determine if the adversary exploited CVE-2020-10148, an authentication bypass vulnerability of SolarWinds Orion or another method to gain access.

At this point, the adversary is collecting credentials as well as deploying tools to maintain persistence, evade defenses and other activities. A common tool that certain adversaries use is procdump.exe. Procdump.exe is a Microsoft command line utility that is used to monitor applications and can create crash dumps. Adversaries have been observed using procdump to dump credentials. To obfuscate the existence of procdump.exe on the SolarWinds server, the adversary renamed their copy of procdump.exe to splunklogger.exe. This masquerading technique is fairly common with certain utilities because the existence of that utility on certain systems may trigger alarms for organizations, whereas a tool like Splunk is used in many organizations

Detecting Masquerading As Well as Indicators of the SUPERNOVA Attack in Splunk

Here we will give you some hot-off-the-press searches to help find some of the badness derived from the CISA Analysis Report on this recent SUPERNOVA attack. If we have coverage for these searches in Splunk security content, we call them out further below in the MITRE ATT&CK section.

We covered some thoughts on detecting the SUPERNOVA webshell in our previous post on the subject as well as the associated vulnerabilities, so today we will focus on the activities that took place after the webshell was established, specifically around masquerading and file integrity of the files manipulated.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

CISA published IOCs, including file names, hashes and IPs, in their blog post. So we collected the common hashes for procdump.exe, along with the IOCs that CISA identified and converted these indicators into simple CSV format so that you may use them as lookup tables —

NewProcessName. If we've turned on CommandLine tracking, we'll be provided that information as well.

Comparatively, Sysmon Event Code 1 has a number of other fields including multiple types of hashes, the Company, and even the parent process id to better contextualize the process that was created.

If we compare files being executed based on the name of the original file and the process, we can use Sysmon data with a search like this to get a side by side comparison and use the match function with the eval command to get a comparative.

```
EventCode=1 OriginalFileName=* process_name=*
| eval OriginalFileName=upper(OriginalFileName
| eval match=if(OriginalFileName=process_name,
| search match="No Match"
| table _time host OriginalFileName process_na
```

again use a favored capability of Splunk, that is the lookup!

We mentioned them above, and just to make sure this blog is super long, let's cover them in greater detail. A very effective way of determining whether or not a process executing on one of your production servers is legit is to use lookups sourced with "known good" metadata about processes normally found in your environment. Assuming you have tight control over upgrades that will change legitimate binaries (e.g. a change control process/board), any executing binaries on your production servers that are "unknown" when compared to "known good" can be flagged.

Here's one way of accomplishing that in Splunk. First, we leverage Sysmon's Event Code 1, which provides hash values and a lot of other interesting process metadata, to harvest this data from a known-good "golden image" server in the environment, and we pipe it to a lookup called UFKnownLookup.csv. Note, there's all sorts of interesting metadata in these events, like the company name, the version number of the file, a description, and so forth:

```
index=endpoint process_name=splunk* EventCode=1
| eval knowngood=1
| stats values(process_name) as process_name va
| outputlookup UFKnownGood.csv
```

```
index=endpoint process_name=splunk* EventCode=
| lookup UFKnownGood.csv SHA256 OUTPUT known_g
| eval known_good = case(known_good == 1, "1",
| search known_good=0
| stats values(process_name) as process_name v
```

And **voila**! We can see that a binary called "splunklogger.exe" executed, but it wasn't in our approved lookup list, and oh, by the way, even though it is called "splunklogger.exe" it certainly isn't a real Splunk binary, based on the Company and Description metadata.

In production, generating the lookup itself against raw data is a reasonable thing to do on an occasional basis. But for matching voluminous Sysmon data in Splunk, a tstats search against an accelerated data model from

```
| lookup UFKnownGood.csv SHA256
```

```
| eval known_good = case(known_good == 1, "1",
```

```
| search known_good=0
```

Fee Fi Fo FIM

We also figured file integrity monitoring (FIM) was a super appropriate topic to cover since, ya know, procdump.exe went all splunklogger.exe on us. The goal we're trying to accomplish with FIM is simple: detect unauthorized changes made to files, directories, network devices, OS and more. This can be accomplished by establishing a "baseline" for a file state, and monitoring for changes made to that state. It's a great way to quickly identify file discrepancies, modifications, and additions.

Need a FIM solution now? There are multiple software solutions that are designated for file integrity monitoring like Tripwire and Qualys FIM.

More of an open source kind of person? Not a problem

Threat Intelligence Framework

If you are using Splunk Enterprise Security, the lookups of IOCs that are listed above can be ingested easily into the threat intelligence framework. Perhaps you aren't sure how to do that. No worries, we published some guidance and a how-to on integrating lists of IOC into the Enterprise Security threat intelligence framework.

Enterprise Security Content Updates (ESCU)

For folks using ESCU, our Threat Research team already has a number of detections around masquerading. While they are not all in a single analytic story, they can be found by using the Keyword Search. In fact, if you check out the MITRE ATT&CK table below, you can cut and paste those Splunk Search titles into the Keyword Search (place * between the words in place of spaces) to view them in ESCU. If you have ESCU running today, you already have some great coverage!

MITRE ATT&CK

a CISCO company

Splunk Blogs

ATT&CK Technique	Technique/ Sub-Technique Title	Splunk Searches
T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Suspicious Curl Network Connection
T1036.003	Rename System Utilities	System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations
T1505.003	Web Shell	Detect Exchange Web Shell W3WP Spawning Shell Supernova Webshell
T1078	Valid Accounts	Reconnaissance of Access and Persistence Opportunitie

		via Mimikatz modules
T1047	Windows Management Instrumentation	Script Execution via WMI Process Execution via WMI Remote Process Instantiation via WMI Reconnaissance and Access to Operating System Elements via PowerSploit modules WMI Permanent Event Subscription WMI Temporary

	T1021.002	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	nce of Connectivity via PowerSploit modules Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via PowerSploit modules Reconnaissance and Access to Shared Resources via Mimikatz modules Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag SMB Traffic Spike SMB Traffic	

		System Elements via PowerSploit modules
T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Reconnaissance and Access to Operating System Elements via PowerSploit modules
T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	CertUtil With Decode Argument
T1003.001	LSASS Memory	Detect Mimikatz Using Loaded Images Dump LSASS via comsvcs DLL Create Remote

		Dump LSASS via procdump Creation of lsass Dump with Taskmgr Dump LSASS via procdump Rename
T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Detect SNICat SNI Exfiltration
T1059.001	PowerShell	Malicious PowerShell Process - Connect To Internet With Hidden Window Set Default PowerShell Execution Policy To

		e Malicious PowerShell Process - Execution Policy Bypass
T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Suspicious Curl Network Connection

Here is a list of all the MITRE ATT&CK TTP's that we saw being used in this attack:

```
T1133, T1078, T1059.001, T1140, T1105, T1505.0
```

Conclusion

This blog is a little bit of an outlier. We realize that attacks are continually occurring, but with the masquerading of procdump.exe as splunklogger.exe as well as the use of the SUPERNOVA malware, which was so recent, it felt like a good time to talk about this specific attack. Masquerading and obfuscation are capabilities that