MoonWalk | ThreatLabz

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Technical Analysis

Attack chain

The focus of this blog post is the second half of the attack chain that begins with the in-memory execution of MoonWalk backdoor. Once the MoonWalk backdoor is successfully loaded by DodgeBox, the malware decrypts and reflectively loads two embedded plugins (C2 and Utility). The C2 plugin uses a custom encrypted C2 protocol to communicate with the attacker-controlled Google Drive account.

A figure depicting the attack chain used to deploy MoonWalk with the DodgeBox loader is shown below.



Figure 1: Attack chain used to deploy the DodgeBox loader and MoonWalk backdoor.

MoonWalk analysis

MoonWalk is a malware backdoor written in C that shares many code similarities with DodgeBox, suggesting a common development toolkit. It incorporates many evasion related functions from DodgeBox, including those related to the following:

- DLL hollowing
- Import resolution
- DLL unhooking
- Call stack spoofing

Additionally, MoonWalk utilizes the same DLL blocklist as DodgeBox.

ThreatLabz analysis reveals MoonWalk's modular design, allowing it to load different plugin components as needed. The sample examined by ThreatLabz contains two embedded plugins, a C2 plugin for C2 communication, and a utility plugin that provides functionality related to compression and public-key cryptography. This modular architecture makes MoonWalk highly adaptable, enabling attackers to customize its functionality for different scenarios.

In the section below, we will highlight several notable capabilities of MoonWalk.

Unloading the DodgeBox loader

When MoonWalk first initializes, it resolves its imports using the same algorithms as DodgeBox. Then, depending on the DodgeBox configuration parameter `Config.fShouldUnloadStealthVector`, MoonWalk unloads the DodgeBox DLL from memory and unlinks it from the Process Environment Block (PEB). This reduces MoonWalk’s in-memory footprint, and obfuscates its origins, hindering memory forensic analysis.

Using Windows Fibers

Next, MoonWalk initializes global structures used to manage Windows Fibers. Windows Fibers are a lightweight threading mechanism, available in the Windows operating system since Windows NT SP5. Unlike traditional threads, which are scheduled by the operating system, fibers are cooperatively scheduled by the application itself. This allows developers to tune an application’s performance for a specific workload. However, due to the complexity of utilizing Windows Fibers, and performance improvements of computer hardware, Windows Fibers were not widely adopted, and remains an obscure feature.

However, with the increased focus on cybersecurity in recent years, there has been an uptick in interest in Windows Fibers from the research and red-teaming community. Multiple research papers (1, 2, 3) and open-sourced proof of concepts (POCs) have been published, abusing Windows Fibers to evade AVs/EDR solutions.

APT41 may have been following these developments, as they have incorporated Windows Fibers into the MoonWalk backdoor. At a high level, MoonWalk maintains a global array of fibers. When a function needs to be executed as a fiber, a fiber is created using the `CreateFiber` API. This fiber is then packaged together with the address of the function and its arguments and other metadata, and inserted into the global array. The main fiber

then schedules these fibers for execution. This use of Windows Fibers helps MoonWalk evade AVs and EDRs which do not support the scanning of Windows Fibers, and also makes analysis challenging by breaking up the control flow.

Configuration

MoonWalk decrypts its configuration, which is hard-coded within its `.lrsrc` section. Like DodgeBox, MoonWalk uses MD5 for configuration validation and AES Cipher Feedback (AES-CFB) for decryption.

However, MoonWalk's configuration is more complex, featuring nested structures and arrays. This configuration contains various execution parameters including the following:

- Mutex names
- A fiber configuration
- Heartbeat intervals
- Encryption keys
- C2-related data

In the sample we analyzed, MoonWalk's configuration (referred to as `Config`) included OAuth secrets used to authenticate with the attacker-controlled Google Drive account, and other notable fields as shown below:

`Config.szClientID:`
`XXXXXXXX3108-0pm3bsjc0mto2e1k4kp2u8817lgk3e3v.apps.googleusercontent.com`

`Config.szClientSecret:`
`XXXXXXXXBiuo8VPZUH1dBHkv86mC1xFU_Z3`

`Config.szRefreshToken:` `XXXXXXXXiYDPmH9cCgYIARAAGAkSNwF-L9IrcM7YiuxWrNuyIfKINyNc_pEVytGNNK750ZyyIm32qH6Wh3dGIBTvdPJ2v92xAohHwWw`

`Config.rgbXorKey:`
`a8e6bd132daf0360b1af1f5eea15e42f8c6f1dcd7d34376ae4e83a1a4f5907c0`

`Config.szMutexName:`
`Global\ctXjvsAxpzyqElmk`

`Config.szName:`
`default`

After loading the default configuration, MoonWalk searches for a new configuration file at `C:\ProgramData\[MD5(Config.rgbIDBytes)]`. If found, the malware decrypts and loads this file. A sample of MoonWalk's decrypted configuration is available in the Appendix of this blog for reference.

Unpacking and loading plugins

MoonWalk then extracts embedded plugins from the `.lrsrc` section. In the MoonWalk sample we analyzed, there were two plugins embedded within this section: one plugin for C2, and another plugin which provides utility

functions such as public key cryptography and compression.

Each plugin in the `.lrsrc` section is prefixed with 72 bytes of metadata, which includes AES-CFB secrets, an MD5 checksum, and plugin type information. The plugin type information fields provide information about the features of a plugin. These fields help identify whether a plugin serves as a command handler, C2, or utility. More details about the structure of plugin metadata can be found in the Appendix section.

MoonWalk organizes these plugins by registering them in a global linked list. MoonWalk then goes through this list to load the C2 plugin and its dependencies, such as the utility plugin, using DLL hollowing. This process is similar to what we previously described in Part 1 for DodgeBox. Like DodgeBox, this MoonWalk sample stores a copy of the host DLL in `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Data.Trace`.

Network Communication

After loading the C2 plugin, MoonWalk is prepared to establish communication with the C2 server. MoonWalk utilizes Google Drive for C2 communications. This helps MoonWalk evade detection, as traffic to and from reputable cloud services are less likely to raise suspicion, especially if a target is already using this service. Strangely, MoonWalk uses the string curl/7.54.0 as its User-Agent when making HTTP requests, even though it does not utilize libcurl in its C2 plugin, and uses the WinHTTP family of APIs instead.

At a high level, MoonWalk communicates over Google Drive in the following manner:

Step	Description
1 - Initialization	MoonWalk obtains an access token from the Google Authorization Server, by utilizing the OAuth secrets in its configuration (`Config.szClientID` , `Config.szClientSecret` and `Config.szRefreshToken`). MoonWalk generates 16 random bytes, and hex-encodes them, resulting in a string such as: `f137da1a9019849fbc2aac49a4b6f2c3.` We will reference this string as `SessionID` . MoonWalk uses the Google Drive APIs to retrieve the ID for the `/data` directory. MoonWalk retrieves the ID for the `/data/temp` directory.
2 - Cryptographic Handshake (Client Hello and Server Hello)	MoonWalk searches /data/temp for a file named after the generated `SessionID` (i.e. `f137da1a9019849fbc2aac49a4b6f2c3`). If the file is not found, MoonWalk generates and uploads a file `/data/temp/[SessionID]` to initiate a cryptographic handshake and exchange AES keys with the server. MoonWalk then looks for the `/data/[SessionID]` directory, and its subdirectory `/data/[SessionID]/s1` . The directory titled `s[number]` seems to serve as

Step	Description
	the designated location where MoonWalk will retrieve and download forthcoming C2 instructions. Lastly, MoonWalk searches for the `/data/[SessionID]/s1/1` file. As it becomes available, MoonWalk downloads and processes it, and completes the cryptographic handshake.
3 - Information Gathering	MoonWalk then checks for the existence of the directory `/data/[SessionID]/c1`, and creates it if it does not exist. Then, MoonWalk gathers information such as the computer name, user name, and OS version, and uploads this to the file `/data/[SessionID]/c1/1`.
4 - Heartbeat	MoonWalk then proceeds to send heartbeats regularly to the C2 server by updating a file named “ `temp.txt` ” with the current Unix timestamp as a string. MoonWalk also regularly polls the `/data/[SessionID]/s1` directory for new files. If a new file is found, MoonWalk processes it and uploads its response in the `/data/[SessionID]/c1` directory. During our analysis of MoonWalk, only ping commands were observed, where MoonWalk responded by uploading encoded files to the `/data/[SessionID]/c1` directory, containing the current Unix timestamp.

Table 1: High-level view of the MoonWalk C2 communication protocol using Google Drive.

Cryptographic Handshake (Client Hello)

During the cryptographic handshake phase, MoonWalk exchanges AES keys with the server using a custom protocol. Because of this, it becomes very difficult or impossible to decode encrypted C2 messages without access to these AES keys, which exist only in MoonWalk’s process memory.

The process begins with MoonWalk generating a 32-byte AES key (`rgbClientAESKey`) and a 16-byte initialization vector (IV) (`rgbClientAESIV`) using a custom random number generator. The AES key is then treated as an Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) private key, to generate the corresponding ECDH public key (`rgbECDHPublicKey`) using the `curve25519_donna` function.

MoonWalk then encodes the ECDH public key and AES IV by XORing them with the XOR key from MoonWalk's configuration (`Config.rgbXorKey`). A checksum is created by performing an MD5 hash on the concatenation of `Config.rgbXorKey` , ECDH public key, and AES IV, and then taking the hash’s first four bytes. Finally, MoonWalk uploads this data to Google Drive at the path `/data/temp/[SessionID]` .

The figure below shows content of an uploaded file:



Figure 2: Contents of a MoonWalk Client Hello key exchange message.

The table below provides a description of the various fields contained within the uploaded file:

Offset	Size in bytes	Description
0x00	1	Unknown field, possibly a message type enum.

0x01	32	`rgbECDHPublicKey` XORed with `Config.rgbXorKey`
		rgbECDHPublicKey before the XOR operation is:
		`d2 04 7b 20 60 c4 25 e2 da 01 f8 1d 5b 89 d1 8c`
		`ae bd 07 d3 da bc 82 41 e1 b1 14 2c 57 b5 5a 07`

0x21	16	`rgbClientAESIV` XORed with `Config.rgbXorKey`
		`rgbClientAESIV` before the XOR operation is:
		`c4 e9 27 7c 18 e3 67 c7 49 32 0a a6 f8 be 7a 67`

0x31	4	First four bytes of `MD5 (Config.rgbXorKey | rgbECDHPublicKey | rgbClientAESIV)`
0x35	15	Unknown bytes.

Table 2: Description of MoonWalk Client Hello key exchange message.

Cryptographic Handshake (Server Hello)

MoonWalk then downloads the file located at `/data/[SessionID]/s1/1`. This file contains the server's response to MoonWalk's handshake above.

This file, and all subsequent uploaded or downloaded files, are encoded using a custom scheme. Here, we walk through the decoding process of this scheme, using the Server Hello file as an example.

The figure below is an example of the overall layout of the encoded Server Hello file:



Figure 3: MoonWalk Server Hello message format.

A description of these fields is shown in the following table.

Offset	Size in bytes	Description
0x00	8	`rgbFileXorKey` The XOR key used to decode `rgbEncodedBytes`.
0x08	8	Unknown, potentially a message type field.

0x10	2	`dwNumEncodedBytes`
		
		The number of encoded bytes that follows. This field is encoded with `rgbFileXorKey`. Decoding this field shows that there are 0xbc encoded bytes within this file.
		
		`85 20 XOR 85 9c = 00 bc`

0x12	dwNumEncodedBytes	`rgbEncodedBytes` The encoded bytes within this file. These bytes appear to contain message metadata, such as Google Drive file IDs, message headers, or junk bytes.

Offset	Size in bytes	Description

		To decode these bytes, `rgbFileXorKey` is used, starting with the third byte of the XOR key.
		
		`18 25 ea a3 39 b4 e8 45 7f 01 99 ba 07 d6`
		
		`XOR`
		
		`29 44 ae cd 5f fb 85 20 29 44 ae cd 5f fb`
		
		`=`
		
		`31 61 44 6e 66 4f 6d 65 56 45 37 77 58 2d`

0x??	variable	`rgbEncryptedBytes` The rest of the file is not encoded, because this section is typically encrypted with AES-CFB, using the AES keys exchanged during the cryptographic handshake phase.

Table 3: Description of the MoonWalk Server Hello message format.

The figure below shows the Server Hello file after decoding:

```
          0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F
00000000  85 20 29 44 ae cd 5f fb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.. )D..._.......|
00000010  00 bc 31 61 44 6e 66 4f 6d 65 56 45 37 77 58 2d  |..1aDnfOmeVE7wX-|
00000020  42 63 77 7a 2d 6e 70 68 47 34 47 58 79 2d 69 64  |Bcwz-nphG4GXy-id|
00000030  57 68 69 00 7e ab 88 27 ff 95 aa cf 53 d2 67 eb  |Whi.~..'....S.g.|
00000040  eb 91 1e 33 c3 56 a6 4d 66 17 b8 23 a7 b0 d4 54  |...3.V.Mf..#...T|
00000050  cf 2e 9f 00 61 36 b0 61 f5 ca 62 1b ba f0 d4 ab  |....a6.a..b.....|
00000060  87 0f 82 15 b8 1d 5f 31 ac 21 25 a5 2f 77 fa b4  |......_1.!%./w..|
00000070  d2 c9 86 20 60 9f 32 bc 92 c4 a3 19 4f 17 5d 6f  |... `.2.....O.]o|
00000080  77 c3 66 37 8c a0 16 9f 8c e6 7c 51 bb 1e 9d 1f  |w.f7......|Q....|
00000090  05 00 9c b1 67 5a 0a ef ff 60 3e 61 24 d1 a0 9d  |....gZ...`>a$...|
000000a0  c9 32 02 29 b7 8c f8 d3 67 7a a2 69 af a1 2d c8  |.2.)....gz.i..-.|
000000b0  af eb 88 eb 2a d1 db 5d 3e 60 53 7b 83 5e 03 18  |....*..]>`S{.^..|
000000c0  91 fc e7 6f 3b 74 ee 54 f9 b2 c3 a6 3a b6 df 64  |...o;t.T....:..d|
000000d0  d9 00 29 b9 97 ba 84 7d 01 e6 cd c2 d1 d0 8e e5  |..)....}........|
000000e0  5a 48 2b 75 1e 31 2f d3 12 38 bd 30 3a fa ad 9b  |ZH+u.1/..8.0:...|
000000f0  6f 1e 08 27 98 17 5e 67 fb c1 33 44 d1 82 05 f5  |o..'..^g..3D....|
00000100  65 bc 83 3b a5 6f ab 58 3b b7 49 7b ed cf 0a     |e..;.o.X;.I{...|
```

Figure 4: Example contents of a decoded MoonWalk Server Hello message.

The decoded Server Hello fields are described in the table below.

Offset	**Size in bytes**	**Description**
0x00	8	`rgbFileXorKey` The XOR key, used to decode `rgbEncodedBytes`.
0x08	8	Unknown
0x10	2	`dwNumEncodedBytes`
0x12	variable	`szHeartBeatFileID` The Google Drive ID of the heartbeat file, `temp.txt`.
0x34	variable	Unknown

0xce	48	Encoded buffer, XOR encoded with `Config.rgbXorKey`.
		
		After decoding, the following fields are revealed:
		
		`rgbServerECDHBasePoint` - Used as the ECDH base point, which MoonWalk later uses to generate the shared AES key used by the server.
		
		`77 82 64 13 04 16 94 da 35 d2 1e b8 27 d7 35 ff`
		
		`02 8a 47 85 56 41 29 5b cb 3b 28 22 f2 69 3d 3a`
		
		The remaining bytes after decoding contain a checksum, and additional unknown bytes.

Offset	Size in bytes	Description
0xfe	4	Checksum generated by `MD5 (rgbServerECDHBasePoint | Config.rgbXorKey.)`
0x102	variable	Unknown

Table 4: Description of fields within a MoonWalk Server Hello message.

With this information, MoonWalk generates a public key (`rgbECDHServerPublicKey`) using the `curve25519_donna` function. Then, `rgbECDHServerPublicKey` is XORed against `Config.rgbXorKey` to generate the server AES key.

```
Curve25519_Donna(
   a1->rgbECDHServerPublicKey,
   // Public Key (out):
   // 000001e6`246391ec  b5 8f a7 ee 0b da d6 79-79 60 85 79 bf 32 ad 91
   // 000001e6`246391fc  24 a3 39 66 4c 4b 49 97-6c 71 92 d3 55 45 4b 3e
   a1->rgbClientAESKey,
   // Private Key:
   // 000001e6`2463920c  54 be fd a7 f4 0f 62 15-fb 22 9a 48 04 e3 6e 90
   // 000001e6`2463921c  85 4b b9 c7 f2 5f de 57-65 59 9c 90 18 04 d9 d1
   a1->rgbECDHServerBasepoint);
   // Basepoint:
   // 000001e6`24639251  77 82 64 13 04 16 94 da-35 d2 1e b8 27 d7 35 ff
   // 000001e6`24639261  02 8a 47 85 56 41 29 5b-cb 3b 28 22 f2 69 3d 3a

rgbServerAESKey = rgbECDHServerPublicKey ^ Config.rgbXorKey
// 1d 69 1a fd 26 75 d5 19-c8 cf 9a 27 55 27 49 be
// a8 cc 24 ab 31 7f 7e fd-88 99 a8 c9 1a 1c 4c fe
```

In this manner, MoonWalk exchanges AES keys with its C2, and thus concludes the cryptographic handshake.

Information gathering

During this phase, MoonWalk collects information about the environment and uploads it to Google Drive. The gathered data includes details such as the processor architecture, Windows product type, version and build numbers, computer and usernames, as well as IP addresses. This information is then compressed using LZ4. A checksum is then added, using the 32-bit MurmurHash2 algorithm, with a customized mixing constant where `r` is set to `15` , and with the initial seed set to `0x12345678` . These bytes are then encrypted using AES-CFB with

the server's AES key, and packaged using the custom scheme detailed above, before being uploaded to Google Drive.

More details of the environment information collected are provided in the Appendix of this blog.

Heartbeat

MoonWalk also regularly sends heartbeats to the server. It uploads the current Unix timestamp in plain text to a `temp.txt` file on Google Drive, using the file ID `szHeartBeatFileID` retrieved as part of the cryptographic handshake.

Backdoor capabilities

In our analysis of MoonWalk, we did not observe the C2 sending any other commands or plugins. If a command handler plugin (`dwPluginTypePart2 == 1` described in the Appendix) is not found, MoonWalk defaults to a built-in list of handlers. These handlers contain functionality, which include the following:

- Collect environment information (similar to the information gathering step above)
- Steal token (token impersonation)
- Create token (log on to the Windows machine using given credentials)
- Download new configuration
- Execute command line commands

Note: This list is not complete as further analysis is required.

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