

Contagious Interview, DeceptiveDevelopment, Gwisin Gang, Tenacious Pungsan, DEV#POPPER, PurpleBravo, TAG-121, Group G1052

Archived: 2026-04-05 14:00:59 UTC

Enterprise [T1583 Acquire Infrastructure](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has used services such as Astrill VPN. [\[9\]\[4\]](#)

[.001 Domains](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has registered domains to leverage in their social engineering campaigns. [\[4\]\[5\]\[8\]](#) [Contagious Interview](#) has also registered domains to utilize for C2. [\[9\]\[12\]\[1\]\[13\]\[14\]\[15\]](#)

[.003 Virtual Private Server](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has acquired virtual private servers from services such as Stark Industries Solutions and RouterHosting. [\[2\]\[7\]](#) [Contagious Interview](#) has also utilized hosting providers to include Tier[.]Net, Majestic Hosting, Leaseweb Singapore, and Kaopu Cloud. [\[4\]](#)

[.006 Web Services](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has used web services such as Dropbox to receive stolen data and Google Drive, Firebase, GitHub, and Telegram to disseminate files. [\[12\]\[4\]](#) [Contagious Interview](#) has also used a cloud platform such as Vercel for C2 operations leveraging malicious web applications and static pages. [\[13\]\[14\]\[15\]](#) [Contagious Interview](#) has also used Slack to coordinate their activities. [\[9\]](#)

Enterprise [T1071 .003 Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has utilized email notifications from malware distribution servers to track victim engagement. [\[9\]](#)

Enterprise [T1547 .001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has established persistence using [InvisibleFerret](#) malware to place a .bat file in the Startup Folder. [\[6\]](#)

[.013 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has established persistence using [InvisibleFerret](#) malware to create a .desktop entry to run on startup on GNOME-based Linux devices. [\[6\]](#)

Enterprise [T1059 .003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has utilized VBS scripts to open cmd.exe and run commands to include the go_batch.bat batch file.^[12]

[.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has targeted macOS victim hosts using a bash downloader coremedia.sh and a bash script cloud.sh.^[12]

[.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has utilized Visual Basic scripts in the execution of their downloader malware targeting Windows devices including a script called update.vbs.^[12]

[.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has used the Python-based malware such as [InvisibleFerret](#) to install and execute Python Packages and Python modules.^{[2][5][7]}

[.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has leveraged JavaScript in the execution of their downloader malware targeting Windows devices using a NodeJS script titled nvidia.js.^[12]

Enterprise [T1543 .001 Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has established persistence using [InvisibleFerret](#) malware to create file to run the script on Startup via LaunchAgents.^[6] [Contagious Interview](#) has also utilized a plist file located in `/Library/LaunchAgents` to enable a malicious bash script the ability to persist.^[12]

Enterprise [T1555 .001 Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has leveraged malware variants configured to dump credentials from the macOS keychain.^{[12][14][15]}

Enterprise [T1587 Develop Capabilities](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) developed malicious NPM packages for delivery to or retrieval by victims.^{[9][1][2][13][14][15][7]}

[.001 Malware](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has developed malware that utilizes Qt cross-platform framework to include [BeaverTail](#).^{[5][8]}

Enterprise [T1573 .001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has encrypted C2 traffic using RC4.^[12]

Enterprise [T1585 Establish Accounts](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has created and maintained personas on code repositories to distribute malicious payloads. [\[9\]\[1\]\[13\]\[14\]\[15\]\[5\]](#)

[.001 Social Media Accounts](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has created fake social media accounts such as LinkedIn and Telegram accounts for their targeting efforts. [\[4\]\[5\]\[16\]\[17\]\[8\]\[6\]](#)

[.002 Email Accounts](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has created fake email accounts to correspond with social media accounts, fake LinkedIn personas, code repository accounts, and job announcements on development job board services. [\[9\]\[4\]\[15\]\[5\]\[6\]\[8\]](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has also utilized fake email accounts with Threat Intelligence vendor services. [\[9\]](#)

Enterprise [T1546 .004 Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has targeted macOS victim hosts using a bash downloader `coremedia.sh` and a bash script `ccloud.sh`. [\[12\]](#)

Enterprise [T1480 Execution Guardrails](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has configured C2 endpoints to review IP geolocation, request headers, victim environment details and runtime conditions prior to delivering payloads. [\[15\]](#)

Enterprise [T1048 .003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has exfiltrated victim information using FTP. [\[5\]\[7\]\[8\]](#)

Enterprise [T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has exfiltrated data from a compromised host to actor-controlled C2 servers. [\[9\]\[2\]\[4\]\[13\]\[14\]\[15\]\[5\]\[16\]\[7\]\[8\]](#)

Enterprise [T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has leveraged Telegram API to exfiltrate stolen data. [\[5\]](#)

[.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has exfiltrated stolen passwords to Dropbox. [\[12\]](#)

Enterprise [T1083 File and Directory Discovery](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has conducted key word searches within files and directories on a compromised hosts to identify files for exfiltration. [\[5\]\[7\]](#)

Enterprise [T1657 Financial Theft](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has stolen cryptocurrency wallet credentials and credit card information utilizing [BeaverTail](#) and [InvisibleFerret](#) malware. [\[2\]\[14\]\[15\]\[5\]\[6\]\[7\]\[8\]](#)

Enterprise [T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has researched specific professional groups such as software developers for targeting. [\[15\]\[16\]\[11\]\[17\]\[7\]\[8\]](#) [Contagious Interview](#) has also researched individuals who work in roles related to cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies. [\[9\]\[12\]](#)

Enterprise [T1562 .001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has convinced victims to disable Docker and other container environments and run code on their machine natively in attempts to bypass container isolation and ensure device infection. [\[15\]](#)

Enterprise [T1656 Impersonation](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) had impersonated HR hiring personnel through social media, job board notifications, and conducted interviews with victims in order to entice them to download malware disguised as legitimate applications or malicious scripts from code repositories. [\[9\]\[11\]\[15\]\[16\]\[11\]\[17\]\[7\]\[8\]](#)

Enterprise [T1070 .004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has configured malware to remove archives used in collection activities following successful exfiltration. [\[14\]](#)

Enterprise [T1036 Masquerading](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has delivered [BeaverTail](#) malware masquerading as legitimate software or applications. [\[2\]\[5\]\[6\]\[7\]\[8\]](#) [Contagious Interview](#) has also delivered malicious payloads masquerading as legitimate software drivers. [\[12\]](#)

Enterprise [T1571 Non-Standard Port](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has used TCP port 1224 for C2. [\[13\]](#)

Enterprise [T1027 .010 Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has obfuscated JavaScript code using Base64 and variable substitutions. [\[5\]\[16\]\[11\]\[6\]](#)

[.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has used hexadecimal string encoding to hide critical JavaScript module names, function names, and C2 URLs, which are decoded dynamically at runtime. [\[13\]](#)

Enterprise [T1588 .002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has used remote management and monitoring software such as "AnyDesk". ^{[2][5][16][7][8]}

[.007 Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has appeared to have used AI to generate images and content to facilitate their campaigns. ^[4]

Enterprise [T1566 .003 Phishing: Spearphishing via Service](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has used fake job advertisements and messages sent via social media to spearfish targets. ^{[12][1][4][5][16][17]} [Contagious Interview](#) has also leveraged hiring websites to solicit victims. ^[4]

Enterprise [T1090 Proxy](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has leveraged Astrill VPN for C2. ^[4]

Enterprise [T1219 .002 Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has downloaded remote management and monitoring software such as "AnyDesk" for post compromise activities. ^{[2][5][16][7][8]}

Enterprise [T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has utilized open-source indicator of compromise repositories to determine their exposure to include VirusTotal, and MalTrail. ^[9]

[.001 Social Media](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) had identified and solicited victims through social media such as LinkedIn, X, and Telegram. ^{[12][1][16][17][7][8]}

[.003 Code Repositories](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) had identified and solicited victims through code repositories such as GitHub. ^[7]

Enterprise [T1681 Search Threat Vendor Data](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has registered accounts with Threat Intelligence vendor services to check for reporting associated with their infrastructure and to evaluate new potential infrastructure. ^[9]

Enterprise [T1608 .001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has hosted malicious payloads on code repositories used as lures for victims to download. ^[9] ^{[1][2][4][13][14][15][5][16][11][6][7]}

Enterprise [T1082 System Information Discovery](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has configured malicious webpages to identify the victim's operating system by reviewing the details of the victims User-Agent of their browser. ^[12]

Enterprise [T1204 .001 User Execution: Malicious Link](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has lured victims to click on a malicious link that led to download of a malicious payload. [\[4\]](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has also leveraged links to malicious payloads on social media and code repositories. [\[4\]](#)

[.002 User Execution: Malicious File](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has distributed malicious files requiring direct victim interaction to execute through the guise of a code test. [\[16\]\[17\]](#)

[.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has leveraged ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious code. [\[9\]\[12\]](#)
[\[1\]](#)

[.005 User Execution: Malicious Library](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has relied on users to install a malicious library from a code repository to infect the victim's device and has led to additional payload distribution and theft of sensitive data. [\[9\]\[1\]\[2\]\[13\]\[14\]\[15\]\[5\]\[11\]\[6\]\[7\]](#)

Enterprise [T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](#)

[Contagious Interview](#) has requested victims to disable Docker and other container environments in attempts to thwart container isolation and ensure device infection. [\[15\]](#)

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1052>