

PROMETHIUM, StrongPity, Group G0056 | MITRE ATT&CK®

Archived: 2026-04-05 18:34:56 UTC

Enterprise [T1547 .001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](#)

[PROMETHIUM](#) has used Registry run keys to establish persistence.^[3]

Enterprise [T1543 .003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service](#)

[PROMETHIUM](#) has created new services and modified existing services for persistence.^[4]

Enterprise [T1587 .002 Develop Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates](#)

[PROMETHIUM](#) has created self-signed certificates to sign malicious installers.^[4]

[.003 Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates](#)

[PROMETHIUM](#) has created self-signed digital certificates for use in HTTPS C2 traffic.^[3]

Enterprise [T1189 Drive-by Compromise](#)

[PROMETHIUM](#) has used watering hole attacks to deliver malicious versions of legitimate installers.^[4]

Enterprise [T1036 .004 Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service](#)

[PROMETHIUM](#) has named services to appear legitimate.^{[3][4]}

[.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](#)

[PROMETHIUM](#) has disguised malicious installer files by bundling them with legitimate software installers.^{[3][4]}

Enterprise [T1553 .002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing](#)

[PROMETHIUM](#) has signed code with self-signed certificates.^[4]

Enterprise [T1205 .001 Traffic Signaling: Port Knocking](#)

[PROMETHIUM](#) has used a script that configures the knockd service and firewall to only accept C2 connections from systems that use a specified sequence of knock ports.^[4]

Enterprise [T1204 .002 User Execution: Malicious File](#)

[PROMETHIUM](#) has attempted to get users to execute compromised installation files for legitimate software including compression applications, security software, browsers, file recovery applications, and other tools and utilities.^{[3][4]}

Enterprise [T1078 .003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts](#)

[PROMETHIUM](#) has created admin accounts on a compromised host. ^[4]

Mobile [T1517 Access Notifications](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to collect message notifications from 17 applications. ^[6]

Mobile [T1437 .001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to communicate with the C2 server using HTTPS. ^[6]

Mobile [T1532 Archive Collected Data](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to exfiltrate encrypted data to the C2 server. ^[6]

Mobile [T1429 Audio Capture](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to record phone calls. ^[6]

Mobile [T1456 Drive-By Compromise](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) distributed [StrongPity](#) through the compromised official Syrian E-Gov website. ^[7]

Mobile [T1521 .001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to encrypt C2 communication using AES. ^[6]

Mobile [T1624 .001 Event Triggered Execution: Broadcast Receivers](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to receive the following broadcast events to establish persistence: `BOOT_COMPLETED` , `BATTERY_LOW` , `USER_PRESENT` , `SCREEN_ON` , `SCREEN_OFF` , or `CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE` . ^[6]

Mobile [T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to exfiltrate to the C2 server using HTTPS. ^{[6][7]}

Mobile [T1420 File and Directory Discovery](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to collect file lists on the victim device. ^[6]

Mobile [T1629 .003 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to modify permissions on a rooted device and tried to disable the SecurityLogAgent application. ^[6]

Mobile [T1544 Ingress Tool Transfer](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to receive files from the C2 and execute them via the parent application.^[6]

Mobile [T1430 Location Tracking](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to access the device's location.^[6]

Mobile [T1655 .001 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) on a compromised website to distribute a malicious version of a legitimate application.^[7]

Mobile [T1406 Obfuscated Files or Information](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to obfuscate code and strings to evade detection.^[6]

Mobile [T1636 .002 Protected User Data: Call Log](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to collect call logs.^[6]

[.003 Protected User Data: Contact List](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to collect the device's contact list.^[6]

[.004 Protected User Data: SMS Messages](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to collect SMS messages.^[6]

Mobile [T1418 Software Discovery](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to obtain a list of installed applications.^[6]

Mobile [T1426 System Information Discovery](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to collect the device's information, such as SIM serial number, SIM serial number, etc.^[6]

Mobile [T1421 System Network Connections Discovery](#)

During [C0033](#), [PROMETHIUM](#) used [StrongPity](#) to collect information regarding available Wi-Fi networks.^[7]

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056>