


## SunCrypt Ransomware sheds light on the Maze ransomware cartel

By Lawrence Abrams


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A ransomware named SunCrypt has joined the 'Maze cartel,' and with their membership, we get insight into how these groups are working together.

In June, we broke the story that the Maze threat actors [created a cartel of ransomware operations](#) to share information and techniques to help each other extort their victims.

When first started, this cartel included Maze and [LockBit](#), but soon [expanded to include Ragnar Locker](#).



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When Maze first formed this group, they refused to answer our questions on how members of their cartel benefited, and if there was a monetary benefit to Maze.

## **SunCrypt joins the Maze ransomware cartel**

In an email sent to BleepingComputer, the operators of a ransomware named SunCrypt stated that they are a new member of the Maze Ransomware cartel.

Based on submissions statistics to [ID-Ransomware](#), this ransomware family began operating in October 2019, but was not very active.

SunCrypt told BleepingComputer that they are an independently run ransomware operation from Maze, but as part of the cartel, they have "two-way communication channels with them,"

When asked why they joined this 'cartel,' we were told that Maze could not handle the volume and needed outside help.

"They just can't handle all the available field of operations. Our main specialization is ransomware attacks," - SunCrypt ransomware operators.

After further questions, they eventually told us that they "share revenue from the successful operation," but did not provide any details about what Maze provided to earn that revenue share.


Based on their statement that they were brought in because Maze can't handle all of the potential attacks, Maze may provide compromised network access to cartel members in exchange for a revenue share.

From a ransomware sample seen by BleepingComputer, it looks like cartel members get more for their money.

## **Maze shares its resources with cartel members**

Yesterday, GrujaRS was finally able to [find a sample](#) of the SunCrypt ransomware so we can get a better glimpse into how the ransomware works.

The SunCrypt Ransomware sample is installed via a heavily obfuscated PowerShell script, shown below.



```
1 Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
2 using System;
3 using System.Diagnostics;
4 using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
5 public static class SczDTJpxMvfHqDckpiNGP {
6 [DllImport("kernel32.dll")]public static extern IntPtr VirtualAlloc(IntPtr
7 [DllImport("user32.dll")]public static extern IntPtr EnumDesktopsW(IntPtr
8 }
9 '@
10
11
12 Function nSZkQPmkPfdwChRidAskN () {
13 return ((-1084 + 1695) - (12622 - 9614))
14 }
15 }
16 $SOMktntsZhpaaSnopvuHr = nSZkQPmkPfdwChRidAskN
17
18 Function RGacawknYmxytpd1pscrg () {
19 return ($SOMktntsZhpaaSnopvuHr)
20 }
21 }
22 $dpYwyTWCLgTIrdiFqLMpt = RGacawknYmxytpd1pscrg
23
24 Function OwACSxjrDIBVpPxN0cnej () {
25 return 12141
26 }
27 }
28 $KrFbS0ZPbpbkKJbicuTYXD = OwACSxjrDIBVpPxN0cnej
29
30 Function NgCrmWdpWoPFKofLcFnPq () {
```

### Obfuscated PowerShell script

When the ransomware is executed, it will connect to the URL [http://91.218.114\[.\]31](http://91.218.114[.]31) and transmit information about the attack and its victim.

The use of this IP address provides another big clue as to what services the Maze threat actors provide their cartel members.

For months, Maze has been hosting a data leak site and launching attacks from known public IP addresses. Yet in all this time, their services remain intact and have not been taken down by law enforcement.

The 91.218.114.31 address is one of the addresses that the Maze operation [uses as part of its campaign](#). Even more similar, Maze infections also transmit information to this IP address during an attack.

This shared IP address means one of the two things; Maze is sharing their infrastructure or white-labeling their ransomware technology to other groups.

This sharing of resources would also explain why they would earn a revenue share for each ransom payment.

*Update 8/31/2020:* The Maze threat actors have told BleepingComputer that they are not affiliated with the SunCrypt ransomware operators.

"We do not have any connections with SunCrypt, it is a lie."

"We do not know why SunCrypt does it, but we believe it is a PR strategy, to send links to companies in chat that they are working with us as a pressure," Maze told BleepingComputer.

Advanced Intel's Vitali Kremez has told BleepingComputer that in addition to connecting to [http://91.218.114\[.\]31](http://91.218.114[.]31), the SunCrypt ransomware will also connect to [http://91.218.114\[.\]30](http://91.218.114[.]30).

Both of these IP addresses are on the same address space.

As previously stated, 91.218.114[.]31 has been used by Maze in the past.


SunCrypt is no longer responding to our queries with follow up questions.

## The SunCrypt Ransomware

The SunCrypt ransomware itself is still being analyzed, but we can provide a basic overview of the ransomware.

The ransomware is currently being distributed as a DLL that, when executed, will encrypt a computer's files.


When encrypting files, it will append a hexadecimal hash to the end of each file name. It is not known what this hash represents.



### SunCrypt encrypted files

In every folder a ransom note named **YOUR\_FILES\_ARE\_ENCRYPTED.HTML** is created that contains information on what happened to a victim's files and a link to the Tor payment site.






### SunCrypt data leak site

At this time, there are approximately five victims listed on the SunCrypt data leak site.

Other ransomware operations that run [data leak sites](#) or have stolen unencrypted files to extort their victims include Ako, Avaddon, Clop, Conti, CryLock, DoppelPaymer, Maze, MountLocker, Nemty, Nephilim, Netwalker, Pysa/Mespinoza, Ragnar Locker, REvil, Sekhmet, Snatch, and Snake.

SunCrypt is currently being analyzed for weaknesses, and it is not known if it is possible to recover files for free.

**Update 8/31/20:** The Maze operators deny having any affiliation with SunCrypt.



## **Automated Pentesting Covers Only 1 of 6 Surfaces.**

Automated pentesting proves the path exists. BAS proves whether your controls stop it. Most teams run one without the other.

This whitepaper maps six validation surfaces, shows where coverage ends, and provides practitioners with three diagnostic questions for any tool evaluation.

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Source: <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/suncrypt-ransomware-sheds-light-on-the-maze-ransomware-cartel/>