{
	"id": "a3befbef-fa4f-4827-bb85-a7d6342c9cc4",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T00:08:56.082773Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T13:11:28.710685Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "4b81cdad70661c6ec8cf1b9c1d7323ca26fb9cf1",
	"title": "CAPEC-159: Redirect Access to Libraries (Version 3.9)",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 46665,
	"plain_text": "CAPEC-159: Redirect Access to Libraries (Version 3.9)\r\nArchived: 2026-04-05 16:52:53 UTC\r\n Description\r\nAn adversary exploits a weakness in the way an application searches for external libraries to manipulate the\r\nexecution flow to point to an adversary supplied library or code base. This pattern of attack allows the adversary\r\nto compromise the application or server via the execution of unauthorized code. An application typically makes\r\ncalls to functions that are a part of libraries external to the application. These libraries may be part of the operating\r\nsystem or they may be third party libraries. If an adversary can redirect an application's attempts to access these\r\nlibraries to other libraries that the adversary supplies, the adversary will be able to force the targeted application to\r\nexecute arbitrary code. This is especially dangerous if the targeted application has enhanced privileges. Access can\r\nbe redirected through a number of techniques, including the use of symbolic links, search path modification, and\r\nrelative path manipulation.\r\n Likelihood Of Attack\r\n Typical Severity\r\n Relationships\r\nThis table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These\r\nrelationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and\r\nlower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to\r\nshow similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.\r\nThis table shows the views that this attack pattern belongs to and top level categories within that view.\r\n Execution Flow\r\nExplore\r\n1. Identify Target: The adversary identifies the target application and determines what libraries are being\r\nused.\r\nTechniques\r\nFind public source code and identify library dependencies.\r\nGain access to the system hosting the application and look for libraries in common locations.\r\nExperiment\r\nhttps://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html\r\nPage 1 of 5\n\n1. Deploy Malicious Libraries: The adversary crafts malicious libraries and deploys them on the system\r\nwhere the application is running, or in a remote location that can be loaded by the application.\r\nExploit\r\n1. Redirect Library Calls to Malicious Library: Once the malicious library crafted by the adversary is\r\ndeployed, the adversary will manipulate the flow of the application such that it calls the malicious library.\r\nThis can be done in a variety of ways based on how the application is loading and calling libraries.\r\nTechniques\r\nPoison the DNS cache of the system so that it loads a malicious library from a remote location hosted\r\nby the adversary instead of the legitimate location\r\nCreate a symlink that tricks the application into thinking that a malicious library is the legitimate\r\nlibrary.\r\nUse DLL side-loading to place a malicious verison of a DLL in the windows directory.\r\n Prerequisites\r\nThe target must utilize external libraries and must fail to verify the integrity of these libraries before using them.\r\n Skills Required\r\n[Level: Low]\r\nTo modify the entries in the configuration file pointing to malicious libraries\r\n[Level: Medium]\r\nTo force symlink and timing issues for redirecting access to libraries\r\n[Level: High]\r\nTo reverse engineering the libraries and inject malicious code into the libraries\r\n Consequences\r\nThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies\r\nthe security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an\r\nadversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific\r\nconsequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high\r\nlikelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to\r\nachieve a different impact.\r\nhttps://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html\r\nPage 2 of 5\n\nScope Impact Likelihood\r\nAuthorization Execute Unauthorized Commands\r\nAccess Control\r\nAuthorization\r\nBypass Protection Mechanism\r\n Mitigations\r\nImplementation: Restrict the permission to modify the entries in the configuration file.\r\nImplementation: Check the integrity of the dynamically linked libraries before use them.\r\nImplementation: Use obfuscation and other techniques to prevent reverse engineering the libraries.\r\n Example Instances\r\nIn this example, the attacker using ELF infection that redirects the Procedure Linkage Table (PLT) of an\r\nexecutable allowing redirection to be resident outside of the infected executable. The algorithm at the entry point\r\ncode is as follows... • mark the text segment writeable • save the PLT(GOT) entry • replace the PLT(GOT) entry\r\nwith the address of the new lib call The algorithm in the new library call is as follows... • do the payload of the\r\nnew lib call • restore the original PLT(GOT) entry • call the lib call • save the PLT(GOT) entry again (if its\r\nchanged) • replace the PLT(GOT) entry with the address of the new lib call\r\n Taxonomy Mappings\r\nCAPEC mappings to ATT\u0026CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct\r\nCAPEC/ATT\u0026CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has\r\nrelevant ATT\u0026CK mappings. Note that the ATT\u0026CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as\r\npart of the mapping to CAPEC.\r\nRelevant to the ATT\u0026CK taxonomy mapping\r\nEntry ID Entry Name\r\n1574.008 Hijack Execution Flow:Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking\r\n References\r\n Content History\r\nSubmissions\r\nhttps://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html\r\nPage 3 of 5\n\nSubmission Date Submitter Organization\r\n2014-06-23\r\n(Version 2.6)\r\nCAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation\r\nModifications\r\nModification\r\nDate\r\nModifier Organization\r\n2015-11-09\r\n(Version 2.7)\r\nCAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation\r\nUpdated References\r\n2018-07-31\r\n(Version 2.12)\r\nCAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation\r\nUpdated Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, References,\r\nRelated_Weaknesses\r\n2019-04-04\r\n(Version 3.1)\r\nCAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation\r\nUpdated Related_Attack_Patterns, Related_Weaknesses\r\n2020-07-30\r\n(Version 3.3)\r\nCAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation\r\nUpdated Taxonomy_Mappings\r\n2020-12-17\r\n(Version 3.4)\r\nCAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation\r\nUpdated References\r\n2021-06-24\r\n(Version 3.5)\r\nCAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation\r\nUpdated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings\r\n2022-02-22\r\n(Version 3.7)\r\nCAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation\r\nUpdated Execution_Flow\r\n2022-09-29\r\n(Version 3.8)\r\nCAPEC Content Team The MITRE Corporation\r\nUpdated Related_Attack_Patterns\r\nMore information is available — Please select a different filter.\r\nhttps://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html\r\nPage 4 of 5\n\nSource: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html\r\nhttps://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html\r\nPage 5 of 5",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"MITRE"
	],
	"origins": [
		"web"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/159.html"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"159.html"
	],
	"threat_actors": [],
	"ts_created_at": 1775434136,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775826688,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
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