

# Account Manipulation Behavior Chain Detection, Detection Strategy DET0096

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## AN0265

Account attribute changes (e.g., password set, group membership, servicePrincipalName, logon hours) correlated with unusual process lineage or timing, indicating privilege escalation or persistence via valid accounts.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
TimeWindow	Time between suspicious process and account change (e.g., 5m).
HighPrivilegeGroupList	Customize group list (e.g., Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins) to monitor.
SubjectTargetMismatch	Flag if account modifier != modified user (potential hijack).

## AN0266

Use of native tools or scripting (e.g., `usermod` , `passwd` , `groupmod` ) to escalate permissions or persist access on existing users, correlated with login or process events.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
SudoPath	Common sudo or privilege escalation paths (e.g., <code>`usr/bin/passwd`</code> ).
ModifiedShellList	Detect if user shell is changed to unusual one (e.g., <code>/bin/sh -&gt; /bin/bash</code> ).

## AN0267

Modifications to user accounts via `dsccl` , `pwpolicy` , or System Preferences CLI ( `sysadminctl` ) that alter user groups, enable root, or bypass MDM restrictions.

### Log Sources

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
ModifiedUserList	Track known non-system user UIDs or service accounts.
GroupMembershipChanges	List of sensitive groups (admin, _developer, _analyticsd).

**AN0268**

Modifications to SSO/SAML user attributes (e.g., `isAdmin` , `role` , MFA bypass, App assignments) often through CLI, API, or rogue IdP apps.

**Log Sources**

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
RoleAssignmentBaseline	Expected user-role pairings per app or org unit.
APIUsageContext	Caller identity or IP address ranges for identity admin actions.

**AN0269**

Addition of new users or changes to role permissions (e.g., `ReadOnly` -> `Admin`) via API or vSphere Client, particularly from non-jumpbox IPs.

**Log Sources**

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
VMAdminAccountName	Expected account name patterns for ESXi/vCenter admins.
NetworkAccessLocation	Expected IPs/subnets for legitimate ESXi access.

**AN0270**

Role escalation (e.g., `Editor` → `Owner`) in cloud collaboration tools (Google Workspace, O365) or file sharing apps to maintain elevated access.

**Log Sources**

**Mutable Elements**

<b>Field</b>	<b>Description</b>
SharingSensitivityLabel	Threshold for labeling sensitive document access escalation.
CrossOrgChanges	Track changes made across organizational boundaries (e.g., guest users).

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Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0096#AN0266>