{
	"id": "69379930-792e-41dd-b480-bde11c2342e0",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T00:11:30.925685Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T13:12:26.369814Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "410470493e32ca57623472a2a6515ada54c7259e",
	"title": "Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon (Update B) | CISA",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 58561,
	"plain_text": "Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon (Update B) | CISA\r\nPublished: 2018-12-18 · Archived: 2026-04-05 16:58:28 UTC\r\n1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\r\nCVSS v3 9.0\r\nATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/HatMan malware specifically targets these vulnerabilities.\r\nVendor: Schneider Electric\r\nEquipment: Triconex Tricon, Model 3008\r\nVulnerabilities: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer\r\n2. UPDATE INFORMATION\r\nThis updated advisory is a follow-up to the updated advisory titled ICSA-18-107-02 Schneider Electric Triconex\r\nTricon (Update A) that was published May 3, 2018, on the NCCIC/ICS-CERT website.\r\n3. RISK EVALUATION\r\nSuccessful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could misinform or control the safety instrumented system which\r\ncould result in arbitrary code execution, system shutdown, or the compromise of safety systems.\r\n4. TECHNICAL DETAILS\r\n4.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS\r\nThe following versions of Triconex Tricon, a Safety Instrumented System, are affected:\r\nMP Model 3008 firmware versions 10.0-10.4\r\n4.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW\r\n4.2.1   IMPROPER RESTRICTION OF OPERATIONS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF A\r\nMEMORY BUFFER CWE-119\r\nSystem calls read directly from memory addresses within the control program area without any verification. \r\nManipulating this data could allow attacker data to be copied anywhere within memory.\r\nCVE-2018-8872 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 9.0 has been calculated; the\r\nCVSS vector string is (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H ).\r\n4.2.2   IMPROPER RESTRICTION OF OPERATIONS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF A\r\nMEMORY BUFFER CWE-119\r\nhttps://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02\r\nPage 1 of 4\n\nWhen a system call is made, registers are stored to a fixed memory location. Modifying the data in this location\r\ncould allow attackers to gain supervisor-level access and control system states.\r\nCVE-2018-7522 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of 7.9 has been assigned; the\r\nCVSS vector string is (AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H ).\r\n4.3 BACKGROUND\r\nCritical Infrastructure Sectors: Multiple Sectors\r\nCountries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide\r\nCompany Headquarters Location: France\r\n4.4 RESEARCHER\r\nThese vulnerabilities were discovered by NCCIC and Schneider Electric during the investigation of the HatMan\r\nmalware.\r\n5. MITIGATIONS\r\n--------- Begin Update B Part 1 of 1 --------\r\n5.1 VENDOR RECOMMENDATION\r\nSchneider Electric has released the following security notification:\r\nhttps://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/SEVD-2017-347-01/\r\nSchneider Electric strongly recommends that users upgrade to the latest Triconex Tricon CX version. Tricon CX\r\nv11.4 is now available and is compliant with the IEC 62443 cybersecurity standard and includes multiple security\r\nenhancements that meet the challenges posed by HatMan malware techniques and other sophisticated methods of\r\nattack. To upgrade your system, contact your field site support representative or contact Schneider Electric\r\nsupport.\r\n5.1.1  DETECT AND RESPOND\r\nTriconex users should contact their local Schneider Electric office for assistance. With this engagement, Schneider\r\nElectric will gather data from each Tricon safety system installation, analyze for the presence of the malware, and\r\ncarry out any necessary malware removal procedures.\r\nFor users who choose to gather data from each Tricon safety system installation on their own, instructions and\r\nsupport material is available for download via the Schneider Electric Process Automation customer support portal\r\n(login required). The data will still need to be sent to Schneider Electric for analysis. As of February 1, 2019,\r\nSchneider Electric will require customers to have a support contract in place to engage with the HatMan malware\r\ndetection service.\r\n--------- End Update B Part 1 of 1 --------\r\nhttps://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02\r\nPage 2 of 4\n\nOnce Schneider Electric has analyzed this data, Triconex users will receive a report for each Tricon system\r\nanalyzed. This report will advise whether the malware was detected, and what the next steps are to remove the\r\nmalware if detected.\r\nA YARA rule that matches the binary components of the HatMan malware is available for download at\r\nhttps://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/file_attach/MAR-17-352-01.yara or by contacting Schneider Electric\r\nCustomer Support.\r\n5.1.2  DEFEND\r\nThe HatMan malware requires unrestricted access to the safety network via remote network or physical access.\r\nAdditionally, the malware requires the Tricon key switch to be in the “PROGRAM” mode to successfully deploy\r\nits payload.\r\nSchneider Electric continues to recommend users always implement the instructions in the “Security\r\nConsiderations” section in the standard Triconex documentation (i.e., Planning and Installation Guides and\r\nTriStation 1131 Developers Guide), which include the following:\r\nEnsure the cybersecurity features in Triconex solutions are always enabled.\r\nSafety systems must always be deployed on isolated networks.\r\nPhysical controls should be in place so that no unauthorized person would have access to the safety\r\ncontrollers, peripheral safety equipment, or the safety network.\r\nAll controllers should reside in locked cabinets and never be left in the “PROGRAM” mode.\r\nAll TriStation engineering workstations should be secured and never be connected to any network other\r\nthan the safety network.\r\nAll methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated safety network such as CDs, USB drives, DVD’s,\r\netc. should be scanned before use in the TriStation engineering workstations or any node connected to this\r\nnetwork.\r\nLaptops and PCs should always be properly verified to be virus and malware free before connecting to the\r\nsafety network or any Triconex controller.\r\nOperator stations should be configured to display an alarm whenever the Tricon key switch is in the\r\n“PROGRAM” mode.\r\n5.2  NCCIC Recommendations\r\nNCCIC recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities.\r\nSpecifically, users should:\r\nMinimize network exposure for all Safety Instrumented Systems, and ensure that they are not accessible\r\nfrom the Internet.\r\nLocate Safety Instrumented Systems behind firewalls, and isolate them from all other networks.\r\nWhen remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs),\r\nrecognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version\r\navailable. Also recognize that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.\r\nhttps://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02\r\nPage 3 of 4\n\nNCCIC reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive\r\nmeasures.\r\nNCCIC also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS-CERT web page.\r\nSeveral recommended practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control\r\nSystems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.\r\nAdditional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS-CERT website in the\r\nTechnical Information Paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.\r\nOrganizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their established internal procedures and\r\nreport their findings to NCCIC for tracking and correlation against other incidents.\r\nNCCIC also recommends that users take the following measures to protect themselves from social engineering\r\nattacks:\r\nDo not click web links or open unsolicited attachments in email messages.\r\nRefer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams for more information on avoiding email scams.\r\nRefer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks for more information on social engineering\r\nattacks.\r\nHatMan malware specifically targets these vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are exploitable remotely. High\r\nskill level is needed to exploit.\r\nSource: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02\r\nhttps://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02\r\nPage 4 of 4",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"MITRE"
	],
	"origins": [
		"web"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"ICSA-18-107-02"
	],
	"threat_actors": [],
	"ts_created_at": 1775434290,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775826746,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
	"files": {
		"pdf": "https://archive.orkl.eu/410470493e32ca57623472a2a6515ada54c7259e.pdf",
		"text": "https://archive.orkl.eu/410470493e32ca57623472a2a6515ada54c7259e.txt",
		"img": "https://archive.orkl.eu/410470493e32ca57623472a2a6515ada54c7259e.jpg"
	}
}