# S


Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thom­
as, U.S. Army, Retired, is a senior
analyst at the Foreign Military Studies
Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. He holds a B.S. from the U.S.
Military Academy and an M.A. from the
University of Southern California.


—Early Bird, 14 December 2007

ince 2005, Chinese cyber attacks against U.S. systems have increased
at an alarming rate. However, the term “attack” carries unwanted

# S

connotations; these unwarranted incursions are more likely reconnaissance
missions to collect intelligence on U.S. military systems, to spot vulner­
abilities or plant trap-doors or viruses in our systems, and to ensure that
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has an immediate advantage in the
event of war involving America and China. If the incursions were “attacks,”
then our systems would be down and destroyed. Instead, these computer
reconnaissance measures appear to conform to an old Chinese stratagem: “a
victorious army first wins and then seeks battle. A defeated army first battles
and then seeks victory.” Reconnaissance via computer to spot vulnerabilities
before the first battle fits the stratagem well.

The United States, of course, is not the only country accusing the Chi­
nese of unwarranted incursions. Germany, England, France, Japan, Taiwan,
Australia, and others have also been Chinese targets. When one views these
events in the light of open-source accounts of Chinese information opera­
tions (IO) theory over the past several years, there is much circumstantial
evidence to find China guilty as accused. The only actual forensic evidence,
of course, is classified and located in the security agencies of the countries
that China has electronically invaded.

This article explains Chinese military thought that supports their cyberattack activities. While other articles focus on who was attacked and how many
times, this article focuses more on the theory behind the attacks, especially the
PLA’s use of electronic stratagems for their computer network operations and
the use of surrogates such as patriotic hacker groups. The article reviews Chi­
nese incursions since 2005 and examines open-source assessments provided
by some of the most important Chinese information warfare theorists.

The PLA has followed theory with practice. Computer network operations
have become part of the peacetime strategic activities of the PLA. More
worrisome is the purpose of these incursions. Is it reconnaissance? Or is the


-----

purpose of these incursions to place Trojan horses
or some other device into U.S. and other partner
systems to disable or destroy them in case of war?
As one reads about Chinese information warfare
developments, it becomes clear that China’s poten­
tial intentions raise questions.

## IW Units and the Active Offense

While the exact reason for China’s cyber attacks is
unknown, we can follow a cause-and-effect rationale
in Chinese contemporary writings. The cause of Chi­
na’s attachment to new information technologies and
the “informatization” of their force is the dramatic
impact the technologies have had on military affairs,
most notably the U.S. use of technology in Iraq. The
effect of these technologies on Chinese military
thought is the Chinese belief that only countries that
take the initiative in an information war or establish
information superiority and control ahead of time
will win, and that this requires reconnaissance and
intelligence gathering before the first battle to set
the stage for the use of cyber forces.

Historically, the PLA based its strategic phi­
losophy on “active defense,” meaning that China
would never attack someone first but would be
ready to respond if attacked. That philosophy has
changed over the past few years with the advent of
the cyber age. There has been a continuous stream
of open-source descriptions of both cyber units
in and offensive cyber operations by the Chinese
military. The PLA’s open recognition of a need for
offensive operations reflects a significant break
with traditional military thought. Further, the PLA
has openly stated that U.S. reliance on computer
systems is a huge vulnerability ripe for exploita­
tion. If the PLA hopes to offset America’s huge
advantage in practical application of IO theory (in
Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan), it has to exploit
that vulnerability. To understand this shift from


defensive to offensive-minded operations, we must
begin by looking at developments in 1999.

## 1999

Nearly a decade ago, Chinese IO theorists were
already discussing offensive actions. Zhu Wenguan
and Chen Taiyi’s Information War, published in 1999,
contains a section called “Conducting Camouflaged
Preemptive Attacks.” The authors note that preemptive
active offense is needed to disrupt and destroy enemy
computer offensive forces.[1] A part of preemption
appears to be network surveillance, which involves
collecting information on the performance, purpose,
and structure of systems related to C4I, electronic
warfare, and weapon systems. The authors note that, in
the broadest sense, computer information surveillance
is a part of computer information attack. They state:

To conduct computer surveillance, we can
use computer information networks set up
in peacetime and enter networks as differ­
ent users to do the surveillance in an area
broader than the battlefield. We can borrow
the power of computer experts, especially
hackers, to finish computer surveillance
tasks . . . it can be seen that using hackers to
obtain military information from computer
networks is a very effective method. We
should be familiar with network protocols
and accumulate network intelligence.[2]

The authors add that the PLA established small
brigades of offensive and defensive computer con­
frontation forces to conduct these attacks.[3] Offensive
training includes how to design and organize virus
invasions and how to enter the other side’s computer
networks. Offensive brigades must repeatedly study
and analyze the enemy’s potential. They must also be
able to sort truth and deception, pinpoint enemy com­
puter-control centers, and jam in targeted ways.[4]

In November 1999, a Jiefanguin Bao (Liberation
_Army Daily) article stated that China may develop_
an information warfare branch of service—a “net
force”—to complement the army, navy, and air force.
(While the article said this development was very
likely to become a reality, there is no evidence to con­
firm the creation of such a branch of service today.)
The force’s task would be to protect net sovereignty
and engage in net warfare. Elements of net warfare
include “offensive and defensive” technologies,
“scanning” technologies, “masquerade” (deception)


## …the Chinese believe that only countries that take the
 initiative in an information war or establish information
 superiority and control
 ahead of time will win…


-----

technology, and “recovery” technology. Masquerade
technology would assist a person who wanted to dis­
semble as a commander and take over a net.[5]

## 2000

The idea of focusing on reconnaissance and
stratagem activities arose as early as 2000. A Jiefan­
_guin Bao article notes that units at and above army_
level should focus their study on reconnaissance
and early warning, command coordination, and the
application of strategy.[6] An article substantiating
this thought appeared in the PLA’s authoritative
journal China Military Science (similar in impor­
tance to Joint Force Quarterly). The latter article
notes that stratagems should create opportunities
and favorable times for releasing viruses.[7]

Another China Military Science article clarified
the offensive posture described in 1999. In it, General
Dai Qingmin opines that offense is at least as impor­
tant as active defense, and notes, “As the key to gain­
ing the initiative in operations lies in positively and
actively contending with an enemy for information
superiority, China should establish such a view for IO
as ‘active offense.’” His view is that active offense
is essential for maintaining information control,
obtaining the initiative, and offsetting an opponent’s
superiority. Offensive information methods can help
sabotage an enemy’s information system.[8]

Dai, who became the head of the PLA General
Staff’s Fourth Department (Electronic Warfare), also
notes that IO stratagems can be formulated before
launching a war to serve as “a sharp sword” that sab­
otages and weakens a superior enemy, while protect­
ing or enhancing China’s fighting capacity. Informa­
tion warfare can serve as a type of invisible fighting
capacity to evade combat with a stronger enemy.[9] If
a future information warfare goal is to defeat strong
forces with weak forces using stratagems, then such
methods are one of China’s asymmetric means to
combat U.S. high technology.[10] Stratagems would
thus be one of the “magic weapons” that Chinese
strategic culture is always stressing.

Finally, Dai’s August 2000 article in _China_
_Military Science discusses the use of electrons as_
stratagems and the development of an integrated
network electronic warfare capability. When com­
bined with the active-offense concept, this article
represents one of the most important information
warfare articles written in China.


Other less notable publications also discuss offen­
sive operations. In a March 2000 Internet version of
_Computer and Information Technology, analysts at_
the PLA’s Electronic Engineering Institute at Hefei
discuss the need for network confrontation teams
and the requirement to conduct both defensive and
offensive operations.[11] In September 2000, the jour­
nal Guangjiao Jing noted that the PLA had recently
established information warfare departments within
its headquarters organizations.[12] Thus, the idea of
offensive operations was not limited just to Dai.

## 2001

The 2001 book _Science of Strategy, published_
by China’s National Defense University, includes a
section on offensive information warfare operations.
It states that strategic information warfare should
“use offense as a main strategy but be prepared for
both offense and defense.” Further, it states, “We
should use the strategy of the preemptive strike and
seize the initiative. Actively launching an informa­
tion offensive is the key to seizing information
superiority and the initiative on the battlefield.”[13]
In this sense, the thinking appears to apply mainly
to wartime and not peacetime action.

The Science of Strategy also describes the type
of war to fight against networks. The book states
that in a war of annihilation, nodes must be attacked
to break up the network before attacking weapons
systems. Information and support systems must
always be the first targets to offset operational
balance. Science of Strategy notes, “After strikes
to damage the net and continuous operations and
persistent weakening of the enemy, then vigorously
launch an annihilating attack.” Ground information
warfare facilities, transmission means, reception
platforms, and information-flow capabilities should
be destroyed in that order. This type of attack
enables one to “take away the firewood from under
the cauldron.”[14] While this scenario appears to apply
to wartime conditions, it can easily be adapted to
peacetime conditions as well.

Information technology has thus stimulated
Chinese strategic thinking; military academics now
argue that those who do not preempt will lose the
initiative in what may be a very short-lived IO war.
In modern conflicts, they suggest, it is easier to
obtain the objective of war through one campaign
or one battle than at any other time in history. This


-----

line of thinking provides further impetus for the
PLA to conduct cyber-reconnaissance activities in
peacetime to prepare to “win victory.”[ 15]

## 2002

An article from June 2002 states that PLA units
were prepared to tamper “with information in terms
of order, time, flow, content, and form; deleting
information in parts, in order to create fragmented
information; and inserting information to include
irrelevant information in order to confuse and mis­
lead each other.”[16] The author adds that two sides
in a computer confrontation may attempt to invade
each other’s information networks by transplanting
computer viruses to downloadable software that can
be activated when necessary in order to sabotage
each other’s computer systems.[17]

General Dai Qingmin wrote in 2002 that a priority
for the PLA was to acquire offensive information
operations equipment, and that the PLA must take
and maintain the initiative.[18] Other publications
weighed in as well on this point.

_Jiefangjun Bao, for example, carried an article_
in August of 2002 about the forms of network
attacks. These were listed as “premeditated” (i.e.,
a persistent computer virus embedded in software),
“contamination” (aimed at the quality of informa­
tion), “strong” (refering to the forced modulation
of computer viruses into electromagnetic waves),
and “fission” (the strong regeneration capability
of a virus).[19] All are capable of being inserted in
peacetime, except perhaps the “strong” variety.

## 2003

At the 2003 10th National People’s Congress,
PLA representatives revealed that it would activate
the first high-tech information warfare units in
Beijing that year. The report stated that the units
would eventually be in all PLA armies. Informa­
tion warfare units would be outfitted with high-tech
equipment, and have the ability to conduct network
warfare on the Internet and the capability to transfer
data via remote sensing satellites.[20] How the “first”
information warfare unit differs from the informa­
tion warfare brigades under discussion in the 1999
Chinese book Information War is unknown.

General Dai, writing in 2003, stressed once again
the importance of carrying out information attacks.[21]
Dai wrote that information warfare is “precursory”


(begins before other operations) and “whole course”
(runs throughout an entire operation). Perhaps the
current emphases on gaining the initiative and on
short wars are the main reasons that Dai gives the
impression that preemption via information warfare
is a necessity in future war.[22] He notes:

Actions such as intelligence warfare,
psychological warfare, and campaign
deception in advance of combat seem to
be even more important to the unimpeded
implementation of planning and ensuring
war. For this reason, information warfare
must be started in advance of other combat
actions before making war plans and while
making war plans.[23]

Specific reserve units also engage in information
warfare activities. For example, in late 2003 the
monthly journal of the PLA Academy of Military
Science, _Guofang, gave specific instructions on_
network attack activities to reserve units. Author
Li Mingrang says that information storm troopers
as “first forces” must be established from the talent
of local communications, telecommunications, and
financial departments and from scientific research
institutes and institutions of higher education.
Stratagems must be developed to increase system
survivability.[24] Li adds:

There is no shortage of computer experts
and network jockeys among them, any one
of whom could become a network guerrilla
who could open up a gunpowderless battle­
field all by himself by harassing attacks
on the network, namely by releasing large
volumes of data from many directions con­
centrated on some enemy network station
to jam up its network router and bring the
network station to a standstill…and once
there is a military requirement, either enter
the network system to steal intelligence or
to activate viruses or detonate ‘bombs’ to
achieve the combat target of destroying the
network.[25]

Reserve forces are directed to work on offensive
strategies.

In his 2003 book Deciphering Information Secu­
_rity, China’s “father of information warfare,” retired_
Colonel Shen Weiguang, wrote about the develop­
ment of an information security university with a
military information security specialty. The specialty


-----

teaches, among some twenty-plus topics, “A Study
of Hacker Attack Methods,” “Network Intrusion
Detection and Defending against Attack,” “Infor­
mation Attack and Defense Tactics,” “Computer
Virus Program Design and Application,” “Network
Security System Structures,” and “Scanning for
Hidden Troubles in Networks.”[26] Many of these
topics would fit the definition of PLA’s peacetime
computer network operations incursion activities.

## 2005

In the 2005 book Study Guide for Information
_Operations Theory, General Dai and his associ­_
ates defined 400 IO-related terms, many related
to preemptive or reconnaissance activities. Only
computer network warfare is described here:

Computer network warfare is composed
of computer network reconnaissance,
computer network attacks, and computer
network defense. Operations mainly involve
the use of armed and equipped network war­
riors. The means of operations include vari­
ous types of viruses, logic bombs, and chip
weapons developed from computer technol­
ogy. Computer network warfare will act as
both a deterrent and a means of warfare,
and it can have a large and profound impact
upon the enemy’s politics, economics, and
military. It is also an important means of
battle for a less well-equipped military
against one with formidable strengths in
high technology.[27]

Dai also discussed the importance of the conduct
of warfare, focusing on information deterrence as a
concept to consider and develop further at the stra­
tegic level. Others who have written on the topic of
information deterrence include Shen Weiguang. The
book Science of Military Strategy devotes an entire
chapter to the topic. The latter source explains how
information deterrence (intimidating by demon­
strating one’s information power or might) can help
achieve national and military objectives. Deterrence
methods include information technology (hardware
and software innovations), information weapons
(discursive dissimulation or disinformation), and
information-resource suppression (analogous to
jamming). According to some Chinese authors,
counter-information deterrence theories must also
be considered.


In Warfare Strategy Theory (2005), Yao Youzhi
asserts that strategy has developed to the point
where technological considerations dominate and
the use of technology has become strategic. Any
strategy that distances itself from focusing on hightechnology weapons has no useful value, according
to Yao. This also means that China must develop
sound counterstrategies.[28] He writes:

It is necessary to be proficient at utilizing
the information superhighway, creating
misleading information, spreading the fog
of war, and jamming and destroying the
enemy’s strategic awareness, thereby using
strategy to control the adversary. It is nec­
essary to be proficient at using electronic
feints, electronic camouflage, electronic
jamming, virus attacks, and space satellite
jamming and deception, leading the enemy
to draw the wrong conclusion and attaining
the goal of strategic deception.[29]

While designed for wartime use, several of these
techniques work as peacetime preventive and pre­
emptive measures as well.

In “stovepipe” structured commands of the past,
a force calculated its strength by adding together
all of its parts. Today, a force’s combat strength is a
product of operational elements where information
technologies factor into a potentially exponential
multiplication.[30]

Yao writes that “informationized” warfare has
changed the traditional significance of “attack, cap­
ture, control, and defend” because precision attacks
have made possible the destruction of the enemy’s
entire war system. The primary attack target has
become an enemy force’s strategic information
system. All activities now revolve around gaining
battlefield supremacy, and information supremacy
is the foundation of battlefield supremacy. Directly
destroying an enemy’s will has supplanted the
annihilation of an enemy’s military capability.
This focus on information invites completely new
methods in future wars.[31]

## 2007

Author Zhang Zhibin notes in Jiefanguin Bao, 13
March 2007, that the dialectical relationship between
offense and defense in network warfare must place
equal emphasis on each. A network deterrence
theory implies that both capabilities are necessary,


-----

**A computer screen displaying a military website is**
**seen inside an army base in Tianjin, on the outskirts of**
**Beijing, China, 30 July 2007. Computer networks have**
**been targeted by cyber spies that media reports say are**
**directed by China’s military, but China denies backing**
**such attacks.**

offense to scare any potential enemy force, and
defense to thwart any attack. Zhang says:

Only by doing a solid job of positive defense
can China ensure winning the initiative in
network warfare. Thus, China should make
unremitting efforts to seek such preemptive
opportunities through developing network
technology and systems and making cor­
responding network defensive operations
research and implementation.[32]
Other articles from 2007 stress a need for PLA
action to gain network control, including access, if
possible. Two books on Chinese IO by this author,
_Dragon Bytes and Decoding the Virtual Dragon,_
mention this focus on control.


## Probable Chinese Computer Attacks against America

Over the past several years, Chinese information
warfare and IO capabilities have become more vis­
ible and troubling. China has used these capabilities
not only against the U.S. but reportedly against
Japan, Taiwan, Germany, England, and Australia
as well. Due to the nature of computer network
operations, exactly how many Chinese information
warfare reconnaissance or offensive events have
transpired or the actual intent of these incursions
remains unknown. Those episodes that have leaked
into the public domain include the following:

 - Espionage conducted against the U.S. Depart­
ment of Defense computers, reported in _Time_
magazine. The report concerned a Chinese cyber
espionage ring that federal investigators codenamed Titan Rain.[33]

 - Chinese attempts to blind a U.S. satellite,
reported in Defense News. The report discussed highpowered Chinese laser attacks on a U.S. satellite.[34]

 - Chinese hacker attacks on the U.S. Naval
War College’s net capability, reported in Federal
_Computer Week. This attack purportedly originated_
from China and took systems off-line.[35]

 - The Chinese destruction of an old Chinese
weather satellite with an anti-satellite missile,
reported on National Public Radio. The report
cited a Beijing People’s University commentator.
He noted, “Satellite-killing technology is logical
in the development of missiles and an information
warfare capability.”[36]

 - A sophisticated computer attack on Tennes­
see’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory in October
and November 2007. The assault was in the form of
phony e-mails which, when opened, allowed hack­
ers to penetrate the lab’s computer security.[37]

 - Hacker attacks against Japan and Taiwan,
reported in the Japanese and Taiwanese press.[38] The
reports noted that these attacks were retaliations for
Japan’s anti-Chinese interpretations of history and
for Taiwanese claims for independence.

On 5 September 2007, the Kansas City Star car­
ried an article in which China denied cyber-attack­
ing any country. Foreign ministry spokesperson Jian
Yu noted, “The Chinese government has always
opposed an Internet-wrecking crime, including
hacking, and cracked down on it according to the
law.”[39] He dismisses accusations of Chinese attacks


## …information supremacy is the foundation of battlefield
 supremacy.…This focus on information invites completely


## new methods in future wars.


-----

on Pentagon computers as “groundless.” A Penta­
gon spokesperson refused to say if the perpetrator
was China, but Britain’s _Financial Times quotes_
an unidentified senior U.S. official as saying the
source had been traced to the PLA.

A week earlier, Germany’s Der Spiegel magazine
reported that the PLA had infiltrated Germany’s
government computer systems. The report said the
hackers had been traced back to Guangzhou and
Lanzhou.[40] Thus, circumstantial evidence contin­
ues to grow. It is difficult to believe that Germany,
Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and America are all
conniving to indict China and portray it as a new
threat. Indeed, through unprovoked cyber opera­
tions, China seems to have indicted itself without
anyone’s assistance.

## China’s Use of Surrogates

One of China’s stratagems is to “attack with
a borrowed sword.” Perhaps the use of patriotic
hackers fits this stratagem. A recent article in
_Time magazine discussed the use of a “network_
crack program hacker” (NCPH) group initiative to
accomplish this goal. The article said the PLA had
developed a competition for hackers and that the
winner would receive a monthly stipend from the
military. It noted that the NCPH group not only won
the competition and received the stipend, but the
PLA also used the NCPH to teach techniques and
procedures to other members of the PLA’s cyberwarfare team. A U.S. branch of VeriSign, iDefense,
has noted that China’s NCPH created 35 programs
to implant Trojans (which take partial control of
computers) and that these programs attacked U.S.
government agencies. VeriSign’s iDefense accused
the NCPH of siphoning off thousands of unclassi­
fied U.S. documents. Such activity would fit the
PLA’s preemption focus.[41]

The concept of “people’s war” also fits with
so-called patriotic hacking. “People’s war” in the


cyber age means that citizens get involved with
hacking or cyber attacking an enemy’s systems.
Presently over 250 hacker groups operate in
China.[42] Quantity could thus create a quality all its
own with the variety and intensity of incursions
they could conduct. None could be traced directly
to the PLA if hacker groups are private citizens
(or for that matter, military members or military
reservists conducting cyber operations from their
home computers). Again, circumstantial evidence
is all that one has to go on, but that evidence is
becoming overwhelming.

## Conclusions

Chinese theory over the last several years indi­
cates that China wants to become proficient in active
offense, cyber reconnaissance, cyber-stratagem, and
computer exploitation activities in case the PLA has
to go to war. If China feels it can gain the initiative
by obtaining information superiority or by prevent­
ing cyber strikes, then the coming years may involve
challenges from that sector. While it remains easy
to measure the intent of troop deployments, the
intent of a Chinese electron is harder to measure.
Is it inserting a virus, conducting reconnaissance,
or disabling a system? The world will move into
uncertain territory as nations attempt to conduct
responses to and develop consequence management
actions for truly disruptive electronic intrusions.

The Chinese note that IO tactics and techniques
allow more emphasis on the principle of offense
than on traditional warfare. A weaker force, for
example, can inflict much damage on a superior
force with a properly timed and precisely defined
asymmetric information attack. China portrays itself
regularly as the weaker side of the U.S.-Chinese
relationship. It thinks that offensive operations such
as information deterrence, information blockade,
information power creation (electronic camouflage,
network deception, etc.), information contamina­
tion, information harassment, nodal destruction,
system paralysis, and entity destruction are key to
victory in a modern conflict with America.

One should remember that this analysis stems
only from open-source information and public
comments from the PLA, and that China’s under­
standing of the intersection of strategy and infor­
mation technology, especially as it relates to actual
conflict, is not extensive in a practical sense. The


## One of China’s stratagems is to “attack with a borrowed sword.”
 Perhaps the use of patriotic
 hackers fits this stratagem.


-----

Chinese have little recent experience with con­
flict. Their forces have not fought an actual war in
decades. From a theoretical perspective, however,
China has written extensively on the use of infor­
mation technology and electronic preemption and
given both much thought. Chinese cyber intrusions
indicate that the Chinese are gaining a lot of practi­
cal and theoretical experience in peacetime.

The PLA’s open-source comments can be inter­
preted either as an attempt to work with the West or
to vigorously oppose it. Perhaps the PLA is being
very open and transparent in its cyber strategies,
perhaps more open than in any other area of mili­
tary operations. (The PLA is far more open with
its information warfare thinking, for example, than
Russia.) If the PLA’s intent is to oppose the West,
it may in fact be concealing rich information war­
fare concepts in PLA “rules and regulations” (the
PLA’s equivalent of doctrine) within the general
staff directorates and research institutes. China’s
information warfare rules and regulations are not


available to other nations, while unclassified U.S.
doctrine is available to anyone on the Internet. The
PLA keeps its rules and regulations close to its
chest. In this case, lack of transparency introduces
unwanted ambiguity. America and other nations
under threat of PLA incursions may react harshly
to some scenarios developed by the Chinese and,
thus, unintentionally set off a conflict.

How and when China might use its activeoffensive concepts for purposes other than recon­
naissance is unclear, but, as general concepts, they
are worrisome. It does not bode well for future
cooperation and stability if Chinese theorists really
do believe (as they openly state) that China can
offset an opponent’s information superiority only
if China strikes first. China will no doubt continue
to use technology in conjunction with innovative
stratagems to try to deceive our high-tech systems
or perhaps even to force errors in the cognitive
processes of U.S. decision-makers. We live in
interesting times. MR


**NOTES**


1. Zhu Wenguan and Chen Taiyi, _Information War (place and publisher not_
stated, 1999), chap. 5 (Computer Operations). This chapter discusses offensive and
defensive computer operations.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. At one point in the discussion, the authors state, “We need to observe
our military’s strategy of active offense and in computer confrontation training ensure
both defense and offense are main partners.”

5. Leng Bingling, Wang Yulin, and Zhao Wenxiang, “Bringing Internet Warfare
into the Military System is of Equal Significance with Land, Sea, and Air Power,”
_Jiefangjun Bao_ (Liberation Army Daily), 11 November 1999, 7, as translated and
downloaded from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Web site, 15
November 1999.

6. Fan Changlong, “Stand in the Forefront of the New Military Revolution in
Deepening Troop Training through Science and Technology,” Jiefangjun Bao (Lib­
_eration Army Daily), 4 April 2000, 6, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS_
Web site, 6 April 2000.

7. Niu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui, “Planning and Application of Strategies
of Information Operations in High-Tech Local War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China
_Military Science) no. 4, 2000, 115-22, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS_
Web site, 9 November 2000.

8. Dai Qingmin, “Innovating and Developing Views on Information Operations,”
_Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, date not given._

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Yang Jian, Zhang Youhua, and Lu Zhankun, (no title), Jisuanji Yu Xinxi Jishu
(Internet version of Computer and Information Technology), Anhui Computer Sub­
scriber Association and the Anhui Computer Society, 16 March 2000, as translated
and downloaded from the FBIS Web site, 18 April 2000.

12. “China’s IW Capabilities,” Guangjiao Jing, Hong Kong, 16 September 2000.
13. Ge Zhenfeng, chap. 16, sec. 4, 366. For translations of excerpts of this book, the
author thanks Dr. Gary Bjorge, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

14. Ge Zhenfeng, chap. 24, sec. 6, 493.
15. Peng and Yao, 418-19.
16. Wen T’ao, “PLA Bent on Seizing ‘Information Control.’” Hong Kong Ching
_Pao, 1 June 2002, no. 299, 44-46, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS_
web page, 5 June 2002.

17. Ibid.
18. Dai Qingmin, “On Integrating Network Warfare and Electronic Warfare,” Zhong­
_guo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), February 2002, 112-17, as translated and_
downloaded from the FBIS Web site, 24 June 2002.

19. Fan Yongsheng, Wu Xinghan, “War on Networks: Modern ‘Contradictory’
Offensive, Defensive Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 14 August


2002, 11, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Web site, 14 August 2002.

20. “PLA to Organize First Information Warfare Units,” Mingpao News, 12 March
2003, <http://full.mingpaonews.com/20030312>.

21. Direct Information War, 170.
22. Ibid., 169.
23. Ibid.
24. Li Mingrang, “Develop the Advantage of People’s War under the Conditions
of Innovation and Informatization,” Guofang, 15 November 2003, 7-8, as translated
and downloaded from the FBIS Web site.

25. Ibid.
26. Shen Weiguang, Deciphering Information Security (Xinhua Publishing House;
July 2003), 127-241.

27. Ibid., 211.
28. Yao Youzhi, Editor-in-Chief, Warfare Strategy Theory (Liberation Army Press,
2005), 475-76.

29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 346-49.
31. Ibid., 99-101.
32. Zhang Zhibin, “Offense is Not Necessarily the Best Defense—Preliminary
Study and Thinking on the Dialectical Relationship between Offense and Defense in
Network Warfare,” Liberation Army Daily, 13 March 2007, as downloaded from the
Open Source Center web site, 9 April 2007.

33. Nathan Thornburgh, “The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies,” _Time, 29_
August 2005, <www.time.com>.

34. Vago Muradian, “China Tried to Blind U.S. Sats with Laser,” Defense News,
25 September 2006, 1.

35. Josh Rogin, “Network Attack Disables Naval War College,” Federal Computer
_Week, 30 November 2006, <www.fcw.com>._

36. Anthony Kuhn, National Public Radio, 19 January 2007, interview with Beijing
representative.

37. “Oak Ridge National Lab Reports ‘Sophisticated’ Cyber Attack Netted Per­
sonal Data on Visitors,” The Associated Press, 6 December 2007, <www.iht.com/
bin/printfriendly.php?id=8626732>.

38. “Chinese Hackers Attack Taiwan Military Computers,” Taipei P’ing-kuo Jih_pao (Internet Version), 15 May 2006, as reported in Open Source Center report_
CPP20060516310002.

39. Tim Johnson, “China Denies Cyber-Attack,” Kansas City Star, 5 September
2007, A5.

40. Ibid.
41. Simon Elegant, “Enemies at the Firewall,” Time, 19 December 2007, <www.
time.com/time>.

42. Conversation with Scott Henderson, whose book on Chinese hackers, Dark Visitor,
is forthcoming. This book is probably the best open-source work on Chinese hackers.


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