

# Behavioral Detection Strategy for Remote Service Logins and Post-Access Activity, Detection Strategy DET0269

Archived: 2026-04-02 10:38:43 UTC

## AN0750

Logon via RDP or WMI by a user account followed by uncommon command execution, file manipulation, or lateral network connections.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
TimeWindow	Correlation window between remote login and post-access activity
LogonUser	Limit to service accounts or privileged users for higher fidelity
RemoteHostList	Allowlisting known admin jumpboxes or deployment tools

## AN0751

SSH session from new source IP followed by interactive shell or privilege escalation (e.g., sudo, su) and outbound lateral connection.

### Log Sources

### Mutable Elements

Field	Description
SourceIP	Limit to new/unexpected SSH source IPs
CommandList	Flag suspicious post-SSH command patterns

## AN0752

Remote login via ARD or SSH followed by screensharingd process activity or modification of TCC-protected files.

### Log Sources

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
RemoteService	Differentiate ARD vs SSH access patterns
TargetedPath	Tunable list of sensitive directories or TCC targets

**AN0753**

Use of cloud-based bastion or VM console session followed by commands that initiate outbound SSH or RDP sessions from the cloud instance to other environments.

**Log Sources**

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
SourceAssetTag	Limit detection to cloud admin/bastion hosts
TargetPortList	Define critical remote service ports to flag

**AN0754**

vSphere API logins (vimService) or SSH to ESXi host followed by unauthorized shell commands or lateral remote logins from the ESXi host.

**Log Sources**

**Mutable Elements**

Field	Description
SessionType	Filter by DCUI, SSH, vSphere API
CommandPattern	Watch for remote access tool invocations (e.g., netcat, ssh)

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Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0269#AN0752>