

APT28, IRON TWILIGHT, SNAKEMACKEREL, Swallowtail, Group 74, Sednit, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team, Threat Group-4127, TG-4127, Forest Blizzard, FROZENLAKE, GruesomeLarch, Group G0007

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Enterprise [T1134](#) [.001 Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft](#)

[APT28](#) has used CVE-2015-1701 to access the SYSTEM token and copy it into the current process as part of privilege escalation. [\[28\]](#)

Enterprise [T1098](#) [.002 Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions](#)

[APT28](#) has used a Powershell cmdlet to grant the `ApplicationImpersonation` role to a compromised account. [\[2\]](#)

Enterprise [T1583](#) [.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains](#)

[APT28](#) registered domains imitating NATO, OSCE security websites, Caucasus information resources, and other organizations. [\[6\]\[14\]\[29\]](#)

[.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server](#)

[APT28](#) hosted phishing domains on free services for brief periods of time during campaigns. [\[26\]](#)

[.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services](#)

[APT28](#) has used newly-created Blogspot pages for credential harvesting operations. [\[29\]](#)

Enterprise [T1595](#) [.002 Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning](#)

[APT28](#) has performed large-scale scans in an attempt to find vulnerable servers. [\[30\]](#)

Enterprise [T1557](#) [.004 Adversary-in-the-Middle: Evil Twin](#)

[APT28](#) has used a Wi-Fi Pineapple to set up Evil Twin Wi-Fi Poisoning for the purposes of capturing victim credentials or planting espionage-oriented malware. [\[14\]](#)

Enterprise [T1071](#) [.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols](#)

Later implants used by [APT28](#), such as [CHOPSTICK](#), use a blend of HTTP, HTTPS, and other legitimate channels for C2, depending on module configuration. [\[6\]\[2\]](#)

[.003 Application Layer Protocol: Mail Protocols](#)

[APT28](#) has used IMAP, POP3, and SMTP for a communication channel in various implants, including using self-registered Google Mail accounts and later compromised email servers of its victims. ^{[6][2]}

Enterprise [T1560 Archive Collected Data](#)

[APT28](#) used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks. ^[3]

[.001 Archive via Utility](#)

[APT28](#) has used a variety of utilities, including WinRAR, to archive collected data with password protection. ^[2]

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) used built-in PowerShell capabilities (`Compress-Archive` cmdlet) to compress collected data. ^[27]

Enterprise [T1119 Automated Collection](#)

[APT28](#) used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks. ^[3]

Enterprise [T1547 .001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](#)

[APT28](#) has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence. ^[21]

Enterprise [T1037 .001 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script \(Windows\)](#)

An [APT28](#) loader Trojan adds the Registry key `HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript` to establish persistence. ^[31]

Enterprise [T1110 Brute Force](#)

[APT28](#) can perform brute force attacks to obtain credentials. ^{[30][21][32]}

[.001 Password Guessing](#)

[APT28](#) has used a brute-force/password-spray tooling that operated in two modes: in brute-force mode it typically sent over 300 authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several hours or days. ^[24]

[APT28](#) has also used a Kubernetes cluster to conduct distributed, large-scale password guessing attacks. ^[2]

[.003 Password Spraying](#)

[APT28](#) has used a brute-force/password-spray tooling that operated in two modes: in password-spraying mode it conducted approximately four authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several days or weeks. ^{[24][32]} [APT28](#) has also used a Kubernetes cluster to conduct distributed, large-scale password spray attacks. ^[2]

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) performed password-spray attacks against public facing services to validate credentials.^[27]

Enterprise [T1059 .001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell](#)

[APT28](#) downloads and executes PowerShell scripts and performs PowerShell commands.^{[11][21][2]}

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) used PowerShell cmdlet `Get-ChildItem` to access credentials, among other PowerShell functions deployed.^[27]

[.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell](#)

An [APT28](#) loader Trojan uses a cmd.exe and batch script to run its payload.^[31] The group has also used macros to execute payloads.^{[18][33][17][21]}

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) used `cmd.exe` for execution.^[27]

Enterprise [T1092 Communication Through Removable Media](#)

[APT28](#) uses a tool that captures information from air-gapped computers via an infected USB and transfers it to network-connected computer when the USB is inserted.^[34]

Enterprise [T1586 .002 Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts](#)

[APT28](#) has used compromised email accounts to send credential phishing emails.^[29]

Enterprise [T1584 .008 Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices](#)

[APT28](#) compromised Ubiquiti network devices to act as collection devices for credentials compromised via phishing webpages.^[26]

Enterprise [T1213 Data from Information Repositories](#)

[APT28](#) has collected files from various information repositories.^[2]

[.002 Sharepoint](#)

[APT28](#) has collected information from Microsoft SharePoint services within target networks.^[35]

Enterprise [T1005 Data from Local System](#)

[APT28](#) has retrieved internal documents from machines inside victim environments, including by using [Forfiles](#) to stage documents before exfiltration.^{[36][3][30][2]}

Enterprise [T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive](#)

[APT28](#) has collected files from network shared drives.^[2]

Enterprise [T1025 Data from Removable Media](#)

An [APT28](#) backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device. ^[34]

Enterprise [T1001 .001 Data Obfuscation: Junk Data](#)

[APT28](#) added "junk data" to each encoded string, preventing trivial decoding without knowledge of the junk removal algorithm. Each implant was given a "junk length" value when created, tracked by the controller software to allow seamless communication but prevent analysis of the command protocol on the wire. ^[6]

Enterprise [T1074 .001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging](#)

[APT28](#) has stored captured credential information in a file named pi.log. ^[34]

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) staged captured credential information in the `C:\ProgramData` directory. ^[27]

[.002 Data Staged: Remote Data Staging](#)

[APT28](#) has staged archives of collected data on a target's Outlook Web Access (OWA) server. ^[2]

Enterprise [T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits](#)

[APT28](#) has split archived exfiltration files into chunks smaller than 1MB. ^[2]

Enterprise [T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](#)

An [APT28](#) macro uses the command `certutil -decode` to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload. ^{[37][11]}

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) unarchived data using the GUI version of WinRAR. ^[27]

Enterprise [T1006 Direct Volume Access](#)

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) accessed volume shadow copies through executing `vssadmin` in order to dump the NTDS.dit file. ^[27]

Enterprise [T1561 .001 Disk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe](#)

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) used the native Microsoft utility `cipher.exe` to securely wipe files and folders – overwriting the deleted data using `cmd.exe /c cipher /W:C`. ^[27]

Enterprise [T1189 Drive-by Compromise](#)

[APT28](#) has compromised targets via strategic web compromise utilizing custom exploit kits. ^[16] [APT28](#) used reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) against government websites to redirect users to phishing webpages. ^[26]

Enterprise [T1114 .002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection](#)

[APT28](#) has collected emails from victim Microsoft Exchange servers. ^{[3][2]}

Enterprise [T1573 .001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography](#)

[APT28](#) installed a Delphi backdoor that used a custom algorithm for C2 communications. [\[13\]](#)

Enterprise [T1546 .015 Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking](#)

[APT28](#) has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate `MMDeviceEnumerator` object with a payload. [\[38\]\[13\]](#)

Enterprise [T1048 .002 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol](#)

[APT28](#) has exfiltrated archives of collected data previously staged on a target's OWA server via HTTPS. [\[2\]](#)

Enterprise [T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service](#)

[APT28](#) can exfiltrate data over Google Drive. [\[21\]](#)

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) exfiltrated data over public-facing web servers – such as Google Drive. [\[27\]](#)

Enterprise [T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application](#)

[APT28](#) has used a variety of public exploits, including CVE 2020-0688 and CVE 2020-17144, to gain execution on vulnerable Microsoft Exchange; they have also conducted SQL injection attacks against external websites. [\[14\]](#)
[\[2\]](#)

Enterprise [T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution](#)

[APT28](#) has exploited Microsoft Office vulnerability CVE-2017-0262 for execution. [\[22\]](#)

Enterprise [T1211 Exploitation for Defense Evasion](#)

[APT28](#) has used CVE-2015-4902 to bypass security features. [\[39\]\[34\]](#)

Enterprise [T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](#)

[APT28](#) has exploited CVE-2014-4076, CVE-2015-2387, CVE-2015-1701, CVE-2017-0263, and CVE-2022-38028 to escalate privileges. [\[39\]\[34\]\[22\]\[27\]](#)

Enterprise [T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services](#)

[APT28](#) exploited a Windows SMB Remote Code Execution Vulnerability to conduct lateral movement. [\[6\]\[40\]\[41\]](#)

Enterprise [T1133 External Remote Services](#)

[APT28](#) has used [Tor](#) and a variety of commercial VPN services to route brute force authentication attempts. [\[2\]](#)

Enterprise [T1083 File and Directory Discovery](#)

[APT28](#) has used [Forfiles](#) to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection. The group also searched a compromised DCCC computer for specific terms. [\[36\]\[3\]](#)

Enterprise [T1589 .001 Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials](#)

[APT28](#) has harvested user's login credentials. [\[32\]](#)

Enterprise [T1591 Gather Victim Org Information](#)

[APT28](#) has used large language models (LLMs) to gather information about satellite capabilities. [\[42\]\[43\]](#)

Enterprise [T1564 .001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories](#)

[APT28](#) has saved files with hidden file attributes. [\[18\]\[18\]](#)

[.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window](#)

[APT28](#) has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal [PowerShell](#) windows. [\[11\]\[44\]](#)

Enterprise [T1562 .004 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall](#)

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) added rules to a victim's Windows firewall to set up a series of port-forwards allowing traffic to target systems. [\[27\]](#)

Enterprise [T1070 .001 Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs](#)

[APT28](#) has cleared event logs, including by using the commands `wevtutil cl System` and `wevtutil cl Security`. [\[5\]\[3\]](#)

[.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion](#)

[APT28](#) has intentionally deleted computer files to cover their tracks, including with use of the program CCleaner. [\[3\]](#)

[.006 Indicator Removal: Timestamp](#)

[APT28](#) has performed timestomping on victim files. [\[5\]](#)

Enterprise [T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer](#)

[APT28](#) has downloaded additional files, including by using a first-stage downloader to contact the C2 server to obtain the second-stage implant. [\[39\]\[31\]\[17\]\[21\]\[2\]](#)

Enterprise [T1056 .001 Input Capture: Keylogging](#)

[APT28](#) has used tools to perform keylogging. [\[34\]\[3\]\[21\]](#)

Enterprise [T1559 .002 Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange](#)

[APT28](#) has delivered [JHUHUGIT](#) and [Koadic](#) by executing PowerShell commands through DDE in Word documents. ^{[44][45][11]}

Enterprise [T1036 Masquerading](#)

[APT28](#) has renamed the WinRAR utility to avoid detection. ^[2]

[.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](#)

[APT28](#) has changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign, and renamed a web shell instance to appear as a legitimate OWA page. ^[2]

Enterprise [T1498 Network Denial of Service](#)

In 2016, [APT28](#) conducted a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against the World Anti-Doping Agency. ^[14]

Enterprise [T1040 Network Sniffing](#)

[APT28](#) deployed the open source tool Responder to conduct NetBIOS Name Service poisoning, which captured usernames and hashed passwords that allowed access to legitimate credentials. ^{[6][40]} [APT28](#) close-access teams have used Wi-Fi pineapples to intercept Wi-Fi signals and user credentials. ^[14]

Enterprise [T1027 .013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File](#)

[APT28](#) encrypted a .dll payload using RTL and a custom encryption algorithm. [APT28](#) has also obfuscated payloads with base64, XOR, and RC4. ^{[39][37][11][18][17]}

Enterprise [T1588 .002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool](#)

[APT28](#) has obtained and used open-source tools like [Koadic](#), [Mimikatz](#), and [Responder](#). ^{[11][22][40]}

Enterprise [T1137 .002 Office Application Startup: Office Test](#)

[APT28](#) has used the Office Test persistence mechanism within Microsoft Office by adding the Registry key `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf` to execute code. ^[46]

Enterprise [T1003 OS Credential Dumping](#)

[APT28](#) regularly deploys both publicly available (ex: [Mimikatz](#)) and custom password retrieval tools on victims. ^{[47][3][14]}

[.001 LSASS Memory](#)

[APT28](#) regularly deploys both publicly available (ex: [Mimikatz](#)) and custom password retrieval tools on victims. ^{[47][3]} They have also dumped the LSASS process memory using the MiniDump function. ^[2]

[.002 Security Account Manager](#)

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) used the following commands to dump SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY hives: `reg save hklm\sam`, `reg save hklm\system`, and `reg save hklm\security`.^[27]

[.003 NTDS](#)

[APT28](#) has used the `ntdsutil.exe` utility to export the Active Directory database for credential access.^[2]

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) dumped NTDS.dit through creating volume shadow copies via `vssadmin`.^[27]

Enterprise [T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery](#)

[APT28](#) uses a module to receive a notification every time a USB mass storage device is inserted into a victim.^[34]

Enterprise [T1566 .001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment](#)

[APT28](#) sent spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office and RAR attachments.^{[37][10][11][3][22][17][21][16]}

Enterprise [T1598 Phishing for Information](#)

[APT28](#) has used spearphishing to compromise credentials.^{[32][16]}

[.003 Spearphishing Link](#)

[APT28](#) has conducted credential phishing campaigns with links that redirect to credential harvesting sites.^{[29][3][13][14][16]}

Enterprise [T1542 .003 Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit](#)

[APT28](#) has deployed a bootkit along with [Downdelph](#) to ensure its persistence on the victim. The bootkit shares code with some variants of [BlackEnergy](#).^[20]

Enterprise [T1057 Process Discovery](#)

An [APT28](#) loader Trojan will enumerate the victim's processes searching for `explorer.exe` if its current process does not have necessary permissions.^[31]

Enterprise [T1090 .001 Proxy: Internal Proxy](#)

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) used the built-in `netsh portproxy` command to create internal proxies on compromised systems.^[27]

[.002 Proxy: External Proxy](#)

[APT28](#) used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims. The group has also used a tool that acts as a proxy to allow

C2 even if the victim is behind a router. [APT28](#) has also used a machine to relay and obscure communications between [CHOPSTICK](#) and their server. [\[6\]\[39\]\[3\]](#)

[.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy](#)

[APT28](#) has routed traffic over [Tor](#) and VPN servers to obfuscate their activities. [\[21\]](#)

Enterprise [T1021 .001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol](#)

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) used RDP for lateral movement. [\[27\]](#)

[.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares](#)

[APT28](#) has mapped network drives using [Net](#) and administrator credentials. [\[2\]](#)

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) leveraged SMB to transfer files and move laterally. [\[27\]](#)

Enterprise [T1091 Replication Through Removable Media](#)

[APT28](#) uses a tool to infect connected USB devices and transmit itself to air-gapped computers when the infected USB device is inserted. [\[34\]](#)

Enterprise [T1014 Rootkit](#)

[APT28](#) has used a UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) rootkit known as [LoJax](#). [\[12\]\[48\]](#)

Enterprise [T1113 Screen Capture](#)

[APT28](#) has used tools to take screenshots from victims. [\[47\]\[49\]\[3\]\[16\]](#)

Enterprise [T1596 Search Open Technical Databases](#)

[APT28](#) has used large language models (LLMs) to assist in script development and deployment. [\[42\]\[43\]](#)

Enterprise [T1505 .003 Server Software Component: Web Shell](#)

[APT28](#) has used a modified and obfuscated version of the reGeorg web shell to maintain persistence on a target's Outlook Web Access (OWA) server. [\[2\]](#)

Enterprise [T1528 Steal Application Access Token](#)

[APT28](#) has used several malicious applications to steal user OAuth access tokens including applications masquerading as "Google Defender" "Google Email Protection," and "Google Scanner" for Gmail users. They also targeted Yahoo users with applications masquerading as "Delivery Service" and "McAfee Email Protection". [\[50\]](#)

Enterprise [T1218 .011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32](#)

[APT28](#) executed [CHOPSTICK](#) by using rundll32 commands such as `rundll32.exe "C:\Windows\twain_64.dll" .` [APT28](#) also executed a .dll for a first stage dropper using rundll32.exe. An [APT28](#) loader Trojan saved a batch script that uses rundll32 to execute a DLL payload. [\[5\]\[39\]\[11\]\[31\]\[13\]\[2\]](#)

Enterprise [T1016 .002 System Network Configuration Discovery: Wi-Fi Discovery](#)

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) collected information on wireless interfaces within range of a compromised system. [\[27\]](#)

Enterprise [T1221 Template Injection](#)

[APT28](#) used weaponized Microsoft Word documents abusing the remote template function to retrieve a malicious macro. [\[51\]](#)

Enterprise [T1199 Trusted Relationship](#)

Once [APT28](#) gained access to the DCCC network, the group then proceeded to use that access to compromise the DNC network. [\[3\]](#)

Enterprise [T1550 .001 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token](#)

[APT28](#) has used several malicious applications that abused OAuth access tokens to gain access to target email accounts, including Gmail and Yahoo Mail. [\[50\]](#)

[.002 Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash](#)

[APT28](#) has used pass the hash for lateral movement. [\[34\]](#)

Enterprise [T1204 .001 User Execution: Malicious Link](#)

[APT28](#) has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on malicious hyperlinks within emails crafted to resemble trustworthy senders. [\[14\]\[16\]](#)

[.002 User Execution: Malicious File](#)

[APT28](#) attempted to get users to click on Microsoft Office attachments containing malicious macro scripts. [\[37\]\[17\]\[16\]](#)

Enterprise [T1078 Valid Accounts](#)

[APT28](#) has used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data from a victim network. The group has specifically used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network. The group has also leveraged default manufacturer's passwords to gain initial access to corporate networks via IoT devices such as a VOIP phone, printer, and video decoder. [\[52\]\[3\]\[23\]\[2\]](#)

[.004 Cloud Accounts](#)

[APT28](#) has used compromised Office 365 service accounts with Global Administrator privileges to collect email from user inboxes.^[2]

Enterprise [T1102 .002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication](#)

[APT28](#) has used Google Drive for C2.^[21]

Enterprise [T1669 Wi-Fi Networks](#)

[APT28](#) has exploited open Wi-Fi access points for initial access to target devices using the network.^{[27][53]}

During [APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign](#), [APT28](#) established wireless connections to secure, enterprise Wi-Fi networks belonging to a target organization for initial access into the environment.^[27]

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/>