

Detection Strategy for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, Detection Strategy DET0570

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AN1571

Unusual processes (e.g., powershell.exe, excel.exe) accessing large local files and subsequently initiating HTTPS POST requests to domains associated with cloud storage services (e.g., dropbox.com, drive.google.com, box.com). Defender perspective: correlation between file reads in sensitive directories and high outbound traffic volume to known storage APIs.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

| Field | Description |
|----------------------|--|
| CloudStorageDomains | List of monitored domains for cloud services (dropbox.com, drive.google.com, onedrive.live.com). |
| ExfilVolumeThreshold | Data volume threshold (e.g., >10MB in single session) used to flag abnormal transfers. |
| UserContext | User accounts permitted to use sanctioned cloud services versus unexpected accounts. |

AN1572

Processes such as curl, wget, rclone, or custom scripts executing uploads to cloud storage endpoints. Defender perspective: detect chained events where tar/gzip is executed to compress files followed by HTTPS PUT/POST requests to known storage services.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

| Field | Description |
|--------------|---|
| AllowedTools | Known tools used legitimately for backups (rclone, gsutil). Deviations raise suspicion. |
| WorkHours | Baseline normal data transfer hours to reduce false positives. |

AN1573

Applications or scripts invoking cloud storage APIs (Dropbox sync, iCloud, Google Drive client) in unexpected contexts. Defender perspective: detect sensitive file reads by non-standard applications followed by unusual encrypted uploads to external cloud storage domains.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

| Field | Description |
|------------------|--|
| WatchedApps | Track processes that normally should not upload data (e.g., Preview, Calculator). |
| EntropyThreshold | High-entropy file uploads may indicate encrypted payloads designed for exfiltration. |

AN1574

Unusual ESXi processes (vmx, hostd) reading datastore files and generating outbound HTTPS traffic toward external cloud storage endpoints. Defender perspective: anomalous datastore activity followed by network transfers to Dropbox, AWS S3, or other storage services.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

| Field | Description |
|----------------------------|---|
| DatastoreTransferThreshold | Threshold for outbound data exfiltration from ESXi datastore files. |
| ApprovedStorageServices | Whitelist of sanctioned storage providers used by admins for backup operations. |

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0570#AN1572>