

Behavior-chain, platform-aware detection strategy for T1125 Video Capture, Detection Strategy DET0197

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AN0568

A non-standard process (or script-hosted process) loads camera/video-capture libraries (e.g., avicap32.dll, mf.dll, ksproxy.ax), opens the Camera Frame Server/device, writes video/image artifacts (e.g., .mp4/.avi/.yuv) to unusual locations, and optionally initiates outbound transfer shortly after.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
TimeWindow	Correlation window (e.g., 0–20 minutes) between device access, file creation, and egress.
AllowedProcesses	Known legitimate camera consumers (e.g., Teams.exe, zoom.exe, obs64.exe) to suppress.
VideoExtensions	List of extensions to flag (.mp4, .avi, .mov, .yuv, .mkv, .h264) – tune for your estate.
RarePathRegex	Regex for unusual storage locations (e.g., %TEMP%*, C:\Windows\Tasks*, user profile hidden dirs).
MinFileSizeMB	Minimum size to reduce FP from thumbnails/snapshots.
ParentProcessAllowList	Service/agent parents permitted to broker camera access.

AN0569

A process opens/reads /dev/video* (V4L2), performs ioctl/read loops, writes large/continuous video artifacts to disk, and/or quickly establishes outbound connections for exfiltration.

Log Sources

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
SyscallSet	Which syscalls to audit (openat, read, ioctl) – performance sensitive.
AllowedCallers	Legitimate processes (e.g., motion, Zoom, Chrome) that access /dev/video*.
VideoExtensions	List of file extensions to flag (.mp4/.avi/.mov/.mkv/.yuv/.h264).
MinContinuousReadCount	Minimum read/ioctl count to infer continuous capture.
TimeWindow	Correlate device open → file write → network exfil (e.g., 30m).

AN0570

A non-whitelisted process receives TCC camera entitlement (kTCCServiceCamera), opens AppleCamera/AVFoundation device handles, writes .mov/.mp4 artifacts to unusual locations, and/or beacons/exfiltrates soon after.

Log Sources

Data Component	Name	Channel
OS API Execution (DC0021)	macos:unifiedlog	Access decisions to kTCCServiceCamera for unexpected binaries
File Access (DC0055)	macos:endpointsecurity	open: Process opens AppleCamera/IOUSB device nodes or AVFoundation frameworks
Process Creation (DC0032)	macos:endpointsecurity	exec: Exec of ffmpeg, avfoundation-based binaries, or custom signed apps accessing camera
File Creation (DC0039)	macos:unifiedlog	Process wrote large .mov/.mp4 in user temp/hidden dirs

Mutable Elements

Field	Description
TCCAllowList	Legitimate apps (Zoom, Teams, FaceTime) that are permitted to camera.
VideoExtensions	Mov/mp4/mkv/yuv etc., tuned to environment workloads.
TimeWindow	Correlation between TCC grant → file write → network egress.
MinFileSizeMB	Reduce FP from thumbnails/snapshots.
LaunchAgentPaths	Allowed persistence paths to reduce false positives when correlating with persistence.

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0197#AN0570>