{
	"id": "1f4b5eec-556f-4174-8b24-db8ffcd1b8da",
	"created_at": "2026-11-20T02:37:26.617005Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-11-20T16:54:10.750545Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "26cc1122699757d3bd6e0abbc24cf4b1213a0d25",
	"title": "Bazuka: The Fraud Framework That Can Do It All",
	"llm_title": "Bazuka: The Fraud Framework That Can Do It All",
	"authors": "ThreatFabric",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 2981370,
	"plain_text": "https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nBazuka: The Fraud Framework That Can Do It All\n\nPublished: 2024-10-01 · Archived: 2026-11-20 02:00:20 UTC\n\nIn late October 2026, while investigating an incident involving an NFC card relay application, ThreatFabric's\n\nMobile Threat Intelligence team encountered a new, previously unknown threat: Bazuka. The research unfolded a\n\nmodular framework for fraudulent operations including LLM integration for victims' management and control.\n\nIn this article we explain the architecture of Bazuka framework, its capabilities and provide a sneak peek behind\n\nthe curtains - control panel of the fraudulent tool.\n\nContext\n\nIt all started with the investigation of yet another NFC-relay banking Trojan. With the exception of the RatOn\n\ncase, where a remote access trojan downloaded an NFC relay application, NFC trojans generally have a fairly\n\nsimple architecture: essentially, there are three components - a reader application, a card emulator application, and\n\na server connecting them. The reader and card emulator applications typically share the same codebase. From an\n\nanalysis perspective, researchers therefore only need to document a single application and possibly the control\n\npanel frontend, if one exists at all.\n\nWhen we received the first Bazuka sample, this was exactly what we expected: a simple wrapper around yet\n\nanother open-source project, perhaps with a custom network protocol added at most. However, Bazuka turned out\n\nto be an entire malware framework capable of carrying out a wide range of attacks, with the exception of\n\nautomated payments. Moreover, the framework’s capabilities include LLM integration and ADB bridging - two\n\ntechnologies that arguably represent the cutting edge of mobile cyber threats.\n\nDuring our research, we managed to uncover most of Bazuka’s components:\n\nDownloader/Dropper\n\nCore\n\n23 modules\n\nIn Bazuka, we encountered an overlay technique we had not seen before: the trojan takes a screenshot of the home\n\nscreen or lock screen and can display it as an overlay on command.\n\nKey takeaways\n\nBazuka is a full malware framework. A dropper/downloader, a core, and 23 modules cover overlays,\n\nkeylogging, 2FA and SMS interception, remote control, and crypto-address swapping.\n\nADB bridging is becoming standard in banking trojans. Bazuka might grant itself permissions covertly;\n\nwe anticipate that malware in general might use it to deploy modules in a way that allows for surviving\n\neven if the host application is removed.\n\nLLMs are now part of the criminal toolkit. AI agents inside the control panel help operators pick out\n\nvictims of interest and manage infections at scale.\n\nPage 1 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nDistribution is built to scale, including intention to go via Google Play. Traffers lure victims with\n\nthemes like adult content, while the dropper is configured with minimal permissions to potentially help it\n\npass Google Play review.\n\nTechnical analysis\n\nDistribution\n\nDuring our analysis of the control panel, we found interface elements for creating accounts for traffers -\n\ncybercriminals responsible for attracting victims and getting them to download trojans.\n\nWe also found dropper builder settings that specify minimal permissions in the manifest (without access to the\n\nAccessibility Services API).\n\nPage 2 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nThis is done specifically to make it easier for the resulting APK to (potentially) pass Google Play’s review\n\nprocess. This intention by the authors is proved by other parts of the control panel, while we have not seen any\n\nsigns of it being a real case. In any way, this suggests at least two distribution channels:\n\nThrough traffers, who create dedicated landing pages and attract victims under a particular pretext (like\n\nIPTV apps). Eager to access the promised content, victims eventually agree to download the file.\n\nThrough Google Play. Traffers may also participate in this scheme to bring in more victims, but Google\n\nhosts the dropper. And, of course, installing the dropper this way is much easier than downloading it from a\n\ntraffer’s website.\n\nWe were able to document the first distribution channel by finding a file on VirusTotal with the SHA256 hash\n\nf046b50166c8229b49839eeebcc7fd14bf3f198e4ec1bfde8a5b271e1407dec5. The original APK filename had\n\nhelpfully been preserved during upload: TikTok18-Dropper-tiktok18-premium-1793332000-daf6efe2.apk.\n\nAs the filename shows, the cybercriminals used adult content as a lure: TikTok18+ is currently a very common\n\ntheme used by various groups.\n\nWe identified two variants of the Bazuka framework’s modus operandi:\n\nA dropper (SHA256: f046b50166c8229b49839eeebcc7fd14bf3f198e4ec1bfde8a5b271e1407dec5)\n\ndownloaded the next stage, which was a separate APK.\n\nA downloader (SHA256: 4d572669d6000304a692874c1583021dfdb4f2f113ea487e470f7e4c486e503a)\n\ndirectly downloaded the payload core.\n\nAt the first stage, the victim interacts with either a dropper or a downloader.\n\nPage 3 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nThe dropper asks the victim for permission to install applications from third-party sources, then downloads and\n\ninstalls an APK through the PackageManager session mechanism. In the dropper’s code, the APK being installed\n\nis referred to as the stager, and the package launched by the dropper is named com.tiktok.premium.pro.\n\nWe were unable to obtain the stager at the time of our research.\n\nWe suspect that the stager may be similar to the downloader in our possession (SHA256:\n\n4d572669d6000304a692874c1583021dfdb4f2f113ea487e470f7e4c486e503a).\n\nIts purpose is to download the core and whichever modules are immediately needed for a particular campaign. In\n\nthe case of 4d572669d6000304a692874c1583021dfdb4f2f113ea487e470f7e4c486e503a, the core and the tapread-\n\nPage 4 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nnfc_module module were downloaded automatically, as this was an NFC relay attack.\n\nAt the second stage, the core and modules are downloaded and launched. Both the core and the modules are DEX\n\nfiles, which the stager loads using InMemoryDexClassLoader. In the case of\n\n4d572669d6000304a692874c1583021dfdb4f2f113ea487e470f7e4c486e503a, the stager downloads the core and\n\nloads the following classes from it:\n\ncom.support.assistant.network.DualWebSocketManager. Calls its connect method.\n\ncom.support.assistant.network.WireSessionManager. Calls its setOverrides method, passing two\n\nidentifiers: 7e8f8f2be55855a86ee120382fa4cbdd851f958a06543da80fffa424b89555df and 14e263bd957d.\n\ncom.support.assistant.network.ModuleLoader. Calls its loadModule method with nfc_module and a URL\n\nfor the NFC module, hardcoded in the stager, as arguments.\n\nAt the third stage, the core starts and establishes a connection to the server. It collects extensive information about\n\nthe device and sends it to the server, then waits for commands from the command-and-control server.\n\nAt the fourth stage, additional modules are downloaded.\n\nOnce the core and required modules are loaded, Bazuka operates as a keylogger and a classic overlay trojan,\n\nmonitoring the text entered by the victim and displaying an overlay at the right moment. All functionality is\n\ncontrolled by commands from C2.\n\nFramework full structure\n\nPage 5 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nThe Core\n\nBazuka’s core maintains communication with C2, loads additional DEX modules, dispatches commands and\n\nsystem events, collects device information, and manages permission acquisition and component updates.\n\nThe core performs a quick assessment of the device’s threat level using information from the Build class, sensor\n\nqueries, the presence of a debugger or security solutions, and battery status.\n\nCuriously, the check for security solutions relies on the presence of packages that are no longer available on\n\nGoogle Play.\n\nA more detailed assessment is performed within the system_checker module.\n\nThe core requests permissions itself and grants them automatically in two ways:\n\nThrough Accessibility.\n\nThrough ADB shell commands.\n\nImportant components of the core include mechanisms for enabling Wireless Debugging and completing the\n\npairing process. The core can open the system settings screen, find the relevant menu, enable Developer options,\n\nand then enable Wireless Debugging. When this mode is enabled, it also intercepts the PIN, which is then used to\n\nestablish a TLS connection to the ADB daemon.\n\nThe core can counter detection by Google Play. It disables the protection component through Accessibility.\n\nThe core contains an overlay mechanism used to obtain permissions and access to the Accessibility API.\n\nAccessibility access is obtained in the following ways:\n\nBy starting an activity with the android.settings.ACCESSIBILITY_SETTINGS intent and flags set to\n\n268435456.\n\nBy attempting to modify the enabled_accessibility_services secure setting.\n\nThrough the self_adb module using the rebind_accessibility command.\n\nThrough the downloader/dropper by sending the com.guidocool.cryptomanager.action.A11Y_REBIND\n\nbroadcast.\n\nThe core supports device profiles downloaded from C2. These profiles change the behavior of the automated\n\ntapping used to obtain permissions.\n\nInterestingly, the core searches for interface elements in Russian, English, Chinese, and Japanese.\n\nThe core communicates with C2 over two WebSocket channels: Control and Data. Frames are encrypted using\n\nChaCha20-Poly1305. Encryption keys are rotated, stored locally in SharedPreferences, and sent separately to C2\n\nas telemetry.\n\nThe Control channel carries commands, while the Data channel is used for data exfiltration, including screen\n\ncapture streams from the optics module.\n\nPage 6 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nAfter opening the Control socket, the bot sends a large block of device information, including ThreatLevel,\n\nallowing the operator to assess how attractive the victim is as a target within seconds of the bot starting.\n\nThe core implements a self-destruct mechanism that clears local storage and deletes the database. It also disables\n\nthe application completely using setApplicationEnabledSetting(packageName, 3, 1);.\n\nThe core can carry out attacks on its own: its code includes a mechanism for collecting notifications from\n\nmessaging and 2FA applications. However, in most cases, malicious functionality is spread across modules. For\n\nexample, the core includes a mechanism for processing clipboard contents using getPrimaryClip, but the\n\nintercepted data is still forwarded to the clip_monitor module.\n\nThe core handles both its own commands and commands for modules. Commands are placed in queues according\n\nto priority, with the highest priority commands executed first. For example, enableUninstallProtection has the\n\nhighest priority.\n\nThe core can download and load modules, and also exposes methods used by those modules. It acts as a proxy\n\nbetween modules and forwards C2 commands to them. The ModuleLoader component downloads a DEX file and\n\npasses it to InMemoryDexClassLoader. In this flow, the module is loaded directly from a byte array, without first\n\nsaving the DEX to a file. Through the core’s HostBridge component, a module gains access to the Accessibility\n\nservice, network functions, shared storage, the result of the MediaProjection permission request, and calls to other\n\nmodules. Events returned by modules are received by ModuleEventRelay, which selects the channel and format\n\nfor transmission.\n\nModules\n\nModule  Description\n\ncall_forwarding Manages call forwarding through USSD commands\n\nSpoofs cryptocurrency wallet addresses in the clipboard. It detects BTC, ETH, TRC20,\nclip_monitor\nand SOL addresses and replaces them with specified addresses.\n\ncontacts Retrieves the victim’s contact list, including names and phone numbers.\n\nManages the device. Many of its commands use the ADB bridge and are executed as\ndevice_control\nshell commands.\n\nfile_manager Provides access to the file system.\n\nPage 7 of 15\n\ninput_recorder\n\nlocation\n\nmedia\n\noem_power\n\noptics\n\npreflight\n\nproxy\n\npush\n\nscreen_control\n\nself_adb\n\nsession_ui\n\nsmsmessage\n\nsystem_checker\n\ntapread-\n\nnfc_module\n\ntoast\n\ntwofa\n\nuninstall_shield\n\nussd\n\nBackend analysis\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nThis module is a keylogger. It uses regular expressions to identify bank card numbers,\n\nwallet addresses, and passwords in user input. It also captures all entered text when a\n\ntarget application is in the foreground.\n\nDetermines the victim’s location using GPS, cell tower positioning, and Wi-Fi.\n\nCaptures photos and streams camera video and microphone audio.\n\nOpens system and OEM settings for power saving, background operation, and autostart.\n\nThis module is responsible for remote control, screencasting, and phishing overlays.\n\nPerforms preliminary checks of the runtime environment.\n\nImplements a reverse TCP proxy, allowing an infected device to act as an intermediary\n\nfor network connections.\n\nCreates and manages local Android notifications.\n\nCaptures the lock screen PIN, text password, and unlock pattern through Accessibility.\n\nImplements an embedded ADB client.\n\nDisplays phishing HTML overlays.\n\nThis module handles SMS: it reads stored messages, monitors incoming messages,\n\nextracts potential verification codes, sends SMS messages, and attempts to delete\n\nmessages from the device.\n\nThis module checks the runtime environment and implements anti-analysis measures.\n\nInteracts with contactless bank cards.\n\nDisplays text messages on the device’s screen.\n\nCaptures one-time verification codes.\n\nThe module counters attempts to uninstall or force-stop the application.\n\nThis module sends USSD requests from the victim’s device and receives responses from\n\nthe mobile operator.\n\nDuring our investigation, we found that the server addresses hardcoded in the samples pointed to Cloudflare.\n\nSubdomains of brokerok[.]org were embedded both in the trojan’s code and in the certificate bundled with the\n\ndownloader:\n\nPage 8 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nc2ws.brokerok[.]org\n\nc2data.brokerok[.]org\n\nc2proxy.brokerok[.]org\n\nc2api.brokerok[.]org\n\nThe domain name is curious: “brokerok” could be a combination of “broker” and “OK,” or an affectionate\n\ndiminutive of the Russian word “брокер” (“broker”).\n\nOverall, this was already enough to analyze the control panel, but we wanted to make sure there were no other\n\nservers beyond those behind Cloudflare.\n\nThere turned out to be two more servers:\n\n95.181.213[.]21 — this server was located in Moscow and hosted by ONE DASH VPS hosting. Curiously,\n\npublicly available sources pointed to a different organization: LLC VEKTOR AITI TEKHNOLOGII. As it\n\nturned out, this company was undergoing bankruptcy proceedings while also owning the One Dash\n\ntrademark. VEKTOR AITI TEKHNOLOGII and ONE DASH shared the same director.\n\n170.168.61[.]117, gargona[.]cash — this server was located in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and hosted by\n\na different provider, GTHost.\n\nThis address was embedded in the certificate bundled with the dropper\n\nf046b50166c8229b49839eeebcc7fd14bf3f198e4ec1bfde8a5b271e1407dec5.\n\nAt the time of our research, 95.181.213.21 was already offline, while 170.168.61.117 was operational and\n\nresponding to requests.\n\nServer port configuration:\n\nPort Service\n\n8082 Control panel over HTTP\n\n8445 Control panel over HTTPS\n\n8443 Bot C2\n\n8444 Bot C2 data channel\n\nThe control panel consists of a frontend (HTML, CSS, and JavaScript) and a backend. The panel itself states that\n\nthe backend is based on Node.js, but we were unable to verify this: the server’s response headers contain no\n\nPage 9 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\ntelltale signs of Node.js.\n\nThe panel is full of images and videos generated by AI.\n\nIt was not fully translated to English– some UI elements were still on Russian.\n\nPage 10 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nPerhaps its most unusual feature is a console that allows various commands to be executed through the bot.\n\nAn interesting section of the control panel is its integration with language models. It supports both locally hosted\n\nmodels (running on a neighboring server) and large models accessed through an API. Interestingly, one of the\n\nPage 11 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nsample prompts was “Спроси: почему тело оффлайн? / статус / integrity / score / grant-стратег” (“Ask: why is\n\nthe body offline? / status / integrity / score / grant strategist”). The text is in Russian and includes the slang term\n\n“тело” (“body”). The example also shows that the operator can request a score, indicating how attractive the\n\nvictim is as an attack target. There is also an option to obtain a strategy for clicking through permission prompts.\n\nThere is, however, one detail that comes up quite often in the world of financial crime.\n\nAll of the panel’s code is accessible without authentication, meaning that anyone can examine the capabilities\n\navailable to the bot operator in considerable detail simply by visiting the frontend website. This is not the first\n\ntime we have encountered this, and it gives the impression that cybercriminals are becoming less concerned about\n\nresearchers being able to easily uncover the panel’s functionality. What matters is that access to victim data\n\nremains protected by authentication on the backend.\n\nNevertheless, it would be more reasonable to regard this as a misconfiguration and a lack of professionalism on\n\nthe developer’s part.\n\nConclusions\n\nIn Bazuka’s case, the cybercriminals put considerable effort into developing the framework, even accounting for\n\nthe likely use of LLMs. And since we are already seeing the first attempts to use it in the wild, the product has\n\nfound a buyer. On the other hand, despite its many modules and functions, Bazuka differs little from other modern\n\nthreats in terms of capabilities. But one thing can be said with confidence: ADB bridging is becoming a standard\n\nfeature of modern banking trojans. While it is not there yet for Bazuka and its current architecture, this is a very\n\nconcerning sign, as it allows a malware to obtain various privileges covertly and deploy independent modules that\n\ncan survive removal of the host application. Another equally concerning feature is the use of LLM chats directly\n\nwithin the control panel. AI agents are used to identify victims of interest.\n\nIt was somewhat surprising to see that the framework’s modules, as well as the dropper, were unobfuscated,\n\ndespite references to hardening in the control panel. Either the buyer did not use it, or the feature is unfinished.\n\nPage 12 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nAnd perhaps the most amusing part was once again seeing a completely exposed control panel frontend—a sign\n\nthat the developers of web components for mobile threats still have little understanding of basic computer security\n\nprinciples. Although the backend remained protected by authentication, some APIs still returned results when they\n\nshould not have.\n\nAppendix\n\nFile hashes\n\nDropper/Downloader\n\n4d572669d6000304a692874c1583021dfdb4f2f113ea487e470f7e4c486e503a\n\nf046b50166c8229b49839eeebcc7fd14bf3f198e4ec1bfde8a5b271e1407dec5\n\nThe Core\n\n3cb8711a51331123247476eef768c435d6286a21cd8ac5479a6276349632c82b\n\nModules\n\nModule name\n\ncall_forwarding.dex\n\nclip_monitor.dex\n\ncontacts.dex\n\ndevice_control.dex\n\nfile_manager.dex\n\ninput_recorder.dex\n\nlocation.dex\n\nSHA256 Hash\n\nc08a5f3df1693b03540db8c6c001b5e7f98ea6121ad4aca9c6904c798f4f4635\n\n84849921d229c4e6c1a43af86582bff7560e938e96ad8b01b0ff13dafe559757\n\nffc35c48d8a5cb1ee3e5bdc80e0df3e8509e8dd840edd0b9fb0ff5d5880834d0\n\n3da80bbcf6c6e7ff117db4cdfe1422375ecf1db97b61574359f97a1da43566ae\n\n7361a1ad372367dfc11421385632586da4aaf164c41f67e0acb2ccdb7931e3c1\n\n910911b7d1be3f67c926067e923ba86be6100366e52f0fe30484176353bf1701\n\n38bf5b694512cf14620edc0af700c08e7570fa5a20b4c3c052c7fe8823b2ec5f\n\nPage 13 of 15\n\nmedia.dex\n\noem_power.dex\n\noptics.dex\n\npreflight.dex\n\nproxy.dex\n\npush.dex\n\nscreen_control.dex\n\nself_adb.dex\n\nsession_ui.dex\n\nsmsmessage.dex\n\nsystem_checker.dex\n\ntapread-nfc_module.dex\n\ntoast.dex\n\ntwofa.dex\n\nuninstall_shield.dex\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nb97b3ca1fdce56ae41418b287ca0e97d93ea16ec7b9182bdde459bba8b09f661\n\nd0fc542db2602d3a881c825c4d58e5ae34db054496d64c9185a84dceab30a850\n\n5cf38406fbed48fe110bcf1e84314429e1f649a2539c00b78216a5808fb53aa0\n\nde97f4864e94eb9fecd018d51c36fc0a2e0d3a67e9bb83ab0e5ac29ad101f292\n\nb7987e06d515fa06751a014a034b680f5a2c185bf0eb1fcf76c29b8626527d53\n\n2cc693857f47758e974c3ee928a4fe0fdba444b7efe5a284dcfc0d3b47429275\n\n4dcad3a1547c72d08ccb86dc393e14935c7f06ebe3ca63ba30e51b98ab4930e1\n\n1c29e14001edcfc548e1ae43572aa17f91ad89ce09a0e9028737077d7af97d30\n\nd0ba986440b06c4b587690acd3e594cc674c82408cd4f5c59c7f6675a2b4d9c0\n\n0785f8ca820ccfb62be61ac4bd55fd5295a771cab9e4cd91fc4eb1e3c43af3db\n\nac57a003ad4464ac357ae78e8e4eb24aae9d8442545129f82ad683efa1b2ad99\n\n5be63e04a98988d8d15d12cdf2af8cd6b1b6b8681e511587bb1a22ebcb32583f\n\nac34c61cb7368ba4409311a7492bf14316e1cee1f2984955005915d6ec7336f3\n\nc181d5c6c098f9f4ac6b10e4b1d69a0278bb3e07f260d0013244113c8504f39a\n\nadf9a4689e4c178a8c8fedef5e0bdf7be6ab443264125efabfadd8e1594bd471\n\nPage 14 of 15\n\nhttps://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nussd.dex 8ee9d88db8874662c7743bb0f7d06e852c372b2bdb1846a12afb71a62b8f0a7b\n\nSource: https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/bazuka-the-fraud-framework-that-can-do-it-all\n\nPage 15 of 15",
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