

# MAR-10135536-3 - HIDDEN COBRA RAT/Worm | CISA

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## Summary

### Description

This submission includes four unique files. The first is an installer for additional malware: a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) and a malicious Dynamic Link Library (DLL) that functions as a Server Message Block (SMB) Worm. The fourth file is another SMB worm in the form of a Windows 32-bit executable.

Both SMB worms attempt to spread locally and to random IP addresses on the public Internet by attempting to brute force vulnerable systems using a built-in list of common passwords. The RAT included with the SMB worm provides the attacker with the ability to deliver additional malware, run local commands, and exfiltrate data.

**As of May 31, 2018, this report has been updated to correct the email addresses used by Wmmvsvc.dll** (ea46ed5aed90cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781).

**For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see:**

- [MAR-10135536-3.stix](#)

### Emails (2)

misswang8107@gmail.com

redhat@gmail.com

### Submitted Files (4)

077d9e0e12357d27f70c336239e961a7049971446f7a3f10268d9439ef67885 (4731CBAEE7ACA37B596E38690160A7...)

a1c483b0ee740291b91b11e18dd05f0a460127acfc19d47b446d11cd0e26d717 (scardprv.dll)

ea46ed5aed90cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781 (Wmmvsvc.dll)

fe7d35d19af5f5ae2939457a06868754b8bdd022e1ff5bdbe4e7c135c48f9a16 (298775B04A166FF4B8FBD3609E7169...)

## Findings

**077d9e0e12357d27f70c336239e961a7049971446f7a3f10268d9439ef67885**

### Tags

backdoortrojanworm

### Details

<b>Name</b>	4731CBAEE7ACA37B596E38690160A749
<b>Size</b>	208896 bytes
<b>Type</b>	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
<b>MD5</b>	4731cbaee7aca37b596e38690160a749
<b>SHA1</b>	80fac6361184a3e24b33f6acb8688a6b7276b0f2

<b>SHA256</b>	077d9e0e12357d27f7f0c336239e961a7049971446f7a3f10268d9439ef67885
<b>SHA512</b>	9fdc1bf087d3e2fa80ff4ed749b11a2b3f863bed7a59850f6330fc1467c38eed052eee0337d2f82f9fe8e145f68199b966ae3c08f7ad1475b665bel
<b>ssdeep</b>	6144:M6atGpHk4NdSksOBbNUyb4ajb1TWiYW9ebYwtJEGLYMYR4:Msdk4NdSksOv
<b>Entropy</b>	7.731026

Antivirus

<b>AVG</b>	BackDoor.Generic14.ARHX
<b>Ahnlab</b>	Trojan/Win32.Npkon
<b>Avira</b>	BDS/Joanap.A.11
<b>BitDefender</b>	Gen:Variant.Barys.57573
<b>ClamAV</b>	Win.Trojan.Agent-1388737
<b>Cyren</b>	W32/Zegost.AA.gen!Eldorado
<b>ESET</b>	Win32/Scadprv.A trojan
<b>Emsisoft</b>	Gen:Variant.Barys.57573 (B)
<b>F-secure</b>	Gen:Variant.Barys.57573
<b>Filseclab</b>	Worm.Agent.age.ebvv
<b>Ikarus</b>	Worm.Win32.Agent
<b>K7</b>	Backdoor ( 04c4b9d11 )
<b>McAfee</b>	W32/FunCash!worm
<b>Microsoft Security Essentials</b>	Backdoor:Win32/Joanap.J!dha
<b>NANOAV</b>	Trojan.Win32.Agent.crilzb
<b>Quick Heal</b>	Backdoor.Joanap
<b>Sophos</b>	Mal/EncPk-AGS
<b>Symantec</b>	Trojan.Gen.2
<b>Systweak</b>	trojan.agent
<b>TrendMicro</b>	BKDR_JOANAP.AC
<b>TrendMicro House Call</b>	BKDR_JOANAP.AC
<b>Vir.IT eXplorer</b>	Backdoor.Win32.Generic.ARHX
<b>VirusBlokAda</b>	Worm.Agent
<b>Zillya!</b>	Worm.Agent.Win32.3373
<b>nProtect</b>	Worm/W32.Agent.208896.AK

Yara Rules

<b>hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara</b>	<pre>rule Enfal_Generic { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "BRAMBUL,,JOANAP" MD5_1 = "483B95B1498B615A1481345270BFF87D" MD5_2 = "4731CBAAEE7ACA37B596E38690160A749" MD5_3 = "CD60FD107BAACCAFA6C24C1478C345C8" MD5_4 = "298775B04A166FF4B8FBD3609E716945" Info = "Detects Hidden Cobra SMB Worm / RAT" strings: \$s0 = {6D737373636172647072762E6178} \$s1 = {6E3472626872697138393076393D3032333D30312A2628542D30513332354A314E3B4C4B} \$s2 = {72656468617440676D61696C2E636F6D} \$s3 = {6D69737377616E673831303740676D61696C2E636F6D} \$s4 = {534232755365435632564474} \$s5 = {794159334D6559704275415756426341} \$s6 = {705641325941774242347A41346167664B6232614F7A4259} \$s7 =</pre>
---------------------------------------	---

```
{AE8591916D586DE4F6FB8EE2F0BBF1F9} $s8 =
{F96D5DD36D6D9A87DD6D506D6D6D516D} $s9 =
{43616E6E6F74206372656174652072656D6F74652066696C652E} $s10 =
{43616E6E6F74206F70656E2072656D6F74652066696C65} $s11 =
{663D547D75128D85FCFEFFFF5056} $s12 =
{663D547D75128D85FCFEFFFF5056E88C060000E9A900000663D557D7512} $s13 =
{663D567D750F8D85FCFEFFFF5056E891070000EB7C663D577D} $s14 =
{3141327A3342347935433678374438773945307624465F754774487349724A71} $s15 =
{393032356A6864686F333965686532} condition: ($s0) or ($s1) or ($s2) or ($s3) or ($s4 and
$s5 and $s6) or ($s7 and $s8) or ($s9 and $s10 and $s11) or ($s12 and $s13) or ($s14 and $s15)
}
```

**ssdeep Matches**

No matches found.

**PE Metadata**

<b>Compile Date</b>	2011-09-14 01:53:24-04:00
<b>Import Hash</b>	e8cd12071a8e823ebc434c8ee3e23203

**PE Sections**

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
bf69e0e64bda28b31e3c2134e1d696	header	4096	0.658046
27f1df91dc992ababc89460f771a6026	.text	24576	6.227301
249e10a4ad0a58c3db84eb2f69db5db5	.rdata	4096	4.367702
88b5582d4d361c92e9234abf0942ed9e	.data	4096	2.546586
a18b7869b3bfd4a2ef0d03c96fa09221	.rsrc	172032	7.969250

**Packers/Compilers/Cryptors**

**Process List**

Process	PID	PPID
077d9e0e12357d27f7f0c336239e961a7049971446f7a3f10268d9439ef67885.exe	2628	(2588)

**Relationships**

077d9e0e12...	Dropped	a1c483b0ee740291b91b11e18dd05f0a460127acfc19d47b446d11cd0e26d717
077d9e0e12...	Dropped	ea46ed5aed900cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781

**Description**

This 32-bit Windows executable file drops two malicious applications.

The first (a1c483b0ee740291b91b11e18dd05f0a460127acfc19d47b446d11cd0e26d717) is a fully functioning RAT.

The second application (ea46ed5aed900cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781) is a SMB worm that will spread to local subnets and external networks.

**a1c483b0ee740291b91b11e18dd05f0a460127acfc19d47b446d11cd0e26d717**

**Tags**

backdoorbotrojanworm

**Details**

Name	scardpriv.dll
------	---------------

<b>Size</b>	77824 bytes
<b>Type</b>	PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
<b>MD5</b>	4613f51087f01715bf9132c704aea2c2
<b>SHA1</b>	6b1ddf0e63e04146d68cd33b0e18e668b29035c4
<b>SHA256</b>	a1c483b0ee740291b91b11e18dd05f0a460127acfc19d47b446d11cd0e26d717
<b>SHA512</b>	37fa5336d1554557250e4a3bcb4ccfca79f4873264cb161dee340d35a2f8f17f7853fe942809bb343ac1eae0a37122b5e8fd703a9b820ec96abb6
<b>ssdeep</b>	768:qtT2AxNtcgpqLepcy2y6/chYdP8KuSFM+Cs5CBaho9S4AJKqBz8MZdVsrQVBnVGa:qwONtBqL1dDMrs5CN9S4A3HOYBnVL
<b>Entropy</b>	6.138177

**Antivirus**

<b>AVG</b>	Agent3.BAPF
<b>Ahnlab</b>	Trojan/Win32.Dllbot
<b>Avira</b>	TR/Gendal.6762100
<b>BitDefender</b>	Gen:Variant.Graftor.Elzob.3935
<b>ClamAV</b>	Win.Trojan.Agent-1388765
<b>ESET</b>	a variant of Win32/Scadprv.A trojan
<b>Emsisoft</b>	Gen:Variant.Graftor.Elzob.3935 (B)
<b>F-secure</b>	Gen:Variant.Graftor.Elzob.3935
<b>Filseclab</b>	Worm.Agent.ago.thfj.dll
<b>Ikarus</b>	Worm.Win32.Agent
<b>K7</b>	Trojan ( 0001659c1 )
<b>McAfee</b>	W32/FunCash!worm
<b>Microsoft Security Essentials</b>	Backdoor:Win32/Joanap.B!dha
<b>NANOAV</b>	Trojan.Win32.Agent.cwccco
<b>Quick Heal</b>	Backdoor.Duzzer.A5
<b>Sophos</b>	Mal/Generic-L
<b>Symantec</b>	Backdoor.Joanap
<b>Systweak</b>	malware.gen-20120501
<b>TrendMicro</b>	BKDR_JOANAP.AC
<b>TrendMicro House Call</b>	BKDR_JOANAP.AC
<b>Vir.IT eXplorer</b>	Trojan.Win32.Agent3.BAPF
<b>VirusBlokAda</b>	Worm.Agent
<b>Zillya!</b>	Worm.Agent.Win32.5702
<b>nProtect</b>	Worm/W32.Agent.77824.CJ

**Yara Rules**

<b>hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara</b>	rule Enfal_Generic { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "BRAMBUL,,JOANAP" MD5_1 = "483B95B1498B615A1481345270BFF87D" MD5_2 = "4731CBAAE7ACA37B596E38690160A749" MD5_3 = "CD60FD107BAACCAFA6C24C1478C345C8" MD5_4 = "298775B04A166FF4B8FBD3609E716945" Info = "Detects Hidden Cobra SMB Worm / RAT" strings: \$s0 = {6D737373636172647072762E6178} \$s1 =
---------------------------------------	---

```
{6E3472626872697138393076393D303233D30312A2628542D30513332354A314E3B4C4B}
$s2 = {72656468617440676D61696C2E636F6D} $s3 =
{6D69737377616E673831303740676D61696C2E636F6D} $s4 =
{534232755365435632564474} $s5 = {794159334D6559704275415756426341} $s6 =
{705641325941774242347A41346167664B6232614F7A4259} $s7 =
{AE8591916D586DE4F6FB8EE2F0BBF1F9} $s8 =
{F96D5DD36D6D9A87DD6D506D6D6D516D} $s9 =
{43616E6E6F74206372656174652072656D6F74652066696C65E} $s10 =
{43616E6E6F74206F70656E2072656D6F74652066696C65} $s11 =
{663D547D75128D85FCFEFFFF5056} $s12 =
{663D547D75128D85FCFEFFFF5056E88C060000E9A900000663D557D7512} $s13 =
{663D567D750F8D85FCFEFFFF5056E891070000EB7C663D577D} $s14 =
{3141327A3342347935433678374438773945307624465F754774487349724A71} $s15 =
{393032356A6864686F333965686532} condition: ($s0) or ($s1) or ($s2) or ($s3) or ($s4 and
$s5 and $s6) or ($s7 and $s8) or ($s9 and $s10 and $s11) or ($s12 and $s13) or ($s14 and $s15)
}
```

**ssdeep Matches**

No matches found.

**PE Metadata**

<b>Compile Date</b>	2011-09-14 01:38:38-04:00
<b>Import Hash</b>	f6f7b2e00921129d18061822197111cd

**PE Sections**

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
c745765d5ae0458d76c721b8a82eca52	header	4096	0.763991
f16ff24a6d95e0e0711eccae4283bbe5	.text	40960	6.506011
b89bb8a288d739a27d7021183336413c	.rdata	20480	6.655349
fdc7ede94211c9d653bd8cc776feb8be	.data	4096	4.326483
56dc69f697f36158eefedde895f39b6	.rsrc	4096	0.613739
20601cf5d6aeb9837dcc1747847c5a2	.reloc	4096	4.068756

**Packers/Compilers/Cryptors**

Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL

**Relationships**

a1c483b0ee...	Dropped_By	077d9e0e12357d27f7f0c336239e961a7049971446f7a3f10268d9439ef67885
---------------	------------	--

**Description**

This 32-bit Windows DLL is written to disk and then loaded by the file "4731CBAEE7ACA37B596E38690160A749".

This malware has been identified as a RAT, providing a remote actor with the ability to exfiltrate data, drop and run secondary payloads, and provide proxy capabilities on a compromised Windows device. The malware binds to port 443 and listens for incoming connections from a remote operator, using the Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) encryption algorithm to protect communications with its Command and Control (C2).

The malware also creates a log entry in a file named "mssccardprv.ax", located in the %WINDIR%\system32 folder. The log entry includes the victim's Internet Protocol (IP) address, host name, and current system time.

**ea46ed5aed90cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781**

**Tags**

backdoorbotrojanworm

Details

<b>Name</b>	Wmmvsvc.dll
<b>Size</b>	91664 bytes
<b>Type</b>	PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
<b>MD5</b>	e86c2f4fc88918246bf697b6a404c3ea
<b>SHA1</b>	9b7609349a4b9128b9db8f11ac1c77728258862c
<b>SHA256</b>	ea46ed5aed900cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781
<b>SHA512</b>	f6097c66a526ba7a3c918b1c7fccae03c812046d642a4adb62ee7a24cbcee889c0348020ae7e2e82ee3f284b311f049ed596edb22b90153cad11
<b>ssdeep</b>	768:9eY/pEwKWcwP/bY4XxlGLup3Tq1LpDLJkDcw3f9zj:MitnU4viJJDw3Z
<b>Entropy</b>	3.156854

Antivirus

<b>AVG</b>	PSW.Generic9.ACQQ
<b>Ahnlab</b>	Trojan/Win32.Dllbot
<b>Avira</b>	BDS/Joanap.A.8
<b>BitDefender</b>	Gen:Variant.Symmi.49274
<b>ClamAV</b>	Win.Trojan.Agent-1388727
<b>Cyren</b>	W32/Trojan.WXKV-0327
<b>ESET</b>	a variant of Win32/Agent.NJF worm
<b>Emsisoft</b>	Gen:Variant.Symmi.49274 (B)
<b>F-secure</b>	Gen:Variant.Symmi.49274
<b>Filseclab</b>	Trojan.Agent.NJF.cuzy.dll
<b>Ikarus</b>	Worm.Win32.Agent
<b>K7</b>	Trojan ( 00515bda1 )
<b>McAfee</b>	Generic PWS.tr
<b>Microsoft Security Essentials</b>	Backdoor:Win32/Joanap.A!dha
<b>NANOAV</b>	Trojan.Win32.Agent.cqilax
<b>NetGate</b>	Trojan.Win32.Malware
<b>Quick Heal</b>	Backdoor.Joanap
<b>Sophos</b>	Mal/Generic-L
<b>Symantec</b>	W32.Brambul
<b>Vir.IT eXplorer</b>	Trojan.Win32.Generic.ACQQ
<b>VirusBlokAda</b>	Worm.Agent
<b>Zillya!</b>	Worm.Agent.Win32.3549
<b>nProtect</b>	Worm/W32.Agent.91664

Yara Rules

<b>hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara</b>	rule Enfal_Generic { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "BRAMBUL,,JOANAP" MD5_1 = "483B95B1498B615A1481345270BFF87D" MD5_2 = "4731CBAEE7ACA37B596E38690160A749" MD5_3 = "CD60FD107BAACCAFA6C24C1478C345C8" MD5_4 = "298775B04A166FF4B8FBD3609E716945" Info = "Detects Hidden Cobra SMB Worm / RAT"
---------------------------------------	---

```
strings: $s0 = {6D737373636172647072762E6178} $s1 =
{6E3472626872697138393076393D3032333D30312A2628542D30513332354A314E3B4C4B}
$s2 = {72656468617440676D61696C2E636F6D} $s3 =
{6D69737377616E673831303740676D61696C2E636F6D} $s4 =
{534232755365435632564474} $s5 = {794159334D6559704275415756426341} $s6 =
{705641325941774242347A41346167664B6232614F7A4259} $s7 =
{AE8591916D586DE4F6FB8EE2F0BBF1F9} $s8 =
{F96D5DD36D6D9A87DD6D506D6D6D516D} $s9 =
{43616E6E6F74206372656174652072656D6F74652066696C652E} $s10 =
{43616E6E6F74206F70656E2072656D6F74652066696C65} $s11 =
{663D547D75128D85FCFEFFFF5056} $s12 =
{663D547D75128D85FCFEFFFF5056E88C060000E9A900000663D557D7512} $s13 =
{663D567D750F8D85FCFEFFFF5056E891070000EB7C663D577D} $s14 =
{3141327A3342347935433678374438773945307624465F754774487349724A71} $s15 =
{393032356A6864686F333965686532} condition: ($s0) or ($s1) or ($s2) or ($s3) or ($s4 and
$s5 and $s6) or ($s7 and $s8) or ($s9 and $s10 and $s11) or ($s12 and $s13) or ($s14 and $s15)
}
```

**ssdeep Matches**

No matches found.

**PE Metadata**

<b>Compile Date</b>	2011-09-14 11:42:30-04:00
<b>Import Hash</b>	f0087d7b90876a2769f2229c6789fcf3
<b>Company Name</b>	Microsoft Corporation
<b>File Description</b>	Microsoft XML Encoder/Transcoder
<b>Internal Name</b>	xpsshrm.dll
<b>Legal Copyright</b>	© Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
<b>Original Filename</b>	xpsshrm.dll
<b>Product Name</b>	Microsoft® Windows Media Services
<b>Product Version</b>	9.00.00.4503

**PE Sections**

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
037e97300efd533dd48d334d30bdc408	header	4096	0.759334
4b5019185bb0b82273442dae3f15f105	.text	24576	6.083997
9e5a1cfda72f8944cd5e35e33a2a73b0	.rdata	4096	3.267725
47982ac1b20cac03adcf62f5881b79c	.data	49152	1.087883
b971ab49349a660c70cb6987b7fb3ed3	.rsrc	4096	1.140488
ad5750c9584c0eba32643810ab6e8a53	.reloc	4096	2.515288

**Packers/Compilers/Cryptors**

Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 DLL

**Relationships**

ea46ed5aed...	Dropped_By	077d9e0e12357d27f7f0c336239e961a7049971446f7a3f10268d9439ef67885
ea46ed5aed...	Connected_To	misswang8107@gmail.com
ea46ed5aed...	Contains	redhat@gmail.com

**Description**

This file is a malicious 32-bit Windows DLL that is written to disk then loaded by the file "4731CBAAE7ACA37B596E38690160A749".

When executed, the DLL attempts to contact all of the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses on the victim's local subnet. If the malware is able to connect to these IP addresses, it will attempt to gain unauthorized access via the SMB protocol on port 445 using a brute-force password attack. The malware contains an embedded password list consisting of commonly used passwords and generates random external IP addresses, which it attempts to attack.

If the malware successfully gains access to another system, it will send an email containing the system's IP address, hostname, username, and password to the following address:

```
--Begin email address--  
misswang8107@gmail.com  
--End email address--
```

The email will appear to be from the following address (Refer to Figure 1):

```
--Begin email address--  
redhat@gmail.com  
--End email address--
```

The malware uses the victim's system folder to create a shared folder named "adnim\$" by running the following commands via a remotely run service:

```
--Begin commands utilized to create SMB share--  
cmd.exe /q /c net share adnim$=%SystemRoot%  
cmd.exe /q /c net share adnim$=%SystemRoot% /GRANT:%s,FULL  
--End commands utilized to create SMB share--
```

The malware will then copy itself to newly created shared folder as a file named "mssscardprv.ax". After copying the malware to the new system it then runs the file on the victim system using a malicious service. The adnim\$ share will then be deleted from the remote system using the following command:

```
--Begin command used to delete share--  
'cmd.exe /q /c net share adnim$ /delete'  
--End command used to delete share--
```

The malware determines if Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) is enabled by attempting to connect to port 3389. If it is able to connect to this port, the malware will report RDP is available on the compromised system. This information is provided to the operator using the malicious email address provided earlier.

This malware can communicate with the RAT identified as "scardprv.dll" (4613f51087f01715bf9132c704aea2c2). The communication is protected with the Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) encryption protocol. When attempting to propagate, the malware uses the following three usernames combined with a password brute-force attack:

```
--Begin malicious usernames used by SMB worm--  
Administrateur  
Administrador  
Administrator  
--End malicious usernames used by SMB worm--
```

Although the malware uses numerous embedded passwords in its brute force attacks, within our environment the malware consistently used the following "Lan Manager Response" in its SMB attacks:

```
--Begin static Lan Manager response--  
8C15084FA541079A0000000000000000  
--End static Lan Manager response--
```

This hexadecimal value may be useful in detecting this worm as it communicates over port 445 and attempts to spread. Specifically, when the malware attempts to run a remote service to create the "adnim\$" share, the following network traffic is generated:

```
--Begin network signature--  
ASCII: cmd.exe /q /c net share adnim$=%SystemRoot% /GRANT:Administrator,FULL  
HEX:  
636D642E657865202F71202F63206E65742073686172652061646E696D243D2553797374656D526F6F7425202F4752414E543A41646D696E6973747  
--End network signature--
```

#### Screenshots

**Figure 1** - The screenshot illustrates the to and from email addresses for data exfiltration.

fe7d35d19af5f5ae2939457a06868754b8bdd022e1ff5bdbe4e7c135c48f9a16

**Tags**

backdoortrojanworm

**Details**

<b>Name</b>	298775B04A166FF4B8FBD3609E716945
<b>Size</b>	86016 bytes
<b>Type</b>	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
<b>MD5</b>	298775b04a166ff4b8fdb3609e716945
<b>SHA1</b>	2e0f666831f64d7383a11b444e2c16b38231f481
<b>SHA256</b>	fe7d35d19af5f5ae2939457a06868754b8bdd022e1ff5bdbe4e7c135c48f9a16
<b>SHA512</b>	adc9bb5a2116134ddf57d1b1765d5981c55828aa8c6719964b0e2eeb6c9068a2acaa98c2e03227a406a4fbfa2f007f5eb9f57a61e3749b8eb0d7:
<b>ssdeep</b>	768:i+cDn8nAQ5Toz4c0+u5jrdXs+W+aCNkiC8xeC3cs:i+M8ndTozOn5jxF/US0s
<b>Entropy</b>	2.873816

**Antivirus**

<b>ClamAV</b>	Win.Trojan.Agent-1388727
<b>ESET</b>	a variant of Win32/Agent.NVC worm
<b>McAfee</b>	GenericRXC.B-TI!298775B04A16
<b>Microsoft Security Essentials</b>	Backdoor:Win32/Joanap.A!dha
<b>Symantec</b>	Heur.AdvML.B

**Yara Rules**

<b>hidden_cobra_consolidated.yara</b>	<pre> rule Enfal_Generic { meta: author = "NCCIC trusted 3rd party" incident = "10135536" date = "2018-04-12" category = "hidden_cobra" family = "BRAMBUL,,JOANAP" MD5_1 = "483B95B1498B615A1481345270BFF87D" MD5_2 = "4731CBAEE7ACA37B596E38690160A749" MD5_3 = "CD60FD107BAACCAFA6C24C1478C345C8" MD5_4 = "298775B04A166FF4B8FBD3609E716945" Info = "Detects Hidden Cobra SMB Worm / RAT" strings: \$s0 = {6D737373636172647072762E6178} \$s1 = {6E3472626872697138393076393D3032333D30312A2628542D30513332354A314E3B4C4B} \$s2 = {72656468617440676D61696C2E636F6D} \$s3 = {6D69737377616E673831303740676D61696C2E636F6D} \$s4 = {534232755365435632564474} \$s5 = {794159334D6559704275415756426341} \$s6 = {705641325941774242347A41346167664B6232614F7A4259} \$s7 = {AE8591916D586DE4F6FB8EE2F0BBF1F9} \$s8 = {F96D5DD36D6D9A87DD6D506D6D6D516D} \$s9 = {43616E6E6F74206372656174652072656D6F74652066696C652E} \$s10 = {43616E6E6F74206F70656E2072656D6F74652066696C65} \$s11 = {663D547D75128D85FCFEFFFF5056} \$s12 = {663D547D75128D85FCFEFFFF5056E88C060000E9A9000000663D557D7512} \$s13 = {663D567D750F8D85FCFEFFFF5056E891070000EB7C663D577D} \$s14 = {3141327A3342347935433678374438773945307624465F754774487349724A71} \$s15 = {393032356A6864686F333965686532} condition: (\$s0) or (\$s1) or (\$s2) or (\$s3) or (\$s4 and \$s5 and \$s6) or (\$s7 and \$s8) or (\$s9 and \$s10 and \$s11) or (\$s12 and \$s13) or (\$s14 and \$s15) }                     </pre>
---------------------------------------	--

**ssdeep Matches**

No matches found.

**PE Metadata**

<b>Compile Date</b>	2018-01-05 01:22:45-05:00
<b>Import Hash</b>	9f298eba36baa47b98a60cf36fdb2301

**PE Sections**

MD5	Name	Raw Size	Entropy
8a5b06109c3bd4323fa3318f9874d529	header	4096	0.703885
413f30d4d86037b75958b45b9efbe1de	.text	20480	6.302858
82b41fefc9aa74a2430f1421fd5fe5b3	.rdata	4096	3.748024
b6f17870ca5f45d4c75e18024e6e1180	.data	53248	1.067897
cda5ef1038742e5ef46b9cfa269b0434	.rsrc	4096	0.608792

**Packers/Compilers/Cryptors**

Microsoft Visual C++ v6.0

**Process List**

Process	PID	PPID
fe7d35d19af5f5ae2939457a06868754b8bdd022e1ff5bdbe4e7c135c48f9a16.exe	2436	(2408)

**Description**

This file is a malicious 32-bit Windows executable file designed to scan the local network and the Internet for machines that are accessible and have open SMB ports. Once the malware gains access to a remote machine, it will deliver a malicious payload. This file accepts the following command-line arguments for execution:

```
--Begin arguments--
-i ==> Create service
-u ==> Control and delete service
-s ==> Start service
-r ==> Run not as a service
-k ==> ControlService
--End arguments--
```

When executed with the "-i" argument, the malware installs and executes itself as the following service:

```
--Begin service information--
ServiceName = "RdpCertification"
DisplayName = "Remote Desktop Certification Services"
DesiredAccess = SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS
ServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS|SERVICE_INTERACTIVE_PROCESS
StartType = SERVICE_AUTO_START
BinaryPathName = "%current directory%\298775B04A166FF4B8FBD3609E716945.exe"
--End service information--
```

The malware creates a mutual exclusion (Mutex) object named "PlatFormSDK20150201", then generates a list of IP addresses using a domain generation algorithm (DGA). The DGA uses the system time in the algorithm to create the list of IP addresses.

It generates network traffic over Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) ports 80 and 445 via the victims' IP addresses and the generated IP addresses.

Sample HTTP request:

```
--Begin HTTP request--
OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1
translate: f
User-Agent: Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/5.1.2600
Host: 159.154.100.0
```

Content-Length: 0  
Connection: Keep-Alive  
--End HTTP request--

Once successfully connected to other Windows hosts or the generated IP addresses using port 445, the malware attempts to use a hard-coded list of passwords for SMB connections. If the password is correctly guessed, a file share is established. The malware uses the following methods to access shares on the remote systems:

To gain access to remote systems it uses (\$IPC) share via "\\remote system IP\IPC"  
It checks for existing shares by using "\\hostname\adnim\$\system32"

It will create a new share named "adnim\$" using the following command:

```
--Begin new share command--  
"cmd.exe /q /c net share adnim$=%SystemRoot%"  
"cmd.exe /q /c net share adnim$=%%SystemRoot%% /GRANT:%s,FULL"  
--End new share command--
```

Once a file share is successfully established, the malware uploads a copy of a payload "C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\TMP1.tmp" and installs it as a service. The malware payload that is uploaded and then run on the newly infected host was not available at the time of analysis.

The remote network share is removed after infection using the following command:

```
--Begin command--  
"cmd.exe /q /c net share adnim$ /delete"  
--End command--
```

Once the payload has been uploaded and executed, the malware uses Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) to send collected data. The data provides infection status to a remote operator.

Displayed below are the domain names of the service providers used to send data:

```
--Begin SMTP domain information--  
"www.hotmail.com"  
--End SMTP domain information--
```

Displayed is the structure of the email sent:

```
--Begin email structure format--  
SUBJECT: %s%s%s  
TO: Joana <%s>%s  
FROM: <%s>%s  
DATA%s  
RCPT TO: <%s>%s  
MAIL FROM: <%s>%s  
AUTH LOGIN%s  
HELO %s%s  
--End email structure format--
```

Displayed is a list of brute force passwords used to establish connections:

```
--Begin brute force password--  
!@$  
!@$%  
!@$%^  
!@$%^&  
!@$%^&*<br>!@$%^&*()<br>"KGS!@$%"<br>0000<br>00000<br>000000<br>00000000<br>1111<br>11111<br>111111<br>1111111<br>11111111<br>11122212
```

1212  
121212  
123123  
123321  
1234  
12345  
123456  
1234567  
12345678  
123456789  
123456^%\$#@!  
1234qwer  
123abc  
123asd  
123qwe  
1313  
1q2w3e  
1q2w3e4r  
1qaz2wsx  
2009  
2010  
2011  
2012  
2013  
2014  
2015  
2016  
2017  
2018  
4321  
54321  
654321  
6969  
666666  
7777  
8888  
88888  
888888  
8888888  
88888888  
Admin  
abc123  
abc@123  
abcd  
admin  
admin123  
admin!23  
admin!@#  
administrator  
administrador  
asdf  
asdfg  
asdfgh  
asdf123  
asdf!23  
baseball  
backup  
blank  
cisco  
compaq  
control  
computer  
cookie123  
database

dbpassword  
db1234  
default  
dell  
enable  
fish  
foobar  
gateway  
guest  
golf  
harley  
home  
iloveyou  
internet  
letmein  
Login  
login  
love  
manager  
oracle  
owner  
pass  
passwd  
password  
p@ssword  
password1  
password!  
passw0rd  
Password1  
pa55w0rd  
pw123  
q1w2e3  
q1w2e3r4  
q1w2e3r4t5  
q1w2e3r4t5y6  
qazwsx  
qazwsxedc  
qwer  
qwert  
qwerty  
!QAZxsw2  
root  
secret  
server  
sqlexec  
shadow  
super  
sybase  
temp  
temp123  
test  
test!  
test1  
test123  
test!23  
winxp  
win2000  
win2003  
Welcome1  
Welcome123  
xxxx  
yxcv  
zxcv  
Administrator

Admin  
 --End brute force password--

**redhat@gmail.com**

**Details**

<b>Address</b>	redhat@gmail.com
----------------	------------------

**Relationships**

redhat@gmail.com	Contained_Within	ea46ed5aed900cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781
------------------	------------------	--

**misswang8107@gmail.com**

**Details**

<b>Address</b>	misswang8107@gmail.com
----------------	------------------------

**Relationships**

misswang8107@gmail.com	Connected_From	ea46ed5aed900cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781
------------------------	----------------	--

**Relationship Summary**

077d9e0e12...	Dropped	a1c483b0ee740291b91b11e18dd05f0a460127acfc19d47b446d11cd0e26d717
077d9e0e12...	Dropped	ea46ed5aed900cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781
a1c483b0ee...	Dropped_By	077d9e0e12357d27f7f0c336239e961a7049971446f7a3f10268d9439ef67885
ea46ed5aed...	Dropped_By	077d9e0e12357d27f7f0c336239e961a7049971446f7a3f10268d9439ef67885
ea46ed5aed...	Connected_To	misswang8107@gmail.com
ea46ed5aed...	Contains	redhat@gmail.com
redhat@gmail.com	Contained_Within	ea46ed5aed900cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781
misswang8107@gmail.com	Connected_From	ea46ed5aed900cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781

**Recommendations**

CISA would like to remind users and administrators to consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

- Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
- Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
- Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
- Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.
- Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.
- Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known.
- Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.
- Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.
- Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).
- Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
- Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumbdrives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
- Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
- Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate ACLs.

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in NIST's Special Publication 800-83, **Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops**.

## Contact Information

### Document FAQ

**What is a MAR?** A Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is intended to provide organizations with more detailed malware analysis acquired via manual reverse engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis.

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**Can I submit malware to CISA?** Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:

- Web: <https://malware.us-cert.gov>
- E-Mail: [submit@malware.us-cert.gov](mailto:submit@malware.us-cert.gov)✉
- FTP: <ftp://malware.us-cert.gov> (anonymous)

CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on the CISA/US-CERT homepage at [www.us-cert.gov](http://www.us-cert.gov).

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