An Oil and Gas Weak Spot: Flow Computers



Executive Summary

- Flow computers calculate oil and gas volume and flow rates; these measurements are critical not only to process safety, but are also used as inputs in other areas, including billing.
- Team82 is disclosing details on a path-traversal vulnerability in ABB TotalFlow flow computers and controllers.
- An attacker could exploit a vulnerable system to inject and execute arbitrary code.
- CVE-2022-0902 (CVSS v3: 8.1) was addressed in a firmware update.
- · Affected products include:
 - ABB's RMC-100 (Standard)
 - RMC-100-LITE
 - XIO
 - XFCG5
 - XRCG5
 - uFLOG5
 - UDC products.
- ABB's security advisory can be found here.

Introduction

Flow computers are specialized computers that calculate volume and flow rates for oil and gas that are critical to electric power manufacturing and distribution. These machines take liquid or gas measurements that are not only vital to process safety, but are also used as inputs by other processes—alarms, logs, configurations—and therefore require accuracy to ensure reliability. These capabilities are described in the American Gas Association's AGA Report No. 9.

One other important aspect to the role of flow computers within a utility is billing. The most noteworthy and related security incident was the ransomware attack against Colonial Pipeline, which impacted enterprise systems, and forced the company to shut down production because it could not bill customers. Disrupting the operation of flow computers is a subtle attack vector that could similarly impact not only IT, but also OT systems; this led us to research the security of these machines.

Team82 focused on ABB flow computers because of their use within many large oil and gas utilities worldwide. We looked for vulnerabilities that could give an attacker the ability to influence measurements by remotely running code of their choice on the device.

As a result, Team82 found a high-severity path-traversal vulnerability (CVE-2022-0902) in ABB's TotalFlow Flow Computers and Remote Controllers. Attackers can exploit this flaw to gain root access on an ABB flow computer, read and write files, and remotely execute code.

ABB has made a firmware update available that resolves the vulnerability in a number of product versions; it also recommends network segmentation as a mitigation. More information, including affected product versions, is found in ABB's advisory.

How Flow Computers Work

Flow measurement computations, especially gas flow, demand a substantial amount of processing power and thus are often calculated by a low-power CPU rather than a microcontroller.



Examples of different flow computers.




Flow meters read raw data from attached sensors that measure the volume of a substance in a number of ways, depending on what's being measured (gas or a liquid). Different examples of flow meters include: electromagnetic, vortex, differential pressure, thermal, coriolis, and others.



Examples of different types of flow meters (Source: ABB)

The following diagram describes how a flow computer usually measures gas flow:



Three types of sensors are used to calculate gas flow using a differential pressure technique: absolute pressure transmitters, differential pressure transmitters, and absolute temperature transmitters. Raw data is sent to the flow computer, which measures gas flow.

Researching ABB's µFLO G5 Flow Computer

The target of our research was ABB's µFLO G5 flow computers. This device can receive raw sensor data from other flow meters, perform flow calculations (following the AGA and ISO standards) and show/propagate the output.



µFLOG5 in its enclosure. (Source: ABB)


The μ FLO G5 is a single board computer with IO ports (Ethernet, USB ,etc.), CPU, and other peripherals. The CPU is an ARMv8 processor, which is a 32-bit architecture. The device runs Linux as an operating system, which was good news for us, because this increased our chances to emulate the device in the lab.

From a security perspective, the μ FLO G5 features three main mechanisms:

- 1. Security switch: A physical switch attached to the board that will enable/disable the use of the security passcode.
- 2. Security passcode: Two four-digit passcodes; one for reading data, and another authorizing writing of data.
- 3. **RBAC**: Role-based access control which assigns roles and permission to read and write specific attributes; this option is implemented only on the client side.

Client Application

The flow computer can be remotely configured with a designated configuration program, below.



Interface of ABB's PCCU Client showing measurement data.

The interesting thing to note is that configuration is done via a proprietary protocol designed by the ABB called TotalFlow. This protocol can be used on top of a serial or Ethernet (TCP) connection. Most of the communication between the client and the device—retrieval of the gas flow calculations, set and get device settings, import and export of the configuration files—is done over the TotalFlow protocol (TCP/9999).

Our goal in this research is to achieve remote code execution on the device. The proprietary protocol seemed to be a good attack vector to start with because undocumented protocols are usually less reviewed by security researchers.

Understanding ABB's TotalFlow Protocol

As we began our examination of the proprietary TotalFlow protocol, we knew two things: TotalFlow is 1) used to configure the device and send the flow measurements to the client, and 2), it listens on TCP port 9999.

Our goal is to be able to send and receive messages of our choice to test the implementation of the protocol. For this, we need to understand the protocol structure and build a simple client that constructs the payload. Luckily for us, the firmware is available online and is not encrypted, therefore we could easily extract it in order to analyze the application.

First, we wanted to find the binary that implements the protocol. Often the implementation of the protocol will reside at the main executable file or one that is directly linked to it.

Because our target is a Linux-based embedded device, the main binary will be executed at system's init. The good place to search for this is the init.d/inittab:



The init revealed the name of the binary: devLoader.exe (exe is a probably legacy name from when the device ran on Windows CE), which allowed us to reverse engineer it. The binaries within the firmware were stripped, but we had a lot of error-related logging strings, below, which was great for our research because it makes our life easier in finding interesting functions.

→ binaries strings -n 20 flash grep -ie '^error' sort uniq head -n 20 ERROR: Failed to load back up process. Warm configuration wont be backup up.
Error creating recursive lock instance for slot=%d
Error in saving RMC persistence files rmcAppDataObjIds.dat and rmcAppDataDefUUIDs.dat
Error parsing CDATA section
Error parsing PCDATA section
Error parsing comment
Error parsing document declaration/processing instruction
Error parsing document type declaration
Error parsing element attribute
Error parsing end element tag
Error parsing start element tag
Error processing xfRecord %hhu.%hu=>%hhu.%hu.%hu for %d regs
Error reading RMC App Def UUIDs file at %s
Error reading RMC App Obj ID file at %s
Error reading detailed config file at %s
Error reading device config file at %s
Error reading from file/stream
Error unlocking mutext for '%s' on count problem processing
Error unlocking mutext for '%s' on count problem processing, %s: %d
Error writing RMC App Def UUID file into RMC filesystem
A sample of error strings found within TotalFlow binaries.

There are few techniques we can start with to search for the relevant code for incoming packet handling.

1. Look for matching strings from the client application and the firmware, below:

🔩 PCCU32 - [Entry]					- • •	
Derate View Window	Help				- 8 ×	
fi 🖻 🖪 💽 🕅	MB	🎯 🛄 🎿 🖉	r -			
TOTALFLOW Communications	Station Se	tup Applications App Licensin	Battery Informa	ation Resources System Log Security Log	Registry	
Totalflow/TCP Totalflow/USB		Descriptio	n	Value		
- Totalflow/COM0:	0.0.4	Station ID		TOTALFLOW		
Totalflow/Remote 1	0.0.5	Location		Measurement and Control		
Bluetooth	0.9.0	Date/Time		06/27/2016 11:13:51		
- Flow Measurement	0.9.0	Set Device with PCCU Date	0SAL dr	iverOpen(2, 0, v3 + 47	(32);	
⊕- AGA3-1		Security		$(v_3 + 4720) = 0;$		
E-AGA7-1	0.0.6	Security Code Level 1	* (_DWOR	(v3 + 4728) = 0;		
⊕- Trend System	0.0.7	Security Code Level 2	*(_BYTE	*)(v3 + 4536) = 0;		
	0.7.3	Security Switch Status		*)(v3 + 4537) = 0;		
		Sleep Mode		*)(v3 + 4538) = 0;	LOOKS	like a constructor
	0.10.2	Remote Comm Cutoff Vo		*)(v3 + 4539) = 0;		
	0.10.3	Sleep Mode Entry Voltage		*)(v3 + 4540) = 0;		
	0.8.8	Sleep Mode Hold-off Time		$(v_3 + 4541) = 0;$		
	0.9.11	Wake Up Time		*)(v3 + 4542) = 0; *)(v3 + 4543) = 0;		
	0.7.14	Wake Up Time Mode		$(v_3 + 4544) = 0;$		
		Lithium Battery Status		(void *)(v3 + 1728), 0	. 0x2C0u):	
	0.7.10	Lithium Battery Status		(void *)(v3 + 2432), 0		
Taken fr	om	Low Charger Alarm En	sub 213			
		Low Charger Alarm	memset((void *)(v3 + 4652), @), 0x41u);	
docume	ntat	Monitor	strcpy((char *)(v3 + 1728),	TOTALFLOW ")	;
				(char *)(v3 + 1739), '		and Control");
Ready				(char *)(v3 + 1764), '		
				(char *)(v3 + 1769),		
			*(_DWOR	$(v_3 + 2036) = 0x_4$.3E6666;	


Since there was a lot of memory initialization, it was likely we had found a constructor, which gave us a place to start.

- 1. Another good place is CRC checks. Embedded devices, especially ones that receive data from serial ports, use a CRC checksum to validate the accuracy of the received payload. Finding the place where CRC checks are validated is interesting because this will point to the payload that was received from the client. CRC checksum often uses hardcoded lookup tables which are easy to find within the binary.
- 2. Last but not least are the error strings; if you are fortunate, you will be able to find the relevant code just by looking at those. Sadly, in this case, we weren't so fortunate.

Now that we have a basic understanding of what we need to look for and where to find it, our next step is to create a setup of the device so we can dynamically debug it.

Emulating a Flow Computer on RaspberryPI

Although quite often we purchase devices we research, this time it was not an option. When the application of interest is within the user space and the device runs a familiar operating system on familiar architecture, it is often possible to



Therefore, we took one of our Raspberry Pis, copied the firmware's file system to it, and chrooted the directory.

Team82 used a Raspberry Pi to load ABB firmware and emulate a flow computer

The main disadvantage of emulating the device is that at some point the application will want to communicate with peripherals. Unfortunately, our Raspberry Pi doesn't have orifice plates attached to it, so any communication with them needs to be patched (changed within the binary).

The procedure to patch the application is straightforward:

- 1. Run the binary
- 2. Wait for the binary to crash (due to emulation/setup issues)
- 3. Patch the function that causes the problem (e.g. skip a check)
- 4. Back to Step No. 1

In this research, seven functions were patched across two binaries; these functions communicate with the sensors and other hardware peripherals, which obviously do not exist in our simulated Raspberry Pi environment. Four hours later, we were good to go to the next step.

Debugging the TotalFlow Protocol

Now that we have a working setup, we were ready to analyze communication between the device and the client application. With a debugger, we can stop at the interesting functions that we have found by reverse engineering the binary and completing our understanding of the protocol.

We downloaded the client application (PCCU) from the ABB website and installed it on a Windows machine. We connected the application to the flow computer by providing the IP address of the Raspberry Pi:

Derate View Help	– 🗆 X
1 📅 🚾 💽 💽 📰 🔤 🚳 🛶 🛄 🎎 🧇	
💽 System Setup	×
Setup Directory Paths Misc Macro Setup	
Communications PCCU Connect Method: O Buetooth Serial port Image: Communications O Buetooth Connection parameters Level 1-2 Security Code: Image: Communications Network ID or IP: 100.100.100 Packet Size: Image: Communications Block Size: 1024 V Image: Communications Level 1-2 Security Code: Image: Communications MELASURE Image: Communications Image: Communications Level 1-2 Security Code: Image: Communications Image: Communications Level 1-2 Security Code: Image: Communications Level 1-2 Security Code: Image: Communications Image: Communications Level 1-2 Security Code: Image: Communications Level 1-2 Security Code: Image: Communi	Toobar Butions
Auto Connect Auto Connect Auto Connect	
Ready	Close Help

The user interface for ABB's client application, PCCU.

0030 0040	fc 4f 5) 20 58 00 67 a4 ff	f 01 54 4f 54 41 4c 46 f 01 54 4f 54 41 4c 46 LOW X···· ··TOTALF	HEADER's String
0050 0060 0070	4c 4f 57 20 58 00 87 a4 fr 4c 4f 57 20 58 00 87 a4 d3 4c 4f 57 20 58 00 87 a4 d3 60 00 00 62 c4 0a 00 f5 f	f 01 54 41 4c 46 LOW X··· ···TOTALF 3 d9 ce c3 33 00 fc ff LOW X··· ···· DO X··· ···· CO X··· ···· X··· ···· X··· ···· CO X··· ···· X··· ···· X··· ···· X··· ···· X··· ···· ···· X··· ···· ···· X··· ····	Fieme Type
0080 0090	00 00 00 3e 3d 0a 00 f5 f 00 00 00 39 9e 0a 00 f5 f	01 02 00 09 00 00 01 ···9···· ·····	Secret code
00a0 00b0 00c0	00 00 00 a6 49 0a 00 f5 f 00 00 00 49 67 0a 00 f5 f 00 00 00 69 a0 0a 00 f5 f	f 01 02 00 17 00 00 ft Ig	CRC Cecks
00d0 00e0	00 00 00 a7 0c 0a 00 f5 f 00 00 00 49 63 0a 00 f5 f 00 00 00 b7 2f 0a 00 f5 f	01 02 00 08 0e 00 07 ····Ic····	Size indicator
00f0 0100 0110	00 00 00 b7 2f 0a 00 f5 f 00 00 00 40 1a 0a 00 f5 f 00 00 00 b4 3f 0a 00 f5 f	f 01 02 00 2b 00 00 56 ····@···· ···+··V	
0120 0130 0140	00 00 00 b6 63 0a 00 f5 f 00 00 00 c2 le 0a 00 f5 f 00 00 00 da 3d 0a 00 f5 f	f 01 02 00 00 f5 c4 01	DATA
0140 0150	00 00 00 da 3d 0a 00 f5 f1 20 00 00 1d 88 00 00		Magic

A packet sent from client to device when first connected.

TotalFlow is a relatively simple protocol: Every setting within the device has its own TAG that is defined by a tuple called Registers (APP, ARRAY, INDEX).

For example, in the image below we see that the "SSH Service" setting is accessible by the (0.7.27) Register.

	Description	Value
0.0.15	Network ID	g5uflo
	Services	
0.7.27	SSH/SFTP Service (Port: 9696)	Disabled
0.7.29	Totalflow Service	Enabled

A sample of network settings from the PCCU client application.

The RegisterGet and RegisterSet functions, below, are responsible for changing/returning the Register's value:

<pre>intfastcall CtfProtocol::RegisterGet(CtfProtoco { int result; // r0 int v5; // r1 char *v6; // r1</pre>	1 *app,	int array,	, unsigned	int index,	void *ptr_	_fot_result)
<pre>lintfastcall CtfProtocol::RegisterSet(CtfProtoc 2{</pre>	ol *app	, unsigned	int array	, unsigned	int index,	void *valu <mark>e</mark>)
3 CtfProtocol *v4; // r4 4 const char *v5; // r7						
5 int v6; // r5 6 int result: // r0						

The following is the payload that will enable SSH - as we set the triple tuple of the SSH settings to be enabled - app: 0 array: 07 index: 0x1b (27).

0000	00	09	0f	09	00	0e	88	66	5a	27	14	b2	08	00	45	00	•••••f Z'••••E•
0010	00	96	00	00	40	00	40	06	2e	bc	0a	64	ee	31	0a	0a	····@@·d.1··
0020	09	07	da	65	27	Øf	са	12	0a	f1	c7	f8	dØ	ff	80	18	····e'····
0030	08	0a	72	53	00	00	01	01	08	0a	11	d8	34	3e	b8	70	
0040	d2	c4	ff	01	54	4f	54	41	4c	46	4c	4f	57	20	58	00	····TOTA LFLOW X·
0050	be	7a	ff	01	54	4f	54	41	4c	46	4c	4f	57	20	58	00	·z··TOTA LFLOW X·
0060	be	7a	ff	01	54	4f	54	41	4c	46	4c	4f	57	20	58	00	·z··TOTA LFLOW X·
0070	be	7a	d3	d9	ce	c3	03	00	fc	ff	00	01	01	93	50	00	•z•••••P•
0080	00	ff	01	54	4f	54	41	4c	46	4c	4f	57	20	58	00	be	···TOTAL FLOW X··
0090	7a	Øb	00	f4	ff	00	02	00	07	1b	00	01	00	00	00	01	
00a0	e5	4a	00	00													·J··

Now that we understood the protocol structure, we could write a simple python client with interesting functionalities such as read-write Registers, enable SSH, and more:

uFLOG5 mini client	
optional arguments: —h, ——help ——read ——write	show this help message and exit
src_file_name SRC_I dest_file_name DES write to file	
<pre>restart_deviceenable_sshget_sec_code_hash_</pre>	

In order to do this, we need to be authenticated by providing the correct security code.

Authentication Bypass

Note the security code (the red rectangle) is a CRC-16 of the four-digit security passcode. Since the device sends an error message on incorrect code and there is no rate limit mitigation available on the device, we can easily bypass the authentication mechanism by enumerating all possibilities.

				urity 2–16	Code					
0030		10.00	100.00		ff 01	54 4	f 54	41 4c	46	· · TOTALF
0040	AC 4f	57 20	58 00	87 a4	ff 01	54 4	f 54	41 4c	46	LOW X··· ··TOTALF
0050	4c 4f	57 20	58 00	87 a4	ff 01	54 4	f 54	41 4c	46	LOW X··· ··TOTALF
0060	4c 4f	57/20	58 00	87 a4	(d3 d9	ce c	3 03	00 fc	ff)	LOW X · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0070	00 00	0e d2	C4 0a	00 f5	TT 01	02 0	0 00	00 00	-86	
0080	00 00	00 3e	3d Øa	00 f5	ff 01	02 0	0 00	27 00	01	···>=··· ·····
0090	00 00	00 39	9e 0a	00 f5	ff 01	02 0	0 09	00 00	01	

CRC-16 is a two-byte value, which has a maximum of 2¹⁶ possibilities. We can brute force all of the possible values in a range 0-65,535, which can take about four minutes. We can also optimize it by calculating, prior to the attack, the values from CRC-16 (0000) to CRC-16 (9999) and thus reducing the number of possibilities to 10,000.

Finding a Vulnerability

Now that we have an authentication bypass, it is time to look at functionalities available to authenticated users. Remember we said the configuration can be uploaded and downloaded? This is a good place to look for bugs because file operations are not always done securely.

This is what the file download procedure looks like in Wireshark:

			- 0	×
Operate View Window He	p			_ 8 ×
f 🛅 🛅 🔂	Terminat 🌃 🖉 🚽 🛄 Setup	2		
. TOTALFLOWE	File System Fre	e Space: 1922129	920	
⊞. tfCold	File Name	Size	Last Modified	Attr
🖃 - tfData	appOptions.cfg	16510	07/21/21 09:48:51	
Comm-1	appProfile.cfg	1	07/21/21 09:48:51	
Comm-2	appRemoteOptions.cfg	1016	03/10/22 13:45:44	
Comm-3	appStatus.cfg	254	07/21/21 09:48:53	
Shared	appTable.cfg	16764	07/28/21 14:31:36	
tfbackup	devicename	1	03/10/22 13:45:42	
\SD Card	Event.log	170000	07/21/21 09:48:53	
(SD Card	Security.log	10010	03/10/22 13:45:51	
	Startup.log	288	03/10/22 13:45:44	
	System.cfg	707	03/10/22 13:46:43	
	System.dat Create		03/10/22 13:45:44	
	System.log Delete		03/10/22 13:45:51	
	Unit_tab.ini Rename		03/10/22 13:45:42	
	Upload File			
	Upload Fold	er		
	Download Fi			
	Download Fe	older		
	Save Station	Files		
	Restore Stati	on Filor		
		UTTTIES		
		on mes]	
		on thes]	
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	Save Station Files Restore Station F		Close	Help
Ready.	Save Station Files Restore Station F	les		
Ready	Save Station Files Restore Station F			Help
Ready 52 54 00 12 35 02 08		iles #Polls: 4	#Errors: 0 Co	nnected
52 54 00 12 35 02 08	00 27 e4 71 02 08 00 4	ies #Polls: 4 ⊧5 00 R®	#Errors: 0 Co	
52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00 8c 71 b6 40 00 80	00 27 e4 71 02 08 00 4 06 00 00 0a 00 02 0f 0	iles #Polls: 4 15 00 R ⁻¹ 3a 64	#Errors: 0 Co	nnected .
52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00 8c 71 b6 40 00 80	00 27 e4 71 02 08 00 4 06 00 00 0a 00 02 0f 0	ies #Polls: 4 ⊧5 00 R®	#Errors: 0 Co	nnected .
52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00 8c 71 b6 40 00 80 ee 85 57 5f 27 0f 58	00 27 e4 71 02 08 00 4 06 00 00 0a 00 02 0f 0 62 81 3f 57 16 ec 1a 5	iles #Polls: 4 15 00 R ⁻¹ 9a 64 90 18	#Errors: 0 Cc	nnected .
52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00 8c 71 b6 40 00 80 ee 85 57 5f 27 0f 58 fa d8 05 77 00 00 ff	00 27 e4 71 02 08 00 4 06 00 00 0a 00 02 0f 0 62 81 3f 57 16 ec 1a 5 01 54 4f 54 41 4c 46 4	lies #Polls: 4 15 00 R [™] 13 64 10 18 14 16 15 18 16 18 17 18 18 18 18 18 1	#Errors: 0 Cc 	nnected .
52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00 8c 71 b6 40 00 80 ee 85 57 5f 27 0f 58 fa d8 05 77 00 00 ff 57 45 58 00 a1 6a d3	00 27 e4 71 02 08 00 4 06 00 00 0a 00 02 0f 0 62 81 3f 57 16 ec 1a 5 01 54 4f 54 41 4c 46 00 2c ff 00 0a 00 20 0	lies #Polls: 4 15 00 RT 0a 64 18 10 18 12 4f	#Errors: 0 Co 	nnected .
52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00 8c 71 b6 40 00 80 ee 85 57 5f 27 0f 58 fa d8 05 77 00 00 ff 57 45 58 00 a1 6a d3	00 27 e4 71 02 08 00 4 06 00 00 0a 00 02 0f 0 62 81 3f 57 16 ec 1a 5 01 54 4f 54 41 4c 46 00 2c ff 00 0a 00 20 0	lies #Polls: 4 15 00 R [™] 13 64 10 18 14 16 15 18 16 18 17 18 18 18 18 18 1	#Errors: 0 Cc 	E • E • d • P • FLO
52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00 8c 71 b6 40 00 80 ee 85 57 5f 27 0f 58 fa d8 05 77 00 00 ff 57 45 58 00 a1 6a d3 05 74 66 44 61 74 61	00 27 e4 71 02 08 00 4 06 00 00 0a 00 02 0f 6 62 81 3f 57 16 ec 1a 5 01 54 4f 54 41 4c 46 4 00 2c ff 00 0a 00 20 6 5c 53 79 73 74 65 6d 2	les #Polls: 4 15 00 RT 0a 64 00 18 10 00 14 10 00 20 63	#Errors: 0 Co 	E P FLO
52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00 8c 71 b6 40 00 80 ee 85 57 5f 27 0f 58 fa d8 05 77 00 00 ff 57 45 58 00 a1 6a d3 05 74 66 44 61 74 61 66 67 00 00 00 00 00	00 27 e4 71 02 08 00 4 06 00 00 0a 00 02 0f 6 62 81 3f 57 16 ec 1a 5 01 54 4f 54 41 4c 46 4 00 2c ff 00 0a 00 20 6 5c 53 79 73 74 65 6d 2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	les #Polls: 4 15 00 RT 0a 64 18 10 00 18 10 00 19 10 00 15 10 00 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15	#Errors: 0 Co 	• E • • d • P • • FLO
52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00 8c 71 b6 40 00 80 ee 85 57 5f 27 0f 58 fa d8 05 77 00 00 ff 57 45 58 00 a1 6a d3 05 74 66 44 61 74 61 66 67 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 27 e4 71 02 08 00 4 06 00 00 0a 00 02 0f 6 62 81 3f 57 16 ec 1a 5 01 54 4f 54 41 4c 46 4 00 2c ff 00 0a 00 20 6 5c 53 79 73 74 65 6d 2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	iles #Polls: 4 15 00 R ¹ 0a 64 18 10 00 18 10 00 19 10 00 19 10 00 19 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	#Errors: 0 Co 	E P FLO
52 54 00 12 35 02 08 00 8c 71 b6 40 00 80 ee 85 57 5f 27 0f 58 fa d8 05 77 00 00 ff 57 45 58 00 a1 6a d3 05 74 66 44 61 74 61 66 67 00 00 00 00 00	00 27 e4 71 02 08 00 4 06 00 00 0a 00 02 0f 6 62 81 3f 57 16 ec 1a 5 01 54 4f 54 41 4c 46 4 00 2c ff 00 0a 00 20 6 5c 53 79 73 74 65 6d 2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	iles #Polls: 4 15 00 RT 0a 64 18 10 00 18 10 00 10	#Errors: 0 Co 	• E • • d • P • • FLO

We can see that the request contains a file name in the tfData directory. Lets check for a path traversal vulnerability by requesting the /etc/shadow file.



Nice. It works.

Remote Code Execution

Now that we have an arbitrary read and write, it is simple to get code execution.

We chose the simplest approach, reading /etc/shadow and using hashcat cracking the root account password (which turned out to be root:root). Then we changed the SSH configuration file to enable root to connect using password. Then all that was left to do was to turn on the SSH daemon (using the TotalFlow protocol) and to connect to it.



Team82's proof of concept in action.

The Vulnerability

CVE-2022-0902

CWE-22 Path Traversal Vulnerability

Affected Products: ABB Flow Computers and Remote Controllers' Totalflow TCP protocol

CVSS v3 score: 8.1

This path traversal vulnerability can enable an attacker to take over flow computers and remotely disrupt the flow computers' ability to accurately measure oil and gas flow. These specialized computers calculate these measurements that are used as inputs in a number of functions, including configurations and customer billing.

A successful exploit of this issue could impede a company's ability to bill customers, forcing a disruption of services, similar to the consequences suffered by Colonial Pipeline following its 2021 ransomware attack.

Team82 disclosed this vulnerability to ABB, which issued an update that addresses the issue. ABB also advises network segmentation as a mitigation strategy; further information is available in ABB's advisory.