"aa" distribution Qakbot (Qbot) infection with DarkVNC traffic
By SANS Internet Storm Center
Archived: 2026-04-05 13:21:48 UTC
Chain of Events
Email --> link --> downloaded zip archive --> extracted Excel file --> enable macros --> HTTPS traffic for
Qakbot DLL files --> Qakbot C2 activity --> DarkVNC traffic
Images
Shown above:  Link from an email distributing Qakbot ("aa" distribution tag) in a web browser.
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28568
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Shown above:  Downloaded zip archive and extracted spreadsheet.
Shown above:  Qakbot DLL files saved to an infected Windows host.
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28568
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Shown above:  Traffic from the infection filtered in Wireshark.
Shown above:  TCP streams for DarkVNC traffic on 45.153.241[.]142 over TCP port 443.
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28568
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Shown above:  Qakbot traffic on 23.111.114[.]52 over TCP port 65400.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
Malware from an infected Windows host:
SHA256 hash: 685aa1d29540f5b63effec08fdf63f8bc7e995d1f15635cc1fd251bb7fb0dc73
File size: 1,093,506 bytes
File name: cocithoueqrta.zip
File location: hxxps://conta2000[.]cl/po/cocithoueqrta
File location: hxxps://conta2000[.]cl/po/A3105126785.zip
File description: zip archive downloaded from link in email
SHA256 hash: 236b9d345a9b405c4850f880e1734712967d7cc34b176c270e78dd6f02f9839d
File size: 1,215,731 bytes
File name: J-233015633.xlsb
File description: Excel file with macro for Qakbot
SHA256 hash: 74400f2acc98e59ddeba6d55da3ee0ea0c909eefdefeca4f1d3bf817a27b692b
File size: 1,385,866 bytes
File location: hxxps://debtsolversuk[.]co[.]uk/HLpeQJZi/NbVfNbhn.png
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File location: C:\Rfgsg\Jefseg.ooccxx
File description: Initial Qakbot DLL
Run method: regsvr32.exe [filename]
SHA256 hash: 29942eb47c0de0415b2507dff8822e3309dd4fcc2ac8d01434b37eb4f75efbe1
File size: 1,385,893 bytes
File location: hxxps://pablopereirasilvaluis[.]com[.]br/OHTvXEr9c/NbVfNbhn.png
File location: C:\Rfgsg\Jefsega.ooccxx
Run method: regsvr32.exe [filename]
SHA256 hash: 59fb3927427c68dee4c2f267f3ed4eea82dc07058061e06b3cd9b18d1a84b77f
File size: 1,385,920 bytes
File location: hxxps://portalregionpuno[.]com/088aFy0Xc8ap/NbVfNbhn.png
File location: C:\Rfgsg\Jefsegb.ooccxx
Run method: regsvr32.exe [filename]
Traffic for zip archive:
hxxps://conta2000[.]cl/po/cocithoueqrta
hxxps://conta2000[.]cl/po/A3105126785.zip
Traffic for Qakbot DLL files:
hxxps://debtsolversuk[.]co[.]uk/HLpeQJZi/NbVfNbhn.png
hxxps://pablopereirasilvaluis[.]com[.]br/OHTvXEr9c/NbVfNbhn.png
hxxps://portalregionpuno[.]com/088aFy0Xc8ap/NbVfNbhn.png
Qakbot post-infection traffic:
189.146.73[.]62 port 443 - HTTPS traffic
75.99.168[.]194 port 443 - HTTPS traffic
37.252.0[.]102 port 443 - HTTPS traffic
port 443 - www.openssl[.]org - HTTPS traffic (connectivity check, not inherently malicious)
23.111.114[.]52 port 65400 - TCP traffic
Dark VNC traffic:
45.153.241[.]142 port 443 - TCP traffic with encoded data.
Certificate issuer data for Qakbot HTTPS traffic:
Certificate issuer data for HTTPS traffic to 189.146.73[.]62:
id-at-countryName=AU
id-at-stateOrProvinceName=DA
id-at-localityName=Ieiaegim
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id-at-organizationName=Vuropti Mika Aguaugaf Inc.
id-at-commonName=qchzpkuwhuh.org
Certificate issuer data for HTTPS traffic to 75.99.168[.]194:
id-at-countryName=AU
id-at-stateOrProvinceName=WD
id-at-localityName=Ntp
id-at-organizationName=Venyec Giteg Xgsw Inc.
id-at-commonName=onuwbkiz.us
Certificate issuer data for HTTPS traffic to 37.252.0[.]102:
id-at-countryName=US
id-at-stateOrProvinceName=CA
id-at-localityName=Los Angeles
id-at-organizationName=vipsauna[.]com
id-at-commonName=vipsauna[.]com
Final words
A packet capture (pcap) of the infection traffic and the associated malware samples are available here.  The pcap is
from an Active Directory (AD) environment.  The pcap been sanitized to disguise usernames, hostnames,
domains, internal IP addresses, the public IP address used to connect from my test lab to the Internet, and any
other information that could identify the environment.
---
Brad Duncan
brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net
Source: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28568
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/28568
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