# Update: Destructive Malware Targeting Organizations in Ukraine

**cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a**

## Summary

**Actions to Take Today:**

- Set antivirus and antimalware programs to conduct regular scans.

- Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching end users.

- Filter network traffic.

- Update software.

- Require multifactor authentication.

**(Updated April 28, 2022) This advisory has been updated to include additional Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) for WhisperGate and**
technical details for HermeticWiper, IsaacWiper, HermeticWizard, and CaddyWiper destructive malware, all of which have been deployed
against Ukraine since January 2022. Additional IOCs associated with WhisperGate are in the Appendix, and specific malware analysis
reports (MAR) are hyperlinked below.

**(end of update)**

Leading up to Russia’s [unprovoked attack against Ukraine, threat actors deployed destructive malware against organizations in Ukraine to](https://www.cisa.gov/shields-up)
destroy computer systems and render them inoperable.

On January 15, 2022, the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) disclosed that malware, known as WhisperGate, was being
[used to target organizations in Ukraine. According to Microsoft, WhisperGate is intended to be destructive and is designed to render](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/)
targeted devices inoperable.
[On February 23, 2022, several cybersecurity researchers disclosed that malware known as HermeticWiper was being used against](https://twitter.com/ESETresearch/status/1496581903205511181)
[organizations in Ukraine. According to SentinelLabs, the malware targets Windows devices, manipulating the master boot record,](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/)
which results in subsequent boot failure.

Destructive malware can present a direct threat to an organization’s daily operations, impacting the availability of critical assets and data.
Further disruptive cyberattacks against organizations in Ukraine are likely to occur and may unintentionally spill over to organizations in
other countries. Organizations should increase vigilance and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection,
and response for such an event.

This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) between the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) provides information on WhisperGate and HermeticWiper malware as well as open-source indicators of compromise
(IOCs) for organizations to detect and prevent the malware. Additionally, this joint CSA provides recommended guidance
and considerations for organizations to address as part of network architecture, security baseline, continuous monitoring, and incident
response practices.

[Download the Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Update: Destructive Malware Targeting Organizations in Ukraine (pdf, 559kb).](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA22-057A_Destructive_Malware_Targeting_Organizations_in_Ukraine.pdf)

[Click here for STIX.](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA22-057A.stix.xml)

## Technical Details

Threat actors have deployed destructive malware, including both WhisperGate and HermeticWiper, against organizations in Ukraine to
destroy computer systems and render them inoperable. Listed below are high-level summaries of campaigns employing the malware. CISA
recommends organizations review the resources listed below for more in-depth analysis and see the Mitigation section for best practices
on handling destructive malware.

On January 15, 2022, Microsoft announced the identification of a sophisticated malware operation targeting multiple organizations in
Ukraine. The malware, known as WhisperGate, has two stages that corrupts a system’s master boot record, displays a fake ransomware
note, and encrypts files based on certain file extensions. Note: although a ransomware message is displayed during the attack, Microsoft
highlighted that the targeted data is destroyed, and is not recoverable even if a ransom is paid. See Microsoft’s blog on Destructive
malware targeting Ukrainian organizations for more information and see the IOCs in table 1.

_Table 1: IOCs associated with WhisperGate_

**Name** **File Category** **File Hash** **Source**

WhisperGate stage1.exe [a196c6b8ffcb97ffb276d04f354696e2391311db3841ae16c8c9f56f36a38e92](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a196c6b8ffcb97ffb276d04f354696e2391311db3841ae16c8c9f56f36a38e92) [Microsoft MSTIC](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/)

WhisperGate stage2.exe [dcbbae5a1c61dbbbb7dcd6dc5dd1eb1169f5329958d38b58c3fd9384081c9b78](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/dcbbae5a1c61dbbbb7dcd6dc5dd1eb1169f5329958d38b58c3fd9384081c9b78) [Microsoft MSTIC](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/)


-----

**(Updated April 28, 2022) See Appendix:** _Additional IOCs associated with WhisperGate._

On February 23, 2022, cybersecurity researchers disclosed that malware known as HermeticWiper was being used against organizations
in Ukraine. According to SentinelLabs, the malware targets Windows devices, manipulating the master boot record and resulting in
subsequent boot failure. Note: according to Broadcom Software, “[HermeticWiper] has some similarities to the earlier WhisperGate wiper
attacks against Ukraine, where the wiper was disguised as ransomware.” See the following resources for more information and see the
IOCs in table 2 below.

ESET Research Tweet: Breaking. #ESETResearch discovered a new data wiper malware used in Ukraine today. ESET telemetry
shows that it was installed on hundreds of machines in the country.
[SentinelLabs: HermeticWiper | New Destructive Malware Used In Cyber Attacks on Ukraine](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/)
Broadcom Software's Symantec Threat Hunter Team: [Ukraine: Disk-wiping Attacks Precede Russian Invasion](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia)

_Table 2: IOCs associated with HermeticWiper_

**Name** **File Category** **File Hash** **Source**


Win32/KillDisk.NCV Trojan 912342F1C840A42F6B74132F8A7C4FFE7D40FB77
61B25D11392172E587D8DA3045812A66C3385451


ESET
research


HermeticWiper Win32 EXE 912342f1c840a42f6b74132f8a7c4ffe7d40fb77 [SentinelLabs](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/)

HermeticWiper Win32 EXE 61b25d11392172e587d8da3045812a66c3385451 [SentinelLabs](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/)


RCDATA_DRV_X64 mscompressed

RCDATA_DRV_X86 mscompressed

RCDATA_DRV_XP_X64 mscompressed

RCDATA_DRV_XP_X86 mscompressed


a952e288a1ead66490b3275a807f52e5 [SentinelLabs](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/)

231b3385ac17e41c5bb1b1fcb59599c4 [SentinelLabs](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/)

095a1678021b034903c85dd5acb447ad [SentinelLabs](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/)

eb845b7a16ed82bd248e395d9852f467 [SentinelLabs](https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/hermetic-wiper-ukraine-under-attack/)


Trojan.Killdisk Trojan.Killdisk 1bc44eef75779e3ca1eefb8ff5a64807dbc942b1e4a2672d77b9f6928d292591 Symantec
[Threat](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia)
Hunter Team

Trojan.Killdisk Trojan.Killdisk 0385eeab00e946a302b24a91dea4187c1210597b8e17cd9e2230450f5ece21da Symantec
[Threat](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia)
Hunter Team

Trojan.Killdisk Trojan.Killdisk a64c3e0522fad787b95bfb6a30c3aed1b5786e69e88e023c062ec7e5cebf4d3e Symantec
[Threat](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia)
Hunter Team

Ransomware Trojan.Killdisk 4dc13bb83a16d4ff9865a51b3e4d24112327c526c1392e14d56f20d6f4eaf382 Symantec
[Threat](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ukraine-wiper-malware-russia)
Hunter Team

## Mitigations

**Best Practices for Handling Destructive Malware**

As previously noted above, destructive malware can present a direct threat to an organization’s daily operations, impacting the availability
of critical assets and data. Organizations should increase vigilance and evaluate their capabilities, encompassing planning, preparation,
detection, and response, for such an event. This section is focused on the threat of malware using enterprise-scale distributed propagation
methods and provides recommended guidance and considerations for an organization to address as part of their network architecture,
security baseline, continuous monitoring, and incident response practices.

CISA and the FBI urge all organizations to implement the following recommendations to increase their cyber resilience against this threat.

**Potential Distribution Vectors**

Destructive malware may use popular communication tools to spread, including worms sent through email and instant messages, Trojan
horses dropped from websites, and virus-infected files downloaded from peer-to-peer connections. Malware seeks to exploit existing
vulnerabilities on systems for quiet and easy access.


-----

The malware has the capability to target a large scope of systems and can execute across multiple systems throughout a network. As a
result, it is important for organizations to assess their environment for atypical channels for malware delivery and/or propagation throughout
their systems. Systems to assess include:

Enterprise applications – particularly those that have the capability to directly interface with and impact multiple hosts and endpoints.
Common examples include:

Patch management systems,
Asset management systems,
Remote assistance software (typically used by the corporate help desk),
Antivirus (AV) software,
Systems assigned to system and network administrative personnel,
Centralized backup servers, and
Centralized file shares.

While not only applicable to malware, threat actors could compromise additional resources to impact the availability of critical data and
applications. Common examples include:

Centralized storage devices

Potential risk – direct access to partitions and data warehouses.
Network devices

Potential risk – capability to inject false routes within the routing table, delete specific routes from the routing table,
remove/modify, configuration attributes, or destroy firmware or system binaries—which could isolate or degrade availability of
critical network resources.

**Best Practices and Planning Strategies**

Common strategies can be followed to strengthen an organization’s resilience against destructive malware. Targeted assessment and
enforcement of best practices should be employed for enterprise components susceptible to destructive malware.

**_Communication Flow_**

Ensure proper network segmentation.
Ensure that network-based access control lists (ACLs) are configured to permit server-to-host and host-to-host connectivity via the
minimum scope of ports and protocols and that directional flows for connectivity are represented appropriately.

Communications flow paths should be fully defined, documented, and authorized.
Increase awareness of systems that can be used as a gateway to pivot (lateral movement) or directly connect to additional endpoints
throughout the enterprise.

Ensure that these systems are contained within restrictive Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs), with additional segmentation
and network access controls.
Ensure that centralized network and storage devices’ management interfaces reside on restrictive VLANs.

Layered access control, and
Device-level access control enforcement – restricting access from only pre-defined VLANs and trusted IP ranges.

**_Access Control_**

For enterprise systems that can directly interface with multiple endpoints:

Require multifactor authentication for interactive logons.
Ensure that authorized users are mapped to a specific subset of enterprise personnel.

If possible, the “Everyone,” “Domain Users,” or the “Authenticated Users” groups should not be permitted the capability to
directly access or authenticate to these systems.
Ensure that unique domain accounts are used and documented for each enterprise application service.

Context of permissions assigned to these accounts should be fully documented and configured based upon the concept of
least privilege.
Provides an enterprise with the capability to track and monitor specific actions correlating to an application’s assigned
service account.
If possible, do not grant a service account with local or interactive logon permissions.

Service accounts should be explicitly denied permissions to access network shares and critical data locations.
Accounts that are used to authenticate to centralized enterprise application servers or devices should not contain elevated
permissions on downstream systems and resources throughout the enterprise.
Continuously review centralized file share ACLs and assigned permissions.

Restrict Write/Modify/Full Control permissions when possible.

**_Monitoring_**


-----

Audit and review security logs for anomalous references to enterprise level administrative (privileged) and service accounts.

Failed logon attempts,
File share access, and
Interactive logons via a remote session.
Review network flow data for signs of anomalous activity, including:

Connections using ports that do not correlate to the standard communications flow associated with an application,
Activity correlating to port scanning or enumeration, and
Repeated connections using ports that can be used for command and control purposes.
Ensure that network devices log and audit all configuration changes.

Continually review network device configurations and rule sets to ensure that communications flows are restricted to the
authorized subset of rules.

**_File Distribution_**

When deploying patches or AV signatures throughout an enterprise, stage the distributions to include a specific grouping of systems
(staggered over a pre-defined period).

This action can minimize the overall impact in the event that an enterprise patch management or AV system is leveraged as a
distribution vector for a malicious payload.
Monitor and assess the integrity of patches and AV signatures that are distributed throughout the enterprise.

Ensure updates are received only from trusted sources,
Perform file and data integrity checks, and
Monitor and audit – as related to the data that is distributed from an enterprise application.

**_System and Application Hardening_**

Ensure robust vulnerability management and patching practices are in place.

CISA maintains [a living catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities that carry significant risk to federal agencies as well as public](https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities)
and private sectors entities. In addition to thoroughly testing and implementing vendor patches in a timely—and, if possible,
automated— manner, organizations should ensure patching of the vulnerabilities CISA includes in this catalog.
Ensure that the underlying operating system (OS) and dependencies (e.g., Internet Information Services [IIS], Apache, Structured
Query Language [SQL]) supporting an application are configured and hardened based upon industry-standard best practice
recommendations. Implement application-level security controls based on best practice guidance provided by the vendor. Common
recommendations include:

Use role-based access control,
Prevent end-user capabilities to bypass application-level security controls,

For example, do not allow users to disable AV on local workstations.
Remove, or disable unnecessary or unused features or packages, and
Implement robust application logging and auditing.

**_Recovery and Reconstitution Planning_**

A [business impact analysis (BIA) is a key component of contingency planning and preparation. The overall output of a BIA will provide an](https://www.ready.gov/business-impact-analysis)
organization with two key components (as related to critical mission/business operations):

Characterization and classification of system components, and
Interdependencies.

Based upon the identification of an organization’s mission critical assets (and their associated interdependencies), in the event that an
organization is impacted by destructive malware, recovery and reconstitution efforts should be considered.

To plan for this scenario, an organization should address the availability and accessibility for the following resources (and should include
the scope of these items within incident response exercises and scenarios):

Comprehensive inventory of all mission critical systems and applications:

Versioning information,
System/application dependencies,
System partitioning/storage configuration and connectivity, and
Asset owners/points of contact.
Contact information for all essential personnel within the organization,
Secure communications channel for recovery teams,
Contact information for external organizational-dependent resources:

Communication providers,
Vendors (hardware/software), and
Outreach partners/external stakeholders
Service contract numbers – for engaging vendor support,
Organizational procurement points of contact,


-----

Optical disc image (ISO)/image files for baseline restoration of critical systems and applications:

OS installation media,
Service packs/patches,
Firmware, and
Application software installation packages.
Licensing/activation keys for OS and dependent applications,
Enterprise network topology and architecture diagrams,
System and application documentation,
Hard copies of operational checklists and playbooks,
System and application configuration backup files,
Data backup files (full/differential),
System and application security baseline and hardening checklists/guidelines, and
System and application integrity test and acceptance checklists.

**_Incident Response_**

Victims of a destructive malware attacks should immediately focus on containment to reduce the scope of affected systems. Strategies for
containment include:

Determining a vector common to all systems experiencing anomalous behavior (or having been rendered unavailable)—from which a
malicious payload could have been delivered:

Centralized enterprise application,
Centralized file share (for which the identified systems were mapped or had access),
Privileged user account common to the identified systems,
Network segment or boundary, and
Common Domain Name System (DNS) server for name resolution.
Based upon the determination of a likely distribution vector, additional mitigation controls can be enforced to further minimize impact:

Implement network-based ACLs to deny the identified application(s) the capability to directly communicate with additional
systems,

Provides an immediate capability to isolate and sandbox specific systems or resources.
Implement null network routes for specific IP addresses (or IP ranges) from which the payload may be distributed,

An organization’s internal DNS can also be leveraged for this task, as a null pointer record could be added within a DNS
zone for an identified server or application.
Readily disable access for suspected user or service account(s),
For suspect file shares (which may be hosting the infection vector), remove access or disable the share path from being
accessed by additional systems, and
Be prepared to, if necessary, reset all passwords and tickets within directories (e.g., changing golden/silver tickets).

As related to incident response and incident handling, organizations are encouraged to report incidents to the FBI and CISA (see the
Contact section below) and to preserve forensic data for use in internal investigation of the incident or for possible law enforcement
[purposes. See Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for more information.](https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-245a)

## Contact Information

[All organizations should report incidents and anomalous activity to CISA 24/7 Operations Center at central@cisa.dhs.gov or (888) 282-](http://10.10.0.46/mailto:central@cisa.dhs.gov)
0870 and/or to the FBI via your [local FBI field office or the FBI’s 24/7 CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or CyWatch@fbi.gov.](https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices)

## Resources

Joint CSA: [Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure](https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-011a)
Joint CSA: NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce Exposure Across Operational Technologies and Control
Systems
Joint CSA: [Ongoing Cyber Threats to U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems](https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-287a)
CISA and MS-ISAC: [Joint Ransomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_MS-ISAC_Ransomware%20Guide_S508C.pdf)
[CISA webpage: Russia Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories](https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/russia)
NIST: [Data Integrity: Detecting and Responding to Ransomware and Other Destructive Events](https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/data-integrity/detect-respond)
NIST: [Data Integrity: Recovering from Ransomware and Other Destructive Events](https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/data-integrity/recover)
CISA [Cyber hygiene services: CISA offers a range of no-cost services to help critical infrastructure organizations assess, identify and](https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services)
reduce their exposure to threats, including ransomware. By requesting and leveraging these services, organizations of any size could
find ways to reduce their risk and mitigate attack vectors.

**Updated April 28, 2022:**

## Appendix: Additional IOCS Associated with WhisperGate


-----

The hashes in Table 3 contain malicious binaries, droppers, and macros linked to WhisperGate cyber actors activity. The binaries are
predominantly `.Net and are obfuscated. Obfuscation varies; some of the binaries contain multiple layers of obfuscation. Analysis`
identified multiple uses of string reversal, character replacement, base64 encoding, and packing. Additionally, the malicious binaries
contain multiple defenses including VM checks, sandbox detection and evasion, and anti-debugging techniques. Finally, the sleep
command was used in varying lengths via PowerShell to obfuscate execution on a victim’s network.
All Microsoft `.doc files contain a malicious macro that is base64 encoded. Upon enabling the macro, a PowerShell script runs a sleep`
command and then downloads a file from an external site. The script connects to the external website via HTTP to download an
executable. Upon download, the executable is saved to `C:\Users\Public\Documents\ filepath on the victim host.`
An identified zip file was found to contain the Microsoft Word file macro_t1smud.doc. Once the macro is enabled, a bash script runs a
sleep command and the script connects to `htxxps://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w32/putty.exe . This binary is likely`
the legitimate Putty Secure Shell binary. Upon download the file is saved to `C:\Users\Public\Documents\ file path.`

**Profile of Malicious Hashes**

**Saintbot (and related .Net loaders)**
**WhisperGate Malware and related VB files**
**Quasar RAT**
**.NET Infostealer malware**
**Telegram Bot**
**Multiple Loaders (mostly utilizing PowerShell that pull down a jpg or bin files)**
**Jpg/PNG files = obfuscated executables**
**antidef.bat = likely a bat file to disable Windows Defender**

_Table 3: Additional IOCs associated with WhisperGate_

**Hash** **Associated Files**

647ebdca2ef6b74b17bb126df19bf0ed88341650 loader2132.exe

24f71409bde9d01e3519236e66f3452236302e46 saint.exe

1e3497ac435936be06ba665a4acd06b850cf56b4 loader.exe

981319f00b654d0142430082f2e636ef69a377d9 Yudjcfoyg.exe

e0dbe49c9398a954095ee68186f391c288b9fcc5 Project_1.exe

0ba64c284dc0e13bc3f7adfee084ed25844da3d2 Hjtiyz.jpg

6b8eab6713abb7c1c51701f12f23cdff2ff3a243 Ltfckzl.jpg

3bbb84206f0c81f7fd57148f913db448a8172e92 Vgdnggv.jpg

7c77b1c72a2228936e4989de2dfab95bfbbbc737 Pfiegomql.jpg

c0cd6f8567df73e9851dbca4f7c4fbfe4813a2e1 Fezpwij.jpg

d6830184a413628db9946faaae8b08099c0593a0 Bqpptgcal.jpg

d083da96134924273a7cbc8b6c51c1e92de4f9e1 loader.jpg

d599f16e60a916f38f201f1a4e6d73cb92822502 Debythht.jpg

9b9374a5e376492184a368fcc6723a7012132eae Dmhdgocsp.jpg

86bd95db7b514ea0185dba7876fa612fae42b715 Zysyrokzk.jpg


-----

e7917df9feabfedae47d8b905136d52cb5cb7f37 Baeipiyd.jpg

b2d863fc444b99c479859ad7f012b840f896172e Tbopbh.jpg

d85e1614cf4a1e9ec632580b62b0ecb5f8664352 Lxkdjr.jpg

08f0b0d66d370151fd8a265b1f9be8be61cc1aa9 Twojt.bin

5ac592332a406d5b2dcfc81b131d261da7e791d2 Rvlxi.bin

052825569c880212e1e39898d387ef50238aaf35 Yarfe.bin

4c2a0f44b176ba83347062df1d56919a25445568 Ftvqpq.bin

d51214461fc694a218a01591c72fe89af0353bc1 Pkbsu.bin

1125b2c3c91491aa71e0536bb9a8a1b86ff8f641 Pkcxiu.bin

37f54f121bcae65b4b3dd680694a11c5a5dfc406 loader.bin

4facd9a973505bb00eb1fd9687cbab906742df73 loader.bin

376a2339cbbb94d33f82dea2ea78bb011485e0d9 Qmpnrffn.bin

b6793fc62b27ee3cce24e9e63e3108a777f71904 Vpzhote.bin

1fc463b2f53ba0889c90cc2b7866afae45a511de Yymmdbfrb.bin

ff71f9defc2dd27b488d961ce0fbc6ece56b2962 Zlhmmwutx.bin

13ca079770f6f9bdddfea5f9d829889dc1fbc4ed Xhlnfjeqy.bin

c99c982d1515ade3da81268e79f5e5f7d550aabd Gpfsqm.png

d6ffa42548ff12703e38c5db6c9c39c34fe3d82a Ktlbo.png

bd5116865bcf066758f817ba9385cc7d001ecad9 Vgdnggv.png

034c0d73b21cf17c25c086d19a6ef3bb8a06bab7 Rsscffiiu.png

69e4efc8000a473d2b2c0067f317b22664453205 loader.png

424f7a756f72f1da9012859bf86ad7651bafa937 Wmztvc.png

6c64e1f2ba11ecff5e899f880d14da42acf3f699 Ygxdlt.png

fa8a373e837d7be2fce0bfe073a6fdeaefc56ca1 Fewbfaklk.png

0eccc0aa674fd9fc27023c70067e630fd5d21cd6 www.google.png

6e11c3e119499f11b83787cc4bb5f2751bd90219 Nxoaa.com

8a93bfd9e70611547a420971662d113b6b3c6234 Lxkdjr.com


-----

b19d5f0d8696271aff5af616b91a4cdc73981934 www.google.com

b5e3e65cd6b09b17d4819a1379dde7db3e33813b Cpdfx.jpeg

d92e315f3c290a7e71950480f074af5b59e8bd3d Mtubbb.jpeg

fb83899dc633c59a8473a3048c9aacce7e1bf8d8 Kzwolw.jpeg

5fbd9bd73040d7a2cac0fc21d2fe29ebe57fb597 Fczdcmep.jpeg

90fa56e79765d27d35706d028d32dc5be7efb623 Jdeiipc.jpeg

cd8ef5a2543a2535416655f861c574c63e9008ea 5415.jpeg

72a45d6bfde93eb92a7b7a1ea284f35e1d24203a 000.jpeg

d2a697fc1b61888c49a48ce094e400b62a71201d Ofewufeiy.exe

bddb6994656659d098d6040dc895e90877fb1266 load.exe

00d6c66ab2fd1810628d13980cc73275884933b1 loader.exe

12f50a97955497c49f9603ea2531384e430f0df5 loader.exe

27c176bbd3e254d5e46ccb865d29c8c166ba4a9f Wdlord.bin

88c76d31b046227d82f94db87697b25e482eb398 Ofewufeiy.bin

2e113050a81bbd0774db7e86fad4abd44e5b6ec2 Bdfjvu.bin

db370ee79d9b4bd44e07f425d7b06beffc8bdded Jdnpanki.bin

88e5bf24bd0f01778217c4fcdb37b76929c2d32b downloader.bin

f6acdc16c695c3c219116aea3d585efedcafdab5 up74987340.bin

c3181fd7cb463893fc73974acc0016605d90ef6c Tdivhgry.png

731dab83ef1d02203db64fbefbe59f3791db1e21 Mbowytboz.png

50566fdea2f4b8a3466427f9c6798dabe2587823 Tlmbluje.png

5dbd68dd3bab6f3a06e303d68bb23e37994084eb loader.png

ac618c4ece55eca2b067bedd2ce963b8ada30b40 antidef.bat

a0074dbb3316eb570c08219609921a33052d7356 antidef.bat

c4f8d6354ef3ee4e437aa7312df0121446d3a71f antidef.bat

d9c2ce9c53f10cd12844a98270b4559e9fbfde44 antidef.bat

87a36b87bade46d0b0614b104152db7814808b21 antidef.bat


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59b03cfb7f2d672f66eb6d027244cb1d9f39f30a 16.09.2021.pdf.js

4ac3c035909101ebddcb78573723d4d48b293a6e loader_exe_64_97975_1.exe

f990e9c85cd196f9380930e951fbc2085fdf76b7 api_signed_3.exe

e8623063485c61d7411fab8f72cfdbab08f29131 api_crypted_2.exe

e0770b79e372f2cab86ae2ec33b5160708059eee payload.exe

2ee451947da9efdee0e9f39c9623f388297db6b4 test2.exe

21312d.exe

c681f91c80673deff9f6efa61060f597fc0c1cd0 payload.exe

d8d875f31c4d7c40cfd6483d6b250943d4f5e437 api177_crypted.exe

f24c3237a1612888c8b5526e557a963f3b73e984 api177_signed.exe

76152dc6243ae29d8315f24f6e9449d620f672cd Fearsomely.exe

d08d894023b16b8374466e6e9ede97f56f7cd4c7 firstgoon.exe

f7ab3996edf81551fdd867fdd28a616491445c38 test4.exe

31ef83a2032cdcc2412991a8fbfe75ed1eed11e8 documents.exe


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d08d894023b16b8374466e6e9ede97f56f7cd4c7 firstgoon1.exe

8b9e47457a645d41b98ba07249e8cc3406831cb5 7.exe

f9b6fff55fef34fc49432c8338eb3e9c0c44286e Matrix_MAX.exe

b91ede2fa35ea3d4031fb51c32bc8211ab5f1e75 crypted.exe

d665b0cfd313d8a72586b0515b92496dd7dc4bb0 crypted_2.exe

4a434c738e402242ecca92182312f04ce336ff86 work.exe

3e50a761cd4bbd9eeaf8f6b9629f9ce871d6f2dd SLP.exe

6c216522d2a1211399fb08567fcdec1d341340e3 Downloader.exe

6d11b5e4fce9c580b06298ca3dd4a6134fe4b520 Xhlnfjeqy.exe

3ac2d185c28548d43ea47b8fa3795b4308a4c39d Jdnpanki.exe

e0770b79e372f2cab86ae2ec33b5160708059eee payload.vbs

payload_2.vbs

98ab3ae46358a66c480810d1e4f24ef730e4dc7e 1.rar

## Revisions

February 26, 2022: Initial Revision

March 1, 2022: Added STIX version.

April 28, 2022: Updated IOCs.

[This product is provided subject to this Notification and this](https://www.cisa.gov/privacy/notification) [Privacy & Use policy.](https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy)

**Please share your thoughts.**

[We recently updated our anonymous product survey; we'd welcome your feedback.](https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa22-057a)


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