

## investigations/2021-02-24\_vietnam at master ·

# AmnestyTech/investigations

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## Overview of Ocean Lotus Samples used to target Vietnamese Human Rights Defenders

From May to November 2020, we have identified malware attacks targeting Human Rights Defenders and organizations from Viet Nam. This technical blog post provides an overview of the different Ocean Lotus samples identified, technical indicators, and details on the link with earlier Ocean Lotus activities. For more information on the context of these attacks and the targets we identified, please read the report entitled [“Click and Bait: Vietnamese Human Rights Defenders Targeted with Spyware Attacks”](#) on the Amnesty website (also available in Vietnamese).

We found 9 different malware samples in this investigation: 4 for Mac OS, and 5 for Microsoft Windows.

### Mac OS Malware

#### First appearance in 2018

The first Mac OS sample we identified targeted Bui Thanh Hieu in February 2018. Attackers delivered a malicious Mac OS application named “PHIẾU GHI DANH THAM DỰ TỈNH HỘI HMDC 2018” attached to an email. This sample belongs to the same family as the Ocean Lotus samples analysed by [Trend Micro in 2018](#), and they even share the same string encryption algorithm and key.

The malicious application uses a first stage dropper to bypass Apple GateKeeper, then it installs the final payload either in `/Library/CoreMediaIO/Plug-Ins/FCP-DAL/iOSScreenCapture.plugin/Contents/Resources/screenassistantd`, if it is launched with root access, otherwise in `~/Library/Spelling/spellagentd`. The malware gains persistence with a Property List file placed in `~/Library/LaunchAgents/`.


The final payload communicates with the same domains mentioned in the Trend Micro report:

`ssl.arkouthrie.com`, `s3.hiahornber.com` and `widget.shoreoa.com`.

#### New variants from 2019

In 2019 Bui Thanh Hieu received three more malicious emails with links to or attached malicious Mac OS applications, which are more recent variants of the same malware we described above. However, these variants seem less developed than the samples analysed by [Trend Micro in November 2020](#), making them likely intermediate versions between those discovered by Trend Micro in 2018 and in 2020.

When executed, these applications launch an installer either embedded in the package or decrypted by a dedicated Python script. The installer disables security protections by removing the `com.apple.quarantine` bit, launches the final payload and configures persistence by creating a property list in the LaunchAgent user folder, or in the `/Library/LaunchDaemons/` folder if launched as root.



The installer drops two files in the destination folder: one Mach-O binary payload and an encrypted shared Mach-O library named `[INTEGER].3gp` (such as `33.3gp` or `152.3gp`). To avoid their discovery during forensic analysis, these files' creation date and time are faked with the command `touch -t`.

The payload first gathers information on the system, including the MacOS version, the kernel version and details on the hardware and CPU. Then it tries to decrypt all the files in the folder until it finds a shared library exporting the functions `ArchaeologistCodeine` and `PlayerAberadurtheIncomprehensible`. This shared library implements the communication with one of three configured Command & Control (C&C) domains, using libcurl to send POST HTTP requests with an encrypted body.

This malware uses custom base64 and AES algorithms to obfuscate all the strings, making it harder to analyse or build signatures as the encryption keys are changing regularly. In comparison, the 2018 variant used a custom base64 but standard AES, while more recent samples analysed by Trend Micro in 2020 abandoned AES in favour of a custom byte manipulation algorithm.

This backdoor has limited purpose. It allows to manipulate files and execute commands in a terminal. For the full list of supported commands, check [Trend Micro's report](#).

## Windows Backdoors

We identified five emails in 2019 and 2020 each containing two files compressed in RAR or ISO archives. The first file is a legitimate copy of Microsoft Word 2007's executable used for DLL side-loading, while the second is a DLL named wwlib.dll loaded at launch by the Word executable it accompanies.


DLL side-loading is a technique observed [several times](#) used by Ocean Lotus, typically with a Microsoft Word executable. The final payload is always a variant of a downloader used exclusively by Ocean Lotus and [named Kerrdown](#) by the cybersecurity company Palo Alto. All the Kerrdown samples we analysed delivered a Cobalt Strike payload.

### Kerrdown analysis

Kerrdown is a dropper that uses several layers of shellcode to obfuscate the final payload. Each one of them decrypting and redirecting to the next layer, until the final payload is reached.

For instance, the first Kerrdown sample we found in May 2019 used 4 distinct stages before executing the final shellcode that downloads a payload from `api.ciscofreak.com/HjRX` (the domain was down during our investigation, but [this Cobalt Strike beacon](#) uploaded on Virus Total in 2019 communicates with this domain)

## Obfuscation of Windows Payload 1: Kerrdown




These layers of shellcode are different for each Kerrdown sample we discovered, making it challenging to build signatures for this malware family.

One of the samples which targeted the Vietnamese blogger in July 2020 introduced an additional step in the execution. The *wwwlib.dll* payload installs a binary in `C:\ProgramData\Java\UK.exe`, a self-extractable RAR archive containing a legitimate executable copy of the Opera browser, then used to sideload a malicious DLL called *opera.dll*.

This *opera.dll* is another variant of the Kerrdown family, but the file itself is exceptionally large (42MB). Expanding payloads with junk data is [a technique](#), called “binary padding”, often used by malware to avoid detection by security solutions as some do not analyse large files in depth to avoid performance issues. Binary padding is known to have been used by Ocean Lotus [in the past](#). This Kerrdown sample includes an obfuscated Cobalt Strike beacon communicating with the domain `delicalo.dnsalias.net`.

## Obfuscation of Windows Payload 3



### Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is an intrusion toolkit sold by the US company [Strategic Cyber LLC](Strategic Cyber LLC) for penetration testing or adversary simulation. Over the past years, cracked versions of Cobalt Strike have been regularly used by attack groups in their operations. [Cobalt Strike allows](#) to remotely monitor a compromised system, including accessing files but also logging keystrokes or taking screenshots.

Ocean Lotus has been known for using Cobalt Strike since [at least 2017](#). The 4 Kerndown samples we identified all either embedded or downloaded a Cobalt Strike beacon. They all used a Cobalt Strike profile impersonating Google Safe Browsing services URLs, similar to [this public profile](#).

The configuration can be easily extracted with the [scripts we released in September 2020](#). Here is an example of configuration for a beacon hosted on `delicalo.dnsalias.net` :

```
dns           False
ssl           True
port          443
.sleeptime    4100
.http-get.server.output
```

```
.jitter 12
.maxdns 245
publickey 30819f300d06092a864886f70d010101050003818d0030818902818100ac50b035fd1b294778b8cbc
.http-get.uri delicalo.dnsalias[.]net,/safebrowsing/rd/e3Iz4FnySnhy3IuXKqrWM40JnseSLDHcH-OzVVfV
.user-agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/55.0.2
.http-post.uri /safebrowsing/rd/3KHLhJGZRq4iyImdpSZ5RM90vLo3Yt2hB
.http-get.client
GAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate,PREF=ID=Cookie
.http-post.client
GAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate,NoncmvrScxBxlwoPREF=ID=Cookie
.post-ex.spawnto_x86 %windir%\syswow64\rundll32.exe
.post-ex.spawnto_x64 %windir%\sysnative\rundll32.exe
.pipename
.cryptoscheme 1
.dns_idle 0
.dns_sleep 0
.http-get.verb GET
.http-post.verb POST
shouldChunkPosts 0
.watermark 0
.stage.cleanup 0
CFGCaution 0
.proxy_type 2
killdate 0
text_section 0
process-inject-start-rwx 64
process-inject-use-rwx 64
process-inject-min_alloc 0
process-inject-transform-x86
process-inject-transform-x64
```

## Indicators of Compromise

### Mac OS samples

<b>Feb 2018</b>	
Package name	PHIẾU GHI DANH THAM DỰ TỈNH HỘI HMDC 2018
Dropper	952c16674bde3c16aa3935b3e01f3f0fb4cbac7ffa130143cbf6ccaa72733068
Payload	d3a198e18f8c5e9ed54ed4959b471a0f15fbda7d4abf92b7726bc07723e46dd5

<b>Feb 2018</b>	
C&C	ssl.arkouthrie.com widget.shoreoa.com s3.hiahornber.com
<b>June 2019</b>	
Package name	TaiLieu
Dropper	ecb6186a5e722fa360ece37191589305858a0e176321c9339831f2884dcb0405
Payload	1599fe6cc77764c17802cfde1ca77f091bb3ec2a49f6cab1c80ee667ea7c752b
Network library	b8567ce4d0595e6466414999798bcb1dfe01cc5ca1dd058bfc55f92033f0f3d8
C&C	tips.jasperpfeiffer.com land.rellecharlessper.com and art.guillermoespana.com
<b>October 2019</b>	
Package Name	Danh sach nhan su
Dropper	b252a8d2ec5c7080286fe3f0ad193062f506b5c34c4c797f97717e396c0a22d5
Payload	9c14cffd79f863fec0a6c0ed337ea82a9044db09afda53b8ac2aef1d49f74f4f
Network Library	5ed6b7b450ead2d0e69faa3069d1e0bd3a6852909092235f75087da0ca05462f
C&C	tips.jasperpfeiffer.com land.rellecharlessper.com and art.guillermoespana.com
<b>December 2019</b>	
Package Name	Don keu cuu cua gia dinh Le Nam Tra
Dropper	a890c88b6c64371242b4047830b9189b4546536c6b11576d0738f0ba1840ade
Payload	0c41358adeea24d80b35bac4b4f60d93711e32e287343cb604e1fa79b5e5e465
Network Library	5ed6b7b450ead2d0e69faa3069d1e0bd3a6852909092235f75087da0ca05462f
C&C	tips.jasperpfeiffer.com land.rellecharlessper.com and art.guillermoespana.com

## Windows Samples

<b>June 2019</b>	
Winword.exe (legitimate)	6c959cfb001fbb900958441dfd8b262fb33e052342948bab338775d3e83ef7f7

<b>June 2019</b>	
wwlib.dll	148e647885712b69258967c5f8798966fb9b8ae24847dda8aeb880cb6f56b6da
C&C	api.cisconfreak.com
<b>April 2020</b>	
Winword.exe (legitimate)	6c959cfb001fbb900958441dfd8b262fb33e052342948bab338775d3e83ef7f7
wwlib.dll	acb33adf7429424170f63fa5490ed580cf502de4a7ef00e4b8c962425cd85052
C&C	node.podzone.org
<b>July 2020</b>	
Winword.exe (legitimate)	6c959cfb001fbb900958441dfd8b262fb33e052342948bab338775d3e83ef7f7
wwlib.dll	5cc8d52fcabfd35042336e095f1f78c2b2884e7826358f5385729cf45ce4d860
Opera.exe (legitimate)	71c3b9538a0f14a8ab67e579ecc4ce2b01e25507d8c07eaf46555e8f44181e37
Opera.dll	a51fb048e5a2730bffd0fd43e3bdda4e931c9358254aff960ddf43526c768120
C&C	delicalo.dnsalias.net
<b>November 2020 (2 emails)</b>	
Winword.exe (legitimate)	6c959cfb001fbb900958441dfd8b262fb33e052342948bab338775d3e83ef7f7
wwlib.dll	a574720e7b4f420098a0ac0055089000435439eb61ec6de2077ac0f782a506e9
C&C	coco.cechire.com

You can find the full list of indicators of compromise [here](#).

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Source: [https://github.com/AmnestyTech/investigations/tree/master/2021-02-24\\_vietnam](https://github.com/AmnestyTech/investigations/tree/master/2021-02-24_vietnam)