

# Tracking Malware Infrastructure With Passive DNS and 302 Redirects

By Matthew

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In this blog, we will identify 36 Latroductus phishing domains through passive DNS analysis of a domain reported on Twitter/X.

The initial reported domain leverages 302 redirects to send users to a malicious or benign file. The URL in the 302 redirect is re-used across numerous domains; we can leverage this information to identify additional infrastructure.

In summary, we will use the following indicators to identify the additional servers

- The same resolved IP address `193.106.174[.]218`
- The same usage of 302 redirects to the same URL on `documentcloud[.]org`
- Previous usage of 302 redirects to `harvardlawreview[.]org`


The primary tooling we will be leveraging is [Validin](#).

[Validin](#)

[Validin offers cutting-edge DNS, certificate, and crawling data services to empower threat researchers and corporate security teams. Identify, track, and mitigate risks with our advanced threat intelligence solutions.](#)




[Validin](#)




## Initial Intelligence

The initial intelligence in this blog is from a tweet posted by @Unit42\_intel.

The tweet details a Latroductus infection leveraging phishing links to redirect victims to a javascript file, which ultimately loads LummaStealer Malware.



Within the original tweet, there is a screenshot of a phishing link contained in an email. This link contains the domain `lufyfeo[.]org`, which will form the basis and starting point of our analysis today.




Our goal is to analyse this domain to identify patterns or indicators that can identify additional domains and IOCs.

### Initial Notes

Based on information contained in the initial post, the `lufyfeo[.]org` domain is likely leveraging redirects to send a victim to alternate "fake" pages.

This information will form an important step in our next analysis, as we will leverage patterns in the 302 redirects to identify additional domains.

## 2024-03-07 (THURSDAY): LATRODUCTUS LEADS TO LUMMA STEALER




### Initial Analysis With Passive DNS

Our initial analysis can begin by searching the `lufyfeo[.]org` domain using a passive DNS tool such as Validin.

This will reveal detailed history about resolved IP addresses have been in use by the domain.


In the below screenshot, we can see that the most recent IP resolution was `193.106.174[.]218`

This IP address will form our first pivot point.



After determining the most recent IP address, we can also review the most recent host responses for the `lufyfeo[.]org` domain.

This reveals the presence of multiple 302 redirects, which are likely redirecting the user to the next malicious page.



The screenshot shows a security tool interface for the domain **lufyfeo.org**. At the top, there are three status indicators: 0 Low, 0 Med, and 1 High. Below this is a navigation bar with categories: Reputation, OSINT (4), Resolutions (9), Subdomains (3), DNS Records (2), Host Connections (10), **Host Responses (20)**, and CT Stream (2). The 'Host Responses (20)' category is highlighted with a red box. Below the navigation bar is a table of responses:

Response Date	Port	Host	Response	Bytes Received	Title
2024-03-28 XX:XX:XX	443	<a href="https://lufyfeo.org">lufyfeo.org</a> 193.106.174.218	<b>HTTP/1.1 302 Found</b>	0 B	
2024-03-28 XX:XX:XX	80	<a href="https://lufyfeo.org">lufyfeo.org</a> 193.106.174.218	HTTP/1.1 302 Found	0 B	

By viewing additional information about the 302 redirect, we can see that the redirect location is a PDF file hosted on **documentcloud.org**

By researching the **documentcloud.org** domain, this appears to be a legitimate site used for hosting pdf files.



The screenshot shows a window titled "HTTPS Request to 443" with the following details:

- URL: <https://lufyfeo.org:443/193.106.174.218>
- Time: 4d 5h ago (2024-03-28TXX:XX:XXZ)
- Section: **Response Banner**
- Response Content:

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: nginx/1.24.0
Date: <Redacted>
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 0
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Cache-Control: no-store
Location:
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/516591
invoice-1-13528347057540-_-pdf
```
- Section: **JARM Fingerprint**
- Fingerprint: `29d29d00029d29d21c29d29d29d29da89a92102ec88d25c11e71ac013f0c0e`

Investigating this exact PDF link on [urlscan](#). After investigating this exact PDF link on urlscan, I found that it appears to be a relatively benign PDF file.

I did not confirm 100%, but I believe that this is a non-malicious PDF returned if the user has not requested the exact URL provided in the initial email.

p. 1 Page 1 of 2

## INVOICE

**THE CW15**  
**CW15**  
 3300 North Sixth Street  
 Harrisburg, PA 17110  
 Main: (717) 238-2100  
 Billing: (717) 238-2100

Billing Address:

**Brabender Cox Mihalke**  
 Attention: Accounts Payable  
 1218 Grandview Avenue  
 Pittsburgh, PA 15211

Send Payment To:

**CW15**  
 Newport Television LLC  
 PO Box 402689  
 Atlanta, GA 30384-2689

Invoice #	Invoice Date	Invoice Month	Invoice Period
68535-1	11/11/12	November 2012	10/29/12 - 11/05/12
Station	Account Executive	Sales Office	Sales Region
WLYH	Millennium Washington DC	Millennium	National
Advertiser	Product	Estimate Number	
Barletta/R/Congress	LOU BARLETTA	471	
Flight Dates	Order #	Alt Order #	
10/29/12 - 11/05/12	68535	9852562 /Brad	
Billing Calendar	Billing Type	Deal #	
Broadcast	Cash		
Special Handling			
IDB #	Advertiser Code	Product Code	
9913021			
Agency Ref	Advertiser Ref		

Line	Start Date	End Date	Description	Start/End Time	MWTFSS	Length	Spots/Week	Rate	Type																																																																																										
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## Leveraging Redirects as Pivot Points

At this point, we have now identified the most recent IP address used by `lufyfe0[.]org`, and we have identified that the domain is leveraging 302 redirects to send the user to the next location.

Recall that the `lufyfe0[.]org` domain contains host responses with 302 redirects.

Response Date	Port	Host	Response	Bytes Received	Title
2024-03-28 XX:XX:XX	443	<a href="#">lufyfeo.org</a> 193.106.174.218	HTTP/1.1 302 Found	0 B	
2024-03-28 XX:XX:XX	80	<a href="#">lufyfeo.org</a> 193.106.174.218	HTTP/1.1 302 Found	0 B	
2024-03-28 XX:XX:XX	443	<a href="#">lufyfeo.org</a> 193.106.174.218	HTTP/1.1 302 Found	0 B	
2024-03-28 XX:XX:XX	80	<a href="#">lufyfeo.org</a> 193.106.174.218	HTTP/1.1 302 Found	0 B	

By expanding our search to the most recent resolved IP address for `lufyfeo[.]org`, we can expand this search to other domains hosted on the same server.

We can check this by searching for the most recent resolved IP `192.106.174[.]218` and checking the `Host Responses` tab for 302 redirects.

Response Date	Port	Host	Response	Bytes Received	Title
2024-03-26 XX:XX:XX	80	<a href="#">sokingscrossho tel.com</a> 193.106.174.218	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	0 B	
2024-03-26 XX:XX:XX	443	<a href="#">interiourbyden nis.com</a> 193.106.174.218	HTTP/1.1 302 Found	0 B	
2024-03-26 XX:XX:XX	443	<a href="#">deqytuu9.org</a> 193.106.174.218	HTTP/1.1 302 Found	0 B	
2024-03-26 XX:XX:XX	443	<a href="#">web3rse.com</a> 193.106.174.218	HTTP/1.1 302 Found	0 B	

Reviewing the redirect details for `interiourbyden[nis][.]com`, we can see that the 302 redirects to the same location.

A very similar response can be observed for `deqytuu9[.]org` and `web3rse[.]org`

## HTTPS Request to 443

```
https://interiourbydennis.com:443/  
193.106.174.218
```

6d 6h ago

2024-03-26TXX:XX:XXZ

## Response Banner

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found  
Server: nginx/1.24.0  
Date: <Redacted>  
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8  
Content-Length: 0  
Connection: keep-alive  
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16  
Cache-Control: no-store  
Location:  
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/516591  
invoice-1-13528347057540-_-pdf
```

## JARM Fingerprint

```
29d29d00029d29d21c29d29d29d29da89a92102ec8  
8d25c11e71ac013f0c0e
```

Of extremely interesting note is that the `deqytuu9[.]` domain resolves to a pdf file hosted on `harvardlawreview[.]org`

To my knowledge, this is a legitimate domain and legitimate file, but it is interesting to note that other sites hosting PDFs are being leveraged.

This will become more important later when we do additional pivoting.

## HTTPS Request to 443

[https://deqytuu9.org:443/  
193.106.174.218](https://deqytuu9.org:443/193.106.174.218)

6d 6h ago  
2024-03-26TXX:XX:XXZ

### Response Banner

```
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: nginx/1.24.0
Date: <Redacted>
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 0
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Cache-Control: no-store
Location: https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2289-2296-Online.pdf
```

### Identifying All Current Domains

At this stage, we have identified an IP address `193.106.174[.]218` that is hosting both the original malicious domain `lufyfeo[.]org` as well as numerous other domains showing similar behaviour.

In total, there are 1256 host responses for the `193.106.174[.]218` address. Our next goal will be to enumerate all of these for indications of 302 redirects to URLs containing pdf references on `harvardlawreview[.]org` or `documentcloud[.]org`


<b>Host Connections</b> (591)	<b>Host Responses</b> (1256)	<b>CT Stream (0)</b>
----------------------------------	---------------------------------	----------------------

↓

Since the number of responses was so large, I utilised the JSON export feature of Validin to obtain the complete results of the search.


This allowed me to focus on information like the 302 redirect location.

We can start this by exporting all entries in the current response.



After exporting the entries, CyberChef can be leveraged to beautify the JSON output and determine which fields are of interest.

In this case, we want only the `host` and `location` fields within the JSON.



## Enumerating JSON Output With Python

Since we only need to check the `location` and `host` fields, we can use a small Python script to enumerate all results in the JSON output for references to URLs with PDF references.




```
import json

f = open("validin_export.json", "r")
data = json.load(f)
f.close()

for entry in data:
    try:
        url = entry['location']
        if "pdf" in url:
            print(entry['host'], end=" : ")
            print(url)
    except:
        continue
```

Running this script produces many results for redirects to the same location as the known malicious domain.



```
>>>
mayanui.com : https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/516591-invoice-1-13528347057540-_pdf
quwezui.org : https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/516591-invoice-1-13528347057540-_pdf
durete.org : https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2289-2296-Online.pdf
hofaty.org : https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2289-2296-Online.pdf
qeqady.org : https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2289-2296-Online.pdf
fuwer.org : https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2289-2296-Online.pdf
defifya.org : https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/516591-invoice-1-13528347057540-_pdf
gotuqoa.org : https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/516591-invoice-1-13528347057540-_pdf
suzabyu.org : https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2289-2296-Online.pdf
web3rse.com : https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/516591-invoice-1-13528347057540-_pdf
mayanui.com : https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/516591-invoice-1-13528347057540-_pdf
quwezui.org : https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/516591-invoice-1-13528347057540-_pdf
durete.org : https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2289-2296-Online.pdf
hofaty.org : https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2289-2296-Online.pdf
qeqady.org : https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2289-2296-Online.pdf
fuwer.org : https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2289-2296-Online.pdf
defifya.org : https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/516591-invoice-1-13528347057540-_pdf
gotuqoa.org : https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/516591-invoice-1-13528347057540-_pdf
```

After deduplicating the results, we are left with 36 domains hosted on the same IP address and redirecting to the same `documentcloud[.]org` file, or the additional `harvardlawreview[.]org` file.

The complete list of these domains can be found below.

```
mayanui[.]com
quwezui[.]org
durete[.]org
hofaty[.]org
qeqady[.]org
fuwer[.]org
defifya[.]org
gotuqoa[.]org
suzabyu[.]org
web3rse[.]com
interiourbydennis[.]com
```

```
sytukoe8[.]org  
lufyfeo[.]org  
boldenslawncare[.]com  
qyjifia[.]org  
vajosoo[.]org  
sabehey[.]org  
nevuj0[.]org  
lyzupoy[.]org  
mypusau[.]org  
zuwagie6[.]org  
marypopkinz[.]com  
simanay[.]org  
cabobao3[.]org  
ticava[.]org  
zefos[.]org  
fazadoe[.]org  
luhuhu[.]org  
cuxu[.]org  
pubonao[.]org  
xacygo[.]org  
deqytuu9[.]org  
gejyg[.]org  
pucak[.]org  
intellipowerinc[.]com  
gejyg[.]org
```

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Source: <https://embeerresearch.io/phishing-domain-analysis-with-passive-dns-latroductus/>