# MAR-10135536-21 – North Korean Tunneling Tool: ELECTRICFISH **us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-129A** ## Notification This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of an regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise This document is marked TLP:WHITE--Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeab misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may b without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp. ## Summary Description This Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts between DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S partners, DHS and FBI identified a malware variant used by the North Korean government. This malware has been identified as ELECTRICFISH. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA ac https://www.us-cert.gov/hiddencobra. DHS and FBI are distributing this MAR to enable network defense and reduce exposure to North Korean government malicious cyber activity. This MAR includes malware descriptions related to HIDDEN COBRA, suggested response actions and recommended mitigation techniques. Use administrators should flag activity associated with the malware and report the activity to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CIS Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give the activity the highest priority for enhanced mitigation. This report provides analysis of one malicious 32-bit Windows executable file. The malware implements a custom protocol that allows traffic to be between a source and a destination Internet Protocol (IP) address. The malware continuously attempts to reach out to the source and the designa which allows either side to initiate a tunneling session. The malware can be configured with a proxy server/port and proxy username and passwor allows connectivity to a system sitting inside of a proxy server, which allows the actor to bypass the compromised system’s required authentication outside of the network. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: [MAR-10135536-21.stix](https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MAR-10135536-21.stix.xml) Submitted Files (1) a1260fd3e9221d1bc5b9ece6e7a5a98669c79e124453f2ac58625085759ed3bb (a1260fd3e9221d1bc5b9ece6e7a5a9...) ## Findings **a1260fd3e9221d1bc5b9ece6e7a5a98669c79e124453f2ac58625085759ed3bb** Details **Name** a1260fd3e9221d1bc5b9ece6e7a5a98669c79e124453f2ac58625085759ed3bb **Size** 1422336 bytes **Type** PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows **MD5** 8d9123cd2648020292b5c35edc9ae22e **SHA1** 0939363ff55d914e92635e5f693099fb28047602 **SHA256** a1260fd3e9221d1bc5b9ece6e7a5a98669c79e124453f2ac58625085759ed3bb **SHA512** 646697e3d5146e05a221183f6c9f00f5eb38400ef9a2f83bfd0fcf2f8af1a7efff99c0a3486740c745ce6cf0939c4f0678cb818cbbff8ed2b28a **ssdeep** 24576:HsO8RKL6OLnWZGFbHq0aMow5Q3gkD/74tU3hYPgP5IyrMsEOhVRpxHkADUHEPbzJ:0KjKHMbO3pkoBIyIstVRpxHL1bF **Entropy** 6.703195 Antivirus **BitDefender** Gen:Variant.Ursu.349885Unclassified **Emsisoft** Gen:Variant.Ursu.349885 (B) Yara Rules No matches found. ssdeep Matches No matches found. PE Metadata ----- **Compile Date** 2018-09-29 11:55:36-04:00 **Import Hash** 3549cfa19e60aa9239f79d80e19279fa PE Sections **MD5** **Name** **Raw Size** **Entropy** 08bb17d8e839e7fc92426e813a696e73 header 1024 2.590786 6c3daca3c522ab98a8ac12a45087297c .text 983040 6.595856 3d3d7962d16652002018640a3fa27d44 .rdata 340480 6.187858 b7f382ea7e6c9c8e737cb92551341e64 .data 37888 4.714377 871fb8486e5ea3307ff7b65ddf46518a .rsrc 512 5.112624 382715f8e776a544bf70f843a52e3ff2 .reloc 59392 6.015022 Packers/Compilers/Cryptors Microsoft Visual C++ ?.? Process List **Process** **PID** **PPID** lsass.exe 488 (384) a1260fd3e9221d1bc5b9ece6e7a5a98669c79e124453f2ac58625085759ed3bb.exe 3052 (3024) Description This file is a malicious Windows 32-bit executable. The application is a command-line utility and its primary purpose is to tunnel traffic between tw The application accepts command-line arguments allowing it to be configured with a destination IP address and port, a source IP address and por address and port, and a user name and password, which can be utilized to authenticate with a proxy server. It will attempt to establish TCP sessio source IP address and the destination IP address. If a connection is made to both the source and destination IPs, this malicious utility will impleme protocol, which will allow traffic to rapidly and efficiently be tunneled between two machines. If necessary, the malware can authenticate with a pro reach the destination IP address. A configured proxy server is not required for this utility. --Begin Example Usage-Source IP/Port: 192.0.2.1:92 Dest IP/Port: 198.51.100.1:92 Proxy IP/Port: 203.0.113.1:92 Proxy User Name: test Proxy Password: testpw a12.exe -s 192.0.2.1:92 -d 198.51.100.1:92 -p 203.0.113.1:92 -u test -pw testpw --End Example Usage- After the malware authenticates with the configured proxy, it will immediately attempt to establish a session with the destination IP address, locate target network and the source IP address. The header of the initial authentication packet, sent to both the source and destination systems, will be two random bytes. Everything within this 34-byte header is static except for the bytes 0X2B6E, which will change during each connection attempt. below (and displayed in Figure 7) is the packet header. --Begin Authentication Packet Sent to Destination System-6161616162626262636363636464646400000000000000002B6E0000040000009210 --End Authentication Packet Sent to Destination System-Screenshots ----- **Figure 1 - Screenshot of the malware authenticating with the proxy server configured at command prompt.** **Figure 2 - Screenshot of the malware building the authentication packet that will be sent to the destination system. It must begin with the static va** to be accepted by the utility. ----- **Figure 3 - Screenshot of the malware evaluating a received authentication packet.** **Figure 4 - Screenshot of the malware system authentication packet to the source/destination system.** **Figure 5 - Screenshot of the authentication packet sent to the source/destination system during analysis. The malware will attempt to tunnel traffic** source and destination systems specified in the command prompt. ----- **Figure 6 - Screenshot of the malware generating two-bytes of random data which will be included in the authentication packet sent to the source/** systems. **Figure 7 - Screenshot of the authentication packet sent to "source" system with lab environment. Malware will attempt to tunnel traffic between th** destination systems specified at command prompt. ## Recommendations CISA recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organizatio Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts. Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines. Keep operating system patches up-to-date. Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication. Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unl Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes. Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known. Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests. Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers. Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content. Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.). Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing. Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs). Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Specia 800-83, "Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops". ## Contact Information CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by answering a very short series of questions about this product at t URL: [https://us-cert.gov/forms/feedback/](https://www.us-cert.gov/forms/feedback/) ## Document FAQ **What is a MIFR? A Malware Initial Findings Report (MIFR) is intended to provide organizations with malware analysis in a timely manner. In most** report will provide initial indicators for computer and network defense. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information level of desired analysis. ----- y p ( ) p g y q engineering. To request additional analysis, please contact CISA and provide information regarding the level of desired analysis. **Can I edit this document? This document is not to be edited in any way by recipients. All comments or questions related to this document should** [the CISA at 1-888-282-0870 or soc@us-cert.gov.](http://10.10.0.46/mailto:soc@us-cert.gov) **Can I submit malware to CISA? Malware samples can be submitted via three methods:** Web: [https://malware.us-cert.gov](https://malware.us-cert.gov/) E-Mail: [submit@malware.us-cert.gov](http://10.10.0.46/mailto:submit@malware.us-cert.gov) FTP: ftp.malware.us-cert.gov (anonymous) CISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and ph [scams. Reporting forms can be found on CISA's homepage at www.us-cert.gov.](https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-129A) ## Revisions May 9, 2019: Initial version May 14, 2019: Updated IOCs [This product is provided subject to this Notification and this](https://www.us-cert.gov/privacy/notification) [Privacy & Use policy.](https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy) **Please share your thoughts.** [We recently updated our anonymous product survey; we'd welcome your feedback.](https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-129A) -----