

Threat Group-3390, Earth Smilodon, TG-3390, Emissary Panda, BRONZE UNION, APT27, Iron Tiger, LuckyMouse, Linen Typhoon, Group G0027

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Enterprise [T1548 .002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control](#)

A [Threat Group-3390](#) tool can use a public UAC bypass method to elevate privileges.^[6]

Enterprise [T1087 .001 Account Discovery: Local Account](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used `net user` to conduct internal discovery of systems.^[2]

Enterprise [T1583 .001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has registered domains for C2.^[11]

Enterprise [T1071 .001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) malware has used HTTP for C2.^[3]

Enterprise [T1560 .002 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used RAR to compress, encrypt, and password-protect files prior to exfiltration.^[2]

Enterprise [T1119 Automated Collection](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user's directories.^[2]

Enterprise [T1547 .001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#)'s malware can add a Registry key to `Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` for persistence.^{[6][11]}

Enterprise [T1059 .001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used PowerShell for execution.^{[2][4]}

[.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used command-line interfaces for execution.^{[2][9]}

Enterprise [T1543 .003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#)'s malware can create a new service, sometimes naming it after the config information, to gain persistence.^{[6][11]}

Enterprise [T1555 .005 Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) obtained a KeePass database from a compromised host.^[4]

Enterprise [T1005 Data from Local System](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user's directories.^[2]

Enterprise [T1074 .001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has locally staged encrypted archives for later exfiltration efforts.^[2]

[.002 Data Staged: Remote Data Staging](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has moved staged encrypted archives to Internet-facing servers that had previously been compromised with [China Chopper](#) prior to exfiltration.^[2]

Enterprise [T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) actors have split RAR files for exfiltration into parts.^[1]

Enterprise [T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](#)

During execution, [Threat Group-3390](#) malware deobfuscates and decompresses code that was encoded with Metasploit's shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as compressed with LZNT1 compression.^[3]

Enterprise [T1189 Drive-by Compromise](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has extensively used strategic web compromises to target victims.^{[1][3]}

Enterprise [T1567 .002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has exfiltrated stolen data to Dropbox.^[4]

Enterprise [T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has exploited the Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2019-0604 and CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in Exchange Server.^[5]

Enterprise [T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has exploited CVE-2018-0798 in Equation Editor.^[5]

Enterprise [T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used CVE-2014-6324 and CVE-2017-0213 to escalate privileges. ^{[2][12]}

Enterprise [T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has exploited MS17-010 to move laterally to other systems on the network. ^[9]

Enterprise [T1133 External Remote Services](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) actors look for and use VPN profiles during an operation to access the network using external VPN services. ^[1] [Threat Group-3390](#) has also obtained OWA account credentials during intrusions that it subsequently used to attempt to regain access when evicted from a victim network. ^[2]

Enterprise [T1574 .001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has performed DLL search order hijacking to execute their payload. ^[6] [Threat Group-3390](#) has also used DLL side-loading, including by using legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants as well as `rc.exe`, a legitimate Microsoft Resource Compiler. ^{[1][2][3][9][11]}

Enterprise [T1562 .002 Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used `appcmd.exe` to disable logging on a victim server. ^[2]

Enterprise [T1070 .004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has deleted existing logs and exfiltrated file archives from a victim. ^{[2][4]}

[.005 Indicator Removal: Network Share Connection Removal](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has detached network shares after exfiltrating files, likely to evade detection. ^[2]

Enterprise [T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has downloaded additional malware and tools, including through the use of `certutil`, onto a compromised host. ^{[1][4]}

Enterprise [T1056 .001 Input Capture: Keylogging](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) actors installed a credential logger on Microsoft Exchange servers. [Threat Group-3390](#) also leveraged the reconnaissance framework, ScanBox, to capture keystrokes. ^{[1][7][3]}

Enterprise [T1112 Modify Registry](#)

A [Threat Group-3390](#) tool has created new Registry keys under `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\` and `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services`. ^{[6][5]}

Enterprise [T1046 Network Service Discovery](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) actors use the Hunter tool to conduct network service discovery for vulnerable systems. ^{[1][9]}

Enterprise [T1027 .002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has packed malware and tools, including using VMProtect. ^{[4][5]}

[.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File](#)

A [Threat Group-3390](#) tool can encrypt payloads using XOR. [Threat Group-3390](#) malware is also obfuscated using Metasploit's shikata_ga_nai encoder. ^{[6][3][9]}

[.015 Obfuscated Files or Information: Compression](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) malware is compressed with LZNT1 compression. ^{[6][3][9]}

Enterprise [T1588 .002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has obtained and used tools such as [Impacket](#), [pwdump](#), [Mimikatz](#), [gsecdump](#), [NBTscan](#), and [Windows Credential Editor](#). ^{[9][1]}

[.003 Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has obtained stolen valid certificates, including from VMProtect and the Chinese instant messaging application Youdu, for their operations. ^[11]

Enterprise [T1003 .001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) actors have used a modified version of [Mimikatz](#) called Wrapikatz to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers. ^{[1][2]}

[.002 OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) actors have used [gsecdump](#) to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers. ^{[1][2]}

[.004 OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) actors have used [gsecdump](#) to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers. ^{[1][2]}

Enterprise [T1566 .001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used e-mail to deliver malicious attachments to victims. ^[4]

Enterprise [T1055 .012 Process Injection: Process Hollowing](#)

A [Threat Group-3390](#) tool can spawn `svchost.exe` and inject the payload into that process. ^{[6][3]}

Enterprise [T1012 Query Registry](#)

A [Threat Group-3390](#) tool can read and decrypt stored Registry values. ^[6]

Enterprise [T1021 .006 Remote Services: Windows Remote Management](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used WinRM to enable remote execution.^[2]

Enterprise [T1018 Remote System Discovery](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used the `net view` command.^[6]

Enterprise [T1053 .002 Scheduled Task/Job: At](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) actors use `at` to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install [HTTPBrowser](#) or [PlugX](#) on other victims on a network.^[1]

Enterprise [T1505 .003 Server Software Component: Web Shell](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used a variety of Web shells.^[9]

Enterprise [T1608 .001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.^[4]

[.002 Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has staged tools, including [gsecdump](#) and WCE, on previously compromised websites.^[1]

[.004 Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has embedded malicious code into websites to screen a potential victim's IP address and then exploit their browser if they are of interest.^[8]

Enterprise [T1195 .002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has compromised the Able Desktop installer to gain access to victim's environments.^[5]

Enterprise [T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) actors use [NBTscan](#) to discover vulnerable systems.^[1]

Enterprise [T1049 System Network Connections Discovery](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used `net use` and `netstat` to conduct internal discovery of systems. The group has also used `quser.exe` to identify existing RDP sessions on a victim.^[2]

Enterprise [T1033 System Owner/User Discovery](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has used `whoami` to collect system user information.^[4]

Enterprise [T1199 Trusted Relationship](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has compromised third party service providers to gain access to victim's environments. ^[12]

Enterprise [T1204 .002 User Execution: Malicious File](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) has lured victims into opening malicious files containing malware. ^[4]

Enterprise [T1078 Valid Accounts](#)

[Threat Group-3390](#) actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks. ^[1]

Enterprise [T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation](#)

A [Threat Group-3390](#) tool can use WMI to execute a binary. ^[6]

Source: <https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027/>