{
	"id": "80322cda-efcd-40c5-9ffa-03ae388f4864",
	"created_at": "2026-04-06T00:21:34.53618Z",
	"updated_at": "2026-04-10T03:35:47.194594Z",
	"deleted_at": null,
	"sha1_hash": "01a556055ea0ac25ae1a4c125f11bf2f8380aba3",
	"title": "New Espionage Campaign Targets South East Asia",
	"llm_title": "",
	"authors": "",
	"file_creation_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_modification_date": "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z",
	"file_size": 45135,
	"plain_text": "New Espionage Campaign Targets South East Asia\r\nBy About the Author\r\nArchived: 2026-04-05 15:33:17 UTC\r\nAn espionage campaign using a previously undocumented toolset has targeted a range of organizations in South\r\nEast Asia. Among the identified targets are organizations in the defense, healthcare, and information and\r\ncommunications technology (ICT) sectors. The campaign appears to have begun in September 2020 and ran at\r\nleast until May 2021.\r\nThe toolset used by the attackers includes loaders, a modular backdoor, a keylogger, and an exfiltration tool\r\ndesigned to abuse cloud storage service Dropbox. \r\nAttacker toolbox\r\nThe initial infection vector employed by the attackers remains unknown. The earliest sign of attempted\r\ncompromise is a loader that decrypts and loads a payload from a .dat file. At least two different file names have\r\nbeen observed for the .dat file: sdc-integrity.dat and scs-integrity.dat. The loader also calls the DumpAnalyze\r\nexport from the decrypted payload.\r\nThe payload has yet to be identified but is almost certainly a modular backdoor. This can be inferred from one of\r\nthe modules identified. This \"Orchestrator\" module points to the existence of a separate DLL module that exposes\r\nat least 16 functions, as well as the existence of a custom binary command and control (C\u0026C) protocol used by\r\nOrchestrator but implemented separately.\r\nThis module appears to be a core component of the backdoor. It runs as a Windows service and a large part of its\r\nfunctionality is implemented in a separate DLL that is loaded from registry (located in\r\nHKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.z\\OpenWithProgidsEx\\\u003cvalue_name_resolved_at_runtime\u003e).\r\nThe module is expected to export the following functions:\r\nConstruct\r\nConnectHost1\r\nForceCloseSocket\r\nAccept\r\nRecv\r\nRecvEx\r\nSend\r\nSendEx\r\nBindShell\r\nTransmitData_htran\r\nKillChildenProcessTree (sic)\r\nExtractIPToConnect\r\nhttps://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-campaign-south-east-asia?s=09\r\nPage 1 of 3\n\nExtractIPToConnect1\r\nGetDeviceInfoString1\r\nGetPseudoSocketInfo\r\nDecrypt_ByteToByte\r\nThe module loads a configuration either from a file\r\n(CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\Keys.dat) or from the registry\r\n(HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.z\\OpenWithProgidsEx\\CONFIG). The configuration is encrypted. The module uses\r\nthe function Decrypt_ByteToByte from the separate DLL to decrypt the configuration. The configuration is\r\nexpected to contain the following options (stored in XML format):\r\nFLAG\r\nIp\r\nDns\r\nCntPort\r\nLstPort\r\nBlog\r\nDropboxBlog\r\nSvcName\r\nSvcDisp\r\nSvcDesc\r\nSvcDll\r\nOlPass\r\nOlTime\r\nSelfDestroy\r\nThe module also uses the hardcoded mutex name, Global\\QVomit4.\r\nOther tools used in the campaign include a keylogger, which shows signs of being authored by the same\r\ndeveloper, sharing unique strings with other tools and string obfuscation techniques. The attackers also used 7zr, a\r\nlegitimate tool that is a lightweight version of the 7-Zip archiver, in addition to a data-exfiltration tool that sends\r\nstolen data to Dropbox.\r\nPossible false flags\r\nThe nature of the targets and the tools used have all the hallmarks of an espionage operation. Symantec has yet to\r\nattribute the attacks to a known actor and it appears that the attackers took some steps to complicate attribution.\r\nFor example, it is not clear what language the group speaks and samples of the backdoor module found contained\r\nstrings in what appeared to be both Cyrillic and Urdu scripts.\r\nThe only potential clue found to date is that one of the organizations attacked was also targeted by a tool used by\r\nthe China-linked Leafhopper group (aka APT30) during the same time period. However, there is no evidence as\r\nyet to tie the tool to this campaign.\r\nhttps://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-campaign-south-east-asia?s=09\r\nPage 2 of 3\n\nProtection/Mitigation\r\nFor the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.\r\nIndicators of Compromise\r\nSource: https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-campaign-south-east-asia?s=09\r\nhttps://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-campaign-south-east-asia?s=09\r\nPage 3 of 3",
	"extraction_quality": 1,
	"language": "EN",
	"sources": [
		"Malpedia"
	],
	"references": [
		"https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-campaign-south-east-asia?s=09"
	],
	"report_names": [
		"espionage-campaign-south-east-asia?s=09"
	],
	"threat_actors": [
		{
			"id": "a9ee8219-1882-4b1b-bac8-641b1603787d",
			"created_at": "2022-10-25T15:50:23.78263Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:05.351155Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "APT30",
			"aliases": [
				"APT30"
			],
			"source_name": "MITRE:APT30",
			"tools": [
				"SHIPSHAPE",
				"FLASHFLOOD",
				"NETEAGLE"
			],
			"source_id": "MITRE",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "30ed778d-15b3-484e-a90b-e1e05b36a42f",
			"created_at": "2023-01-06T13:46:38.290626Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:02.91411Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "APT30",
			"aliases": [
				"G0013"
			],
			"source_name": "MISPGALAXY:APT30",
			"tools": [],
			"source_id": "MISPGALAXY",
			"reports": null
		},
		{
			"id": "578e92ed-3eda-45ef-b4bb-b882ec3dbb62",
			"created_at": "2025-08-07T02:03:24.604463Z",
			"updated_at": "2026-04-10T02:00:03.798481Z",
			"deleted_at": null,
			"main_name": "BRONZE GENEVA",
			"aliases": [
				"APT30 ",
				"BRONZE STERLING ",
				"CTG-5326 ",
				"Naikon ",
				"Override Panda ",
				"RADIUM ",
				"Raspberry Typhoon"
			],
			"source_name": "Secureworks:BRONZE GENEVA",
			"tools": [
				"Lecna Downloader",
				"Nebulae",
				"ShadowPad"
			],
			"source_id": "Secureworks",
			"reports": null
		}
	],
	"ts_created_at": 1775434894,
	"ts_updated_at": 1775792147,
	"ts_creation_date": 0,
	"ts_modification_date": 0,
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